<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="container content-width3" style="--font-size:20px;">
<div class="header reader-header reader-show-element" dir="ltr"> <font
size="-2"><a class="domain reader-domain"
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14580">https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14580</a></font>
<h1 class="reader-title">Crisis & Critique: Norway,
Bachelet, and the Twilight of Guaido’s Insurrection</h1>
<div class="credits reader-credits">By Ociel Lopez - July 10,
2019<br>
</div>
</div>
<hr>
<div class="content">
<div class="moz-reader-content line-height4 reader-show-element"
dir="ltr">
<div id="readability-page-1" class="page">
<div>
<section>
<article>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p><em>Venezuelanalysis is proud to present
our new column dedicated to big picture
political analysis titled, “Crisis &
Critique.” Our columnist is Ociel Alí
López, a Venezuelan sociologist
specializing in popular culture and
communication. Each month, Ociel will
provide us with a structural analysis of
Venezuela’s ever fluid correlation of
forces, examining the current political
and social dynamics underpinning Chavismo,
the right-wing opposition, and US
imperialism. This week, Ociel takes a look
at the state of Guaido’s coup effort in
the wake of Bachelet’s visit and amid new
negotiations with the Maduro government. </em></p>
<p>Guaido’s uprising is going through its
terminal phrase. He does not yet appear to
have reached his end as leader, as he still
produces and consolidates an important
consensus among the opposition. What has
decisively failed is his attempt to form a
government without elections with the
backing of the hawks in Washington. In
almost six months since his <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14244">self-swearing
in</a> as “interim president,” it has
become palpable that his governing is truly
impossible. The coup de grace was delivered
by Michelle Bachelet when she visited the
National Assembly, of which he is president
and a deputy. The UN high commissioner for
human rights did not recognize him as
president of the republic, but she did
propose a roadmap for pressuring the Maduro
government, which Guaido accepted even
though it represents a deviation from
Washington’s strategy.</p>
<p>The Trump administration invested a large
part of its political and diplomatic capital
in overthrowing Maduro, especially in the
first six months of 2019. And it didn’t
achieve it. Pence, Pompeo, Bolton, and
Abrams squandered a valuable amount of time
with disastrous results. Since talks <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14495">began</a>
in Norway, the hawks have opted to <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14525">wash
their hands</a> of the matter and leave
Guaido to his own fate.</p>
<p>The fracture in the opposition deepens with
every defeat. The faction of the opposition
favored by the US government is stronger
online than it is in the streets, where it
grows weaker every day. Voluntad Popular
(VP), <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11452">Leopoldo
Lopez</a> and Juan Guaido’s minoritarian
radical party with only 14 seats in the
165-seat legislature, was chosen by the
hawks to lead a new offensive that has not
only been defeated on its own terms, but VP
has been <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14577">accused</a>
of “appeasement” by its own radical sectors
after promoting dialogue with the Maduro
government under the auspices of Norway. As
the Venezuelan popular saying goes, “they
were left without the goat and without the
leash.” That is, the much-anticipated
invasion never came and the actors that
could maneuver in the national political
sphere, namely the large opposition parties,
were displaced by those who imposed a
media-driven politics that looks to foreign
powers for solutions. And now what?</p>
<p>The anti-government march on July 5
demonstrated that the opposition now does
not even mobilize the bases of its own
parties. Looking at the social media feeds
of the most radical and mobilized opposition
currents, it’s clear that they blame Guaido
for failing in his attempt to govern and for
his inefficient endeavor to secure foreign
military intervention. Also weighing heavy
are the allegations of <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14545">corruption</a>
on the part of his team in the provision of
humanitarian aid, exposed by opposition
media outlets.</p>
<p>From January of this year, when Guaido
swore himself in, it was foreseeable that
street mobilizations would not be enough to
oust Maduro, not even those of <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14250">January
23</a>, whose widespread support was even
evident in hardcore protests in some Caracas
barrios. What was anticipated was some kind
of direct action by the US armed forces, or
those of a neighboring country, so that the
escalation of the conflict in the media
actually reached the national territory. The
climax, which took place on <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14347">February
23</a> around the attempted forced entry
of humanitarian aid, quickly petered out.
The same thing happened on April 30 with the
<a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14453">coup
attempt</a>. They were very weak movements
that drew Maduro and the armed forces closer
together – the opposite of what was sought.</p>
<p>But the decline of Guaido does not mean a
definitive victory for Chavismo. It can even
debilitate it as we will see.</p>
<h3>Bachelet’s report</h3>
<p>The three-day <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14554">visit</a>
to Venezuela by UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights and former Chilean President
Michelle Bachelet on June 19-21 and
subsequent release of her report on July 5
can be read as a change of scene in the
Venezuelan conflict.</p>
<p>During her stay, Bachelet met with
President Maduro in the presidential palace
and with Juan Guaido in the National
Assembly. This may surprise us if we
remember that since January over fifty
foreign governments have <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14303">recognized</a>
Guaido as “interim president,” although he
has not been able to exercise any functions
beyond naming “ambassadors.” Bachelet put an
end to the farce and showed things as they
really are, something which the
international community has not dared to do:
she removed the virtual throne from under
Guaido and recognized Maduro as the only
president.</p>
<p>Bachelet’s report effectively displaces the
conflict to the political arena because it
is accepted enthusiastically by the
opposition, even though the document doesn’t
repeat its mantra of the “end of the
usurpation,” and is welcomed by Maduro, who
made two important gestures: the release of
22 “political prisoners” and the rumored
proposal for Bolivarian deputies to return
to their seats in the National Assembly,
which they had abandoned since the emergence
of the National Constituent Assembly in
August 2017. In this way, Maduro opens up
the possibility of negotiation, in which the
<a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14510">Norway</a>
experience can play a pivotal role.</p>
<p>The report presents interesting options for
both parties in the conflict. For Maduro, it
legitimates his refusal to recognize
Guaido’s “interim presidency” and it
sidelines Washington in the dispute for
hegemony over the Venezuela question. For
the opposition, which suffered another
defeat and internal division following
Bachelet’s <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14554">recognition</a>
of Maduro, the report allows it to double
down on its call for foreign military
intervention. The radicals on either side
have simultaneously launched a broadside of
criticisms at the ex-president, but
significant sectors in both camps have
recognized the legitimacy of the report,
which sets the table for Norway-mediated
talks.</p>
<h3>Chavismo in its trench</h3>
<p>The elements of cohesion in Chavismo are
more external than internal. Chavismo closes
ranks when confronting an enemy force of the
proportions of the governments of the US or
Colombia, or when the opposition resorts to
violence. Once the “Guaido effect” is
exposed as an impotent act, the Maduro
government is left standing without tangible
opponents and begins to face a crisis
situation in which it is itself completely
helpless. That is when the seams in the
institutional armor covering the government
become visible, due to its inability to
control an economy that is already <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14542">liberalized</a>.</p>
<p>What has also become apparent recently is
the government’s lack of control over state
security forces. Obviously, Chavismo resents
having to confront situations like the <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14563">death</a>
by alleged torture of Captain Acosta Arevalo
on June 29, as well as the arrest of
grassroots Bolivarian militant Jose Ramon
Rodriguez on July 5. In the first case,
arrests have been, and in the second, Ramon
Rodriguez has been freed. However, the
accusations of grave misconduct on the part
of the security forces, detailed in the
Bachelet Report, are a concern shared by
some <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14256">currents</a>
of Chavismo.</p>
<p>Other sectors, including the United
Socialist Party of Venezuela, <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14575">reject</a>
the Bachelet report. Even now Maduro has
demonstrated – and Bachelet has recognized
it – that he is making moves to set the
stage for negotiations: is there movement
towards a power-sharing agreement or rather
tactical maneuvers to remain in power?</p>
<p>Regardless, it is undeniable that
negotiations driven by Norway open the way
for a scenario that can overcome the
stalemate in the internal political game. A
shift in political and diplomatic relations
is needed in order to extricate Venezuela
from its current economic quagmire, which is
impacting the region.</p>
<p><em>Ociel Alí López is a Venezuelan
researcher who has published numerous
written and multimedia works. He is
dedicated to analyzing Venezuelan society
for several European and Latin American
media outlets. He is a co-founder of
alternative Venezuelan state television
station Avila TV in 2006. He is the
recipient of the CLACSO/ASDI researcher
prize and the Britto Garcia literature
award.</em></p>
<p><em>The views expressed in this article are
the author's own and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis
editorial staff.</em></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</article>
</section>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
415 863.9977
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://freedomarchives.org/">https://freedomarchives.org/</a>
</div>
</body>
</html>