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<div class="header reader-header reader-show-element" dir="ltr"> <font
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href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/05/01/social-unrest-as-obstacle-to-colombian-military-intervention-in-venezuela/">https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/05/01/social-unrest-as-obstacle-to-colombian-military-intervention-in-venezuela/</a></font>
<h1 class="reader-title">Social Unrest as Obstacle to Colombian
Military Intervention in Venezuela</h1>
<span class="post_author_intro">by</span> <span
class="post_author" itemprop="author"><a
href="https://www.counterpunch.org/author/gaguwe/"
rel="nofollow">W. T. Whitney</a> - May 1, 2019</span></div>
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<p>Rightwing Colombian governments, obedient to the United
States and unhappy with socialist Venezuela, have
provided muscle behind the U.S. push for regime change
there. What are the capacities of Colombia to intervene
militarily in Venezuela? The mainstream and alternative
media offer little in this regard. The argument here is
that political instability in Colombia is standing in
the way of that country’s military forces intervening
more than is presently the case.</p>
<p>Colombian paramilitaries, numbering <a
href="http://www.acn.com.ve/grupos-paramilitares-operan-venezuela/">15,000</a>,
are operating in 10 western Venezuelan states. Most of
them <u><a
href="https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/239333-paramilitarismo-opera-venezuela-colombiano">work
fo</a>r </u>or cooperate with landowners and
businesspeople. They control travel routes, local
economies, food supplies, and even health care and
schools. Crossing a border porous in both directions,
they engage in narco-trafficking, smuggling of goods and
people, private security, arms-trafficking, kidnapping,
<a
href="https://www.lahaine.org/mundo.php/la-invasion-paramilitar-a-venezuela">casinos</a>,
currency trading, land theft, illegal mining, terrorism,
and military combat. They arrived in Venezuela in 1997.</p>
<p>In the early 1960s U.S. military advisors recommended
that Colombia’s government use paramilitaries to combat
leftist insurgencies. According to <a
href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/analysis/The-Infiltration-of-Colombian-Paramilitaries-into-Venezuela-20150824-0005.html">one
analyst</a>, they are “recruited by and received
training from the Colombian military and intelligence …
The military and the paramilitary groups worked in
coordination to root out entire populations.” Colombia’s
National Center for Historical Memory blames
paramilitaries for causing <a
href="http://www.pacocol.org/index.php/noticias/conflicto-armado/8015-como-se-convirtio-colombia-en-estado-paramilitar">94.754
deaths</a> in Colombia, mostly of civilians, over the
course of 50 years.</p>
<p>Colombian paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño supposedly<u><a
href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/analysis/The-Infiltration-of-Colombian-Paramilitaries-into-Venezuela-20150824-0005.html">“met
with</a></u>140 Venezuelan businessmen and landlords
[in 1997] ato create a paramilitary structure similar to
the one he led in Colombia.” A reporter quoted Castaño
as saying, “We <u><a
href="http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=248829">have
people</a> </u>issuing instructions in Venezuelan
territory. We maintain communications.”</p>
<p>Paramilitary attacks in 2003 prompted a report that “<u><a
href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/analysis/The-Infiltration-of-Colombian-Paramilitaries-into-Venezuela-20150824-0005.html">120
campesino</a> </u>and indigenous leaders had been
killed” over four years.” Venezuelan authorities accused
116 paramilitaries whom they arrested in 2004 of
preparing to assassinate President Hugo Chávez.</p>
<p>Colombian paramilitaries were responsible for a wave of
political murders in early 2010, and by 2015, <u><a
href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/analysis/The-Infiltration-of-Colombian-Paramilitaries-into-Venezuela-20150824-0005.html">200
more</a> </u>Venezuelans had been killed.
Authorities arrested groups of them in 2013 and 2017. In
Caracas presently they carry out <u><a
href="https://prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article23656">selective
killings</a> </u>of leftist political activists.</p>
<p>Colombian journalist Fredy Muñoz claims that the
rightwing opposition “<u><a
href="https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/239333-paramilitarismo-opera-venezuela-colombiano">uses
them to</a> </u>carry out the cruelest actions,
like selective assassinations, setting young people
afire, or destroying state infrastructure.” Colombian
paramilitaries are <a
href="https://www.lahaine.org/mundo.php/la-invasion-paramilitar-a-venezuela">known
to have</a> coordinated the opposition’s violent
street demonstrations (the “guarimbas”). They <u><a
href="https://prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article23656">trained
someof those</a> </u>participating in the
assassination attempt against Venezuelan President
NicolásMaduro on August 4, 2018.</p>
<p>In contrast to regular military forces, paramilitaries
are self sufficient, low- profile, and inexpensive. They
offer advantages in carrying out destabilization, which
is their main mission. They infiltrate rather than
invade, thus facilitating the glossing over of
violations of international norms. And moving large
military units into Venezuela would present major
logistical and administrative challenges. In fact,
Colombia’s military is very large.</p>
<p>Regular military personnel number <u><a
href="https://www.businessinsider.com/militaries-most-active-duty-soldiers-troops-2018-5#15-turkey-350000-active-personnel-1">511,550</a></u>.
Military expenditures in 2018 consumed $<u><a
href="https://www.export.gov/article?id=Colombia-">9.7
billion</a></u>. Taken as a percentage of GDP,
Colombia’s military spending in 2017 was <u><a
href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/3_Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932017%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP.pdf">tops
by far</a> </u>in Latin America. The U.S.
government has long provided <u><a
href="https://www.wola.org/analysis/president-trump-colombias-santos-meet-week/">military
assistance</a>. </u>Since 2000 it’s provided
equipment, training, and over $10 billion in funding and
has based troops, military contractors, and military
planes there.</p>
<p>But one other problem stands in the way of Colombian
military intervention in Venezuela: troops deployed to
Venezuela would be letting go of duties in Colombia.</p>
<p>The Colombian Army has long carried out operations
within Colombian borders, the banana-workers <u><a
href="https://www.academia.edu/28036360/The_workers_massacre_of_1928_in_the_Magdalena_Zona_Bananera_-_Colombia">massacre</a>
</u>in Magdalena in 1928 being a prime example. Recently
military thinkers all over have been working to justify
domestic military activities. For example, “Prism,” the
journal of the National Defense University, calls upon
armed forces anywhere to be able “<u><a
href="https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_4-4/Evolving_Internal_Roles_of_the_Armed_Forces_correctedII.pdf">to
resolve national</a> </u>crises [such as] civil
disturbances” and to deal with challenges to “domestic
and regional security and stability.” And Juan C.
Correa, a Colombian Army officer studying at the School
of Advanced Military Studies in Kansas, examined “<u><a
href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=703244">stability
operations</a></u>.” According to his thesis, they
are the means through which Colombia could “achieve a
long-standing deterrence against terrorist and criminal
threats.”</p>
<p>Colombia’s Army may indeed be prioritizing the home
front. New elements of instability recently have emerged
there and civilian and military leaders presumably are
not blind to them. They are: the accentuation of
class-based divisions, antagonisms, and suffering and,
secondly, an ongoing wave of protests. Here are the
facts:</p>
<p>Between January 2016 and March 27, 2019,<u> <a
href="http://estrategia.la/2019/04/06/cientos-de-lideres-sociales-sistematicamente-asesinados-en-colombia/">498
people</a> </u>were killed. They included 113
community leaders, 18 political movement leaders, 9
labor leaders, 7 environmental activists, 6 land
claimants, 5 human rights defenders, 31 indigenous
leaders, 28 peasant leaders, and 24 Afro—Colombian
leaders. Since the signing of the peace agreement
between FARC insurgents and the government in late 2016,
murderers have hit more than <a
href="https://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/04-2019-128-exmiembros-de-farc-han-sido-asesinados-desde-2016">129
former FARC</a> guerrillas and <u><a
href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/colombia-asesinato-lideres-sociales-defensoria-pueblo-20190110-0034.html">431
social and community</a> </u>leaders (some of whom
having been accounted for above).</p>
<p>During the last 10 years, <a
href="https://www.las2orillas.co/presidente-duque-un-concierto-por-la-guajira-tambien-es-posible/">5000
Wayúu</a> Indian children died of starvation in La
Guajira state; 58 percent of people there live in
poverty<strong>, </strong><u><a
href="https://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/a276196.html">25
percent</a> </u>of them in extreme poverty. The
poverty rate for residents of Buenaventura on the
Pacific coast is 80 percent; 41 percent live in extreme
poverty. And, 71 percent have limited access to water;
40 percent, no sewage; and 65 percent, no jobs. <u><a
href="https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/mas-regiones/casi-la-mitad-de-la-poblacion-vive-con-menos-de-6-dolares-diarios-282484">Half
o</a>f </u>Colombians live on less than $6 daily; 4
percent, on less than $2 daily. In 2015 Colombia <u><a
href="https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings">ranked
11<sup>th</sup></a> </u>in the world for income
inequality.</p>
<p>In early March indigenous people in southwestern
Colombia convened a Minga (The Quechuan word means “<u><a
href="https://nacla.org/news/2019/04/16/colombia%27s-minga-protests-demand-justice-president-duque-isn%E2%80%99t-listening-translation">collective
effort</a> </u>for the common good”). Over 15,000
people gathered in Cauca and went on to block the
Pan-American Highway between Popayán and Cali for 25
days. In mid April President Ivan Duque refused to meet
with them. Anti-riot police and Army elements were in
place and the <u><a
href="https://www.cric-colombia.org/portal/comunicado-a-la-opinion-publica-nacional-e-internacional-ante-ataques-indiscriminados-del-esmad-emcar-y-ejercito-nacional-contra-comuneros-as-de-la-minga-por-la-defensa-de-la-vida-el-territorio-la/">dead
and wounded</a> </u>mounted.</p>
<p>Protesters demanded land rights, no more
discrimination, and autonomy in organizing health care
and education. They denounced failed implementation of
the government-FARC peace agreement, and as <u><a
href="https://nacla.org/news/2019/04/16/colombia%27s-minga-protests-demand-justice-president-duque-isn%E2%80%99t-listening-translation">reported
</a>by </u>Virginie Laurent, called for “shared
struggle” in favor of a “radical shift in Colombia to
combat the marginalization and exploitation of the
majority of the population.” The Minga reached out to
non- indigenous allies.</p>
<p>The National Civic Strike of April 25, joined by
activists from dozens of organizations including <u><a
href="http://www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2019/04/25/paro-nacional-contudente-en-colombia-miles-marcharon-en-todo-el-pais-fuerte-represion-en-plaza-bolivar-bogota/">the
Minga</a></u>, featured <u><a
href="https://kaosenlared.net/colombia-paro-civico-del-25-a-minga-al-esmad/">marches,
assemblies</a></u>, sit-ins, and highway
demonstrations throughout the nation. The “<u><a
href="applewebdata://D84308B0-56FE-44C9-B1FD-D3D0A2C26D02/pacocol.org/index.php/comites-regionales/tolima/8022-paro-civico-nacional-la-colombia-profunda-en-pie">other
Colombia</a>,</u>or deep Colombia” was standing up
for “defense of life and defense of autonomy – that is
to say, national sovereignty,” reported Nelson Lombana
Silva, writing for the Communist Party website. They
were protesting the killings; assaults on unions,
agrarian rights, and public education; failed
implementation of the peace accords; free rein for
paramilitaries; U.S. military bases in Colombia; and
U.S. “use of national territory in attacking Venezuela
politically and militarily.”</p>
<p>At some point, and maybe now is the time, a nationwide
revolutionary upsurge is due. It would be the first time
since 1948.</p>
<p>That year Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, <u><a
href="http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=254670&titular=a-71-a%C3%B1os-del-asesinato-de-jorge-eliecer-gait%C3%A1n-">a
socialist</a></u>, was on track to become Colombia’s
president in 1950. He had led the Colombian agrarian
masses against the violence an ultra-conservative
government had used in defending big land holdings. An
assassin killed Gaitánon April 9 1948. The government
blamed communists and opened the door to extreme
violence that would last for decades. Repression became
the norm.</p>
<p>At the end of 50 years of war against FARC insurgents,
hopes were high for peace at last and for solving grave
social problems. But the peace agreement is in shreds,
violence continues, and political processes are stuck.
High officials probably assume that revolutionaries are
re-thinking options. Seeking to prevent further descent
into instability, the government, logically, would want
regular troops to remain in Colombia where they are
needed rather than being deployed in Venezuela.</p>
</div>
<p> <em><strong>W.T. Whitney Jr.</strong> is a retired
pediatrician and political journalist living in Maine.</em>
</p>
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