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href="https://news.yahoo.com/revealed-the-us-militarys-36-codenamed-operations-in-africa-090000841.html?soc_src=hl-viewer&soc_trk=tw">https://news.yahoo.com/revealed-the-us-militarys-36-codenamed-operations-in-africa-090000841.html?soc_src=hl-viewer&soc_trk=tw</a></font>
<h1 class="reader-title">Revealed: The U.S. military's 36
code-named operations in Africa</h1>
<div class="credits reader-credits">Nick Turse and Sean D.
Naylor Nick Turse and Sean D. Naylor</div>
<div class="meta-data">
<div class="reader-estimated-time">April 17, 2019<br>
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<div id="readability-page-1" class="page">
<p type="text" content="Many Americans first became aware of
U.S. military operations in Africa in October 2017, after
the Islamic State ambushed American troops near Tongo
Tongo, Niger, killing four U.S. soldiers and wounding two
others." data-reactid="19">Many Americans first became
aware of U.S. military operations in Africa in October
2017, after the Islamic State ambushed American troops
near Tongo Tongo, Niger, killing four U.S. soldiers and
wounding two others.</p>
<p type="text" content="Just after the attack, U.S. Africa
Command said U.S. troops were providing “<a
href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DLXe9uiXcAAUJjz.jpg"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">advice and
assistance</a>” to local counterparts. Later, it
would become clear that those troops — the <a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/world/middleeast/army-niger-members-punished.html"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">11-man</a><a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/world/africa/niger-ambush-defense-department-report.html"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank"> Operational Detachment-Alpha
Team 3212</a> — were working out of the
town of <a
href="https://dod.defense.gov/portals/1/features/2018/0418_niger/img/Oct-2017-Niger-Ambush-Summary-of-Investigation.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Oullam</a> with
a larger Nigerian force under the umbrella of Operation
Juniper Shield, a wide-ranging <a
href="http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14923/what-you-need-to-know-about-why-u-s-special-operations-forces-are-in-niger"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">counterterrorism
effort</a> in northwest Africa."
data-reactid="20">Just after the attack, U.S. Africa
Command said U.S. troops were providing “<a
href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DLXe9uiXcAAUJjz.jpg"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">advice and
assistance</a>” to local counterparts. Later, it would
become clear that those troops — the <a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/world/middleeast/army-niger-members-punished.html"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">11-man</a><a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/world/africa/niger-ambush-defense-department-report.html"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"> Operational
Detachment-Alpha Team 3212</a> — were working out of the
town of <a
href="https://dod.defense.gov/portals/1/features/2018/0418_niger/img/Oct-2017-Niger-Ambush-Summary-of-Investigation.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Oullam</a> with
a larger Nigerian force under the umbrella of Operation
Juniper Shield, a wide-ranging <a
href="http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14923/what-you-need-to-know-about-why-u-s-special-operations-forces-are-in-niger"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">counterterrorism
effort</a> in northwest Africa.</p>
<p type="text" content="Until poor weather prevented it,
that team was supposed to lend support to another group of
American commandos who were trying to kill or capture
Islamic State leader Doundoun Cheffou as part
of <a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/africa/niger-soldiers-killed-ambush.html"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Obsidian
Nomad</a> II." data-reactid="21">Until poor
weather prevented it, that team was supposed to lend
support to another group of American commandos who were
trying to kill or capture Islamic State leader Doundoun
Cheffou as part of <a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/africa/niger-soldiers-killed-ambush.html"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Obsidian Nomad</a> II.</p>
<p type="text" content="Juniper Shield and Obsidian Nomad II
were not isolated efforts but part of a panoply of named
military operations and activities U.S. forces have been
conducting from dozens of bases across the northern tier
of Africa. Many of these operations are taking place in
countries that the U.S. government does not recognize as
combat zones, but in which U.S. troops are nonetheless
fighting and, in several cases, taking casualties."
data-reactid="22">Juniper Shield and Obsidian Nomad II
were not isolated efforts but part of a panoply of named
military operations and activities U.S. forces have been
conducting from dozens of bases across the northern tier
of Africa. Many of these operations are taking place in
countries that the U.S. government does not recognize as
combat zones, but in which U.S. troops are nonetheless
fighting and, in several cases, taking casualties.</p>
<p type="text" content="Between 2013 and 2017, U.S. special
operations forces saw combat in at least 13 African
countries, according to retired Army Brig. Gen. Don
Bolduc, who served at U.S. Africa Command from 2013 to
2015 and then headed Special Operations Command Africa
until 2017. Those countries, according to Bolduc, are
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia. He
added that U.S. troops have been killed or wounded in
action in at least six of them: Kenya, Libya, Niger,
Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia." data-reactid="23">Between
2013 and 2017, U.S. special operations forces saw combat
in at least 13 African countries, according to retired
Army Brig. Gen. Don Bolduc, who served at U.S. Africa
Command from 2013 to 2015 and then headed Special
Operations Command Africa until 2017. Those countries,
according to Bolduc, are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, South
Sudan and Tunisia. He added that U.S. troops have been
killed or wounded in action in at least six of them:
Kenya, Libya, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia.</p>
<p type="text" content="Yahoo News has put together a list
of three dozen such operations across the continent."
data-reactid="24">Yahoo News has put together a list of
three dozen such operations across the continent.</p>
<p type="text" content="The code-named operations cover a
variety of different military missions, ranging from
psychological operations to counterterrorism. Eight of the
named activities, including <a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/africa/niger-soldiers-killed-ambush.html"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Obsidian Nomad</a>, are
so-called <a
href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/02/secret-war-africa-pentagon-664005"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">127e programs</a>,
named for the budgetary authority that allows U.S. special
operations forces to use certain host-nation military
units as surrogates in counterterrorism missions."
data-reactid="25">The code-named operations cover a
variety of different military missions, ranging from
psychological operations to counterterrorism. Eight of the
named activities, including <a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/africa/niger-soldiers-killed-ambush.html"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Obsidian Nomad</a>,
are so-called <a
href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/02/secret-war-africa-pentagon-664005"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">127e programs</a>,
named for the budgetary authority that allows U.S. special
operations forces to use certain host-nation military
units as surrogates in counterterrorism missions.</p>
<p type="text" content="Used extensively across Africa, 127e
programs can be run either by Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC), the secretive organization that controls
the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, the Army’s Delta Force and other
special mission units, or by “theater special operations
forces.” These programs are “specifically designed for us
to work with our host nation partners to develop small —
anywhere between 80 and 120 personnel — counterterrorism
forces that we’re partnered with,” said Bolduc. “They are
specially selected partner-nation forces that go through
extensive training, with the same equipment we have, to
specifically go after counterterrorism targets, especially
high-value targets.”" data-reactid="26">Used extensively
across Africa, 127e programs can be run either by Joint
Special Operations Command (JSOC), the secretive
organization that controls the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, the
Army’s Delta Force and other special mission units, or by
“theater special operations forces.” These programs are
“specifically designed for us to work with our host nation
partners to develop small — anywhere between 80 and 120
personnel — counterterrorism forces that we’re partnered
with,” said Bolduc. “They are specially selected
partner-nation forces that go through extensive training,
with the same equipment we have, to specifically go after
counterterrorism targets, especially high-value targets.”</p>
<p type="text" content="Using documents obtained via the
Freedom of Information Act, interviews, published reports
and a Defense Department list of named U.S. military
operations that <a
href="https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/milops-2018.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">leaked</a> online,
Yahoo News put together the following list of 36
operations and activities that are (or were until
recently) ongoing in Africa." data-reactid="27">Using
documents obtained via the Freedom of Information Act,
interviews, published reports and a Defense Department
list of named U.S. military operations that <a
href="https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/milops-2018.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">leaked</a> online,
Yahoo News put together the following list of 36
operations and activities that are (or were until
recently) ongoing in Africa.</p>
<p type="text" content="Where possible, Yahoo News has also
listed the bases that support these operations, relying
mostly on information sheets about those locations
obtained via the Freedom of Information Act. Yahoo News
does not claim that this list is comprehensive."
data-reactid="28">Where possible, Yahoo News has also
listed the bases that support these operations, relying
mostly on information sheets about those locations
obtained via the Freedom of Information Act. Yahoo News
does not claim that this list is comprehensive.</p>
<p type="text" content="While the Defense Department has
acknowledged the names, locations and purposes of some of
these operations, others are far lower-profile. Almost all
are unknown to the general public:" data-reactid="29">While
the Defense Department has acknowledged the names,
locations and purposes of some of these operations, others
are far lower-profile. Almost all are unknown to the
general public:</p>
<div data-reactid="38">
<p type="text" content="<strong>ARMADA
SWEEP:</strong> A U.S. Navy electronic
surveillance effort conducted from ships off the coast
of East Africa, <a
href="https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/target-africa/"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Armada
Sweep</a> supports the U.S. drone war in
the region." data-reactid="40"><strong>ARMADA SWEEP:</strong>
A U.S. Navy electronic surveillance effort conducted
from ships off the coast of East Africa, <a
href="https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/target-africa/"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Armada Sweep</a> supports
the U.S. drone war in the region.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Unknown" data-reactid="41"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Unknown</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>ECHO
CASEMATE:</strong> This operation covers a series
of activities in the Central African Republic. It began
in 2013 as a<a
href="http://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/11575/dod-continues-central-african-republic-peacekeeping-support"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">
support</a> mission for French and
African forces deployed to the troubled Central African
Republic for peacekeeping purposes and continued as an
advise-and-assist mission to those African peacekeeping
forces. However, U.S. forces neither accompanied their
partners in the field nor formally trained them. The
operation also covered the introduction of contractors
and Marines to secure the U.S. Embassy in Bangui and the
deployment of a small U.S. special operations contingent
to assist the U.S. ambassador in missions to counter the
Lord’s Resistance Army. In the first days of the
operation, the U.S. military airlifted hundreds of
Burundian troops, tons of equipment and more than a
dozen military vehicles into the Central African
Republic, <a
href="http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/11575/dod-continues-central-african-republic-peacekeeping-support"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">according</a> to
Africom. The U.S. military continued <a
href="https://www.315aw.afrc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/633159/charleston-airmen-receive-4-af-aircrew-excellence-award/"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">transporting French
forces</a> in and out of the Central
African Republic, and the mission was still underway in
early 2018." data-reactid="42"><strong>ECHO CASEMATE:</strong>
This operation covers a series of activities in the
Central African Republic. It began in 2013 as a<a
href="http://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/11575/dod-continues-central-african-republic-peacekeeping-support"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"> support</a> mission
for French and African forces deployed to the troubled
Central African Republic for peacekeeping purposes and
continued as an advise-and-assist mission to those
African peacekeeping forces. However, U.S. forces
neither accompanied their partners in the field nor
formally trained them. The operation also covered the
introduction of contractors and Marines to secure the
U.S. Embassy in Bangui and the deployment of a small
U.S. special operations contingent to assist the U.S.
ambassador in missions to counter the Lord’s Resistance
Army. In the first days of the operation, the U.S.
military airlifted hundreds of Burundian troops, tons of
equipment and more than a dozen military vehicles into
the Central African Republic, <a
href="http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/11575/dod-continues-central-african-republic-peacekeeping-support"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">according</a> to
Africom. The U.S. military continued <a
href="https://www.315aw.afrc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/633159/charleston-airmen-receive-4-af-aircrew-excellence-award/"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">transporting
French forces</a> in and out of the Central African
Republic, and the mission was still underway in early
2018.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Base
used:</strong> Abeche, Chad" data-reactid="43"><strong>Base
used:</strong> Abeche, Chad</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>EXILE HUNTER:
</strong>One of a family of similarly named
counterterrorism efforts that U.S. special operations
forces have conducted in East Africa. Exile Hunter was a
127e program in which elite U.S. troops trained and
equipped an Ethiopian force for counterterrorism
missions in Somalia. Bolduc says he shut it down in 2016
because the Ethiopian government was uncomfortable about
the force not falling under its command. However, a
February 2018 Defense Department <a
href="https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/milops-2018.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">list</a> of
named operations suggests it had been resurrected."
data-reactid="44"><strong>EXILE HUNTER: </strong>One of
a family of similarly named counterterrorism efforts
that U.S. special operations forces have conducted in
East Africa. Exile Hunter was a 127e program in which
elite U.S. troops trained and equipped an Ethiopian
force for counterterrorism missions in Somalia. Bolduc
says he shut it down in 2016 because the Ethiopian
government was uncomfortable about the force not falling
under its command. However, a February 2018 Defense
Department <a
href="https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/milops-2018.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">list</a> of
named operations suggests it had been resurrected.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti"
data-reactid="45"><strong>Bases used: </strong>Camp
Lemonnier, Djibouti</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>JUKEBOX LOTUS:
</strong><a
href="https://www.usuhs.edu/sites/default/files/media/bde/pdf/chaplainmackbio.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Operation Jukebox
Lotus</a> began as the crisis response to
the September 2012 attack in Benghazi, Libya, that
killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three
other Americans, but continued until at least 2018. It
gives Africa Command broad authority to conduct a
variety of operations in Libya as required and is
specific to neither special operations nor
counterterrorism." data-reactid="46"><strong>JUKEBOX
LOTUS: </strong><a
href="https://www.usuhs.edu/sites/default/files/media/bde/pdf/chaplainmackbio.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Operation
Jukebox Lotus</a> began as the crisis response to the
September 2012 attack in Benghazi, Libya, that killed
U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other
Americans, but continued until at least 2018. It gives
Africa Command broad authority to conduct a variety of
operations in Libya as required and is specific to
neither special operations nor counterterrorism.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Faya Largeau and N’Djamena, Chad; Air
Base 201, Agadez, Niger" data-reactid="47"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Faya Largeau and N’Djamena, Chad; Air
Base 201, Agadez, Niger</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>JUNCTION
RAIN:</strong> A maritime security effort in the
Gulf of Guinea involving African and U.S. Coast Guard
boarding teams operating from U.S. Navy ships or those
of African forces. In 2016, the hybrid teams
conducted <a
href="http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/security-cooperation/africa-maritime-law-enforcement-partnership-amlep-program"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">32 boardings</a>,
resulting in $1.2 million in fines levied for more than
50 maritime violations, as well as the recovery of
a <a
href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/26/nigeria-navy-oil-tanker-pirates-us-training-mission"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">diesel
fuel</a> tanker that had been seized by
pirates. Last year, operations with the Senegalese and
Cabo Verdean navies resulted in at least <a
href="https://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/30988/first-phase-of-amlep-closes"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">40
boardings</a> — mostly of fishing vessels
— and $75,000 in fines handed down for two fishing
violations." data-reactid="48"><strong>JUNCTION RAIN:</strong>
A maritime security effort in the Gulf of Guinea
involving African and U.S. Coast Guard boarding teams
operating from U.S. Navy ships or those of African
forces. In 2016, the hybrid teams conducted <a
href="http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/security-cooperation/africa-maritime-law-enforcement-partnership-amlep-program"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">32 boardings</a>,
resulting in $1.2 million in fines levied for more than
50 maritime violations, as well as the recovery of a <a
href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/26/nigeria-navy-oil-tanker-pirates-us-training-mission"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">diesel fuel</a> tanker
that had been seized by pirates. Last year, operations
with the Senegalese and Cabo Verdean navies resulted in
at least <a
href="https://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/30988/first-phase-of-amlep-closes"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">40 boardings</a> —
mostly of fishing vessels — and $75,000 in fines handed
down for two fishing violations.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Base used:
</strong>Dakar, Senegal" data-reactid="49"><strong>Base
used: </strong>Dakar, Senegal</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>JUNCTION SERPENT:
</strong>A <a
href="https://warisboring.com/the-pentagons-timeline-of-its-latest-libya-intervention-just-doesnt-line-up/"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">surveillance
effort</a> in Libya that, as part of the
2016 <a
href="https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2016/08/01/us-conducts-new-round-of-airstrikes-against-isis-in-libya/"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">campaign of
airstrikes</a> against Islamic State
positions in the Libyan city of Sirte, gave Joint
Special Operations Command specific authorities to
coordinate assets in order to develop targeting
information for the campaign" data-reactid="50"><strong>JUNCTION
SERPENT: </strong>A <a
href="https://warisboring.com/the-pentagons-timeline-of-its-latest-libya-intervention-just-doesnt-line-up/"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">surveillance
effort</a> in Libya that, as part of the 2016 <a
href="https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2016/08/01/us-conducts-new-round-of-airstrikes-against-isis-in-libya/"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">campaign of
airstrikes</a> against Islamic State positions in the
Libyan city of Sirte, gave Joint Special Operations
Command specific authorities to coordinate assets in
order to develop targeting information for the campaign</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Unknown" data-reactid="51"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Unknown</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>JUNIPER
MICRON:</strong> In 2013, after France launched a
military intervention against Islamists in Mali
code-named Operation Serval, the U.S. began
Operation <a
href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175818/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_american_proxy_wars_in_africa"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Juniper Micron</a>,
which involved airlifting French soldiers and supplies
into that former French colony, flying refueling
missions in support of French airpower, and assisting
allied African forces. Juniper Micron was ongoing as of
October 2018, with <a
href="https://www.amc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1654978/fairchild-kc-135s-airmen-support-operation-juniper-micron/"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">plans for it to
continue</a> in the future."
data-reactid="52"><strong>JUNIPER MICRON:</strong> In
2013, after France launched a military intervention
against Islamists in Mali code-named Operation Serval,
the U.S. began Operation <a
href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175818/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_american_proxy_wars_in_africa"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Juniper Micron</a>,
which involved airlifting French soldiers and supplies
into that former French colony, flying refueling
missions in support of French airpower, and assisting
allied African forces. Juniper Micron was ongoing as of
October 2018, with <a
href="https://www.amc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1654978/fairchild-kc-135s-airmen-support-operation-juniper-micron/"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">plans for it
to continue</a> in the future.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; <a
href="https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/747951/operation-juniper-micron-support-to-continue-from-istres/"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Istres-Le Tube Air
Base</a>, France; Bamako and Gao, Mali; Air Base
201 (Agadez), Arlit, Dirkou, Madama and Niamey, Niger;
Dakar, Senegal" data-reactid="53"><strong>Bases used: </strong>Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso; <a
href="https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/747951/operation-juniper-micron-support-to-continue-from-istres/"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Istres-Le Tube
Air Base</a>, France; Bamako and Gao, Mali; Air Base
201 (Agadez), Arlit, Dirkou, Madama and Niamey, Niger;
Dakar, Senegal</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>JUNIPER NIMBUS:
</strong><a
href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/juniper-nimbus.htm"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Juniper
Nimbus</a> is a long-running operation
aimed at supporting the Nigerian military campaign
against Boko Haram." data-reactid="54"><strong>JUNIPER
NIMBUS: </strong><a
href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/juniper-nimbus.htm"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Juniper Nimbus</a> is
a long-running operation aimed at supporting the
Nigerian military campaign against Boko Haram.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; N’Djamena,
Chad; Arlit, Dirkou and Madama, Niger" data-reactid="55"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; N’Djamena,
Chad; Arlit, Dirkou and Madama, Niger</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>JUNIPER SHIELD:
</strong>The umbrella operation for the mission
that resulted in the deadly ambush in
Niger, <a
href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/FY2019_OCOTF_Justification_Book_FINAL.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Juniper
Shield</a> is the United States’
centerpiece<a
href="http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14923/what-you-need-to-know-about-why-u-s-special-operations-forces-are-in-niger"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank"> counterterrorism
effort</a> in northwest Africa and
covers <a
href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/FY2019_OCOTF_Justification_Book_FINAL.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">11 nations</a>:
Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania,
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. Under
Juniper Shield, U.S. teams rotate in every six months to
train, advise, assist and accompany local partner forces
to conduct operations against terrorist groups,
including ISIS-West Africa, Boko Haram and al Qaida and
its affiliates." data-reactid="56"><strong>JUNIPER
SHIELD: </strong>The umbrella operation for the
mission that resulted in the deadly ambush in Niger, <a
href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/FY2019_OCOTF_Justification_Book_FINAL.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Juniper Shield</a> is
the United States’ centerpiece<a
href="http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/14923/what-you-need-to-know-about-why-u-s-special-operations-forces-are-in-niger"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">
counterterrorism effort</a> in northwest Africa and
covers <a
href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/FY2019_OCOTF_Justification_Book_FINAL.pdf"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">11 nations</a>:
Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania,
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. Under
Juniper Shield, U.S. teams rotate in every six months to
train, advise, assist and accompany local partner forces
to conduct operations against terrorist groups,
including ISIS-West Africa, Boko Haram and al Qaida and
its affiliates.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases
used:</strong> Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; Garoua
and Maroua, Cameroon; Bangui, Central African Republic;
Faya Largeau and N’Djamena, Chad; Bamako and Gao, Mali;
Nema and Ouassa, Mauritania; Air Base 201 (Agadez),
Arlit, Diffa, Dirkou, Madama and Niamey, Niger; Dakar,
Senegal" data-reactid="57"><strong>Bases used:</strong>
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; Garoua and Maroua, Cameroon;
Bangui, Central African Republic; Faya Largeau and
N’Djamena, Chad; Bamako and Gao, Mali; Nema and Ouassa,
Mauritania; Air Base 201 (Agadez), Arlit, Diffa, Dirkou,
Madama and Niamey, Niger; Dakar, Senegal</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>JUPITER
GARRET:</strong> A <a
href="https://theintercept.com/document/2015/10/15/small-footprint-operations-5-13/#page-6"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">JSOC
operation</a> aimed at high-value targets
in Somalia, Jupiter Garret first came to light in a 2012
Washington Post <a
href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html?utm_term=.a714bcd3b3cf"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">article</a>. It was
ongoing as of February 2018" data-reactid="58"><strong>JUPITER
GARRET:</strong> A <a
href="https://theintercept.com/document/2015/10/15/small-footprint-operations-5-13/#page-6"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">JSOC operation</a> aimed
at high-value targets in Somalia, Jupiter Garret first
came to light in a 2012 Washington Post <a
href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html?utm_term=.a714bcd3b3cf"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">article</a>.
It was ongoing as of February 2018</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier and Chebelley, Djibouti;
Laikipia, Manda Bay and Wajir, Kenya; Baidoa, Baledogle,
Bosasso, Galcayo, Kismayo and Mogadishu, Somalia"
data-reactid="59"><strong>Bases used: </strong>Camp
Lemonnier and Chebelley, Djibouti; Laikipia, Manda Bay
and Wajir, Kenya; Baidoa, Baledogle, Bosasso, Galcayo,
Kismayo and Mogadishu, Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>JUSTIFIED SEAMOUNT:
</strong>Another counter-piracy effort in the
waters off East Africa" data-reactid="60"><strong>JUSTIFIED
SEAMOUNT: </strong>Another counter-piracy effort in
the waters off East Africa</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Chebelley, Djibouti; Laikipia, Mombasa
and Wajir, Kenya; Victoria, Seychelles; Baidoa,
Baledogle, Kismayo and Mogadishu, Somalia"
data-reactid="61"><strong>Bases used: </strong>Chebelley,
Djibouti; Laikipia, Mombasa and Wajir, Kenya; Victoria,
Seychelles; Baidoa, Baledogle, Kismayo and Mogadishu,
Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>KODIAK
HUNTER:</strong> A 127e program in which U.S.
special operators trained and equipped a Kenyan force to
conduct counterterrorism missions in Somalia"
data-reactid="62"><strong>KODIAK HUNTER:</strong> A 127e
program in which U.S. special operators trained and
equipped a Kenyan force to conduct counterterrorism
missions in Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Base used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; Manda Bay,
Kenya" data-reactid="63"><strong>Base used: </strong>Camp
Lemonnier, Djibouti; Manda Bay, Kenya</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>MONGOOSE
HUNTER:</strong> A 127e program in which U.S.
special operations forces trained and equipped a Somali
force for counterterrorism missions against al-Shabab"
data-reactid="64"><strong>MONGOOSE HUNTER:</strong> A
127e program in which U.S. special operations forces
trained and equipped a Somali force for counterterrorism
missions against al-Shabab</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Base used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; Baledogle,
Somalia" data-reactid="65"><strong>Base used: </strong>Camp
Lemonnier, Djibouti; Baledogle, Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>NEW
NORMAL:</strong> An Africa-wide crisis response
capability established by the U.S. military after the
2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya"
data-reactid="66"><strong>NEW NORMAL:</strong> An
Africa-wide crisis response capability established by
the U.S. military after the 2012 attack on the U.S.
Consulate in Benghazi, Libya</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases
used:</strong> Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti;
Libreville, Gabon; Accra, Ghana; Dakar, Senegal;
Entebbe, Uganda" data-reactid="67"><strong>Bases used:</strong>
Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; Libreville, Gabon; Accra,
Ghana; Dakar, Senegal; Entebbe, Uganda</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>NIMBLE SHIELD:
</strong>A low-profile effort targeting Boko Haram
and ISIS-West Africa" data-reactid="68"><strong>NIMBLE
SHIELD: </strong>A low-profile effort targeting Boko
Haram and ISIS-West Africa</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases
used:</strong> Douala, Garoua and Maroua,
Cameroon; Bangui, Central African Republic; N’Djamena,
Chad; Diffa, Dirkou, Madama and Niamey, Niger"
data-reactid="69"><strong>Bases used:</strong> Douala,
Garoua and Maroua, Cameroon; Bangui, Central African
Republic; N’Djamena, Chad; Diffa, Dirkou, Madama and
Niamey, Niger</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OAKEN SONNET
I-III:</strong> A series of three contingency
operations in South Sudan.<a
href="https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/133/2Major%20Keefer%20BIO.pdf?ver=2017-08-24-104530-233"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank"> Oaken
Sonnet</a> I was the <a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/magazine/niger-ambush-south-sudan-military.html"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">difficult</a> 2013 <a
href="https://medium.com/authority-magazine/together-were-better-because-of-the-diversity-of-thought-lessons-learned-with-chris-rawley-4a4a17384864"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">rescue of U.S.
personnel</a> from that country at the
beginning of its civil war. Oaken Sonnet II took place
in 2014 and Oaken Sonnet III in 2016." data-reactid="70"><strong>OAKEN
SONNET I-III:</strong> A series of three contingency
operations in South Sudan.<a
href="https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/133/2Major%20Keefer%20BIO.pdf?ver=2017-08-24-104530-233"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"> Oaken Sonnet</a> I
was the <a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/magazine/niger-ambush-south-sudan-military.html"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">difficult</a> 2013 <a
href="https://medium.com/authority-magazine/together-were-better-because-of-the-diversity-of-thought-lessons-learned-with-chris-rawley-4a4a17384864"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">rescue of U.S.
personnel</a> from that country at the beginning of
its civil war. Oaken Sonnet II took place in 2014 and
Oaken Sonnet III in 2016.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Base used:
</strong>Juba, South Sudan" data-reactid="71"><strong>Base
used: </strong>Juba, South Sudan</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OAKEN STEEL:
</strong>The reinforcement of the U.S. Embassy in
Juba, South Sudan, to protect State Department personnel
during a conflict between rival factions in that
country’s civil war, <a
href="https://www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/238552"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Operation Oaken
Steel</a>, which ran from<a
href="https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/MPP/OEPM/AFSM%20Approved%20Operations%20-%202017%2008%2009.pdf?ver=2018-01-30-221252-837"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank"> July 12, 2016</a>,
to Jan. 26, 2017, saw U.S. forces deploy to Uganda to
provide for rapid crisis response during the unrest."
data-reactid="72"><strong>OAKEN STEEL: </strong>The
reinforcement of the U.S. Embassy in Juba, South Sudan,
to protect State Department personnel during a conflict
between rival factions in that country’s civil war, <a
href="https://www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/238552"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Operation
Oaken Steel</a>, which ran from<a
href="https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/MRA_Docs/MPP/OEPM/AFSM%20Approved%20Operations%20-%202017%2008%2009.pdf?ver=2018-01-30-221252-837"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"> July 12, 2016</a>,
to Jan. 26, 2017, saw U.S. forces deploy to Uganda to
provide for rapid crisis response during the unrest.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; Moron Air Base,
Spain; <a
href="https://www.commondreams.org/views/2017/04/27/us-military-moves-deeper-africa"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">Entebbe</a>, Uganda"
data-reactid="73"><strong>Bases used: </strong>Camp
Lemonnier, Djibouti; Moron Air Base, Spain; <a
href="https://www.commondreams.org/views/2017/04/27/us-military-moves-deeper-africa"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">Entebbe</a>,
Uganda</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OBJECTIVE VOICE:
</strong>In 2010, the first head of Africa
Command, Army Gen. William “Kip” Ward, <a
href="https://www.army.mil/article/35595/africom_posture_statement_ward_reports_annual_testimony_to_congress"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">told</a> the
Senate Armed Services Committee that Operation Objective
Voice was an “information operations effort to counter
violent extremism by leveraging media capabilities in
ways that encourage the public to repudiate extremist
ideologies.” Coordinated with other government agencies,
this propaganda effort included “youth peace games” in
Mali, a film project in northern Nigeria, and, according
to his successor, Army Gen. Carter Ham, a “variety of
messaging platforms, such as the African Web Initiative,
to challenge the views of terrorist groups.” Objective
Voice continues today." data-reactid="74"><strong>OBJECTIVE
VOICE: </strong>In 2010, the first head of Africa
Command, Army Gen. William “Kip” Ward, <a
href="https://www.army.mil/article/35595/africom_posture_statement_ward_reports_annual_testimony_to_congress"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">told</a> the
Senate Armed Services Committee that Operation Objective
Voice was an “information operations effort to counter
violent extremism by leveraging media capabilities in
ways that encourage the public to repudiate extremist
ideologies.” Coordinated with other government agencies,
this propaganda effort included “youth peace games” in
Mali, a film project in northern Nigeria, and, according
to his successor, Army Gen. Carter Ham, a “variety of
messaging platforms, such as the African Web Initiative,
to challenge the views of terrorist groups.” Objective
Voice continues today.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases
used:</strong> Garoua and Maroua, Cameroon;
Bangui, Central African Republic; Abeche, Faya Largeau
and N’Djamena, Chad; Bamako and Gao, Mali; Nema and
Ouassa, Mauritania; Air Base 201 (Agadez), Arlit and
Madama, Niger; Dakar, Senegal; Entebbe, Uganda"
data-reactid="75"><strong>Bases used:</strong> Garoua
and Maroua, Cameroon; Bangui, Central African Republic;
Abeche, Faya Largeau and N’Djamena, Chad; Bamako and
Gao, Mali; Nema and Ouassa, Mauritania; Air Base 201
(Agadez), Arlit and Madama, Niger; Dakar, Senegal;
Entebbe, Uganda</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OBLIQUE
PILLAR:</strong> A program to provide private
contractor helicopter support to Navy SEAL-advised units
of the Somali National Army fighting al-Shabab in
Somalia. The operation was in existence as of February
2018." data-reactid="76"><strong>OBLIQUE PILLAR:</strong>
A program to provide private contractor helicopter
support to Navy SEAL-advised units of the Somali
National Army fighting al-Shabab in Somalia. The
operation was in existence as of February 2018.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; Mombasa and
Wajir, Kenya; Baidoa, Baledogle, Kismayo and Mogadishu,
Somalia; Entebbe, Uganda." data-reactid="77"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; Mombasa and
Wajir, Kenya; Baidoa, Baledogle, Kismayo and Mogadishu,
Somalia; Entebbe, Uganda.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OBSERVANT
COMPASS:</strong> An operation to capture or kill
Joseph Kony and eradicate his Lord’s Resistance Army, a
militia that has committed atrocities since the 1980s.
In 2017, with around $780 million spent on the
operation, and Kony still in the field, the United
States wound down Observant Compass and shifted its
forces elsewhere. But the operation didn’t completely
disband, according to the Defense Department. “U.S.
military forces supporting Operation Observant Compass
transitioned to broader scope security and stability
activities that continue the success of our African
partners,” Pentagon spokesperson Cmdr. Candice Tresch
told Yahoo News." data-reactid="78"><strong>OBSERVANT
COMPASS:</strong> An operation to capture or kill
Joseph Kony and eradicate his Lord’s Resistance Army, a
militia that has committed atrocities since the 1980s.
In 2017, with around $780 million spent on the
operation, and Kony still in the field, the United
States wound down Observant Compass and shifted its
forces elsewhere. But the operation didn’t completely
disband, according to the Defense Department. “U.S.
military forces supporting Operation Observant Compass
transitioned to broader scope security and stability
activities that continue the success of our African
partners,” Pentagon spokesperson Cmdr. Candice Tresch
told Yahoo News.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Obo, Central African Republic; Abeche,
Chad; Dungu, Democratic Republic of Congo; Juba and
Nzara, South Sudan; Entebbe, Uganda" data-reactid="79"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Obo, Central African Republic; Abeche,
Chad; Dungu, Democratic Republic of Congo; Juba and
Nzara, South Sudan; Entebbe, Uganda</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OBSIDIAN LOTUS:
</strong>A 127e activity concentrated on Libya, in
which U.S. commandos trained and equipped Libyan special
operations forces battalions. One of those units ended
up under the control of renegade warlord Gen. Khalifa
Haftar, according to Bolduc." data-reactid="80"><strong>OBSIDIAN
LOTUS: </strong>A 127e activity concentrated on
Libya, in which U.S. commandos trained and equipped
Libyan special operations forces battalions. One of
those units ended up under the control of renegade
warlord Gen. Khalifa Haftar, according to Bolduc.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Unknown" data-reactid="81"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Unknown</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OBSIDIAN MOSAIC:
</strong>A 127e counterterrorism effort focused on
Mali." data-reactid="82"><strong>OBSIDIAN MOSAIC: </strong>A
127e counterterrorism effort focused on Mali.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Unknown." data-reactid="83"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Unknown.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OBSIDIAN NOMAD I and
II:</strong> Two 127e counterterrorism programs in
Niger: Obsidian Nomad I in Diffa and Obsidian Nomad II
in Arlit. The operational name <a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/africa/niger-soldiers-killed-ambush.html"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank">emerged</a> in
the wake of the October 2017 ambush in Niger that killed
four U.S. soldiers." data-reactid="84"><strong>OBSIDIAN
NOMAD I and II:</strong> Two 127e counterterrorism
programs in Niger: Obsidian Nomad I in Diffa and
Obsidian Nomad II in Arlit. The operational name <a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/africa/niger-soldiers-killed-ambush.html"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">emerged</a> in
the wake of the October 2017 ambush in Niger that killed
four U.S. soldiers.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Arlit and Diffa, Niger" data-reactid="85"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Arlit and Diffa, Niger</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OCTAVE
ANCHOR:</strong> A psychological operation focused
on Somalia" data-reactid="86"><strong>OCTAVE ANCHOR:</strong>
A psychological operation focused on Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; Mogadishu,
Somalia" data-reactid="87"><strong>Bases used: </strong>Camp
Lemonnier, Djibouti; Mogadishu, Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OCTAVE SHIELD:
</strong>An Africa Command psychological operation
focused on Somalia, carried out under the aegis of
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, based at Camp
Lemonnier in Djibouti." data-reactid="88"><strong>OCTAVE
SHIELD: </strong>An Africa Command psychological
operation focused on Somalia, carried out under the
aegis of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, based
at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases
used:</strong> Camp Lemonnier and Chebelley,
Djibouti; Laikipia, Manda Bay, Mombasa and Wajir, Kenya;
Victoria, Seychelles; Baidoa, Baledogle, Bosasso,
Galcayo, Kismayo and Mogadishu, Somalia; Entebbe,
Uganda." data-reactid="89"><strong>Bases used:</strong>
Camp Lemonnier and Chebelley, Djibouti; Laikipia, Manda
Bay, Mombasa and Wajir, Kenya; Victoria, Seychelles;
Baidoa, Baledogle, Bosasso, Galcayo, Kismayo and
Mogadishu, Somalia; Entebbe, Uganda.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OCTAVE
SOUNDSTAGE:</strong> A JSOC psychological
operation focused on Somalia." data-reactid="90"><strong>OCTAVE
SOUNDSTAGE:</strong> A JSOC psychological operation
focused on Somalia.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Unknown" data-reactid="91"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Unknown</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OCTAVE
STINGRAY:</strong> A JSOC psychological operation
focused on Somalia" data-reactid="92"><strong>OCTAVE
STINGRAY:</strong> A JSOC psychological operation
focused on Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Base used:
</strong>Mogadishu, Somalia" data-reactid="93"><strong>Base
used: </strong>Mogadishu, Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>OCTAVE
SUMMIT:</strong> A JSOC psychological operation
focused on Somalia" data-reactid="94"><strong>OCTAVE
SUMMIT:</strong> A JSOC psychological operation
focused on Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Base used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti"
data-reactid="95"><strong>Base used: </strong>Camp
Lemonnier, Djibouti</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>ODYSSEY LIGHTNING:
</strong>The campaign of special
operations-directed airstrikes against Islamic State
targets in Sirte, Libya, between August and December
2016" data-reactid="96"><strong>ODYSSEY LIGHTNING: </strong>The
campaign of special operations-directed airstrikes
against Islamic State targets in Sirte, Libya, between
August and December 2016</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Base used:
</strong>Naval Air Station, Sigonella, Italy"
data-reactid="97"><strong>Base used: </strong>Naval Air
Station, Sigonella, Italy</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>ODYSSEY
RESOLVE:</strong> Another component of the 2016
special operations campaign of air strikes against the
Islamic State in the Libyan city of Sirte,<a
href="https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2016/08/01/us-conducts-new-round-of-airstrikes-against-isis-in-libya/"
rel="nofollow noopener"
target="_blank"> Operation Odyssey
Resolve</a> consists of intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance flights. It was ongoing
as of February 2018." data-reactid="98"><strong>ODYSSEY
RESOLVE:</strong> Another component of the 2016
special operations campaign of air strikes against the
Islamic State in the Libyan city of Sirte,<a
href="https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2016/08/01/us-conducts-new-round-of-airstrikes-against-isis-in-libya/"
rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"> Operation
Odyssey Resolve</a> consists of intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance flights. It was ongoing
as of February 2018.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases
used:</strong> Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; Faya
Largeau, Chad; Benina and Misrata, Libya; Bamako and
Gao, Mali; Nema and Ouassa, Mauritania; Arlit and
Niamey, Niger; Dakar, Senegal; Bizerte, Tunisia;
Entebbe, Uganda" data-reactid="99"><strong>Bases used:</strong>
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; Faya Largeau, Chad; Benina
and Misrata, Libya; Bamako and Gao, Mali; Nema and
Ouassa, Mauritania; Arlit and Niamey, Niger; Dakar,
Senegal; Bizerte, Tunisia; Entebbe, Uganda</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>PALADIN HUNTER:
</strong>A 127e counterterrorism program in the
semi-autonomous Puntland region of Somalia."
data-reactid="100"><strong>PALADIN HUNTER: </strong>A
127e counterterrorism program in the semi-autonomous
Puntland region of Somalia.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; Bosasso and
Galcayo, Somalia" data-reactid="101"><strong>Bases used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; Bosasso and Galcayo,
Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>RAINMAKER:
</strong>A highly sensitive classified signals
intelligence effort" data-reactid="102"><strong>RAINMAKER:
</strong>A highly sensitive classified signals
intelligence effort</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Chebelley, Djibouti; Baidoa, Baledogle,
Kismayo and Mogadishu, Somalia" data-reactid="103"><strong>Bases
used: </strong>Chebelley, Djibouti; Baidoa,
Baledogle, Kismayo and Mogadishu, Somalia</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>ULTIMATE
HUNTER:</strong> A 127e counterterrorism program
using a U.S.-trained, equipped and directed Ugandan
force in Somalia." data-reactid="104"><strong>ULTIMATE
HUNTER:</strong> A 127e counterterrorism program using
a U.S.-trained, equipped and directed Ugandan force in
Somalia.</p>
<p type="text" content="<strong>Bases used:
</strong>Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti."
data-reactid="105"><strong>Bases used: </strong>Camp
Lemonnier, Djibouti.</p>
<p type="text" content="<em>*Information on which
operations the following bases support was partially
redacted: Douala, Garoua and Maroua (all Cameroon);
N’Djamena, Chad; Bangui, Central African Republic;
Diffa, Dirkou, Madama and Niamey (all Niger). The list
of operations supported by Tobruk and Tripoli (both
Libya) was fully redacted. Other data were likely
withheld completely.</em>" data-reactid="106"><em>*Information
on which operations the following bases support was
partially redacted: Douala, Garoua and Maroua (all
Cameroon); N’Djamena, Chad; Bangui, Central African
Republic; Diffa, Dirkou, Madama and Niamey (all
Niger). The list of operations supported by Tobruk and
Tripoli (both Libya) was fully redacted. Other data
were likely withheld completely.</em></p>
<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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<div> </div>
</div>
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