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<div class="header reader-header reader-show-element" dir="ltr"> <font
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href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14252">https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14252</a></font>
<h1 class="reader-title">Is a Foreign Military Intervention in
Venezuela Imminent?</h1>
<div class="credits reader-credits">By James Jordan – Alliance
for Global Justice</div>
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<div class="reader-estimated-time" dir="ltr"
style="text-align: left;">Jan 25th 2019</div>
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<p>According to conventional wisdom, there should be no
serious talk of foreign military intervention in
Venezuela. But these aren’t conventional times. The
conventional playbook would adopt a strategy of
foreign coordination of the Venezuelan opposition,
economic sabotage, infiltration of the military, and
manipulation of popular movements against the elected
government. All this is being done, however, so far,
not successfully. The frustrations of the Bolivarian
movement’s enemies is palpable. Does this mean
intervention is imminent? And what would such an
intervention look like?</p>
<p>We know that the Trump administration met with
Venezuelan coup plotters in 2017 and the Venezuelan
opposition speaks openly of its coordination with the
United States government. Officials in the U.S. and
internationally have repeatedly called for the
Venezuelan military and business people to take power,
denouncing and refusing to recognize legitimate
elections, and even having the audacity to “recognize”
a “new president” in Venezuela who was not elected and
who has no legitimate claim to office. Recent events
have included the first ever attempted coup-by-drone,
in August 2018; and the January 22nd mutiny by 27
National Guard troops led by a sergeant. One might
infer a sense of desperation among the enemies of the
Bolivarian government. </p>
<p>US National Security Advisor John Bolton called Cuba,
Venezuela, and Nicaragua a “Troika of Tyranny”, but
the real triple threat faced by Latin America is the
alliance of ultra-right administrations from the
United States, Colombia, and Brazil of Donald Trump,
Iván Duque, and Jair Bolsonaro, respectively. These
Oligarchs of Overthrow have Venezuela in their sight,
and military intervention is clearly an option on the
table where they are seated.</p>
<p>Important circumstances have changed that had
previously served as effective obstacles to
intervention. Military engagements in the Middle East
and Central Asia had made intervention in Venezuela
untenable. In Colombia, the kind of military invasion
advocated by former President Álvaro Uribe was
impossible because the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) were committed to defending Venezuela
from within should war break out. Today the FARC has
transformed into a political party, the unarmed
Revolutionary Alternative Common Force (still called
FARC). Meanwhile, President Trump has announced troop
withdrawals from both Syria and Afghanistan. Trump is
not a man of peace, and he has openly expressed his
support for a violent intervention in Venezuela.</p>
<p>Certainly, there is a long-standing connection
between the Colombian military and the war in
Afghanistan. Colombia has sent advisors, trainers, and
special operations troops to Afghanistan, and there is
a history of U.S. troop transfers between the two
countries. In fact, the application in Afghanistan of
lessons learned from decades of protracted war in
Colombia is an oft-mentioned theme among military
officials. Regarding Syria, Venezuelan expert on
unconventional warfare, Jorgé Negrón Valera wrote in
October 2018 that, “A hypothesis of a direct conflict
cannot be discarded. But all indications are that the
the first thing on the Pentagon’s table will be
Syria….” But as we enter 2019, the situation has
changed. Should U.S. troops be withdrawn from
Afghanistan and Syria, they could be well-suited for
redeployment in a Colombia-based conflict with
Venezuela.</p>
<p>Does all this mean that an invasion of Venezuela is
imminent? Not at all. But it also doesn’t mean an
invasion is <em>not </em>imminent, or that there are
not scenarios that include other forms of military
intervention. The US Empire and its Latin American
partners want to use Venezuela as an example and put
the nail in the coffin of socialist and popular
advances in the region. They want it so badly that
they are willing to consider options that had
previously been unthinkable.</p>
<p>Back in the early 2000s, when then Colombian
President Álvaro Uribe wanted the US to back him in a
military assault on Venezuela, even an enthusiastic
proponent of war like George W. Bush felt constrained
to put the brakes on Uribe’s adventurous inclinations.
At that time, traditional voices still were confident
they could put together the coalition to force regime
change. Nineteen years later, one cannot be surprised
if some of that confidence has waned.</p>
<p>Until recently, talk about military intervention in
Venezuela was roundly criticized and dismissed.
Neither Wall Street nor the traditional right wing had
any stomach for the disruption that would follow. But
that was then, and this is now. Bess Levin makes this
point in a September 2018 article published in Vanity
Fair:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Approximately one year ago, Donald Trump said that
he was considering a ‘military option’ in Venezuela.
At the time, virtually no one in Washington thought
this was a good idea….</p>
<p>What has changed, alarmingly, is that now there are
some people in Washington who have actually come
around to the idea. Last month, Senator Marco Rubio
said that… there is now a ‘very strong argument’
that the situation… could very well necessitate U.S.
military involvement. Bloomberg notes that ‘security
hawks with an interest in Latin America are taking
positions in the administration, adding to a sense
that Washington may be warming to intervention.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There has been a series of statements by world and
national leaders concerning military intervention in
Venezuela. President Trump famously declared “We have
many options for Venezuela, including a possible
military option”. In September 2018, Trump said that,
Venezuela, “…frankly, could be toppled very quickly by
the military if the military decides to do that.”</p>
<p>Likewise, in September 2018, Luís Almagro, General
Secretary of the Organization of American States said,
“With regards to a military intervention aimed at
overthrowing the regime of Nicolas Maduro, I think we
should not exclude any option.” Latin American
opposition to military intervention is widespread, and
a subsequent vote to denounce Almagro’s comment was
passed by the Lima Group, specifically tasked to find
a solution to the Venezuelan crisis. Nevertheless, it
is notable that Canada, Colombia, and Guayana refused
back this censure.</p>
<p>Since then, the situation on the diplomatic front has
only worsened. The OAS’ Almagro, all thirteen members
of the Lima Group, and the U.S. government have
released statements that they would not recognize the
election of Nicholas Maduro as Venezuela’s President.
Both Almagro and the U.S. State Department, in an act
of brazen violation of Venezuelan sovereignty, have
instead recognized the little-known Juan Guaidó,
leader of the right-leaning National Assembly (as
opposed to the more popular Constituent Assembly).
While President Maduro was reelected overwhelmingly in
May 2018, Guaido has not even run in a national
election. Former director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and current Secretary of State Michael Pompeo
released a statement on January 23 2019 saying,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The United States recognizes Juan Guaidó as the
new interim President of Venezuela, and strongly
supports his courageous decision to assume that role
pursuant to Article 233 of Venezuela’s constitution
and supported by the National Assembly, in restoring
democracy to Venezuela. As President Trump said,
“The people of Venezuela have courageously spoken
out against Maduro and his regime and demanded
freedom and the rule of law.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>On the Colombian front, indications from President
Iván Duque have been contradictory. Not only did
Colombia refuse to censure Almagro’s comments, but its
ambassador in Washington DC, Francisco Santos has
insisted that “all options are on the table”.
Nevertheless, Duque, in contrast with his mentor,
Uribe, has said that the military option “is not the
way.” On the other hand, Duque has called for
increasing spending on Colombia’s air force and issued
an order to put the air force on high alert. Following
on the heels of Pompeo’s announcement, Duque declared
his recognition of Guaidó as Venezuela’s president.</p>
<p>As mentioned earlier, the disarming of the FARC is a
factor we must consider.</p>
<p>In a 2005 interview (while the FARC still existed as
an armed force) conducted by Dick Emanuelsson and
Ingrid Storgen, political analyst Heinz Dieterich
makes the following points:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“There are 20,000 soldiers in the rear guard of an
eventual military conflict between Colombia and
Venezuela…. If these forces were not to exist, I am
absolutely sure that today we would have the
scenario that the Sandinistas had on the northern
border with Honduras (in the 80s)…. Objectively, by
its mere existence, they fundamentally make
impossible whatever strategy of military or
paramilitary destruction by the forces of the United
States or Uribe.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, in February 2005, the FARC made
exclusively clear their position when FARC commander
Raúl Reyes declared,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“In case of an invasion of our Venezuelan brothers
by the United States War Hawks, the FARC would
condemn it energetically and will offer its
unconditional solidarity to the Bolivarian process
of the country that saw the birth of our Liberator.
In Bolívar we find everything.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Now the FARC are demobilized and Raúl Reyes himself
was killed in a camp in Ecuador, working out terms for
the release of prisoners of war.</p>
<p>With this absence of the FARC, the presence and
activity of Colombian paramilitaries has grown and
intensified. As previously mentioned, on August 4
2018, Venezuela’s President Nicholas Maduros was
targeted in an assassination attempt using drones.
Venezuela says it has evidence that Colombian
paramilitaries were involved. In October 2018, the
Venezuelan military captured three Colombian
paramilitaries in the state of Tachira along the
border, citing evidence that the paramilitaries were
in coordination with Colombian police and military. On
November 5 2018, at least three members of the
Venezuelan National Guard were killed in
confrontations with Colombian paramilitaries in the
state of Amazonas. On December 24, 2018, Venezuela
captured nine Colombian paramilitaries entering the
country to carry out a “mission in Caracas.” Maduro
maintains that as many as 734 Venezuelan and Colombian
mercenaries are preparing to commit false flag
operations attacking military units on the border in
order to escalate and confuse popular opinion, and to
justify a potential intervention.</p>
<p>Negrón Valera instructs,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Finally, we must understand that within the
doctrine of Non-Conventional Warfare, aggression
will not come in the traditional army against army
form…. It will be the Colombian paramilitaries
operating on the border, the U.S.’s armed wing in
the region. Only this time it will have the full
logistical and military support of Washington and
the support of Colombia on the ground.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Negrón Valera also notes the construction of wells in
Colombia by the U.S. Army near the border with
Venezuela as a possible precursor to intervention. He
writes that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Let’s turn our attention to the tweet of the
Commander of the Colombian National Army, Ricardo
Gómez Nieto, who in the framework of the UNITAS
naval exercises, speaks of his gratitude to the U.S.
Army for its help in the ‘construction of a drinking
water well’ in the community of Rumonero.</p>
<p>The same ‘altruistic’ strategy has been used by the
US army in Afghanistan to consolidate itself in the
territory.In any case, the important thing to
highlight is that it was precisely in this part of
Guajira that Colombia established in 2015 the Task
Force on Combined Medium Arms (FUTAM), equipped with
armored combat weapons, artillery, infantry,
logistical support and army aviation. Only by
looking at the map where the ‘water wells’ are built
do we understand why Venezuela has a right to be
concerned.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nevertheless, we must consider that there remain
strong arguments that military invasion and other
forms of intervention are not likely. It behooves us
to soberly assess both Empire’s voices for and against
such a war before we jump to any conclusions.</p>
<p>The main argument is that such an invasion or other
interventions would be far too disruptive not only to
their targets, but to all those involved. Such efforts
would throw the economy into yet further crisis and
fuel a flood of refugees. A coup or invasion would
also likely spur a civil war that, in the absence of a
strong Venezuelan military component, would depend on
foreign troops to stabilize. That in and of itself
would be so offensive to most Venezuelans that, be
they supporters of the Bolivarian government or not,
many would defend their national soil on patriotic
grounds.</p>
<p>And that underscores the lack of popular backing for
the Venezuelan opposition. Uruguayan journalist and
Telesur cofounder Aram Aharonian observes,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“A Hinterlaces poll revealed that more than 64% of
Venezuelans have an unfavorable opinion about the
actions of rightwing leaders….There is another fact
that stands out in the poll: 62% of Venezuelans
prefer President Maduro to solve the economic
problems of the country, while 34% prefer an
opposition government. 61% blame economic problems
on agents external to the government, such as the
economic war, the fall of the price of oil, price
speculation, and U.S. financial sanctions, while 37%
attribute them to economic policies implemented by
the government.</p>
<p>….However, it is clear that the US hawks may push
for intervention: we must not let our guard down.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another factor that makes military intervention less
plausible is the reality that the Venezuela military
would not resist a military intervention alone. There
are 1.6 million armed and trained civilian militia
members ready to take to the streets to fight coup
attempts and foreign invaders. At the same time, with
the failures of the Colombian peace process, many
former FARC insurgents are returning to the hills to
join other armed groups and to perhaps form a new
insurgency. The National Liberation Army (ELN) is
still armed and several thousand strong. The ELN has
claimed responsibility for a January 17 car bombing in
Bogotá. Would the ELN be a pro-Bolivarian force within
Colombia in the event of an invasion?</p>
<p>With or without an armed Colombian insurgency, there
is a popular movement that can be expected to take the
streets in Colombia in protest to any invasion.
Colombia has a very large and well-organized
opposition that could paralyze its streets with
protest, should its people rise up to resist this war.</p>
<p>Internationally, countries such as Russia, China, and
Cuba could be counted on to come to Venezuela’s
defense, perhaps even with arms. On December 10, 2018,
Russia openly sent two nuclear-capable bombers to
Venezuela. Likewise, Mexico’s newly elected President
Manuel Lopez Obrador has announced that Mexico will
not participate in or support destabilization plans
toward Venezuela.</p>
<p>When we weigh all the factors, it is not possible to
say with any kind of certainty that there will be, or
that there will not be, a foreign military
intervention, invasion, or otherwise foreign directed
coup in Venezuela. But Empire has been waiting a long
time and faced failure after failure, so patience may
be running thin. More, the prize of regime change in
Venezuela, even with all the disruption and chaos that
would entail, is that it would existentially threaten
popular governments and movements throughout Latin
America. We must not underestimate that temptation.</p>
<p>What is required of all those who stand in solidarity
with Venezuela, and of all those who oppose Empire and
its wars, is this: that we be ready for all
eventualities on the table, including the military
option. The best way to end a march toward war is to
make sure that war never happens. To do that requires
those who love peace to mobilize.</p>
<p><em>The views expressed in this article are the
author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of
the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.</em></p>
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