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<h1 class="reader-title">Vietnam Will Win: Epilogue</h1>
<span class="post_author_intro">by</span> <span
class="post_author" itemprop="author"><a
href="https://www.counterpunch.org/author/wilfred-burchett/"
rel="nofollow">Wilfred Burchett</a> - March 30, 2018</span></div>
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<p>In the previous chapters I have dealt with what could
be considered the long and infinitely difficult road to
Paris. At the time of writing, the delegates to the
four-party Paris Conference have been meeting for nearly
four months, ostensibly to negotiate an end to the war
and to seek a political solution to the problem of South
Vietnam. Henry Cabot Lodge, who had served twice as U.S.
ambassador to South Vietnam and was deeply committed to
the military-fascist-type dictatorship which the United
States installed there, replaced Harriman as head of the
U.S. delegation.</p>
<p>During the first five and a half months before Johnson
finally ordered the bombing halt that cleared the way
for full-scale negotiations, it was possible to argue
that the Paris discussions were useless. Almost six
months after Johnson’s fable of March 31, 1968, the
bombings of the North were continued more intensively
than ever. There was a steady month-by-month increase in
missions flown, in tons of bombs dropped and number of
shells fired from 7th Fleet units prowling up and down
the coast. The difference between generalized and
“limited” bombing is that in the latter the bombings and
naval bombardments are concentrated in a much smaller
area, which is militarily more effective, as Defense
Secretary Clifford has pointed out the target area is
the narrow 200-mile corridor or “panhandle” leading
north from the 17th parallel, through which all
North-South communications pass. It is an area where
more than a quarter of North Vietnam’s 17 million people
live, one of the country’s most densely populated areas.</p>
<p>During the month of August alone, the town of Vinh,
provincial capital of Nghe An – the province where Ho
Chi Minh was born – was attacked 139 times within seven
days. Of the province’s 426 villages, 211 were bombed
during the month. In the neighboring province of Ha
Tinh, 217 out of 250 villages were attacked and 83
shelled by the big guns of the 7th fleet. Many of the
bombs dropped are the murderous pellet bombs designed
exclusively for the human body. In Quang Binh Province,
124 out of 131 villages were attacked. The little
coastal town of Dong Hoi – a major target of the first
systematic raids in February 1965 – was shelled for 24
hours on end. The town and surrounding villages received
2,500 shells during the 24 hour period.</p>
<p>On nine occasions between August 10 and 27, there were
21 B-52 raids, totaling 140 sorties, dropping 4,000 tons
of bombs on 17 villages of the Vinh Linh region, which
is the northern part of Quang Tri Province, truncated by
the 17th parallel. In the same period all 23 villages of
Vinh Linh were heavily attacked during 670 raids, apart
from those made by the B-52s with another 4,000 tons of
bombs supplemented by 300 naval shellings. There has
been nothing comparable to this tonnage of bombs and
shells in the history of warfare. It gives the lie to
Johnson’s August 19 speech to the Veterans of Foreign
Wars in which he claimed he had “halted 90 percent of
the bombings…” The actual statistics of “limited
bombings” are as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>U.S. Bombing of North Vietnam: 1968<br>
</strong><strong>Average Number of Daily Bombing Raids</strong></p>
<p>First 3 months of 1968 before Johnson’s March 31
“limited bombing” speech. 70 (over all North
Vietnam)</p>
<p>April “limited bombing” 160 (over the “panhandle”)</p>
<p>May “limited bombing” 152 (over the “panhandle”)</p>
<p>June “limited bombing” 170 (over the “panhandle”)</p>
<p>July “limited bombing” 206 (over the “panhandle”)</p>
<p>August “limited bombing” 209 (over the “panhandle”)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The tonnage of bombs dropped rose in the same
proportion. If the “escalation” rate slowed down
somewhat in August, this was because typhoon conditions
kept the carrier borne planes below hatches for almost a
week. The duplicity of Johnson and total lack of
sincerity which dominates his conduct of the Paris talks
is illustrated by the fact that the sharpest increase in
the bombings was precisely during the period that the
Vietnamese had given the sign of “restraint” the
American negotiators had been harping on for weeks as
the signal to halt the bombings altogether and move the
talks on to full-scale negotiations to end the war.
Between June 21 and August 19, there was an end to
rocket attacks on Saigon and a marked lull in ground
activity, reflected by a falling off in U.S. casualties.
Harriman had been saying publicly – and even more so
privately – that Johnson needed only a “sign,” no need
for anything to be said publicly or even privately, a
“sign of restraint,” and bombings would be halted
altogether so that full talks could start. And he said
that such a lull would be taken as the “sign.”</p>
<p>It is common knowledge in Paris that the Harriman
delegation did clearly recognize the “sign” and the less
“hawkish” among them flattered themselves that they had
steered the “official conversations,” as the talks are
known, over the first great hurdle. They recommended a
bombing halt. The word came strong and clear from
diplomatic and press circles that Johnson was to
announce a total bombing halt in mid-August Instead
there was the August 19, “no-bombing halt” speech. The
final pretext given for the start of the systematic
bombing attacks in February 1965 – as noted in an
earlier chapter – was that this was necessary to inject
some morale into the shaky regime of Nguyen Cao Ky at
the time. It was obvious that the refusal to halt the
bombings, as rather brutally announced by Johnson on
August 19, was for precisely the same reason. The
Thieu-Ky regime would not survive the end of bombings
and start of political talks, Thieu having made this
clear to Johnson just a month earlier at Honolulu.</p>
<p>The August 19 speech came as no surprise to the
Vietnamese because it was consistent with every move
Johnson has made in relation to talks. When the first
moves for secret Washington-Hanoi contacts were made in
December 1966, Johnson’s reaction was immediately to
order the first bombing raids on Hanoi. When he offered
in December 1966 and January 1967 to halt all bombings
if there were “any sort of a sign, public or private,
official or unofficial” that Hanoi would be prepared to
sit down and talk, and he got that sign on January 28,
1967, in Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh’s statement
that if the bombings were halted talks could start,
Johnson’s reaction was to double the bombing. When his
“any time, any place” offer was taken up it turned out
that “any place” did not include Phnom Penh or Warsaw.</p>
<p>All the various moves that have led to getting talks
started and the start of the talks themselves, have been
accompanied by bad faith on the part of the United
States, which seems always traceable back directly to
President Johnson himself. Numerous diplomatic and non
diplomatic initiatives during the 18 months that
preceded the start of talks in Paris were reported to
the Vietnamese as coming directly from the White House
itself. Hanoi’s positive response to a certain number of
these initiatives has been invariably followed by
violent repudiations on Johnson’s part of the
assumptions on which such initiatives would be based. In
Paris, Harriman’s entourage has also conducted quiet
soundings, legitimate in the conduct of such delicate
negotiations, that have resulted in the Vietnamese
taking certain measures to facilitate the atmosphere of
the talks themselves and to try to move them ahead. The
invariable response by President Johnson has been the
opposite to that aimed at. In refusing to halt the
bombings, which he well knows is the indispensable step
that must be taken to move the talks on to discussion of
a political solution, President Johnson is personally
responsible for the deaths and mutilation of tens of
thousands of Vietnamese and Americans. At least in this
affair of getting the war in Vietnam ended, he has
revealed himself as a man whose words cannot be trusted
on matters of the most critical international
importance.</p>
<p>That he refused to halt the bombings and thus shorten
the war, on the pretext that halting the bombings would
“jeopardize” American lives, is merely to add cynicism
to bad faith.</p>
<p>The NLF riposte to the August 19 speech was swift and
shattering. They launched a series of attacks in key
areas, gradually concentrating on the elite units whose
job was to protect the main cities and bases. On the
southern front, the U.S. 25th division based in Gia Dinh
and Tay Ninh Provinces with the main task of defending
Saigon was very severely mauled in a series of actions
still continuing at the time of writing. The astronomic
“body count” figures of “Vietcong” dead cannot hide the
fact that about a quarter of the 25th Division, the
equivalent of a full brigade, was put out of action –
including a battalion wiped out as a unit – and a huge
quantity of the division’s armor was destroyed in
attacks starting August 22 against the division’s bases
and outposts, and ambushes against supply convoys and
armored units sent to relieve besieged positions. In the
northern area, it was the American division, earmarked
for the defense of Da Nang, which took heavy losses.</p>
<p>To understand the evolution in South Vietnam and at
Paris during the first year of the Conference, one must
bear in mind that by the time the Paris talks started
the third stage of classical people’s war – the
encirclement of the cities – had already been reached.
As explained earlier,<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[1]</a>
the abandonment of Khe Sanh marked the withdrawal by
U.S. forces into the cities and bases, protected by
heavily fortified triple defense perimeters considered
“impenetrable.” To get at the adversary’s combat units,
the NLF now had to go after them in the cities and
bases. This is the meaning of the sort of actions in and
around Saigon and Da Nang in late August and September
1968 while the Paris talks were bogged down by Johnson’s
demand for “reciprocity” for halting all bombings of the
North.</p>
<p>This “reciprocity” was nothing less than a pledge from
the DRV that all attacks would be halted against South
Vietnam’s cities which the U.S.-Saigon Command were
using as sanctuaries, just as the U.S. Strategic Air
Command was using Thailand, Okinawa, Guam and other
bases as attack-free sanctuaries from which to launch
their B-52 raids against the South.</p>
<p>Naturally the DRV delegation refused to give any such
pledges. An analysis of the Paris talks is beyond the
scope of this book. Suffice to say that American tactics
from the start were first to see if any decisive
military advantage could be extracted from them. Thus
Harriman’s first move – under the innocent guise of
seeking a start of the implementation of the Geneva and
1962 Laos Agreements – was to demand the reconstitution
of the demilitarized zone and what would amount to
sealing off South Vietnam’s borders with North Vietnam
and Laos. As Westmoreland had exerted considerable
military effort to occupy the DMZ and failed, and as the
U.S.-Saigon command from the time it was set up under
General Paul Harkins in February 1962 had a major
strategic aim to occupy the border areas with Laos and
had failed, it was hardly likely that the DRV was going
to hand these over as prizes at the conference table. Of
course, there was also the offer of considerable dollar
bait if the DRV delegation would renounce aid to and
interest in the South. In essence the U.S. position has
been to try to get the DRV to agree that the DRV can do
what it likes in the North so long as the United States
has a free hand to do what it likes in the South. Any
perceptive analysis of the various Harriman statements
can only result in this sort of conclusion.</p>
<p>There is a fantastic lack of reality about the tough
U.S. stance at the Paris talks and the sharply
deteriorating situation on the military and political
front in South Vietnam. Developments in the military
situation since the talks have been going on in Paris,
have been analyzed in an earlier chapter. The trend of
withdrawal for the defense of the cities which started
with the abandonment of Khe Sanh has continued. The
abandonment of the McNamara Line which I first reported
in the August 24 issue of the <em>Guardian</em> was
confirmed by a marine spokesman to a UPI correspondent
on September 11. “Plans for the McNamara Line… have all
but been abandoned, U.S. Marine sources said today….”<a
href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[2]</a> As with the
abandonment of Khe Sanh, the story was tucked away in
the inside pages of most papers. Major U.S. bases are
now under very serious threat of being overrun and
further “deactivations” will be inevitable in the months
to come.</p>
<p>As the NLF encircling grip on the cities daily becomes
tighter and the shock troops allotted to the defense of
the cities are being seriously whittled away by
unrelenting NLF attacks and harassment, the role of the
newly formed Alliance of National Democratic and Peace
Forces becomes more evident. The Alliance is independent
of the NLF but is closely supported by the latter and
the two are pledged to undertake “JOWL activities” aimed
at overthrowing the Saigon puppet regime and securing
the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign troops. The
Alliance draws its support essentially from the urban
middle class and intellectuals. It reaches into sections
of the population which the NLF only marginally reached.
The NLF also has its clandestine organizations in the
cities, mainly among the workers and students. The
Alliance fulfills an important role of liaison with
patriotic elements within the Saigon administration and
armed forces. Only ten members of the Alliance’s
40-member Central Committee have been named. The others,
for security reasons, remain clandestine, but it is
widely known that they include high ranking members of
the Saigon army and administration. And this holds out
rich prospects for the future, as the army sees that
prospects for a U.S. military defeat are very real and
the very fact of the Paris talks has provoked an
exceedingly strong smell of an American “sellout” No one
wants to stay with the losing side beyond the point of
no return.</p>
<p>Thieu and Ky are increasingly isolated even in their
own milieu and this is the reason why in mid September
they sent an emissary to Bangkok to request “Big Minh”
(General Duong Van Minh) to return from exile. “Big
Minh” had organized the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem and
headed the short lived triumvirate that replaced the Ngo
Dinh brothers. But he was suspected by the U.S. command
of having “neutralist” leanings, so he was deposed by
the leading U.S. favorite at the time, “strong man”
Nguyen Khanh, and exiled to Thailand. Nguyen Khanh
lumped “neutralism” together with “communism” as one of
the two deadliest sins punishable by death if culprits
were found espousing its cause. A limited amount of
prestige stuck to “Big Minh” because of his role in
deposing and killing the hated Ngo Dinh brothers and
because of his suspected “neutralist” leanings. Thieu
and Ky – previously his bitterest enemies – would now
like to have “Big Minh” at their sides for
respectability’s sake, one more indication of the
political degeneration in Saigon. Another indication is
the flight of the “elite”. First the dollars go, then
the wives and children, then the heads of families – all
those who can pay a few thousand dollars for passports
and exit visas. For a son of military age the price is
usually doubled, with part of it all ending up in the
pockets of Thieu and Ky, that is, in their bank accounts
abroad. France and Australia are the favorite holes for
well-heeled Saigon rats. The Paris talks have been an
important yeast-like element in the Saigon ferment and
if they really move on to the next phase aimed at a
political settlement in South Vietnam based on the
Geneva Agreements, then the ferment could predictably
erupt into a volcano.</p>
<p>The Paris talks proved to be an important yeast-like
element in the Saigon ferment, especially after the
bombing halt, when the NLF delegation arrived to take
its place in the quadripartite talks and was accorded
full diplomatic honors by the French government. As
explained earlier, the talks that were due to begin
November 6, 1968 only got underway on January 25, 1969,
because of the stalling tactics of the Saigon regime
backed by Pentagon “hawks” and Ambassador Bunker in
Saigon.</p>
<p>The U.S. delegation tried hard to pretend that there
had been some “understandings,” some “tacit agreements”
in exchange for the bombing halt. But the DRV delegation
strenuously denied this.</p>
<p>Shortly after the NLF launched its “spring offensive”
on the night of 22-23 February, Cabot lodge started to
claim these were violations of “understandings which had
been made clear to the other side.” Correspondents at
the Conference press briefings tried to discover what
kind of an “understanding” it was that had to be made
“clear to the other side.” However this was something
which U.S. press officer Harold Kaplan (who had replaced
William Jorden in the Cabot Lodge delegation) found it
impossible to explain.</p>
<p>In the four-party talks, the DRV and NLF delegations
have made it abundantly clear that a final settlement
can only be brought about by the United States sitting
down to “direct and serious negotiations” with the NLF,
for a settlement based on the complete withdrawal of
U.S. and satellite troops from South Vietnam. Many of
Vietnam’s well-wishers marvel at the patience of the DRV
and NLF delegates in Paris, faced with the lack of
sincerity and plain deceit and treachery which has been
the U.S.-Saigon response to their various efforts to
show goodwill.</p>
<p>It will suffice to give a few examples of this
treachery. B-52 bombing raids were vastly stepped up
over the whole of Vietnam after Johnson’s “limited
bombing” order of March 31, 1968. During 1967, there
were 1,164 B-52 raids by flights of 3 to 12 planes over
Vietnam. In 1968 there were 3,172, with the monthly
total jumping up after the March 31 speech and
escalating still more after the October 31 decision to
halt all bombings in the North and start the 4-party
talks. While Harriman was demanding that the NLF halt
its attacks against the cities, the number of B-52 raids
in the immediate vicinity of Saigon increased from 928
in 1967, to 3,022 in 1968 and the monthly average
continued to grow steadily during the first three months
of 1969. (It may be noted that a single flight of three
B-52’s drops 100 tons of bombs and that there are
densely populated villages on the outskirts of Saigon
that are being bombed.)</p>
<p>From a period some weeks before the October 31 bombing
halt, at a time when Harriman was demanding a “lowering
of hostilities,” a “reduction of combat contacts,” etc.,
until February 22, 1969, the NLF virtually halted all
combat initiatives, quite clearly to provide a favorable
atmosphere for the Paris Conference.</p>
<p>What was the U.S. response to this “restraint” for
which Harriman had pleaded so eloquently?</p>
<p>This question is answered in an extract from an article
by the Saigon correspondent of the N.Y. Times, Terence
Smith, who wrote in the March 24, 1969 <em>Times</em>:</p>
<p>“As a result of a shift in ground tactics… the rate of
contacts – that is the number of times an American unit
lured an enemy force into battle – jumped dramatically.
By February, the rate of contacts had increased 100
percent from the days before the bombing halt…” And as
to how this was made possible, Smith continues:</p>
<p>“The pullback of enemy troops from the cities and
towns, particularly in the northern and central parts of
South Vietnam, in the late summer and fall of last year
permitted the allied troops to spread out and assume a
more vigorous role…”</p>
<p>In other words the United States exploited militarily
the “restraint” by the NLF which Harriman had argued
would be most conducive to progress at the peace talks.
Incidentally, in the same article, Smith quotes an
embarrassed Harriman as stating that “the enemy
offensive was preceded by a sharp increase in
American-initiated ground activity… essentially a
response to U.S. actions, rather than a deliberate move
to affect the peace talks…”</p>
<p>The “spring offensive” would not have been necessary
had the U.S. delegation in Paris shown any signs of
wanting serious negotiations, or had U.S. policy-makers
in Washington shown any signs of understanding the real
situation in South Vietnam. The “spring offensive” was
necessary to emphasize and bring home the reality of the
defeat of the US.-Saigon forces. Even Henry Kissinger,
now President Nixon’s chief foreign policy adviser,
writing in the January 1969 <em>Foreign Affairs</em>,
has noted that for the United States not to win a war of
this type was to lose it, whereas for the NLF, not to
lose was to win. But the Pentagon’s hawks and its
“spokesmen” like Joseph Alsop had the NLF defeated once
again, until the beginning of the “spring offensive,”
and similar attitudes comprised the negotiating position
of Cabot Lodge in Paris. The “spring offensive” knocked
all this fantasy on the head and was probably directly
responsible for Nixon’s eight-point peace plan,
announced on May 14.</p>
<p>Although the same degree of surprise as in the 1968 Têt
offensive was not possible, the U.S. did not know in
advance either the day or hour of the simultaneous NLF
attacks against 140 bases in February 1969. They were
also taken by surprise at the targets hit. The most
heavily defended headquarters and bases were hit during
the first minutes and hours. General Abrams had
concentrated 400,000 troops for the defense of the
Saigon area, but some of the heaviest blows fell well
within its defense perimeter – in the biggest logistics
division. The famous Air Cavalry division, withdrawn
from the northern front for the defense of Saigon and
stationed in the Tay Ninh area, was forced to “shorten
its defense perimeter” – a classic formula for
disguising retreat. These elite divisions, together with
the U.S. 1st Infantry division suffered very heavy
casualties. Heavy losses were also inflicted on
specialized units, helicopters and armored vehicles.</p>
<p>Abrams was further caught off guard by NLF tactics.
This time the NLF attacked with smaller but infinitely
better equipped units. The “spoiling operations” and
massive use of B-52’s against supposed “Vietcong staging
areas” and “concentrations” proved to have been useless.
The NLF could strike when and where it liked, making the
enclave theory of U.S. troops holding out indefinitely
in selected bases hopelessly outmoded.</p>
<p>If the Têt offensive dealt a death blow to
Westmoreland’s “search and destroy” strategy, the
“spring offensive” dealt a deathblow to Abram’s “clear
and hold” strategy. And if the massive use of
helicopters added a new factor – high mobility – to
counter-guerrilla warfare , the NLF’s big rockets
introduced a new factor also. Defense perimeters,
minefields, electronic detectors made little sense when
the rockets could fly overhead straight to their
targets.</p>
<p>The “spring offensive” showed that the relation of
forces had continued to change dramatically in favor of
the NLF and it had gone far enough to be an irreversible
process, notwithstanding “Alsop’s Fables” and “captured
enemy documents.” However, I still believe that had it
not been for U.S. double-dealing in response to NLF
restraint the “spring offensive” would never have been
launched.</p>
<p>Another example of U.S. double-dealing is on the
question of “self-determination” for the South
Vietnamese people, a term used over and over again by
Harriman and repeated by Lodge. The CIA inaugurated its
“Phoenix Plan,” aiming to liquidate 85,000 “VCI’s” –
Vietcong infrastructure – in CIA jargon, after the Paris
talks started. According to lists drawn up by the CIA
and its Saigon counterpart there are 85,000 NLF cadres
from members of the Central Committee down to humble
villagers who look after matters like public health and
education at a hamlet level. They are all marked down
for summary execution, usually by specially trained
commando groups. “Phoenix Plan” organs have been
established at the central, zonal, provincial and
district levels, each with U.S. advisers attached. The
1969 plan calls for physical liquidation of 33,000
“VCI’s” and the present rate of assassination is said by
high U.S. officials in Saigon to be running at 500 per
month.</p>
<p>In case any agreement emerges from the Paris talks, the
U.S.-Saigon command fondly hopes it will have no NLF
problem to worry about. The murder gangs will have
solved the political future of South Vietnam. What they
have overlooked is that for every NLF cadre killed there
are ten ready to take his or her place.</p>
<p>For the DRV and NLF negotiators, the Paris talks
represent another dimension of the greatest struggle
waged by the Vietnamese people in their long history.
The struggle in the arena of diplomacy and public
opinion in Paris, the military struggle to defend the
North against U.S. air and naval forces and the
military-political struggle led by the NLF in the South,
are all part of an integral whole. Xuan Thuy who heads
the DRV delegation and Tran Buu Kiem, who then headed
that of the NLF in Paris, have repeatedly stated that if
the United States wants a peaceful solution, the
Vietnamese are ready to negotiate in good faith. But if
the United States wants to continue the war, the
Vietnamese – north and south of the l7th parallel – are
prepared for that, for as long as necessary.</p>
<p>I believe the Vietnamese leaders see that the Paris
talks, backed up by their strong position in the field,
could bring them to the end of that long and difficult
road to complete national independence and the final end
of a century of foreign aggression and occupation by
western powers. At home the Vietnamese people are
fighting a titanic, unequal battle for the life of their
nation, their suffering and heroism largely unknown to
the outside world. In Paris, the Vietnamese delegations
fight on another level, but in full view of the eyes and
ears of the whole world. The fact that the United States
had to come to Paris to do diplomatic battle on more or
less equal terms with the victim of their aggression, is
a matter of historic significance. It is unprecedented.
This, and the valiant fight of the Vietnamese people
that made the Paris talks possible, is a source of
inspiration for the oppressed throughout the world.
Whether the Paris talks will eventually mark the end of
this long struggle remains to be seen, but the DRV and
NLF negotiators are far too responsible towards their
people and world public opinion to leave any stone
unturned to bring this about. And it is in this context
that one must view the 10-point peace plan, submitted by
Tran Buu Kiem at the 16th plenary session of the Paris
Conference, on May 8, 1969.<a href="#_edn3"
name="_ednref3">[3]</a></p>
<p>The 10-point plan represented a maximum effort by the
NLF to bring about the degree of unity and national
reconciliation essential to bring the war to an end and
“escort” the United States out of South Vietnam with
whatever “honor” could be salvaged from such a
disastrous and inglorious enterprise. The plan also
provides for the maximum guarantees of true self
determination, not the spurious variety being peddled by
Cabot Lodge in Paris. The main stress was put on the
need to settle the problems of South Vietnam by the
South Vietnamese themselves, as a “family matter” as one
NLF delegate expressed it to me.</p>
<p>The NLF was ready to sit down with those representing
the most diverse political and social tendencies, as
long as they subscribed to peace with independence and
neutrality for South Vietnam, to obtain agreement on the
composition of a provisional, coalition government. A
responsible member of the NLF delegation told me that
the NLF would take part in such discussions without any
fixed formula and would not force its views on the
participants nor demand any set proportion of seats in
the future government.</p>
<p>In my first meeting with President Nguyen Huu Tho, he
stressed that the NLF did not demand any exclusive
position for itself and did not demand a monopoly in
settling the problems of South Vietnam. The NLF was
pioneering, coordinating, organizing a resistance
struggle to acquire true independence for Vietnam,
without which real peace was inconceivable. This is the
position today, in the moment of victory. National
interests sometimes take precedence over class
interests. The 10-point plan is also in full agreement
with deposition of the Peoples’ Revolutionary Party as
described in Chapter 13.</p>
<p>In my discussions with NLF delegation members after the
10-point plan was put forward, the importance of
neutrality was emphasized by them. “Neutrality is an
objective need of our situation,” one member stated. “It
gives us the best conditions for consolidating our
independence and reconstructing the country. Maybe some
will say it is a propaganda trick, that once the United
States withdraws the floodgates will be opened to
communism, they think. But if one is a realist and
reflects for a moment, he can see that neutrality is an
objective need for a people that wants to consolidate
its independence, to reconstruct a war-torn country and
live on the best possible terms with its neighbors. We
want real neutrality in the most practical sense of the
term. Not just in a formal sense but in a very real
sense. There will be no a adherence to any blocs. We
will not accept the protection of any country…”</p>
<p>All this reflects the fact that the NLF leaders are
highly conscious of their historic role, their
responsibilities towards future generations of
Vietnamese who will live in a country genuinely free and
independent, not only because of the exceptional heroism
of those that fought to make this possible, but because
of the exceptional wisdom and realism of those that
directed this struggle.</p>
<p>This was more evident than ever with the formation on
June 8, 1969 of the Provisional Revolutionary Government
(PRG), an event of great historic importance. Organized
from elements of the NLF and the Alliance of National,
Democratic and Peace Forces, the PRG now takes over the
NLF administration within South Vietnam and diplomatic
representation abroad. Elements of the PRG will later be
joined with representatives of other patriotic forces to
form a Provisional Coalition Government which will hold
genuinely democratic elections for a new National
Assembly.</p>
<p>The PRG’s twelve-point program (see Appendix) reflects
a blend of moderation and realism that has marked every
step of the development of NLF strategy and tactics. The
NLF will continue to bear the brunt of the struggle by
retaining its role of organizer and leader of the
resistance struggle. But it also shows its willingness
to share power with all who accept the minimum
requirements of peace with independence and neutrality.
Heading the new government, which was promptly
recognized by all socialist states and many “Third
World” countries, is Huynh Tan Phat, the Saigon
architect who is secretary general of the NLF Central
Committee and chairman of the NLF Saigon Gia Dinh
Organization. Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, former deputy head
of the NLFs delegation to the Paris talks, who made a
deep impression on the entire press corps because of her
intelligence, capability and dignified charm, was named
foreign minister and head of the NLF delegation in
Paris. Tran Bun Kiem returned to the PRG’s jungle
headquarters as minister without portfolio and is
certain to have an important post in any future
coalition government.</p>
<p>The PRG has taken over the NLF flag and the slogans of
a South Vietnam independent, democratic, peaceful,
neutral and prosperous. The PRG was founded at a
three-day Congress of People’s Representatives between
June 6 and 8, in which 88 delegates from the NLF and the
Alliance took part, and with 72 guests from other
organizations also present.</p>
<p>During their long history, the Vietnamese have, in
defense of their homeland, defeated the greatest
invading armies of the past. They defeated the armies of
the great Mongolian empire. They defeated armies led by
some of the most skillful Chinese feudal generals. In
modern times they carried out a successful nationwide
revolution while under Japanese occupation at the end of
World War II. They defeated the French and they dealt a
death blow to French colonialism from which France never
recovered. (Inspired by the successful Vietminh
resistance, the Algerian people rose up in their turn
and gave French colonialism the coup de grâce.) It might
appear that in standing up singlehandedly against the
United States, the mightiest of all the imperialisms,
history has imposed too great a task upon the Vietnamese
people. But here again they are acquitting themselves in
a way that has aroused the admiration of mankind.</p>
<p>The Vietnamese people have the blood of victory in
their veins, but as victors in struggles to defend their
own patrimony, their own homes and villages, their own
temples and ancestors’ tombs. They could perhaps be
annihilated if the ultimate madness comes over Nixon and
he orders the use of nuclear weapons, but they will
never be defeated. They like to compare themselves to
bamboo, which is very tough, but very flexible. These
are the qualities they display in the highest degree on
the battlefields of Vietnam and at the Paris conference
table.</p>
<p><strong>Notes.</strong></p>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[1]</a> Chapter 7.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[2]</a> <em>International
Herald Tribune</em> (Paris), September 12, 1968.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[3]</a> The full text
of the 10-point plan is published as an Appendix.</p>
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