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<h1 id="reader-title">Vietnam Will Win: Self-Defence</h1>
<div id="reader-credits" class="credits">by <span
class="post_author" itemprop="author"><a
href="https://www.counterpunch.org/author/wilfred-burchett/"
rel="nofollow">Wilfred Burchett</a> - March 9, 2018<br>
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<p>During the 1968 Lunar New Year offensive, NLF attacking
forces were immediately able with remarkable facility to
set up defensive positions in numerous cities, which
they quickly turned over to local, self-defense forces,
enabling the spearhead of the attacking force to be
withdrawn for action elsewhere. The task of the
self-defense forces, the hard core formed mainly from
underground NLF cells established in the cities during
years of patient organizational work, was to defend the
positions secured and to transform them into NLF
military bases inside the cities for use as jumping off
points for further waves of attacks. In one great bound
the NLF had jumped over what the Americans considered
insuperable obstacles at the approaches of the cities
and had seized what were considered impregnable
positions. Their forces were implanted inside the cities
in such a way as to require virtually no supply lines or
transport; their arms, munitions and food were secured
in those first few hours when they seized almost all the
arsenals and munitions depots, distributing the contents
to the future self-defense forces.</p>
<p>Several scores of thousands of arms were seized and
distributed within the first 24 hours of the attacks
(hundreds of artillery pieces and heavier weapons for
which the NLF had no use were destroyed to deny their
use to the enemy). Machinery from the arsenals for
making or repairing light weapons was also seized and in
the days that followed, this equipment was distributed
to hundreds of tiny workshops in the cities and
throughout the country. Of the 140 towns and cities
attacked, the NLF leadership had designated certain
priorities and within each town and city there were
priority targets. Attacks on the US. Embassy and Thieu’s
presidential palace in Saigon, for instance, were
diversionary, while priority targets like the huge Thanh
Tay An arsenal, near Tan Son Nhut airport, were seized
and 5,000 weapons, from this one installation alone,
were distributed to the future self-defense forces.</p>
<p>Another priority target was communications (the cutting
of all major roads, the blowing up of strategic bridges
and the destruction of planes, helicopters, military
vehicles, trucks and river craft) aiming to paralyze
military movement and isolate the cities at least
temporarily, preventing the enemy from rushing
reinforcements to any one spot. Time was thus gained for
the self-defense forces to dig in, consolidate their
positions, link up these positions with trench networks
and tunnels and build strong points and combat nests in
order to create solid positions from which to continue
the armed struggle in the cities. The priority target in
Saigon was the “Chinese city” of Cholon, with more than
one million population. Cholon is the main location of
rice-husking mills and therefore the greatest rice
storage center in all of South Vietnam. All warehouses
were seized and steps immediately taken to set up big
reserves of foodstuffs for the self-defense forces
(stocks were also distributed to the population in case
the Americans started bombing the storage depots as part
of their usual tactics to prevent foodstuffs falling
into “Vietcong” hands). Within the first few hours of
the attack against Saigon-Cholon, the self-defense
forces had stocks of arms, ammunition and food,
sufficient for many months of combat. The same was true
in most other cities marked down as priority targets. In
the main target cities, the self-defense forces were
firmly established in one key sector or another,
consolidating their positions and where necessary
establishing a line of communication with NLF rear
bases.</p>
<p>The conception of “self-defense” centers is an original
idea, one of many developed by the Vietnamese people for
the conduct of guerrilla warfare, and it is inseparable
from the whole conception of “people’s war.”
Self-defense or auto-defense was utilized during the
anti-French resistance war, but on nothing like the
scale on which it has been used more recently in the
South. Self-defense in the cities is exclusively an
innovation of the South. Although the stage of
encirclement of the cities had been reached in the
anti-French resistance, the Geneva Agreements obviated
the necessity for the actual assault on the cities.
Auto-defense in the cities is but an extension of a
system already perfected in the self-defense villages.</p>
<p>Auto-defense has been extremely important in South
Vietnam and the resistance struggle could never have
reached its present stage of assaulting cities without
the formation of self-defense units in the liberated
villages and the integration of whole groups of
fortified villages into self-defense zones.</p>
<p>The establishment of self-defense units and zones was
an inevitable and logical development within the South
Vietnamese conception of people’s war. The self-defense
concept is inseparably linked with the political
unpopular aspect of the armed struggle and plays a vital
supporting role of overall political-military
activities. Self-defense mobilizes the creative
initiative of the people for developing new techniques,
tactics and even weapons. This creative energy reaches
full fruition only when an entire nation is engaged in
the struggle.</p>
<p>The self-defense concept has been developed in the very
specific conditions of South Vietnam, including such
factors as the establishment by the adversary of village
“self-defense” units as an anti guerrilla measure and
the building of anti guerrilla fortifications around the
“strategic hamlets,” which facilitated their
transformation into anti government “fortified
villages,” defended by the weapons and often some of the
personnel of the original anti guerrilla “self-defense”
units. But the basic idea of self-defense villages and
zones presumably could be adapted anywhere the people
have taken to arms in a nationwide liberation struggle.
Success obviously depends on the struggle being waged
not partially but on a large scale; on careful political
work to lay a solid groundwork in which the widest
possible unity is forged around determination to wage a
resolute, long-range struggle. The self-defense zones
have to be either large enough or have natural
conditions to permit a certain mobility of the defending
forces within the zone itself, or must be linked to a
solid base area into which they can temporarily withdraw
or maneuver.</p>
<p>The Vietnamese experience with self-defense is largely
unknown abroad and has nothing in common with the
failures of auto defense in Columbia and Bolivia
analyzed by Régis Debray in <em>Revolution in the
Revolution. </em>In saying that “today self-defense
as a system and as a reality is liquidated,” Debray is
apparently referring to the concept of self-defense when
utilized in complete isolation and as the primary
strategy used in a revolution. For example, in Bolivia
the tin miners who played a key role in overthrowing the
oligarchy then established themselves in an almost
autonomous and heavily defended but politically isolated
zone, against which government forces could prepare at
leisure and finally in May 1964 launch a devastating
attack supported by aircraft and U.S.-trained
parachutists. Debray accurately analyzes the weaknesses
of such a concept of “self-defense” in isolation but the
conclusions are incorrect that: “self-defense therefore
reduces guerrilla warfare to a tactical role and robs it
of all revolutionary strategic significance…” and “…
even if it temporarily ensures the protection of the
population it endangers it in the long run…”</p>
<p>A revolutionary war, like a revolution itself, is a
process of constant development, sometimes at a snail’s
pace, sometimes in great bounds ahead. In a previous
chapter there were illustrations of how a simple
propaganda act of scrawling up slogans was transformed
into political action; political acts were transformed
into armed struggle. Similarly passive defense was
transformed into active defense and defensive operations
were transformed into offensive operations. Units which
started their military career in 1959 by preparing
spiked traps around their villages later became veteran
battalions which stormed into cities at the end of
January 1968, or which tore elite U.S. parachute units
to pieces in the battle of Dak To in November 1967.
There was nothing static about self-defense units or
self-defense zones in South Vietnam. They were in
constant development and played an active role of vital,
revolutionary strategic significance.</p>
<p>At the beginning of the struggle in early 1960 in the
old revolutionary bases of the Ca Mau peninsula,
self-defense took the form of “passive violence,”
according to Nguyen Tu Quang.<a href="#_edn1"
name="_ednref1">[1]</a> “Since the Diem authorities
were using extreme forms of violence against us, we
decided the only recourse was to counter violence with
violence. As protection against the large-scale military
sweeps, people started defending their villages and
homes with traps. They did not prevent movement on the
roads at this stage… If the enemy came through the
village and went straight on, nothing happened. But if
the troops started moving into houses or around the
pigsties and fowl pens or into the gardens and orchards,
they started falling into spiked traps… This was one of
our earliest forms of self-defense and for a time it was
extremely effective. When the enemy started getting
tougher, we started making all sorts of explosive booby
traps-they were still more effective.”</p>
<p>Confirmation of the effectiveness of such self-defense
measures was reported in the <em>New</em> <em>York
Times</em><a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[2]</a> in
a dispatch from Da Nang by Joseph Treaster, who wrote:
“Few United States Marines in South Vietnam question the
thesis that booby traps and mines are the guerrillas’
most valuable weapons. Despite a growing effort in the
past two years, the Marines have been unable to decrease
significantly the effectiveness of the wide variety of
devices that explode suddenly and fatally, often when
the enemy has long disappeared.</p>
<p>“Booby traps and mines account for 50 percent of the
casualties among the 25,000 men of the First Marine
Division and for 25 percent of those suffered by the
74,000 Marines in Vietnam…” To reduce casualties,
Treaster states, a special “Vietcong Booby-Trap School”
had been set up from which marines must graduate before
coming to Vietnam. “Part of the graduation,” he
continues, “is a walk through a ‘Vietcong’ village.</p>
<p>“An intruder who opens the main bamboo gate pulls the
detonator on an American-made mortar shell. A trip wire
a few feet down the main path rattles a can full of
rocks to warn of his approach. Further down the main
path are examples of guerrilla ingenuity found in dense
jungles: a large bamboo square fitted with large spikes
and set to fall between two trees, a supple length of
bamboo with six spikes rigged so it will whip into the
midsection of a man, and several carefully camouflaged
holes…”</p>
<p>“Stick to the main road and no harm will befall you,”
people told the Diem troops in the early days of
insurrection, “but move off it and you’ll be in trouble
because there are spiked traps everywhere. The Vietcong
were around here last night.” When “accidents” happened,
none would appear more sympathetic than the villagers
who had in fact laid the traps. “Ah, poor young man. We
warned you, and now look what’s happened.” While binding
up his wounds and giving him tea the villager might say:
“But why did you come burning our houses anyway. The
Vietcong said you would do this but we didn’t believe
them…”</p>
<p>When a group of villages had developed enough spiked
traps to make it costly for troops to enter houses or
pillage orchards and fields and the soldiers started
using artillery to demolish the hamlets, then
self-defense – still passive – reached out further to
“mine” the roads with spiked traps. And in the highland
tribal areas it was natural to use poison on the spikes
and then to move from the “passive” use of spikes to the
“active” use of poisoned arrows from their crossbows
combined with “passive” animal traps.</p>
<p>Y Bay of the Sedang minority, a political cadre of the
Autonomous Minority Movement of the NLF, spoke about
events in Kon Plong District of Kontum Province as early
as 1957. “There was a battalion from the Diem 22nd
Division stationed at Longlek. Once they sent a unit to
one of our Sedang villages to take a pig, but it was the
day after one of our festivals. There had been a big
feast and there was only one pig fit to eat left in the
village. The woman who owned it refused to let the
troops take it. One soldier grabbed it by the head and
she grabbed it by the tail. There was a real tussle;
then the woman drew her knife and slashed the soldier’s
hand. He reached for his gun, but a big crowd gathered
round with knives and crossbows. The unit withdrew. The
enemy didn’t come back for a long time and this incident
had a big effect on all our Sedang people, not only in
that village but throughout Kon Plong. The Diem
authorities started sending agents to survey the
situation but we set traps for them and few ever got
back to report. Then they sent troops and we had losses,
people were arrested, tortured and killed, buffalo shot
and houses burned down. We had greater losses between
1957 and 1959 than during the nine years of the
anti-French war.</p>
<p>“In 1959 our people could stand it no longer. They rose
up and destroyed the enemy post Mangden, killing the
district chief and wiping out a platoon of troops that
had behaved very brutally. A new district chief was sent
and a meeting arranged with one of our tribal leaders.
The district chief said: ‘president Diem will send an
army of a million men to punish those who attacked the
post.’ ”</p>
<p>Y Bay continued: “We have already got an army of a
million waiting for them. You could not crush our people
with your Mangden post or your Longlek post and even if
you send a few thousand troops against us, this will
change nothing. We have a million defenders on duty day
and night, in sunshine or rain, well dug in where your
men will never find them and can never shoot them.” He
was talking of the thousands of steel-hard bamboo spikes
set in a wide variety of traps which uttered the
approach to every village, man-sized versions of those
they had perfected in generations past for use against
wild beasts.</p>
<p>“From December 1960 to June 1961, our hamlets were
constantly under attack by troops from the Longlek post.
During that period about 60 of them were killed in our
traps and we had collected most of their arms. In June
1961 we attacked the Longlek post and wiped it out
completely. Since then [we were talking in early 1964],
Kon Plong District has been a liberated zone. Our people
picked up all sorts of tactical tricks. We started
setting our traps on the roads. Once we set an ambush on
the left side of the road, but we had devices for making
noises on the opposite side. When they turned towards
the noise we fired poisoned arrows into their backs. At
150 feet, our crossbows never miss.</p>
<p>“In one of our villages, the enemy burned down most of
the houses, but left one as a sort of watch tower. When
the officer leaned out of the window next day to look
around, a device dropped down and sliced off his head So
that house was burned down too. But troops kept away
from that area for a long time. Everybody in our
villages has an allotted task. The men use their guns
and crossbows. Women and children sharpen the bamboo
spikes and the older children lay them out in our
minefields.</p>
<p>“At first we just protected our villages with an
occasional attack on a post. But then we sent out our
best sharpshooters to surround the enemy posts and
prevent their troops from moving out. We let them go out
to obtain water, but if they started moving toward the
villages then there was a poisoned arrow for the head of
the column and the first one or two following him. In
the end the Longlek post was abandoned and the enemy
pulled all the way back to Quang Ngai Province…”</p>
<p>The whole area of which Y Bay was speaking is now a
solidly liberated area and most of the young men who
started their military activity by sharpening bamboo
stakes are now veterans of the regular NLF armed forces
who stormed into Kontum city at 2 a.m. on January 30,
1968. Over the years, passive self-defense in Kon Plong
district, which started with a fight over a pig, had
developed into active pursuit of large-scale enemy
units.</p>
<p>In general, “passive violence” was already widespread
in 1959-60 and was a prelude to the self-defense concept
which followed the widespread uprisings against the
“strategic hamlets” system.</p>
<p>Persons with whom I spoke who had taken part in the
early stage of the resistance struggle usually
emphasized certain steps in the evolution from passive
to active defense and developments within the framework
of “auto-defense” itself. The main lines of these
developments and different steps were as follows: first,
defense of houses and fields was extended to the tracks
leading from the main roads to the hamlets and then to
the main roads themselves; in the next phase, explosives
were used in addition to the spiked traps; this was
followed by the dramatic turning point at which guns
recovered from the victims were used, first by the armed
propaganda groups and then by the self-defense units,
which soon started ambushing and counterattacking
raiding forces; and finally the time was reached when
enemy troops would be pushed back into their posts and
full-time encirclement of these posts was maintained. It
is important to note that the change from one phase to
another never occurred in isolation but in whole groups
of villages at a time, so that none could be singled out
for special reprisals.</p>
<p>Once the self-defense forces had enough firearms for a
whole group of such villages there was never any
question of their sitting around waiting for the enemy
to come to their particular hamlet before they took to
arms against him. The self-defense activities of hamlets
were first coordinated at village level<a href="#_edn3"
name="_ednref3">[3]</a> and village activities were
later coordinated at district level. Although the
primary tasks of the self-defense forces were to defend
their own hamlets and villages and to neutralize nearby
enemy posts, in the case of large-scale enemy attacks
they coordinated their harassing activities and ambushes
with actions of the NLF regional troops and the regular
NLF army, as the latter gathered strength. The
self-defense forces were an excellent training school
for recruits for the regional troops and later for the
regular army, providing a constant supply of manpower
for the latter. They were in constant process of
development; after every successful action there were
more arms available. Technique and tactics improved, as
did coordination between hamlets, to such an extent that
in some districts an elaborate network of underground
tunnels linked every hamlet.</p>
<p>In Cu Chi District of Gia Dinh Province, at the gateway
to Saigon, which I visited in early 1964 and again in
late 1966, virtually all hamlets were interconnected
with such a tunnel system into which the self-defense
forces could withdraw in case of overwhelming force and
within which they could maneuver to outflank the enemy,
striking from the least expected places at the most
unexpected times, to disappear underground again to
explode electrically controlled mines or ambush from
underground firepoints within the maze of tunnels and
communications trenches of which they were the
undisputed masters.</p>
<p>The most difficult moment for the self-defense units
was the first period after formation. Normally an armed
propaganda unit helped to demolish their “strategic
hamlet” and get a self-defense unit organized, then
moved off to deal with some other problem while the
self-defense unit was on its own awaiting the inevitable
enemy reprisal, especially in the early days when the
Diem regime tried to stamp out the first sparks of
revolt at all costs.</p>
<p>What usually happened, especially after the NLF was
formed and resistance was scientifically organized and
coordinated, was that the NLF command at district level
carefully selected a target “strategic hamlet” where a
solid political base had been established. With the
collaboration of trusted elements within the hamlet a
supported uprising would be staged, various reforms
(outlined in an earlier chapter) would be instituted and
a self-defense unit set up. Delegates from the hamlet
would immediately be sent to inform other hamlets in the
area what was happening while at times delegates arrived
from other hamlets demanding NLF support for an
uprising. Usually before the Diem authorities had time
to react against the first uprising, there were
simultaneous actions in a dozen or more other hamlets,
with a total of anything up to 50,000 people involved.
Such large scale uprisings spread over a large area
could only occur if the people were politically ripe for
such a move. In the case of the group hamlet uprisings,
whatever weapons the Diem authorities had put in the
hands of local Civil Guards or other paramilitary units
in and around the hamlets automatically passed into the
hands of the new self-defense units. The local district
commander simply did not have enough troops at his
disposal to cope with the situation, especially as steps
were taken to ensure that he had an exaggerated account
of the size of the NLF supporting troops. (He could
never gamble on such accounts not being true because on
some occasions when the NLF forces were really strong,
they spread rumors that they were only a handful in
order to lure district troops into ambush.)</p>
<p>In my book <em>Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla
War</em>, I mentioned a typical action in the coastal
province of Phu Yen where, after a “model” strategic
hamlet at Ky Lo in Dong Xuan District was liberated,
delegates arrived asking for NLF support for uprisings
in their hamlets in neighboring Son Hoa District.
Support was readily lent, although the NLF cadres had
not had time to organize political bases in these
particular strategic hamlets. Almost simultaneous
uprisings took place in another 13 hamlets, as a result
of which almost one-third of Phu Yen Province was
liberated, with important self-defense detachments
immediately set up. Within the 16 months that followed,
no less than 55 operations had been launched by Diem
troops, all of them thwarted by the self-defense units,
sometimes in coordination with regular NLF troops. The
main result of the 55 operations was the liberation of
most of the rest of Phu Yen Province.</p>
<p>Sometimes uprisings in the hamlets were coordinated at
district level, sometimes at provincial level. The
self-defense units set up as a result of uprisings in
Dong Xuan-Son Hoa Districts were strong enough for this
area to be considered from then on an important
guerrilla base which soon linked up with other solidly
NLF-controlled areas in the highlands to the west.</p>
<p>Effective self-defense units are not something that can
be set up under coercion, as the Americans have learned
at great cost. Every effort they have made to create so
called “self-defense” units, aimed at repression of the
population, has ended with the arms passing into the
hands of those they were intended to repress. The guns
must be in the hands of people who have something to
defend, something more than their own pay or skins.</p>
<p>The self-defense units set up during the campaigns to
destroy the “strategic hamlets” had these immediate
aims: to use the guns to defend the new, free life; the
right to live in their former villages, cultivate their
old fields and protect the new ones received under land
reform; freedom to practice the cult of their ancestors;
to resist the tax collectors and landlords’ agents and
those who protected the latter; to resist at all costs
being herded back into “strategic,” “new life” or some
other type of concentration camp hamlets.</p>
<p>These aims were very easy for members of the
self-defense units to grasp. If the task at first seemed
limited to defense of their own homes and fields, the
self-defense recruits soon saw the necessity of going
further afield, at first to pin the enemy down in nearby
posts and then at an appropriate moment to take the
initiative in wiping out those posts in coordinated
actions. In the process of taking on these broader
tasks, a self-defense zone was transformed into a
guerrilla zone, an area in which the guerrillas were
complete masters at night (and usually during daytime)
but in which locally based Saigon forces could also
penetrate in daytime if they came in force. As the
situation developed, it was easy to grasp that if, in
coordination with other self-defense units, they could
wipe out the enemy’s local forces, the guerrilla zone
could be transformed into a guerrilla base in which they
were masters day and night and the enemy could penetrate
only by using his main-force units. When the call went
out for recruits from the self-defense forces to serve
with NLF regional troops to encircle enemy posts at
district or even provincial level and be ready to oppose
and counterattack the enemy’s mopping-up operations,
there was no lack of volunteers. Concepts broadened and
the necessity to engage the enemy’s main-force units by
building up NLF main-force units, especially after the
direct commitment of US. combat troops, also became
clear to everyone. Every attack by U.S. planes speeded
up the flow of recruits and demands to go still further
afield to hit the bases where the planes were stationed
self-defense with rifles and light automatic weapons was
obviously not sufficient against planes; the best
defense was to attack them on the ground. The
self-defense units produced natural guerrilla leaders
and fighters of exceptionally high morale because every
step they had taken had been so clearly right, so
clearly in defense of their interests, those of their
neighbors and those of the nation.</p>
<p>The self-defense units are actually the base of the
pyramid on which the whole structure of the NLF armed
forces rests. They are the most concrete expression of
people’s war. They are of the people, for the people and
appointed by the people. It would be difficult to
imagine a more democratic form of armed forces or a more
perfect form for the tasks imposed by the resistance
struggle. They represent an answer to the NLF’s seeming
lack of mobility due to its lack of a modern transport
system and American monopoly of air power. While the
Americans have to fly their troops (and the munitions,
food and even water to supply them) scores or hundreds
of miles for an operation, the self-defense forces are
always on the spot over the entire face of South
Vietnam, surrounding every U.S. base and outpost, and
they are ready for speedy concentration if necessary
with sufficient equipment on their backs to give
immediate battle to the enemy’s mobile forces. They can
count on continuous replenishment of supplies by the
local population. The self-defense units have proved
capable of holding up U.S. main unit attacks or severely
slowing them down until NLF regional troops arrive to
wage coordinated actions with the self-defense units,
and if necessary in cooperation with the Liberation
Army’s regular forces.</p>
<p>During the 1965-66 and 1966-67 American dry season
offensives, self-defense units bore the brunt of the
American operations. They ground offensives down to a
halt by harassing operations and ambushes, forcing the
attackers to employ roads and trails where traps had
been prepared well in advance, planting mines from
unexploded U.S. shells and bombs in the path of tank
columns, launching night attacks and preventing the
attackers from penetrating the main base areas where the
regular NLF forces were building up for the 1967-68
operational season. In their first two years of
offensive operations, U.S. forces rarely came to grips
with the NLF regular troops, although the main avowed
aim of the “search and destroy” operations was to find
and wipe out these main-force units. This was because of
the solid organization of the “self-defense” troops and
regional forces with which they closely cooperated.</p>
<p>The establishment of even partial NLF power in the
cities, with another four million population from which
to recruit, ensures an extremely rapid growth of urban
self-defense units. The latter act as a powerful pole of
attraction for city youth, who have been resisting by
all possible means conscription into the Saigon army,
and also for individuals and units within the Saigon
army. Possibilities of desertion were greatly
facilitated by the move into the cities. If the first
great wave of some 200,000 desertions was mainly from
among the Saigon army’s regional troops, it was certain
that the example of the self-defense units in the cities
would be a further powerful stimulus for the Saigon
regulars to desert.</p>
<p>It is clear that the self-defense forces in South
Vietnam are playing a major role in revolutionary
warfare.</p>
<p><strong>Notes.</strong></p>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[1]</a> See Chap. 10</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[2]</a> March 31,
1967.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[3]</a> Most villages
are comprised of four to six hamlets.</p>
<p><strong>NEXT: Chapter 13 – The People’s Revolutionary
Party</strong></p>
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