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<h1 id="reader-title">Vietnam Will Win: Taking on the Pentagon</h1>
<div id="reader-credits" class="credits">by Wilfred Burchett -
February 19, 2018<br>
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<div class="post_content" itemprop="articleBody">To mark the
50th Anniversary of the 1968 Têt Offensive, CounterPunch
is serializing Wilfred Burchett’s <em>Vietnam Will Win </em>(Guardian
Books, New York, 1968) over the next few weeks. Readers
can judge for themselves the validity of the facts,
observations, analysis, conclusions, predictions and so on
made by the author. The books is based on several visits
to the Liberated Zones controlled by the National
Liberation Front (‘Viet Cong’) of South Vietnam in
1963-64, 1964-65 and in 1966-67 and close contacts with
the NLF leadership, resistance fighters and ordinary folk.
Wilfred Burchett’s engagement with Vietnam began in March
1954, when he met and interviewed President Ho Chi Minh in
his jungle headquarters in Thai Nguyen, on the eve of the
battle of Dien Bien Phu. He was also on intimate terms
with General Vo Nguyen Giap, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong
and most of the leadership of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam during the country’s struggle against French
colonialism and American imperial aggression. Wilfred
Burchett was not writing history as a historian, with the
benefit of hindsight, access to archives etc. He was
reporting history as it was unfolding, often in dangerous
places. He was an on-the-spot reporter, an eyewitness to
history. In his reporting, he followed his own
convictions, political and moral. The book he wrote after
his first two visits to the Liberated Zones, <em>Vietnam:
Inside Story of the Guerilla War </em>(International
Publishers, New York, 1965) concludes with this short
sentence: “The best they [the Americans] can do is to go
home.” <em>Vietnam Will Win</em> confirms that.
<p>Unfortunately, it took another seven years (1968-75) of
death and devastation – and the extension of the war
into Cambodia and Laos – for the U.S. to finally leave
Vietnam in ignominy in April 1975. So here, chapter by
chapter, Wilfred Burchett exposes the futility of
fighting a people united in their struggle for
independence, liberty and unity. It also explains,
soberly and factually, why they were winning and how
they won.</p>
<p><em>George Burchett, Hanoi.</em></p>
<p><strong>Taking on the Pentagon</strong></p>
<p>When the first 3,500 U.S. Marines started disembarking
at Da Nang, on March 8, 1965, the NLF knew it was going
to be faced with new problems. The leadership was not
fooled by the Pentagon fairy tale that the Marines had
landed only to “protect the Da Nang air base,” with
instructions “to shoot only if fired upon.” The NLF
quickly took the measure of the redoubtable Marines,
tested U.S. tactics and techniques and the quality of
leadership, and prepared for mighty battles to come.
During my third visit to the liberated areas in November
1965, the question of how the NLF counted on tackling
the world’s mightiest military machine was one I
discussed with NLF President Nguyen Huu Tho, a senior
staff officer, Nguyen Van Chan, and others during two
days and nights of talks at their jungle headquarters.</p>
<p>“Every new situation brings its surprises,” said Nguyen
Van Chan, “and the confrontation with all-American units
with their vastly superior firepower, the speedy
reaction of their planes and artillery and the
super-mobility of airborne troops, was bound to bring
its surprises too. Even in 1962 when they first started
using heliborne puppet troops in a big way, our troops
were caught off-balance for a short time. But we swiftly
developed tactics to deal with helicopters and the Ap
Bac<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[1]</a> victory was
the first big demonstration that we could successfully
defeat heliborne operations.”</p>
<p>I asked if the battle of Chu Lai, which started on
August 18, 1965, the first big confrontation between NLF
and U.S. forces, which the U.S. Marines claimed as the
“biggest victory of the war” with “600 Vietcong killed,”
was an example of the NLF forces being caught
“off-balance.”</p>
<p>“On the contrary,” replied Chan, “despite what the
Marines claimed, we regard the Van Thong battle, which
the Marines call Chu Lai, as another ‘Ap Bac’
demonstration that we can beat the Americans. It showed
that with correct tactics we could stand up to the best,
from their viewpoint, that they could hurl against us.
We hit the Marines so hard at Van Tuong that they have
practically never budged since. After that one battering
of their elite troops, the Americans in fact had to
change the whole strategy of their invasion force.</p>
<p>“The Marine generals had bragged about a famous ‘ink
blot’ strategy for months previously. Marine troops were
supposed to set up bases all along the coast and these
bases were supposed to expand out like drops of ink on
blotting paper to link up into one solidly occupied belt
all along the coast. Army troops would then start from
inside this belt and push westward until all of Central
Vietnam, north from Cap St. Jacques to the 17th parallel
and west to the Laotian and Cambodian borders, would be
under U.S. control – a splendid idea for the armchair
strategists. The Marines may consider themselves as
drops of ink – that’s their affair. But our people and
our armed forces don’t consider themselves as scraps of
blotting paper. The Marines discovered that to their
cost at Van Tuong. They have not even been able to link
up their two bases at Da Nang and Chu Lai, or open the
road between them, let alone start forming ‘ink blots’
all along the coast. We inflicted exceptionally severe
casualties on the Marines at Van Tuong, despite the
fantastic weight of equipment thrown against us, in a
daylight battle which lasted two days, our troops
slipping out of the area under cover of darkness on the
second night.”</p>
<p>Chan continued, explaining that the results of that
first major battle were discussed and analyzed first at
staff headquarters and then in Liberation Army units all
over the country. The lessons learned, both positive and
negative ones, were applied in the Ban Bang<a
href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[2]</a> battle at Dan
Tieng. (A few days previously I had been at an advanced
headquarters with Nguyen Huu Tho on the edge of a
Michelin rubber plantation while a major battle was
going on at Dan Tieng, a few miles distant.)</p>
<p>I had brought with me some newspaper clippings of the
American versions of several battles, including that at
Ban Bang, and I had never seen Nguyen Huu Tho and his
aides laugh so uproariously as when the President read
them, translating the highlights into Vietnamese, noting
especially the reports on Ban Bang. According to the
first official American version, a battalion of the U.S.
1st Infantry Division had been engaged in a battle that
“raged all day” and American losses were “light.” The
following day another version said that “a reinforced
battalion” had been engaged and that “146 Vietcong had
been killed and abandoned on the battlefield” and
another “27 had probably been killed by air and
artillery strikes” which had continued from 7 a.m. until
5:40 p.m. American losses in the second version were
upgraded to “moderate,” which meant, in the communiqué
terminology of those days, between 15 and 40%
casualties.</p>
<p>President Tho quickly drew a map with red and green
arrows to illustrate what really had happened 10 days
earlier on November 12, 1965.</p>
<p>“Two U.S. Infantry battalions, two tank squadrons and a
heavy artillery company of the U.S. 1st Infantry
Division set out from their big base at Lai Khe on
November 11,” he said, “on the start of what was to be a
big sweep to wipe out our main force units in the area.
This was to form one flank of an operation, the code
name of which was ‘Construction Ten.’ They hoped to open
up some highways in the area once they had dealt with
our main force units. Details of the operation were
known to us. Their troops moved cautiously down Highway
13 and by nightfall had taken up positions in a rubber
plantation near Bau Bang village. Our troops were
ordered to wipe them out that night. They moved swiftly
to the area, but it took some time to locate all the
American positions as these were strung out over two
kilometers along the highway. But by half an hour before
dawn, all their units were located and surrounded. The
order to attack was given and the Americans were taken
completely by surprise. Within the first minutes, their
command post and communications center were wiped out
and this added to their confusion and panic. At the same
time another of our units attacked the U.S. artillery
positions at Lai Khe, silencing the guns there. An
American reinforcing unit set out from Lai Khe when the
shooting at Bau Bang was heard, but the greater part
turned back, presumably because they heard our mortars
firing at Lai Khe and noticed there was no returning
fire from their own artillery.</p>
<p>“Within half an hour, the greater part of the units at
Bau Bang were destroyed. They had 36 tanks there, and
another three arrived with that part of the reinforcing
unit which continued from Lai Khe. The survivors from
our first assault scrambled aboard these tanks and tried
to flee, but our men rushed the tanks and in close-in
fighting with machine guns, bazookas, grenades and
satchel charges, they wiped out 37 of the tanks on the
spot. Two that escaped this encounter were destroyed by
one of our ambush units set up for the heavy
reinforcements we had expected from Lai Khe. All ten
artillery pieces were destroyed before they could fire a
shot, and before the sun was up, virtually the whole
American task force was out of action. We estimate their
total casualties were around 2,000.</p>
<p>“Because we destroyed the communications center within
the first few minutes, the divisional headquarters
seemed to have no idea what had happened. Planes were
late on the scene and the artillery which was supposed
to support this unit – apart from that at Lai Khe which
was destroyed – started firing only when the action was
over. By the time the attack planes arrived, our troops
had already withdrawn, laden with whatever they could
carry of the captured heavy and automatic weapons.
Around 8 a.m., and not 7 a.m. as their accounts say,
fighter-bombers came over and started circling. After a
while they seem to have concluded that their own dead
and wounded lying around the battlefield were our
troops, hiding in the grass and undergrowth. They had no
ground-air radio contact because they had nothing
operational left on the ground. Our troops were marching
off with all their communications equipment. They
started bombing the battlefield, bombing their own dead
and wounded. Then their artillery joined in. The battle
that ‘raged all day’ according to their communiqué never
took place except that between their own planes and
artillery and their own dead and wounded It was not
until late in the afternoon that two puppet battalions
entered the area to collect what was left of the two
American battalions. Nguyen Van Chan can fill in any
other details you might want,” concluded President Tho,
“because he was on the spot and helped direct the
battle.”</p>
<p>Chan began by saying that until the Bau Bang battle,
NLF units in that area had not had much contact with the
U.S. combat units. “We had only studied the analyzes and
experiences passed on by units on other fronts. But our
troops had confidence in the tactical and technical
instructions passed on by the high command, based mainly
on the Van Tuong battle, even for such complicated and
dangerous tactics as close in fights with tanks and
hand-to-hand fighting to rob the enemy of his air and
artillery superiority. We had practiced these tactics
for months past in our training bases and in encounters
with puppet troops with whatever tanks and artillery
they had but in the Bau Bang battle, our lads went over
to real, practical application of their theoretical
studies. They are most enthusiastic about the results.
The U.S. troops don’t seem to have been physically or
psychologically prepared for hand-to-hand fighting.
Probably they never thought it would be necessary; the
bombs and shells would do the work at long range for
them.</p>
<p>“At Bau Bang we saw how the American troops thought
only of saving themselves –abandoning terrain, their
armored vehicles and even their weapons, something our
men would never do, the moment we launched attacks at
close quarters. On many occasions, they refused
hand-to-hand combat. They turned their backs, bellowing
like oxen, and became easy targets for our men using
their bayonets or light automatics. Because it had taken
more time than we had allowed to locate all their
dispositions, the battle started later than intended and
spilled over into the early daylight hours. But even
when the first reconnaissance planes came, they could do
nothing because we were completely integrated with what
American troops were still left.”</p>
<p>I asked Chan how he evaluated the leadership of the
U.S. troops. He said it would be incorrect to generalize
on the basis of one battle, especially as it was a
surprise night attack. But he also pointed out that the
U.S. 1st Infantry Division was considered one of the
best, an elite unit, especially powerful in motorized
units and 40-mm mortar teams and with a high proportion
of ultra rapid automatic arms. “But what we noted from
the moment of our attack,” said Chan, “and I was sent
there by our high command just to note such things, was
that the command post was in complete disorder and
coordination between infantry and the motorized units
was nonexistent. Tanks, when they got under way at all,
moved aimlessly about and quickly lost their mobility
among the trees, to be destroyed one after another by
our special tank-destruction teams. One of our 10-man
squads put 11 tanks out of action, while another combat
trio put a tank crew out of action, then jumped aboard
and turned the tank’s heavy machine guns against what
was left of that tank unit, forcing them to break
formation and present easy targets for our own antitank
teams and their bazookas. In our summing-up discussion
later, our troops had much praise for the quality of the
study classes where we had analyzed the enemy’s weak
points in technique, their machines as well as their
men. They found our evaluations were really very close
to the mark. The conclusions we had drawn were home out
to the letter on the battlefield.</p>
<p>“One of the greatest weaknesses of the Americans,
judged by the Bau Bang battle, is the lack of creative
leadership of the officers, their inability to adapt
themselves quickly to surprise situations, and the lack
of <em>esprit de corps</em> among the men. This was
something especially noted by our troops. In tough
situations where success or defeat depends on men acting
as a unit, they have an ‘every man for himself’ attitude
which is perhaps a reflection of their individualistic
social system, but in military situations is disastrous.</p>
<p>“The greatest difference between their troops and ours,
however, is ideological,” Chan concluded. “Before the
Bau Bang action, the U.S. divisional commander issued an
‘Order of the Day’ which we captured. It praised the
victories the division had won in two world wars and
boasted of the splendid ultramodern weapons with which
it was equipped. But this didn’t help. Traditions are no
substitute for ideology. Recalling the past in purely
military terms could not inject the quality of morale
which our politically conscious soldiers have to a high
degree, and this was manifest in all stages of the
action. In addition, the greater part of enemy troops
killed were young men in their early 20s. We learned
this from their personal documents. Despite the
division’s traditions, individually the men had had no
previous combat experience, and collectively they had no
cause for which to sacrifice themselves. Our men were
burning to get to grips with the enemy, while the latter
dreaded the face-to-face encounter. Thus, despite their
equipment, much of it our equipment now, they could not
withstand the withering attacks of our troops.”</p>
<p>Nguyen Huu Tho said that reports coming in from the
most distant comers of the country were of the same
order and that some preliminary, general conclusions had
been drawn by the Liberation Army high command to the
effect that U.S. troops lacked combat spirit, solidarity
and physical endurance. “They march badly. With their
helicopters they get to the scene quickly but once there
they move like snails. What seems to be an advantage,
the ability of the helicopters to bring them everything
from bullets to canned turkey and drinking water, turns
into a disadvantage when the helicopters cannot land
because of our heavy ground fire or because fog has
blotted out the tree tops and landing patches. At the
rate their troops use up supplies, even a few hours’
delay with the helicopters has turned into a disaster
for them.”</p>
<p>Concerning the quality of the U.S. high command, Nguyen
Van Chau said the most striking characteristics were
“passivity and very limited strategic initiative;
hesitation between tendencies to concentrate troops for
offensive operations and to disperse them in holding or
‘Pacification’ duties; inability to defend effectively
their own bases and positions, and lack of vigor in
attack. “Of all the surprises the Americans have brought
with them,” Chau stated, “the biggest and most agreeable
for us is the great disparity between the high quality
of the equipment and the poor quality of strategic and
tactical command of the officers and men. With us it is
just the opposite, and we believe that the decisive
factor is men and morale and correct leadership.”</p>
<p>“Battles are sometimes compared to a game of chess,”
said Nguyen Huu Tho. “But war in South Vietnam is
certainly not a game of chess. When the Pentagon decided
to commit U.S. troops, it did so because they had
already lost the ‘special war.’ In a game of chess if
you lose one game, you sweep the chess board clean, each
side gathers up his men and you start again. Not so in
war. When the Americans moved in their own troops in the
‘limited war,’ they moved into a situation in which our
men were already in position on the chessboard – a
winning position They moved into a situation dominated
by us, one in which, in military terms, we held the
strategic initiative. They had only a very limited
freedom of choice as to where they could place their
pawns and generals. They could not draw a line and say
to us ‘south of this is yours, north of it is ours;
let’s fight and see who wins.’ They could only move into
those positions that the crumbling puppet army had still
been able to hold, and a few more for which the
Americans were willing to pay a high price to secure and
a higher price still to hold. Whatever positions they
secured were immediately encircled by our forces.</p>
<p>“One of the decisive factors,” continued President
Nguyen Huu Tho, “is obviously going to be on whose terms
the war is to be waged. If the Americans could impose
their terms, our armed forces would quickly be finished.
We have no planes, no naval vessels, no tanks, no heavy
artillery. But since we are masters of the situation, we
will impose our terms. It is we who will decide where,
when and how the decisive battles will take place. The
Americans must fight on our terms, not we on theirs.
Even where they take a tactical initiative, within each
of their offensive operations, it is our forces that
decide when, where and how to give battle. The Americans
have to pay the penalty of being aggressors in a land
where everything is hostile to them, man above all, but
nature and climate also. Many foreign correspondents are
overwhelmed when they see the staggering amount of
equipment the Americans are massing on our soil. Even
those who have some sympathy toward us conclude that we
will quickly be crushed under the enormous weight of
military technique. But how does this help when, as Chau
here has experienced, their men do not dare to stand up
to ours in hand-to-hand encounters where superior morale
is decisive? And we will force them to fight that way.
We will give them no choice whether to concentrate or
disperse. If they want to disperse, we will force them
to concentrate. If it suits them better to concentrate
we will force them to disperse. Even if at times they
seem to have a tactical initiative it is we who will
retain the strategic initiative, and within their
tactical initiatives it is our forces which will retain
the initiative of action.”</p>
<p>These analyzes of the fundamental factors relating to
the military struggle by President Nguyen Huu Tho and
staff officer Chau still remain valid. Apart from the
obvious ideological factors, there were basic
differences between the military training, tactics and
psychology of U.S. and NLF troops which favored the
latter. American troops were trained for a war in which
one rarely saw the adversary at close range, at most
over the sights of a machine gun or rifle or as death
had caught him. And death came from afar, from the blast
of bombs or shells, from an air run over map
coordinates, the split-second view of an adversary in a
machine gun sight or even as blobs on radar screens.</p>
<p>Artillery and planes were supposed to do the main work,
troops sweeping ahead aboard tanks and armored troop
carriers, leaping earthward when necessary to mop up
survivors from air and artillery strikes, then back into
armor and transport and on again. Everything from the
comics to the TV screens and their own military training
had prepared them for such a war, in which technology
dominated tactics. This was especially true of the first
combat divisions to arrive in South Vietnam. Instead
they found themselves called upon to fight in man-to-man
combat, which nullified their technological superiority.</p>
<p>Precisely because of their dependence upon a monopoly
of air power and artillery, American troops were
deprived of this advantage by the NLF’s “grab the enemy
by the belt” tactics. NLF combat training was oriented
around the necessity of countering the adversary’s
monopoly of air power, tanks and artillery. U.S. combat
training was oriented around the facts of air, tank and
artillery support. Furthermore, motivation of troops
must be taken into account. If the deepest desire of
most U.S. soldiers was never to see a live “Vietcong” at
close quarters, the deepest desire of most NLF soldiers
was to confront live Americans at close quarters.
Virtually every one of them had what they call some
personal “blood debts to settle.” They wanted to settle
accounts for villages bombed and relatives killed by the
faceless, unreachable enemy that streaked down from the
skies and disappeared back into the blue; for family
members arrested, tortured, executed according to lists
and orders drawn up over the years by American advisers
sitting in air conditioned Saigon offices. Most NLF
fighters had an accumulation of personal hatred that
they wanted to get out of their systems in a very
personal way. They had felt frustrated for years at
never getting to grips with the real enemy, and welcomed
the chance when tactics dictated hand-to-hand fighting
as the best way of preventing the enemy from using his
planes and artillery.</p>
<p>Tactics of U.S. troops, once battle was joined, were to
put as great a distance as possible between themselves
and the enemy so that the bombs and shells could do the
fighting; to “disengage,” as the U.S. briefing officers
in Saigon expressed it, “to run for their lives,” as the
NLF troops would say. But the only way to deal with
hand-to-hand fighting is to face up to it, man to man,
bayonet to bayonet, knife to knife if necessary. The
first to break and turn his back is doomed. And it was
neither in the NLF interests nor in their character to
be the first to break. The very first major
confrontation between U.S. and NLF troops revealed
serious weaknesses among the American troops, even in
such matters as classic infantry training, not to
mention the question of morale, according to the sober
evaluations of NLF staff officers.</p>
<p>Truong Ky, the regimental political officer quoted
previously, put his finger on another weakness of the
U.S. Command. This was “subjectivism,” he said. “It
crops up all the time in U.S. planning and battlefield
operations. They always overestimate their own strength
and underestimate ours. That is an error we never make.
If we were unable to make a fairly precise estimate of
the enemy’s real strength and capacities for each
operation, we would soon be in real trouble.” This
latter conversation took place in August 1966, during my
fourth visit to the NLF controlled areas, when there
were already rumors that U.S. forces would be built up
to around 500,000 in 1967. I asked if this would not
overtax NLF strength.</p>
<p>“No,” replied Truong Ky, “because the Americans will in
fact be less effective with 500,000 troops than with the
250,000 they had for their 1965-66 dry season
operations.”</p>
<p>Would not, I inquired, the American mobile forces, that
is, units available for offensive operations, increase
proportionately to the total force committed?</p>
<p>“Not under our conditions,” he replied, “because we
will continue to encircle and hug their bases wherever
they establish them. Our forces are also constantly
increasing in quantity and quality. As we get stronger,
they will need proportionately more to defend those
bases, including new bases needed to supply any big
increase in their troops. They are operating 10,000
kilometers from their own rear. Problems of transport
and unloading stores and shifting them around the
country once they are unloaded are already giving them
headaches with 300,000 men. Keeping the garrison bases
supplied is already a problem for them, but distributing
supplies to the battlefield when we control the rear and
the areas immediately surrounding the battlefield is
even worse. Doubling the number of troops under such
conditions means more than doubling their problems. We
will force them to disperse their troops and hog them
down in static defense positions so that their mobile
forces will get progressively smaller, not bigger.</p>
<p>When I asked President Nguyen Huu Tho how he viewed the
possibility of the Pentagon increasing its forces to
500,000 or more, he replied as follows: “We believe the
strength of an army in time of war is composed of a
great number of factors of which the determinant ones
are political and moral. We have absolute supremacy over
the Americans on the political and moral front. Our
entire people wage this war and do not shrink from any
difficulty or sacrifice. We are also stronger than the
Americans in other fundamental aspects of the struggle,
such as our strategic position, our rear areas, our
actual conduct of the war. Our ground forces are
superior to theirs; these are factors</p>
<p>that decide the outcome on the battlefield. Although
the Americans are strong in material and equipment, they
also have fundamental weaknesses, politically and
materially, strategically and tactically.</p>
<p>“Because of their overseas commitments and their policy
of world domination, total American power is not
unlimited. The fact that they are engaged in a war of
aggression thousands of miles from their own country,
their inability to transform any part of our territory
into a stable base for themselves, represents serious
weakness…</p>
<p>“We can successfully stand up to new American
reinforcements and militarily defeat the American
aggressors in any situation whatsoever. In fact, just as
it is obviously true that the Americans cannot bring off
a military victory in South Vietnam, it is also obvious
to us that the South Vietnamese people and its armed
forces can bring off the final victory, despite U.S.
military and economic strength”</p>
<p>Truong Ky added that when they spoke of “final
victory,” this meant an “independent and sovereign South
Vietnam, democratic and neutral without any foreign
troops on our soil. We are not seeking to impose a
military defeat on the U.S. as such,” he said. “If they
want to withdraw and call it their victory, they can do
so. We won’t even argue about who won. Our independence
is prize enough. For this we win fight to the end-and
win.”</p>
<p><strong>Notes.</strong></p>
<p><a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[1]</a> The battle of
Ap Bac, in My Tho Province of the Mekong Delta, was
fought on Jan. 1, 1963, and was considered by the
U.S.-Saigon Command as the biggest defeat sustained by
the government troops till that time.</p>
<p><a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[2]</a> Ban Bang is in
Binh Duong Province, about 32 miles due north of Saigon.</p>
<p><strong>NEXT: Chapter 7 – Military Realities </strong></p>
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