<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div id="container" class="container font-size5 content-width3">
<div id="reader-header" class="header" style="display: block;"> <font
size="-2"><a id="reader-domain" class="domain"
href="https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/palestinian-authority-security-forces-whose-security/">https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/palestinian-authority-security-forces-whose-security/</a></font>
<h1 id="reader-title">The Palestinian Authority Security Forces:
Whose Security?</h1>
<div id="reader-credits" class="credits">by Alaa Tartir on May
16, 2017</div>
</div>
<hr>
<div class="content">
<div id="moz-reader-content" class="line-height4"
style="display: block;">
<div id="readability-page-1" class="page"
xml:base="https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/palestinian-authority-security-forces-whose-security/">
<div class="post clear-post large-9 large-centered columns">
<p><i><span>To speak of Israeli-Palestinian
“cooperation”…is to use no less than a misnomer.
This is not, however, simply because “the outcome of
cooperation between an elephant and a fly is not
hard to predict,” as Chomsky so pithily writes…but
because under Oslo, “cooperation” is often only
minimally different from the occupation and
domination that went before it. “Cooperation,” in
this context, is above all an internationally
pleasing and acceptable signifier which obscures
rather than elucidates the nature of
Israeli-Palestinian relations.</span></i><span> – </span><a
href="http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/12317/"><span>Jan Selby,
2003</span></a></p>
<p><i><span>I…applaud the Palestinian Authority's
continued security coordination with Israel. They
get along unbelievably well. I had meetings, and at
these meetings I was actually very impressed and
somewhat surprised at how well they get along. They
work together beautifully. – </span></i><a
href="http://www.haaretz.com/us-news/1.787109"><span>Donald
Trump, 2017</span></a></p>
<h2><b>Overview</b></h2>
<p><span>From the outset, the Palestinian Authority (PA)
security establishment has failed to protect
Palestinians from the main source of their insecurity:
The Israeli military occupation. Nor has it empowered
Palestinians to resist that occupation. Instead, the
PA has contributed to a situation in which the
Palestinian struggle for freedom has </span><a
href="http://jps.ucpress.edu/content/46/2/7"><span>itself
been criminalized</span></a><span>. Rather than
recognize resistance as a natural response to
institutionalized oppression, the PA, in tandem with
Israel and the international community, characterizes
resistance as “insurgency” or “instability.” Such
rhetoric, which favors Israeli security at the expense
of Palestinians, echoes discourse surrounding the “war
on terror” and criminalizes all forms of resistance. </span></p>
<p><span>This dynamic can be traced back to the 1993 Oslo
Accords but it has been galvanized over the last
decade through the PA’s evolution as a donor-driven
state that espouses neoliberal policies. The
donor-driven reform of the security sector has been
the lynchpin of the PA’s post-2007 state building
project. The enhanced effectiveness of the PA’s
security forces as a result of massive </span><a
href="http://carnegie-mec.org/2011/02/28/policing-people-building-state-authoritarian-transformation-in-west-bank-and-gaza-pub-42924"><span>donor
investment</span></a><span> has in turn created
additional ways of protecting the Israeli occupier,
thus creating spaces that are “securitized” within
which the occupier can move freely in the execution of
its colonial project. </span></p>
<p><span>Such a development could only have </span><a
href="http://jps.ucpress.edu/content/46/2/7"><span>two
outcomes</span></a><span>: “Better” collaboration
with the occupying power in a way that shored up the
destructive status quo; and greater violation of
Palestinians’ security and national rights by their
own government and national security forces.</span></p>
<p><span>This policy brief analyzes the evolution and
“reform” of the Palestinian security forces since the
establishment of the PA, and then examines
Palestinian-Israeli security coordination and its
deleterious effects on the Palestinian ability to
resist Israel’s occupying forces as well on basic
liberties. It focuses on the PA forces in the West
Bank and not the situation in Gaza, which requires
separate research and analysis. It concludes with
policy recommendations to reinvent the PA security
forces’ operations and overhaul their structures so
that they may truly serve to protect their own people.</span></p>
<h2><b>The Rise of the Palestinian Authority Security
Forces</b></h2>
<p><span>The evolution of the PA security forces can be </span><a
href="http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.gi/"><span>categorized
in three phases</span></a><span>: The Oslo Accords
(1993-1999), the Second Intifada (2000-2006), and the
post-2007 PA state-building project. </span></p>
<p><span>The Oslo Accords were characterized by two
parallel, yet conflicting, projects: State building
and national liberation. The former implied
constructing state-like institutions and a bureaucracy
(soon inflated) under occupation, while the latter
meant pursuing the revolutionary program for
self-determination that had been adopted by the PLO.
The tension between these ventures already manifested
themselves under the late president Yasser Arafat’s
rule. Arafat’s personalized </span><a
href="http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9844/1/State_Formation_under_the_PNA2.pdf"><span>style
of governance</span></a><span> and its resultant
complex network of </span><a
href="https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/corruption-in-palestine/"><span>corruption</span></a><span>
and </span><a
href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538102?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents"><span>patronage</span></a><span>
meant that the evolution of the PA security forces was
from its advent neither inclusive nor transparent.
Rather, it was fraught with nepotism and was used as a
tool to address the threats posed by Oslo’s opponents
and to stabilize the population. In turn, it also
solidified the nascent “peace” agreements. The 9,000
recruits in the “strong police force” envisaged in the
1994 Cairo Agreement became nearly 50,000 security
personnel by 1999.</span></p>
<p><span>This proliferation of the security forces – all
spying on each other, as Edward Said once said – has
had severe consequences for Palestinians.</span><span>
Arafat’s establishment of security-driven political
structures nourished authoritarianism and blocked
accountability mechanisms in the Palestinian political
system. This resulted in a dearth of legitimacy and
further insecurity for Palestinians. As the security
establishment grew in numbers and institutions,
Palestinians remained ill-protected, and corruption
and patronage within the forces became endemic. The
divide-to-rule approach paved the way for future
Palestinian fragmentation. </span></p>
<p><span>During the Second Intifada, Israel destroyed the
PA’s security infrastructure because PA security
forces participated in the uprising. This created a
security vacuum into which non-PA actors inserted
themselves, with mixed results for Palestinians. This
exacerbated intra-Palestinian competition and led
external donors, the PA, and Israel to be even more
concerned with building a strong and dominant security
sector. In June 2002, the PA announced its </span><a
href="https://www.google.ch/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwij_f6H6YjTAhUBlBQKHVyvCU4QFggnMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdocuments.worldbank.org%2Fcurated%2Fen%2F821861468762865028%2FWest-Bank-and-Gaza-update&usg=AFQjCNFzvQDqvhbzDnF_J42XOtM52EcnjQ&sig2=vVxSWepWV6TshmLeWVe2lA"><span>100-Day
Reform Plan</span></a><span>. In 2003 </span><a
href="http://www.un.org/news/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf"><span>the
Road Map</span></a><span> demanded that a “rebuilt
and refocused Palestinian Authority security
apparatus” confront “all those engaged in terror” and
dismantle “terrorist capabilities and infrastructure.”
The forces were forced to combat terrorism, apprehend
suspects; outlaw incitement; collect all illegal
weapons; provide Israel with a list of Palestinian
police recruits; and report progress to the United
States.</span></p>
<p><span>Accordingly, Palestinian security reform
“remained…an externally-controlled process, driven by
the national security interests of Israel and the
United States, and characterized by very limited
ownership on the part of Palestinian society.”</span><span>
The international donor community led this reform in
2005 through the establishment of the European Union
Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
(EUPOL COPPS) and the United States Security
Coordinator (USSC). This situation continues to this
day, in the form of a </span><a
href="http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/0353e88a-286d-4266-82c6-6094179ea26d/97a3c162-9eb9-4e06-b5c7-c7758f9da15a#L1"><span>“one
gun, one law, one authority” strategy</span></a><span>
through which</span> <span>the PA’s monopoly on force
and violence is ensured.</span></p>
<span class="bctt-click-to-tweet"><span
class="bctt-ctt-text"><a
href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=The%20security%20sector%20consumes%20more%20of%20the%20PA%E2%80%99s%20budget%20than%20education%2C%20health%2C%20and%20agriculture%20combined&via=AlShabaka&related=AlShabaka&url=http://ow.ly/oU0m30bHSEK"
target="_blank">The security sector consumes more of
the PA’s budget than education, health, and
agriculture combined </a></span><a
href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=The%20security%20sector%20consumes%20more%20of%20the%20PA%E2%80%99s%20budget%20than%20education%2C%20health%2C%20and%20agriculture%20combined&via=AlShabaka&related=AlShabaka&url=http://ow.ly/oU0m30bHSEK"
target="_blank" class="bctt-ctt-btn">Click To Tweet</a></span>
<p><span>The post-2007 state-building project under the PA
has aimed, mainly through EUPOL COPPS and USSC, to
reinvent the PA security forces </span><a
href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/PRDP08-10.pdf"><span>through
technical means</span></a><span> including training
and weapons procurement. It has also aimed to reinvent
the forces </span><a
href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/ruling-palestine-ii-west-bank-model"><span>politically</span></a><span>
by constraining Hamas and its armed wing, curbing
Fatah-allied militants through co-optation and
amnesty, cracking down on criminals, and conducting
security campaigns, particularly in Nablus and Jenin.
The forces became known as </span><a
href="http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/2011/01/2011125145732219555.html"><span>Dayton’s
forces</span></a><span> in reference to Keith
Dayton, the US Lieutenant General who led the PA
military establishment’s “professionalization and
modernization” process. Local and international human
rights organizations have accused these </span><a
href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533312.2014.910404"><span>reformed</span></a><span>
forces of </span><a
href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde21/006/2013/en/"><span>human
rights violations</span></a><span> and </span><a
href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/19/palestine-no-action-assault-police"><span>suppressing
freedom</span></a><span>s</span><span>.</span></p>
<p><span>The most current phase has further entrenched the
predominance of Israeli security interests at the
expense of the Palestinians. Disarmament and
criminalization have impaired popular resistance
against the occupation, including peaceful
demonstrations and marches, advocacy against Israel’s
violations of human rights, and student activism.
Today, the PA security forces largely protect the
security of the occupier and not that of the occupied.
In short, the security of Palestinians has been
jeopardized because their own leadership has been </span><a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/opinion/subcontracting-repression-in-the-west-bank-and-gaza.html"><span>subcontracted</span></a><span>
to </span><a
href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/palestinian-authority/2017-03-06/palestinian-response-trump"><span>repress
them</span></a><span>. The post-2007 security reform
agenda has thwarted Palestinians’ national struggle,
their resistance movement and their everyday security,
and has subverted the very functioning of Palestinian
politics.</span></p>
<h2><b>Security Coordination as Domination </b></h2>
<p><span>To understand the magnitude of the security
coordination enterprise, it is useful to note that the
</span><a
href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/security-aid-pa-sustains-israel-occupation-161103120213593.html"><span>Palestinian
security sector</span></a><span> employs around half
of all civil servants, accounts for </span><a
href="https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/after-gaza-what-price-palestines-security-sector/"><span>nearly</span></a><span>
$1 billion of the PA budget, and receives around 30%
of total international aid disbursed to the
Palestinians. The security sector consumes more of the
PA’s budget than the education, health, and
agriculture sectors combined. The sector is currently
</span><a
href="https://www.academia.edu/31426494/Infographic_The_Palestinian_Security_Sector_in_the_West_Bank_and_Gaza_Strip"><span>comprised</span></a><span>
of 83,276 individuals in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, including 312 brigadier generals, of whom 232
report to the PA and 80 to Hamas. In comparison, the
entire US Army has 410 brigadier generals.</span><span>
The ratio of security personnel to the population is
as high as 1 to 48 – one of the highest in the world.
</span></p>
<p><span>Security collaboration between Israel and the PA
has fulfilled the Oslo Accords’ objectives of
institutionalizing security arrangements and launching
a peace process that is tightly controlled by the
security sector in order to enable Israel to fulfil
its colonial ambitions while claiming to be pursuing
peace. This process of “securitized peace” is </span><a
href="https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/after-gaza-what-price-palestines-security-sector/"><span>manifest</span></a><span>ed</span><span>
in a number of ways, </span><a
href="http://jps.ucpress.edu/content/46/2/7"><span>including</span></a><span>
the PA security forces’ arrest of Palestinian suspects
wanted by Israel (as in the </span><a
href="https://palestinesquare.com/2017/03/16/the-assassination-of-basel-al-araj-how-the-palestinian-authority-stamps-out-opposition/"><span>recent
case of Basil Al-‘Araj</span></a> <span>who was
arrested and released by the PA only to be chased and
eventually assassinated by the Israelis); the
suppression of Palestinian protests against Israeli
soldiers and/or settlers; intelligence sharing between
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the PA security
forces; a revolving door between Israeli and PA jails
through which Palestinian activists cycle for the same
offenses; and regular joint Israeli-Palestinian
meetings, workshops, and trainings. </span></p>
<p><span>Though Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has
threatened to suspend security coordination, he has at
the same time declared it a </span><a
href="http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/211102-israeli-palestinian-security-collaboration-called-into"><span>“Palestinian
national interest”</span></a><span> and a </span><a
href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UG5NcdkthQ0."><span>“sacred”</span></a><span>
doctrine. The PA security forces’ activities and
Abbas’s political maneuverings have naturally created
a deep gap in trust between the Palestinian people and
the PA. </span></p>
<p><span>Indeed, multiple surveys over the years have
shown that the majority of Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip (between </span><a
href="http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/625"><span>60%</span></a><span>
and </span><a
href="http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/8c85f60b-1071-46de-8e64-ceb72c06cd71"><span>80%</span></a><span>)
oppose security coordination with Israel. And in a
March 2017 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey</span><a
href="http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/poll%2063%20fulltext%20March%202017%20English.pdf"><span>
poll</span></a><span>, two-thirds of respondents
demanded Abbas’s resignation, with 73% expressing the
belief that Abbas is not serious in his threat to
suspend security coordination with Israel. In a 2010
Maan News Agency poll, 78% of respondents said they
believe that the PA security forces are engaged in
surveillance, monitoring activities, and intervening
in people’s privacy. Finally, according to Visualizing
Palestine, </span><a
href="http://visualizingpalestine.org/visuals/palestinian-authority-occupied"><span>67%
of West Bank Palestinians</span></a><span> said they
feel that they are living in an undemocratic system
that cracks down on freedoms in large part as a result
of the </span><a
href="http://thisweekinpalestine.com/the-security-forces-operating-in-palestine/"><span>security
realm</span></a><span>. </span></p>
<p><span>Negative public perceptions about security
coordination are fueled by lived experiences – from
which elites are often spared – as well as by official
rhetoric and the contents of the leaked </span><a
href="http://www.aljazeera.com/%20palestinepapers/"><span>Palestine
Papers</span></a><span>. For instance, US General
Keith Dayton </span><a
href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/DaytonKeynote.pdf"><span>remarked</span></a><span>
in 2009 that senior IDF commanders asked him, in
regard to the Palestinian security forces he was
training, “How many more of these new Palestinians can
you generate, and how quickly?” He also said that a
senior Palestinian official </span><a
href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/DaytonKeynote.pdf"><span>addressed</span></a><span>
a graduating class of these “new Palestinian men” in
Jordan, saying, “You were not sent here to learn how
to fight Israel…you were rather sent here to learn how
to keep law and order, respect the right of all of our
citizens, and implement the rule of law so that we can
live in peace and security with Israel.” And in 2013,
in a speech before the European Parliament, Israeli
president Shimon Peres </span><a
href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/full-text-of-peres-speech-to-european-parliament-1.508915"><span>stated</span></a><span>:
“A Palestinian security force was formed. You and the
Americans trained it. And now we work together to
prevent terror and crime.”</span></p>
<span class="bctt-click-to-tweet"><span
class="bctt-ctt-text"><a
href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Coordination%20will%20remain%20a%20feature%20of%20the%20skewed%20reality%20that%20favors%20Israel%20if%20action%20is%20not%20taken&via=AlShabaka&related=AlShabaka&url=http://ow.ly/oU0m30bHSEK"
target="_blank">Coordination will remain a feature
of the skewed reality that favors Israel if action
is not taken </a></span><a
href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Coordination%20will%20remain%20a%20feature%20of%20the%20skewed%20reality%20that%20favors%20Israel%20if%20action%20is%20not%20taken&via=AlShabaka&related=AlShabaka&url=http://ow.ly/oU0m30bHSEK"
target="_blank" class="bctt-ctt-btn">Click To Tweet</a></span>
<p><span>While security coordination between Israel and
the PA has been cemented since the Oslo Accords, the
status quo is not a foregone conclusion. However,
change will be difficult to achieve, as the system has
created a segment of Palestinian society that will
seek to maintain it. This segment is composed not only
of security personnel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
but also of those Palestinians benefiting from</span>
<span>institutional arrangements and a network of
collaboration and domination. The </span><a
href="https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/palestinian-authority-unsettling-status-quo-scenarios/"><span>status
quo</span></a><span> is beneficial for them, and
“stability” is their mantra. They are committed to an
approach that privileges the political, economic, and
security elite, and they have no incentive to reverse
the rules of the game. </span></p>
<p><span>Any attempt to halt security coordination would
thus have real consequences for the PA and its
leadership. Yet the perpetuation of the status quo is
destructive for the majority of Palestinians living
under Israel occupation and for the Palestinian people
at large. With the crushing of the ability to correct
political wrongdoing and hold elites accountable,
business as usual will likely continue. Security
coordination will remain a defining feature of the
skewed reality that favors the occupier if action is
not taken – and soon. </span></p>
<h2><b>Reinventing the PA’s Security Doctrine and
Establishment </b></h2>
<p><span>The entrenchment of the PA security establishment
requires policy interventions at multiple levels, from
correcting biased rhetoric to establishing
accountability mechanisms. The following
recommendations, addressed to different stakeholders,
propose an overhaul of the PA security forces’
operations and structures. </span></p>
<p><i><span>The Palestinian Authority </span></i></p>
<p><span>The PA must listen to the Palestinian people and
respect their wishes and aspirations, including in the
security domain; otherwise the legitimacy and trust
gap will grow far greater. There has never been an
inclusive Palestinian political system, but a more
responsive, representative, and responsible leadership
would ensure that the security of Palestinians, rather
than that of their occupier and colonizer, is a core
concern. An authentic security sector, as </span><a
href="http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/211102-israeli-palestinian-security-collaboration-called-into"><span>Tariq
Dana has argued</span></a><span>, would mean an end
to the “focus on internal policing known as the
‘Dayton Doctrine’” and “a program that demands
accountability and justice be put in place.” </span></p>
<p><span>As</span><a
href="http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Hani%20Masri%20%20Arabic%20New.pdf"><span>
Hani Al-Masri has elaborated</span></a><span>, this
would require gradual but firm steps to eventually
freeze or suspend security coordination, including:
Putting a stop to Palestinian security apparatus
intervention in political issues; reducing security
allocations in the annual budget; disbanding parts of
the security apparatus and restructuring the
remainder, with an emphasis on professionalism,
patriotism, and freedom from political nepotism; and
instructing the security apparatus to resist raids by
Israel in Area A.</span></p>
<p><span>Although the PA still argues that the current
security arrangements and division of labor serve the
two-state solution, the relentless Israeli
colonization of Palestinian land means that the PA and
its leadership must reassess their function. The
looming threat of annexation should push the PA to
take action before its role solidifies as a
subcontractor to the Israeli occupation. </span></p>
<p><i><span> Palestinian Civil Society </span></i></p>
<p><span>Palestinian civil society organizations,
especially human rights organizations, must form more
effective coalitions and intensify their efforts to
hold the PA and its political and security leadership
accountable for their human rights violations. In the
absence of institutions that perform checks and
balances, pressure that goes beyond writing and
publishing reports (though this in itself is an
important act) is urgently needed. In other words,
Palestinian civil society organizations need to
develop practical actions that confront the PA’s
continuous rights violations. </span></p>
<span class="bctt-click-to-tweet"><span
class="bctt-ctt-text"><a
href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Resistance%20is%20the%20duty%20of%20the%20Palestinian%20people%2C%20especially%20when%20policymakers%20do%20not%20represent%20them&via=AlShabaka&related=AlShabaka&url=http://ow.ly/oU0m30bHSEK"
target="_blank">Resistance is the duty of the
Palestinian people, especially when policymakers do
not represent them </a></span><a
href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Resistance%20is%20the%20duty%20of%20the%20Palestinian%20people%2C%20especially%20when%20policymakers%20do%20not%20represent%20them&via=AlShabaka&related=AlShabaka&url=http://ow.ly/oU0m30bHSEK"
target="_blank" class="bctt-ctt-btn">Click To Tweet</a></span>
<p><span>These civil society actors, including academic
institutions, public intellectuals, and think tanks,
must also address the PA’s faulty discourse, in which
Palestinian resistance is reframed as criminal
insurgency or instability. Israeli and international
actors who use this discourse should also be
confronted. Civil society must embrace and
operationalize resistance rather than see it
criminalized, and view it as an all-encompassing way
of living under occupation and in exile. Resistance as
a way of life can help to reverse how the political
and security elite currently portray it. Resistance
can then </span><a
href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/supplementpalestine/2016/2/28/%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9"><span>ensure</span></a><span>
the restoration of the core values and ideas that
enable Palestinians to engage collectively to realize
rights. </span></p>
<p><span>External actors, particularly the security bodies
EUPOL COPPS and USSC, need serious scrutiny from civil
society, both within Palestine and in their home
countries. They cannot continue to dominate the
security realm without accountability or transparency.
By promoting the rule of law in an authoritarian
context, these bodies contribute to the
“professionalization” of authoritarian practices by
(ab)using a good governance framework. Their claim
that their mandate is “technical” enables them to
evade the very political results of their operations
and interventions. After a decade of operation, it is
time to conduct an independent Palestinian-led
evaluation of these bodies and use that as an
accountability mechanism to reform these erstwhile
“reformers” and decide on the way forward. </span></p>
<p><i><span>Donors and the Donor Industry </span></i></p>
<p><span>In a context highly dependent on aid, the
supremacy assigned to securitization and
militarization </span><a
href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2015.1100016"><span>extends
to the realm of development</span></a><span>.</span><span>
Policymakers in donor states and Palestinians who
facilitate donor programs should address how
“securitized aid” has transformed a liberation
movement into a </span><a
href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/opinion/subcontracting-repression-in-the-west-bank-and-gaza.html?_r=0"><span>subcontractor
to the colonizer</span></a><span>, and has resulted
in </span><a
href="https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/after-gaza-what-price-palestines-security-sector/"><span>authoritarian
tendencies</span></a><span> that favor the security
establishment at the expense of other sectors, such as
health, education, and agriculture, as well as at the
expense of democracy.</span></p>
<p><span>Moreover, in Palestine, securitized aid and
development have not only </span><a
href="https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/can-oslos-failed-aid-model-be-laid-rest/"><span>fail</span></a><span>ed</span><span>
to address poverty, unemployment, and empowerment, but
have also created new insecurity and illegitimacy.
Development planners must acknowledge that these</span><a
href="https://alaatartir.com/2014/11/20/unwilling-to-change-determined-to-fail-donor-aid-in-occupied-palestine-in-the-aftermath-of-the-arab-uprisings/"><span>
patterns</span></a><span> will never be reversed </span><a
href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629395.2015.1126391"><span>unless
people</span></a><span>, and not the security
establishment, drive actions and are the constant
reference point. </span></p>
<p><span>At base, all these actions are the duty of the
Palestinian people, especially when policymakers do
not represent them and their aspirations. Palestinian
society needs to confront the tools used to repress
its mobilization and organize in order to ensure the
realization of its fundamental rights. The
non-factional youth-led initiative </span><a
href="https://www.facebook.com/EndCoordination/"><span>End
Security Coordination</span></a><span> that emerged
in the aftermath of Basil Al-‘Araj’s assassination in
March 2017 represents an example of such mobilization.
In their call for action, the youths </span><a
href="https://www.facebook.com/EndCoordination/photos/a.1856026354670386.1073741830.1851201625152859/1856026578003697/?type=3&theater"><span>stated</span></a><span>,
</span></p>
<blockquote>
<p><span>Our people have struggled for too long for us
to stand idle while repressive leaders barter our
oppression and dispossession for their personal
gain…We are approaching 30 years since the Oslo
Accords that transformed what remained of our land
into open air prisons administered by
unrepresentative PA officials who have hired
themselves out to be our colonizers’ first line of
defense…The Oslo regime does not represent us. Now
is the time for us to come together and rebuild our
collective struggle for the liberation of all of
Palestine. </span></p>
</blockquote>
<p><span>If such organized resistance can continue and
increase, pressure from the people may be able to
change the trajectory of PA-Israeli security
coordination, rendering Palestinians better equipped
to work toward self-determination and the attainment
of human rights. </span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
415 863.9977
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.freedomarchives.org">www.freedomarchives.org</a>
</div>
</body>
</html>