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<h1 class="title">Is South America’s ‘Progressive Cycle’ At an End?</h1>
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<p class="byline"> By <span class="author">Claudio Katz – </span>
<span class="date">March 9th 2016</span> </p>
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<div class="block-inner"><b><small><small><small><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11881">http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11881</a></small></small></small></b><br>
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<p class="intro-text">The year 2015 ended with significant
advances of the Right in South America. Mauricio Macri was
elected President in Argentina, the opposition gained a majority
in the Venezuelan parliament, and Dilma Rousseff is being
hounded relentlessly in Brazil. Then there are the
conservatives’ campaigns in Ecuador, and it remains to be seen
whether Evo Morales will obtain a new mandate in Bolivia.<a
id="ref1"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#fn1"
rel="footnote">[1]</a></p>
<div>What is the nature of the period in the region? Has the
period of governments taking their distance from neoliberalism
come to an end? The answer requires that we describe the
particular features of the last decade.</div>
<h3>Causes and Effects</h3>
<p>The progressive cycle arose in popular rebellions that brought
down neoliberal governments (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Argentina) or eroded their continuity (Brazil, Uruguay). These
uprisings modified the power relations but did not alter South
America's economic insertion in the international division of
labour. On the contrary, in a decade of rising prices for raw
materials all countries reinforced their status as exporters of
primary products.</p>
<p>The right-wing governments (Sebastián Piñera in Chile, Álvaro
Uribe-Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia, Vicente Fox-Enrique Peña
Nieto in Mexico) used the foreign exchange bonanza to
consolidate the model based on openness to free trade and
privatizations. The centre-left administrations (Néstor and
Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, Inácio Lula da Silva-Dilma
Rousseff in Brazil, Tabaré Vázquez-José “Pepe” Mujica in
Uruguay, Rafael Correa in Ecuador) promoted increased internal
consumption, subsidies to local business owners and social
welfare programs. The radical presidents (Hugo Chávez-Nicolás
Maduro in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia) applied models of
improved redistribution of income and contended with sharp
conflicts with the ruling classes.</p>
<p>The affluence of dollars, the fear of new uprisings and the
impact of expansive policies in the region avoided the severe
neoliberal adjustments that prevailed in other regions. The
classic abuses suffered in the New World were transferred to the
Old Continent, Europe. Greece's surgery has had no parallel in
Latin America nor have we suffered the financial agonies visited
on Portugal, Iceland or Ireland.</p>
<p>This relief was also an effect of the defeat of the FTAA. The
project to create a continental free trade area was suspended
and this paved the way for a productive respite and social
improvements.<a id="ref2"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#fn2"
rel="footnote">[2]</a></p>
<p>During the decade there was a serious limitation of U.S.
interventionism. The Marines and the Fourth Fleet continued to
operate but did not carry out the invasions typical of
Washington. This restraint was confirmed in the decline of the
OAS. That Ministry of Colonies lost influence while new
organizations (UNASUR, CELAC) intervened in the major conflicts
(as in Colombia).</p>
<p>U.S. recognition of Cuba reflected this new scenario. For 53
years the United States had been unable to vanquish the island.
It now opted for negotiations and diplomacy, hoping to restore
its image and regain hegemony in the region.</p>
<p>This cautious approach of the State Department contrasts with
its virulence in other parts of the world. To note the
difference, it is enough to observe the sequence of massacres
suffered by the Arab world, where the Pentagon ensures U.S.
control of oil, destroying states and upholding governments that
crush the democratic springs. This demolition (or the wars of
plunder in Africa) were absent in South America.</p>
<p>The progressive cycle allowed democratic conquests and
constitutional reforms (Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador) introducing
rights that had been denied for decades by the ruling elites.
And greater tolerance was displayed toward social protest. In
this respect, the contrast with the more repressive regimes
(Colombia, Peru) or with governments that have used the war on
drugs to terrorize people (Mexico) is quite striking.</p>
<p>The progressive period also included the recovery of
anti-imperialist ideological traditions. This reappropriation
was visible in the commemorations of the independence
bicentennials, now updated as the agenda of a Second
Independence. In a number of countries this atmosphere
contributed to the reappearance of the socialist horizon.</p>
<p>The progressive cycle involved transformations that drew
international appreciation from the social movements. South
America became a reference for popular agendas. But now the
limits of the changes occurring during this stage have surfaced.</p>
<h3>Frustrations with Integration</h3>
<p>During 2015 Latin American exports declined for the third
consecutive year. China's slower growth, the lesser demand for
agrofuels, and the return of speculation in financial assets
tend to downgrade the market value of raw materials.</p>
<p>The fall in prices will be reinforced if shale co-exists with
traditional oil and other substitute sources are developed for
basic resources. This is not the first time that capitalism has
developed new techniques to counteract the rise in prices of raw
materials. These tendencies tend to seriously undermine all of
the Latin American economies tied to agro-mineral exports.</p>
<p>The difficulties in the new situation are confirmed in the
reduced growth. Since the public debt is lower than in the past
the traditional collapses are not yet cause for concern. But
fiscal resources are now declining and the margin for developing
policies to reactivate the economy is narrowing.</p>
<p>The progressive cycle has not managed to alter regional
vulnerability. This fragility persists in the expansion of raw
materials deals to the detriment of integration and productive
diversification. The South American association projects have
been overcome again through national export activities that
promote commercial balkanization and the deterioration of
manufacturing processes.</p>
<p>After the defeat of the FTAA many initiatives were taken to
forge common structures throughout the area. These included
shared industrialization goals, energy loops and communications
networks. But those programs have languished year after year.</p>
<p>The regional bank, reserve fund and coordinated currency
exchange system have never materialized. Norms to minimize the
use of the dollar in commercial transactions as well as priority
regional infrastructure projects have remained on the drawing
boards.</p>
<p>No concerted protection against the fall in export prices has
been set in motion. Each government has opted to negotiate with
its own customers, shelving plans to create a regional bloc.</p>
<p>This impotence is synthesized by the freezing of the Bank of
the South. It was obstructed in particular by Brazil, which
promotes instead its BNDES<a id="ref3"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#fn3"
rel="footnote">[3]</a> and even a BRICS bank. The absence of
any common financial institution has undermined the programs for
exchange convergence and a common currency.</p>
<p>The negotiations with China reveal the same regional fracture.
Each government unilaterally signs agreements with the new Asian
power which monopolizes purchases of raw materials, sales of
manufactured goods, and the granting of credit.</p>
<p>China prioritizes dealings in commodities and is grudging in
transferring technology. The asymmetry that it has established
with the region is surpassed only by the subordination it
imposes in Africa.</p>
<p>The consequences of this inequality began to be noted last
year, when China reduced its growth and its acquisitions in
Latin America. Furthermore, it began to devalue the yuan in
order to increase its exports and adapt its exchange parity to
the exigencies of a global currency. Those measures accentuated
its position as the source of cheap merchandise in South
America.</p>
<p>Up to now China has been expanding without exhibiting
geopolitical or military ambitions. Some analysts identify this
conduct with friendly policies toward the region. Others see in
it a neocolonial strategy of appropriation of natural resources.
In any case the result has been a geometric increase in South
American dependency on raw materials exports.</p>
<p>Instead of establishing intelligent links with the Asian giant
as a counter to U.S. domination, the progressive governments
have opted for indebtedness and trade restriction. In UNASUR or
CELAC there has never been any discussion on how to negotiate
with China as a bloc in order to sign more equitable agreements.</p>
<p>The failures in integration explain the new impetus that has
been given to the Trans-Pacific Treaty. The FTAs reappear with
an intensity rivalled only by the decline in South American
cohesiveness. The United States has objectives that are clearer
than they were at the time of the FTAA. It promotes an agreement
with Asia (TPP) and another with Europe (TTIP)<a id="ref4"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#fn4"
rel="footnote">[4]</a> in order to secure its pre-eminence in
strategic activities (research labs, computing, medicine, the
military). In the wake of the 2008 collapse it has been
promoting free trade with renewed intensity.</p>
<p>South America is a market that is coveted by all transnational
enterprises. These companies want treaties with greater labour
flexibility and explicit advantages in litigating lawsuits over
environmental pollution. The United States and China rival each
other in their use of those tools to ease trade restrictions.</p>
<p>Chile, Peru and Colombia have already signed on to the
free-trade requirements of the TPP in matters of intellectual
property, patents and public procurement. They simply want to
obtain better markets for their agro-mineral exports. But the
big novelty is the readiness of the new Argentine government to
participate in this type of negotiations.</p>
<p>Macri claims he will loosen up the agreement with the European
Union and induce Brazil to participate in some way in the
Pacific Alliance. He has noted that Dilma's cabinet includes
agribusiness representatives more responsive to trade
liberalization than they are to the industrialism of MERCOSUR.</p>
<p>The FTAs will be put to the test in the bargaining over another
deal being negotiated in secret by 50 countries, which contains
far-reaching provisions for liberalization of services (the
TISA, or Trade in Services Agreement). This initiative has
already been rejected in Uruguay, but there are continuing
attempts. The progressive cycle is directly threatened by the
avalanche of free trade sponsored by the Empire.</p>
<h3>Failures in Neo-Developmentalism</h3>
<p>The limits of progressivism have been most visible in the
national attempts to implement neo-developmentalist policies.
Those efforts were aimed at turning again to industrialization
using strategies based on greater state intervention, imitating
the development of South-East Asia. Unlike the classic
developmentalism they have promoted alliances with agribusiness
and look to a long period in which to reverse the deterioration
in the terms of trade.</p>
<p>After a decade, they have not managed to achieve any of the
industrialization goals. The expectation of equalling the Asian
advance has dissolved in the face of the higher profits
generated by exploitation of workers in the Far East. The hope
of entrepreneurship by local business people has faded as they
continue to require state assistance. The promotion of an
efficient civil service has been neutralized by the re-creation
of inept bureaucracies.</p>
<p>The major neo-developmentalist attempt was carried out in
Argentina during the decade that followed the social explosion
of 2001. That experiment was eroded by many imbalances. Attempts
to administer the agrarian surplus in a productive way through
state management of foreign trade were abandoned. Instead, trust
was placed in business owners who used the subsidies for capital
flight rather than meaningful investment. Furthermore, they
hoped for a virtuous circle of demand based on contributions of
the capitalists, but the latter preferred to mark up prices.</p>
<p>The model preserved all of the structural imbalances of the
Argentine economy. It heightened dependency on raw materials,
fostered stagnation in energy supply, perpetuated a concentrated
industrial structure and sustained a financial system that was
hostile to investment. The maintenance of a regressive tax
system stood in the way of modifying the pillars of social
inequality.</p>
<p>The accumulated tensions led to a regressive turn that the
Kirchnerist candidate (Daniel Scioli) eluded by losing the
election. He proposed a gradual adjustment program through
taking on new debt, devaluating the currency, reaching a
settlement with the vulture funds claimants, and imposing higher
fees and cutbacks in social spending.</p>
<p>In Brazil the debate has been over whether the PT government is
managing a conservative variant of neo-developmentalism or a
regulated version of neoliberalism. As it did not have to
contend with the crisis and popular rebellion that convulsed
Argentina, the changes in economic policy were more limited.</p>
<p>But at the end of a decade the results are similar in both
countries. The Brazilian economy has stagnated and the expansion
in consumption has not reduced social inequality or increased
the size of the middle class. There is greater dependency on
commodity exports and a major downturn in industry. Finance
capital retains its privileges and agribusiness stifles any hope
of agrarian reform.</p>
<p>Dilma introduced the conservative turn that progressivism
avoided in Argentina. She won the election disputing the
adjustment advocated by her rival (Aecio Neves) and then
disowned those promises under pressure of the markets. She
appointed an ultra-liberal Finance minister (Joaquim Levy<a
id="ref5"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#fn5"
rel="footnote">[5]</a>), a replay of the first Lula presidency
that began with personalities of the same type (Antonio Palocci<a
id="ref6"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#fn6"
rel="footnote">[6]</a>).</p>
<p>During 2015 this orthodox management generated increased rates
and fees. Dilma justified the cutback in social policies and
maintained the advantages enjoyed by financiers as they build
their fortunes. But as the new year opened she replaced the
bankers’ man with a more heterodox economist (Nelson Barbosa)
who promises a slower fiscal adjustment to cushion the
recession. This turn does not portend an exit from the mess
created by the conservative policies.</p>
<p>Ecuador has experienced the same regression from
neo-developmentalism. Correa began with a reorganization of the
state that strengthened the internal market. He increased tax
revenues, provided improved social programs, and channelled part
of the rent into public investment.</p>
<p>But later he faced all the limits of analogous experiments and
opted for increased debt and export promotion. He signed a FTA
with Europe, facilitated privatization of highways, and awarded
fully developed oil reserves to the major companies.</p>
<p>The failings of neo-developmentalism have blocked the
progressive cycle. That model attempted to channel export
surpluses into productive activities. But it encountered
resistance from the economic power and gave in to those
pressures.</p>
<h3>A New Type of Protests</h3>
<p>During the last decade explosions of popular discontent have
become more infrequent. All of the governments count on using
increased fiscal revenues as a significant buffer in the face of
social demands. The Right resorted to welfarism, the Centre-Left
improved existing programs without affecting powerful interests,
and the radical processes facilitated conquests of greater
importance.</p>
<p>Throughout the region there was a relaxation in social tensions
and the major conflicts were expressed in the political sphere,
as in the big resistance mounted against rightist attempts to
remove Left governments and the huge mobilizations backing
candidates in election battles. But there were no uprisings
equivalent to those in the preceding period. Only the heroic
response to the coup in Honduras came close.</p>
<p>The fighting spirit of the masses was expressed in other
fields, as in the mass demonstrations of Chilean students for
free education, the outstanding general strike in Paraguay, or
the energetic demands of the peasants, indigenous and
environmentalists in Colombia and Peru.</p>
<p>But the principal novelty in this period was the social
protests in the countries governed by the Centre-Left. In a
context of strong political pressures from the Right, this
outburst from below highlighted popular dissatisfaction.</p>
<p>The defiance was quite striking in Argentina. First there was
the extended wave of strikes by teachers and public sector
workers, followed by the refusal to pay a tax imposed on
higher-income wage-earners. This discontent set off four general
strikes in 2014-2015. The size of these actions surprised the
leaders of the official trade unions, who opposed the protest.</p>
<p>In Brazil, the discontent emerged in the July days of 2013. The
huge demonstrations demanding improvements in public
transportation and education convulsed the major cities. These
were not just “second generation” claims over and above what was
already achieved; they expressed a frustration with the
conditions of life. This discontent was manifested in the
questioning of the superfluous expenditures associated with the
financing of the World Cup that could have gone instead toward
investment in education.</p>
<p>Finally, in Ecuador the social and indigenous mobilizations
became more frequent in the streets and in the past year reached
a peak in terms of numbers involved. Correa responded in a harsh
and authoritarian manner, widening the rift separating the
government from broad sectors of the masses.</p>
<h3>Why is the Right Advancing?</h3>
<p>Macri's arrival in the presidency represents the first
electoral overturn of a Centre-Left administration by its
conservative opponents. This turn is not comparable to what
occurred in Chile with Piñera's victory over Michelle Bachelet.
That was a substitution of government within the limits of the
same neoliberal rules.</p>
<p>Macri is a crude exponent of the Right. He resorted to
demagogy, depoliticization and illusions of concord. With
vacuous promises he transformed the powerful <em>cacerolazos</em> [pot-banging
street protests by predominantly middle-class sectors] into a
surge of votes.</p>
<p>The new President has appointed a cabinet of managers to
administer the state as if it was a business. He has initiated a
drastic and regressive transfer of incomes through devaluation
and increased prices. He is issuing decrees criminalizing social
protest and is preparing to repeal recently won democratic
rights.</p>
<p>Macri's triumph was no accident. It was preceded by the
Kirchner government's refusal to accept many demands from below
that the Right took up in a distorted and demagogic way. The
Kirchner followers fail to acknowledge their responsibility.</p>
<p>Some progressives see the victory of the PRO, Macri's party, as
a transient misfortune and hope to retake the government in a
few years. They do not understand the modifications in the
political map that are probable in the interval. Others argue
that the election was lost through bad luck or because of an
erosion in support over 12 years, as if that weariness adhered
to some fixed chronology.</p>
<p>Those who attribute the election outcome to the harangue –
effective, no doubt – of the hegemonic news media do not accept
that the alternative mounted by the official propaganda failed
as well. This applies as well to those who banter about Macri's
“post-politics” discourse without noting the declining
credibility of the Kirchner discourse. Macri's victory is
ascribable to the frustration with corruption, clientelism, and
the Peronist culture of top-down control and loyalty.</p>
<p>The reactionary offensive in pursuit of Dilma has not achieved
the results it did in Argentina, but it did disrupt the
Brazilian government throughout 2015. The Rightists began with
big demonstrations in March that they were unable to sustain in
August, and even less in December. The social mobilizations
against the institutional coup followed instead an opposite
course and grew as time went by.</p>
<p>The Supreme Court has blocked the political trial for now, and
the government has gained a respite that it is using to
reorganize alliances in exchange for a certain fiscal relief.
But Dilma has only achieved a truce with her opponents in the
Congress and the media.</p>
<p>As in Argentina, the progressive forces evade any explanation
of this retreat. They simply manoeuvre to secure the
government's survival through new agreements with the business
lobby, the provincial elites and the <em>partidocracia</em>, the
bureaucratic party structures.</p>
<p>They don't bother to investigate the regression of the PT,
which has eroded its social base by agreeing to the adjustments.
In the last election Dilma won by a slim margin, compensating
her losses in the south with votes in the northeast. Support
from the old working-class base of the PT has declined and been
supplanted by traditional clientelism.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the government is tarnished by serious corruption
scandals. Shady deals with the industrial elite have come to
light that portray the consequences of governing in alliances
with the affluent. Instead of analyzing this tragic mutation,
the theorists of progressivism repeat their timeless messages in
opposition to conservative restoration.</p>
<p>A similar regression is observed in Ecuador. Correa's
management is marked by a big divorce between his belligerent
rhetoric and his <em>status quo</em> administration. The
President polemicizes against Rightists and is implacable in his
denunciations of imperialist interference. But day by day he
crosses a new barrier in his acceptance of free trade and his
confrontation with the social movements.</p>
<p>Here too the analyses of progressivism are limited to redoubled
warnings against the Right. They overlook the disillusionment
created by a president who is compromised with the establishment
agenda. This turn explains Correa's recent decision not to seek
a new mandate.</p>
<h3>The Centrality of Venezuela</h3>
<p>The outcome of the progressive cycle is at stake in Venezuela.
What is happening there is not equivalent to what is going on in
other countries. These differences are not appreciated by those
who compare the recent triumphs of the Right in Venezuela and
Argentina. The two situations are not comparable.</p>
<p>In Venezuela the election unfolded amidst an economic war, with
shortages, hyperinflation, and smuggling of subsidized
commodities. It was a campaign full of bullets, paramilitaries,
conspiratorial NGOs, and criminal provocations.</p>
<p>The Right prepared its usual denunciations of fraud in order to
discredit an adverse election result. But it won, and was then
unable to explain how it could achieve this victory under a
“dictatorship.” For the first time in 16 years it obtained a
majority in the parliament and will now try to call a vote to
revoke Maduro's mandate.</p>
<p>Since they are unwilling to wait until 2018, when his term
expires, a huge conflict looms with the Executive power. In the
National Assembly they will promote unacceptable demands – free
the convicted coup plotters, expose speculation, overturn the
social conquests – explicitly aimed at harassing the President.</p>
<p>None of these features is present in Argentina. Not only does
Capriles have priorities that are quite distinct from Macri's,
but Chavismo differs significantly from Kirchnerism. The first
arose out of a popular rebellion and declared its intention to
achieve socialist objectives. The latter limited itself to
capturing the effects of an uprising and consistently glorified
capitalism.</p>
<p>In Venezuela there was a redistribution of the rent,
undermining the privileges of the dominant classes. In Argentina
this surplus was distributed without significantly altering the
advantages enjoyed by the bourgeoisie. The popular empowerment
that Chavismo unleashed bears no comparison with the expansion
of consumerism promoted by Kirchnerism. And the anti-imperialist
project of the ALBA is quite unlike the conservatism of the
MERCOSUR (Cieza, 2015; Mazzeo, 2015; Stedile, 2015).</p>
<p>But the principal singularity of Venezuela is derived from the
place it occupies in the system of imperialist domination. The
United States has targeted this country, hoping to regain
control of the largest oil reserves in the continent. It
maintains a strategy of permanent aggression.</p>
<p>The war the Pentagon waged in the Middle East – demolishing
Iraq and Libya – is sufficient to show the importance it assigns
to control of crude oil. The State Department may recognize Cuba
and discuss with opposing presidents, but Venezuela is a
non-negotiable prey.</p>
<p>That is why the hegemonic news media hammer away day and night
against this country, portraying a disaster that must be rescued
from afar. The coup plotters are presented as innocent victims
of persecution, omitting the fact that Leopoldo López was
convicted for the murders that were committed during the <em>guarimbas </em>[violent
street protests]. Any U.S. court would have handed down much
harsher sentences for such outrages. The media demonization is
designed to isolate Chavismo and encourage further condemnation
of it by the Social Democracy.</p>
<p>This campaign had been unsuccessful until the recent election
victory of the Right. Now they are resolved to dust off the
plans to overthrow Maduro, combining the erosion in support
promoted by Capriles with the violent removal favoured by López.
They are trying to push the government into a chaotic situation
in order to stage a repetition of the institutional coup
perpetrated against Fernando Lugo in Paraguay.</p>
<p>Macri is the international coordinator of this conspiracy. He
heads up all the challenges to Venezuela, while he criminalizes
protest in Argentina. He governs his own country by decree but
demands respect for parliamentarians in another nation.</p>
<p>Macri has already called for sanctions against Venezuela, a new
partner in MERCOSUR, but he does not talk about Guantánamo or
mention the ordeals of the political prisoners in U.S.
penitentiaries. He has postponed his call for sanctions in
Venezuela as he waits for Dilma to take a firmer stance. But he
will revert to a hard line if he thinks it fits well with the
provocations of López.</p>
<h3>Unpostponable Decisions</h3>
<p>Chavismo has faced major assaults because of the radicalism of
its process, the rage of the bourgeoisie, and the U.S.
determination to control oil production. The contrast with
Bolivia is striking. There too a radical anti-imperialist
government prevails. But the Altiplano lacks the strategic
relevance of Venezuela and drags with it a much higher level of
underdevelopment.</p>
<p>Evo Morales retains political hegemony and has achieved
significant economic growth. He has forged a plurinational
state, displacing the old racist elites, and asserted for the
first time the real authority of this organism throughout the
territory.</p>
<p>Up to this point the Right has been unable to mount a
successful challenge for government, but a battle has now opened
over the issue of Morales’ re-election. In any case, Bolivia
does not confront the unpostponable decisions that Chavismo must
now make.</p>
<p>Since the fall in the oil price, Venezuela has suffered a
drastic cutback in revenues that threatens its access to the
imports required for the day-to-day functioning of the economy.
Added to this are the huge surge in the fiscal deficit and the
failure to control the foreign exchange rate, inflation and the
money supply.</p>
<p>It's not enough to simply note the existence of an economic
war. It must also be said that the government has failed to
confront these abuses. Maduro has lacked the firmness that Fidel
displayed during Cuba's “special period.” The economic sabotage
is effective because the state bureaucracy continues to uphold
with PDVSA dollars a foreign exchange system that facilitates
the organized embezzlement of public resources (Gómez Freire,
2015; Aharonian, 2016; Colussi, 2015).</p>
<p>This lack of control accentuates the stagnation of the
distributionist model that initially channelled the oil rent
into social welfare programs but failed subsequently to
jumpstart the creation of a productive economy.</p>
<p>The current situation offers a new (and perhaps final)
opportunity to reorganize the economy. This unavoidably entails
cutting off the use of U.S. dollars for the smuggling of
merchandise and entry of overpriced imports. This fraud enriches
the bourgeoisified civil service and infuriates the people. It
is not enough to reorganize PDVSA, control the borders or jail a
few offenders. Unless the corrupt officials are removed
altogether, the Bolivarian process will condemn itself to
decline.</p>
<p>Chavismo needs to counterattack if it is to regain popular
support. Various economists have developed detailed programs to
implement an alternative management of the exchange rate, based
on nationalization of the banks and foreign trade. Since there
are no longer enough dollars to pay for imports and pay the
debt, there is a need as well to look into auditing those
liabilities.</p>
<p>Maduro has declared he will not surrender. But in the present
delicate situation measures from above are not enough. The
survival of the Bolivarian process requires building popular
power from below. Legislation already exists defining the
attributes of communal power. Those institutions [the communal
councils and communes] alone can sustain the battle against
capitalists who frustrate exchange controls and recapture
surplus oil profits.</p>
<p>The exercise of communal power has been impeded for some years
by a bureaucracy that is impoverishing the state. That sector
would be the first to be adversely affected by a democracy from
below. Maduro has now installed a national assembly of communal
power. But the verticalist functioning of the PSUV<a id="ref7"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#fn7"
rel="footnote">[7]</a> and the hostility toward more radical
currents [within Chavismo] impede this initiative (Guerrero,
2015; Iturriza, 2015; Szalkowicz, 2015; Teruggi, 2015).</p>
<p>Any boost given to communal organization will bring redoubled
denunciations in the international media about the “violation of
democracy” in Venezuela. That kind of propaganda will be spread
by the likes of those who were behind the U.S. coup in Honduras
or the institutional farce that overthrew Lugo in Paraguay.</p>
<p>These same personalities say nothing about the state terrorism
that is rampant in Mexico or Colombia. They had to put up with
Cuba's membership in the OAS and CELAC, but they are not
prepared to tolerate Venezuela's challenge. Confronting that
media establishment is a priority in the continent as a whole.</p>
<h3>What the Rightists Conceal</h3>
<p>The new situation in South America has emboldened the Right. It
thinks its time has come and it promises to end the “populist”
cycle and replace “interventionism” with “the market” and
“authoritarianism” with “freedom.”</p>
<p>What these messages conceal is the Right's direct
responsibility in the devastation suffered during the 1980s and
‘90s. The progressive governments the Right is challenging came
into being because of the economic collapse and the social
blood-letting produced by the neoliberals. The Right not only
portrays that past as a process unrelated to their regimes, it
covers up what actually happened in the countries it governs.</p>
<p>It would seem that the only problems in Latin America are
located outside of that radius. This deception has been
constructed by the hegemonic news media, which overlook any
information considered adverse to right-wing administrations.</p>
<p>The cover-up is shameless and most people are kept in ignorance
of any news related to those countries targeted by the dominant
press. The media describe the inflation and the currency
tensions existing under these governments, but do not mention
the unemployment and lack of job security prevalent in the
neoliberal economies.</p>
<p>They also highlight the “loss of opportunities” caused by
capital controls while remaining silent about the upheavals
produced by deregulation. They rant against “mindless
consumerism” but hide the damage caused by inequality.</p>
<p>But the grossest omission concerns the functioning of the
state. The Right objects to the “discretionary paternalism”
practiced by the progressive regimes but ignores the social
collapse in the narco-states that has occurred in conjunction
with free trade and financial deregulation. Three economies
known for their openness and attractiveness to capital – Mexico,
Colombia and Peru – are now suffering this corrosion of the
state.</p>
<p>Mexico has the highest level of violence in the region. No
high-ranking official has been jailed and many territories are
controlled by criminal gangs. In Colombia the drug cartels
finance presidents, parties and sections of the army. In Peru
official complicity with drug trafficking has gone to the point
that sentences have been commuted for 3,200 people convicted of
that offence.</p>
<p>None of this information is reported with the persistence given
to the reports of Venezuela's misadventures. This duality in
reporting extends to matters of corruption. The Right presents
it as a gangrene typical of progressivism, overlooking the
protagonistic participation of the capitalists in the major
incidents of embezzlement in all countries.</p>
<p>The major media expose the dark details of the official
handling of public money in Venezuela, Brazil or Bolivia. But
they do not mention the more scandalous cases involving their
protégés. The collective outrage that precipitated the recent
resignation of Guatemala's president did not make the headlines.</p>
<p>The Right resorts to the same media one-sidedness in
embellishing Chile's economic model, which is praised for its
privatizations, with no mention of the stifling household debt,
job insecurity, and miserable private retirement pensions, or
the slowing growth and rising corruption that are jeopardizing
the education reforms and social security promised by Bachelet.</p>
<p>The contrast between the neoliberal paradise and the
progressive hell also entails silence about the only case of
default in 2015. Puerto Rico ran out of money to finance the
plunder of its human resources (emigration), natural resources
(replacement of local agriculture by imported food), and
economic resources (relocation of industry and tourism).</p>
<p>There is no space for the consequences of neoliberalism in the
newspapers or news bulletins. The Right discusses the end of the
progressive cycle while failing to mention what is happening
outside of that universe.</p>
<h3>A Post-Liberal Period?</h3>
<p>The Right's misleading view of the progressive cycle contrasts
with the important debate now unfolding among Left theorists as
to whether this cycle is continuing or is exhausted.</p>
<p>Those who support the continuity thesis point to the solidity
of the transformations of the last decade. They emphasize the
socio-economic accomplishments, the advances in continental
integration, the geopolitical successes and the election
victories (Arkonada, 2015a; Sader, 2015a).</p>
<p>The consistency that they see in the changes carried out is
established through the use of the adjective “post-liberal” to
describe this cycle. They hold that a “post” stage has left the
preceding phase behind through the thoroughgoing nature of the
changes registered. This is their focus in polemics against
those who emphasize the decline in that process (Itzamná, 2015;
Sader, 2016b; Rauber, 2015).</p>
<p>The triumph of Macri, the advance of Capriles-López, and the
paralysis of Dilma or Correa have moderated these assessments
and induced certain criticisms. Some cite the harmful effects of
bureaucracy or shortcomings in the cultural battle (Arana, 2015;
Arkonada, 2015b).</p>
<p>But in general they maintain their characterization of the
period and emphasize the limitations of the conservative
offensive. They highlight the weakness of that project, the
transitory nature of its successes or the proximity of major
social resistance (Puga Álvarez, 2015; Arkonada, 2015b).</p>
<p>This view fails to register the degree to which the deepening
of the extractivist pattern has undermined the progressive
cycle. The link between this economic pattern and right-wing
governments is not extended to include its peers on the
Centre-Left. These governments are adversely affected by the
consequences of a model that reduces employment and inhibits
productive development. This contradiction is much more serious
in the radical processes.</p>
<p>The assumption of a post-liberal period omits those tensions.
Not only does it forget that overcoming neoliberalism means
beginning to reverse the region's dependency on raw materials
exports, it entails a serious lack of clarity in the
characterization of the period. It is never explained whether
post-liberalism is referring to the governments or to the
patterns of accumulation.</p>
<p>It is sometimes suggested that what is involved is a period
counterposed to the Washington Consensus. But in that case it is
the political turn to autonomy that is emphasized, while
ignoring the persistence of the pattern of raw materials
exports.</p>
<p>Or it is argued that a more substantial change in the economic
model would go beyond what it is possible to do in Latin
America. Such a turn would involve more significant changes in
the direction of a multipolar capitalist world that is said to
be developing. However, no one explains how those
transformations would alter the traditional physiognomy of the
region. What occurred in the last decade illustrates a course of
raw materials development counterposed to the steps that would
have to be taken in the region to forge an industrialized,
diversified and integrated economy.</p>
<p>Those sympathetic to progressivism defend the
neo-developmentalist economic base of the last decade, noting
its contrast with neoliberalism. But they do not register the
many areas of complementarity between the two models. Nor do
they note that no attempt at greater state regulation has
reversed the privatizations, eradicated job insecurity or
modified the payments on the debt.<a id="ref8"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#fn8"
rel="footnote">[8]</a></p>
<p>These insufficiencies do not constitute the “price to pay” for
the development of a post-liberal scenario. They perpetuate
dependency and primary export specialization.</p>
<p>In the last decade, of course, there have been social
improvements, greater consumption and some growth. But that kind
of recovery has occurred in other cycles of business recovery
and higher export prices. What has not changed is the profile of
regional capitalism and its adaptation to the current
requirements of globalization.</p>
<p>When this fact is ignored there is a tendency to see advances
where there is stagnation and enduring achievements where
mistakes are prevalent. The backdrop to the problem is the
sanctification of capitalism as the only feasible system. The
theorists of progressivism rule out the implementation of
socialist programs or at best concede their possibility in a
distant future.</p>
<p>With that premise, they imagine the viability of heterodox,
inclusive or productive schemas of a Latin American capitalism.
Each proof of failure of this model is replaced by another hope
of the same type, which ends in similar disappointments.</p>
<h3>Unthinking <em>Oficialismo</em></h3>
<p>The real problems afflicting progressivism are frequently
eluded, and criticism is focused exclusively on the bureaucracy,
corruption, or inefficiency. It is forgotten that those problems
can occur at any time in all economic models and do not
constitute a peculiar feature of the last decade.</p>
<p>And since it is supposed that the sole alternative to those
governments is a conservative return, conduct is justified that
ends up facilitating the right-wing restoration.</p>
<p>This conduct has been exposed during the protests that have
erupted under the centre-left governments. Their supporters
respond with the allegation that the right wing is behind the
protests. They question the “ungrateful ones” who have taken to
the streets but ignore the mistakes made by the progressive
governments.</p>
<p>During the Argentine strikes in 2014 and 2015, progressivism
repeated the traditional establishment arguments. It decried the
“political” nature of the strikes, as if that reduced their
legitimacy. It attacked the “extortion by the picketers,”
overlooking the fact that it is the bosses, not the activists,
who engage in blackmail, and that gestures like these roadblocks
are tactics used by workers in the informal sector, lacking the
right to protest, in order to protect themselves.</p>
<p>Other progressives try to discredit the strikes, saying that
“tomorrow everything will remain the same,” as if an act of
force by the workers will not improve their bargaining power.
And they present the strike as an act of “egotism” by the
better-off workers, even though that advantage has helped to
generate some of the biggest social acts of resistence in
Argentine history.</p>
<p>In Brazil, the reaction of the PT was similar. It did not
participate when the protests began in 2013. It expressed a lack
of trust toward the demonstrators and only conceded the validity
of the marches when they became a mass movement. The government
limited itself to accusing the Right of encouraging discontent
instead of noting the popular disillusionment with an
administration that appoints neoliberal ministers.</p>
<p>This hostility toward the actions in the streets was a result
of the PT's regression. The party has lost its sensitivity to
popular demands as a result of its close links with the business
interests and bankers. Its leadership manages the economy in the
interests of the capitalists and is surprised when its social
base asks for what it has always demanded.</p>
<p>The same tensions emerged in Ecuador in the face of numerous
petitions by the social movements in defense of the land and
water. Since their marches coincided with the Right's rejection
of the government's moves to tax the highest incomes, government
officials pointed to the convergence of both actions as the same
process of conservative restoration. Instead of favouring an
approach to the social protesters in order to forge a common
front in opposition to the reactionaries, progressivism blindly
lined up with Correa.</p>
<p>What is happening in the face of the protests in these three
countries governed by the Centre-Left illustrates how the
progressive administrations distance themselves from the popular
movement. That is how they pave the way for a return of the
Right.</p>
<h3>Enduring distinctions</h3>
<p>Objecting to the post-liberal thesis are other authors who
identify an exhaustion of the progressive cycle as a consequence
of extractivism. In their view, mega-mining undertakings
(Tipnis, Famaitina, Yasuni, Aratiri)<a id="ref9"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#fn9"
rel="footnote">[9]</a> and the primacy of soy or hydrocarbons
development have blocked reduction in social inequality. And
they argue that all the governments in Latin America converge in
a “commodities consensus” that accentuates dependency on raw
materials production and export (Svampa, 2014; Zibechi, 2016,
Zibechi, 2015a).</p>
<p>This is a correct description of the consequences of a model
that privileges raw materials exports. But it is wrong in
postulating the pre-eminence of a uniform physiognomy in the
region. It fails to note the significant differences that
separate the right-wing, centre-left and radical governments in
all respects other than extractivism.</p>
<p>Venezuela has not eradicated its dependence on oil, Bolivia has
not liberated itself from the centrality of gas production, and
Cuba maintains its reliance on nickel production or tourism. But
this dependency does not convert Maduro, Evo or Raúl Castro into
leaders similar to Peña Nieto, Santos or Piñera. Raw materials
exports prevail throughout the Latin American economy without
defining the profile of the governments.</p>
<p>By highlighting the damaging effects of extractivism, the
critics avoid the naive post-liberal perspective. But the
limitations of progressivism cannot be reduced to the
reinforcement of the agro-mining pattern, nor can
neo-developmentalism be defined by this feature. If extractivism
were to constitute the principal feature of that model, it would
have no significant differences with neoliberalism.</p>
<p>The new developmentalists have tried to channel the agro-mining
rents toward the internal market and industrial recomposition.
They have failed in that objective, but they had a goal that is
absent in their free-trade adversaries.</p>
<p>It is important to explain these distinctions if we are to
develop alternatives. The answers do not emerge from a contrast
with extractivism alone. Against the post-liberal capitalism
promoted by the theorists of the continuity of the progressive
cycle, these critics do not advance the socialist option.
Instead, they issue generic calls for projects centred on
increasing the number of self-managed communities.</p>
<p>This localist horizon tends to obviate the need for a state
administered by the popular majorities, and which harmonizes
protection of the environment with industrial development. Latin
America needs to nationalize the mainsprings of its economy if
it is to finance productive undertakings using the rent from
agricultural production and mining.</p>
<p>The beneficiaries would then be the labouring majorities and
not the capitalist minorities. There lies the main difference
between socialism and neo-developmentalism.</p>
<p>The theoreticians of the decline of progressivism question the
authoritarianism of the neo-developmentalist governments. They
point to restrictions on public freedoms, assaults on the
indigenous movement and the trend toward centralizing powers in
the hands of presidents. And they denounce the substitution of
dynamics of hegemony by coercive logics and the silencing of
voices independent of the official discourse (Svampa, 2015;
Gudynas, 2015; Zibechi, 2015b).</p>
<p>But none of these tendencies has converted a centre-left
administration into a government of reaction. The only such case
might be the President of Peru, Ollanta Humala, who posed as a <em>Chavista</em> but
has operated as president with a heavy hand and neocolonial
subordination.</p>
<p>It is important to recognize these differences if we are to
take our distance from the messages spread by the Right against
“authoritarianism” and “populism.” While the conservative
politicians seek to amalgate criticism of progressivism in a
deceitful common discourse, the Left needs to take its distance.
Explicitly repudiating the arguments and posturing of the
reactionaries is the best way to avoid that trap.</p>
<p>It is worth remembering that radicalizing the processes that
are bogged down by the hesitations of progressivism is a task
that is counterposed to the neoliberal regression. Areas of
convergence with the Centre-Left can exist, but never with the
Right. Confronting the reactionaries is a requisite of
mass-based political action.</p>
<p>These distinctions apply in all respects and have particular
validity in the exercise of democracy. Progressivism can adopt
coercive approaches but repressive patterns are not part of its
basic structure. That is why a passage from hegemonic forms of
rule (by consensus) to dominant forces (coercion) in the
administration of the state is usually accompanied by changes in
the type of government. The differences between the Centre-Left
and the Right that appeared at the outset of the progressive
cycle persist today.</p>
<h3>Concrete Controversies</h3>
<p>All of these current debates now take on an urgent content in
Venezuela. In that country the discussion is not about generic
diagnoses of continuity or exhaustion of a stage but of specific
proposals over radicalization or regression of the Bolivarian
process.</p>
<p>The revolutionists advocate radicalization. They reject
agreements with the bourgeoisie, promote effective actions
against speculators and favour consolidation of the communal
power. These initiatives reflect the audacity that characterized
the successful revolutions of the 20th century. They call for
going on the offensive before the Right comes out on top.
(Conde, 2015; Valderrama, Aponte, 2015; Aznárez, 2015; Carcione,
2015).</p>
<p>The second approach is advocated by the Social Democrats and
officials who are feathering their nests with the status quo.
Their theorists do not advance a clear program. Nor do they
openly dispute the radical theses. They simply emphasize the
objectives, suggesting that the government will know how to find
the correct road.</p>
<p>They tend to lay the blame on imperialism for all the
difficulties Venezuela is experiencing, but they contribute no
ideas on how to defeat those attacks. They call for renewed
efforts to fight “inefficiency” or “lack of control” but do not
mention nationalization of the banks, the expropriation of those
engaged in capital flight, or an audit of the debt.</p>
<p>Merely defending the Bolivarian process (and the following it
maintains) will not solve any problems in the present dilemma.
Without an open discussion of why Chavismo lost votes among its
supporters, there is no way to overcome the bigger predicament
posed by the Right. Nor is there any point in elliptically
noting that the government “did not or could not” adopt the
appropriate policies.</p>
<p>It is even more unwise to blame the people for “forgetting”
what Chavismo brought to them. This line of reasoning assumes
that improvements paternally granted by a government should be
applauded without hesitation. It is the polar opposite of
communal power and the protagonism of workers who are building
their own future.</p>
<p>The projects of post-liberal capitalism collide with the
reality of Venezuela. This proves the fanciful nature of that
model and the need to open anticapitalist routes in order to
head off the conservative restoration. Rejecting that approach
with a recipe book of impossibilities simply amounts to crossing
one's arms in futility.</p>
<p>Some thinkers agree with this characterization, but they think
“the time has passed” to advance in that direction. But how is
this timing determined? What is the barometer that can establish
the end of a transformative process?</p>
<p>The loss of enthusiasm, the retreat to private life, and
proclamations of “good-bye to Chavismo” are current today. But
the people often react to situations of extreme adversity. It
would not be the first time that divisions and errors of the
Right precipitated a Bolivarian counter-attack.</p>
<h3>Socialist Identity</h3>
<p>The persistence, renewal or extinction of the progressive cycle
in the region depends on the popular resistance. Without this
dimension it is impossible to ascertain whether it is the
continuation or the close of that period. It is a huge error to
assess changes in governments without reference to the levels of
struggle, organization or consciousness of the oppressed.</p>
<p>The Right has the initiative for now, but the nature of the
period as a whole will be defined in the social battles that the
conservatives themselves will surely precipitate. And the
outcome of those conflicts does not depend solely on the
preparedness to struggle. A key factor will be the influence of
socialist, anti-imperialist and revolutionary currents.</p>
<p>In the last decade the traditions of these currents have been
brought up to date through social movements and radical
political processes. In particular, a new generation of
militants has renewed with the legacy of the Cuban revolution
and Latin American Marxism.</p>
<p>Chávez played a key role in this recovery, and his death
severely affected the renaissance of socialist ideology. The
impact was so great that it inspired a search for substitute
references. An example is the centrality assigned to Pope
Francis, which tends to confuse roles of mediation with roles of
leadership.</p>
<p>Some personalities are of course useful for negotiating with
enemies. The first Latin American to accede to the Papacy has a
strong record as an intermediary with imperialism. His presence
can serve to break the economic blockade of Cuba, oppose the
sabotage of the peace negotiations in Colombia, or intercede
against the criminal gangs operating in the region. It would be
foolish to squander Francis's usefulness as a bridge in any of
those negotiations.</p>
<p>However, that function does not mean the Pope is a protagonist
in the battles against neoliberal capitalism. Many people assume
that Francis leads that confrontation thanks to his messages in
opposition to inequality, financial speculation or environmental
devastation.</p>
<p>They fail to note that these proclamations stand in
contradiction to the ongoing lavishness of the Vatican and its
financing through obscure banking operations. The divorce
between sermon and reality has been a classic feature of
ecclesiastical history.</p>
<p>The Pope also adopts various precepts of the social doctrine of
the Church that promote models of capitalism with greater state
intervention. Those schemes are designed to regulate markets,
raise compassion among the wealthy and guarantee the submission
of the dispossessed. They expand on an ideology forged during
the 20th century in polemics with Marxism and its influential
ideas of emancipation.</p>
<p>The Church's conceptions have not changed. Francis is
attempting to resurrect them in order to overcome the loss of
members that Catholicism has experienced at the hands of rival
creeds. The latter have modernized, are more accessible to the
popular classes and are less identified with the interests of
the ruling elites.</p>
<p>The Vatican's campaign counts on the approval of the news
media, which exalt the image of Francis, overlooking his
questionable past under the Argentine dictatorship. Bergoglio
maintains his old hostility to Liberation Theology, rejects
sexual diversity, denies the rights of women and avoids the
penalization of pedophiles. And he covers for bishops challenged
by their communities (Chile), canonizes missionaries who
enslaved indigenous peoples (California), and facilitates
assaults on secularism.</p>
<p>It is an error to assume that the Latin American Left will be
built in an environment shared with Francis. Not only is there a
lasting and huge counterposition of ideas and objectives. While
the Vatican continues to recruit believers in order to deter the
struggle, the Left is organizing protagonists of the resistance.</p>
<p>It is as important to reinforce this combative attitude as it
is to strengthen the political identity of the socialists. The
Left of the 21st century is defined by its anticapitalist
profile. Fighting for the communist ideals of equality,
democracy and justice is the best way to contribute to a
positive outcome of the progressive cycle. •</p>
</div>
<div id="endnotes">
<p>Endnotes:</p>
<p><a id="fn1"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#ref1">1.</a> A <a
class="relay"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolivian_constitutional_referendum,_2016">referendum
will be held in Bolivia</a> on February 21 to determine
whether the country's Constitution should be amended to allow
presidential candidates to stand for more than two terms,
thereby allowing President Evo Morales and Vice-President Álvaro
García Linera to run for another term in office in 2019.</p>
<p><a id="fn2"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#ref2">2.</a> The
rejection by South American governments of the proposed Free
Trade Area of the Americas in 2005, at Hugo Chávez's
instigation, was a turning point in relations between the United
States and most Latin American governments.</p>
<p><a id="fn3"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#ref3">3.</a> BNDES,
the National Social and Economic Development Bank.</p>
<p><a id="fn4"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#ref4">4.</a> Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP).</p>
<p><a id="fn5"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#ref5">5.</a> Levy
is now the World Bank Chief Financial Officer.</p>
<p><a id="fn6"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#ref6">6.</a> Palocci
was a Finance minister under Lula, later a Chief of Staff in
Dilma's first government.</p>
<p><a id="fn7"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#ref7">7.</a> PSUV
– United Socialist Party of Venezuela, founded by Hugo Chávez.</p>
<p><a id="fn8"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#ref8">8.</a> This
may be overstated somewhat. For example, Bolivia's MAS
government did in fact reverse many of the privatizations of
major industries carried out by previous neoliberal regimes. And
Correa did repudiate a substantial portion of Ecuador's debt
pursuant to an independent audit of its foreign debt
liabilities.</p>
<p><a id="fn9"
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php#ref9">9.</a> Tipnis
refers to Bolivian government plans to build a highway through a
national park of that name; protest marches led to a provisional
suspension of the project. Famaitina refers to a Canadian-based
company's plan to develop an open-pit gold mine in the town of
the same name in Argentina; after vigorous protests by the
community, the project was suspended in 2012. Yasuni refers to
Correa's offer to cancel plans to exploit hydrocarbons in a
biologically diverse part of Ecuador's Amazon if international
funding could be found to compensate for the loss of potential
state revenues; when such funding failed to materialize, Correa
withdrew the offer. Aratirí refers to a proposed open-pit iron
ore mine in Uruguay that has been widely protested.</p>
</div>
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<li>Sader Emir, 2015a. <a class="relay"
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<li>Stedile, João Pedro, 2015, <a class="relay"
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<li>Zibechi, Raul, 2015a. <a class="relay"
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</ul>
</div>
<div id="articlesource"><span class="label">Source:</span> <span
class="source"><a
href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1229.php"
title="Source: Socialist Project ">Socialist Project </a></span></div>
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