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<h1 id="DetailTitle">ON WAR AND GAZA'S WILL TO RESIST</h1>
<p id="NewsSpot">Undoubtedly, operation Protective Edge has failed
to weaken Palestinian resistance against unjustifiable sanctions
and violence posed upon Gaza. On the contrary, Israel's cruel
treatment on Palestinians have further raised an anti-Israel
stance throughout the world</p>
<ul class="origin">
<li class="autor">
Dr. Hatem Bazian </li>
<li> Updated : <span>04.09.2014 01:26:46</span></li>
<li><span><b><small><small><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/09/04/on-war-and-gazas-will-to-resist">http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/09/04/on-war-and-gazas-will-to-resist</a></small></small></b><br>
</span></li>
</ul>
<div class="dw"><span></span></div>
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Carl von Clausewitz, in his enormously influential work, "On War,"
articulated two principle standards to measure success in
confronting an enemy in a campaign: the military force must be
destroyed, and likewise, the will to resist must be crushed.<br>
<br>
We are certain that Israel and the Zionist Movement for the past 68
years - if not longer - has identified the Palestinian people, both
individuals and groups, as an enemy, and waged many wars to destroy
its limited force while seeking to crush its will to resist. From
the Nakba massacres in 1948 and the 1967 War, to the massive
assaults on Lebanon, numerous assassinations and Rabin's policy of
"force, might and beatings," Israel has spared no tool or stratagem
in pursuit of a mirage: crushing the Palestinians will to resist.<br>
<br>
No one can argue that Israel's military hardware, start-of-the-art
armaments and power are far superior to that of the Palestinians in
the past and present. One has to consider that the U.S. and European
powers provide Israel everything it needs regarding military
hardware, training, funding and technology as well as commitment to
maintaining Israel's "qualitative edge" over the combined Arab and
Muslim forces. Israel's aptitude in destruction and spilling
innocent blood is undisputed, and would receive a "World Cup" if
this was the measure for victory in Gaza. "Blood is not an argument"
nor a military strategy, however, but this has eluded the Israeli
leadership.<br>
<br>
After the announcement of a long-term cease-fire agreement on Aug.
25, 2014, the door has opened for a clearer strategic assessment
after Israel's disproportionate destructive campaign and endless
slaughter of the Palestinians in Gaza. What did Israel accomplish,
though? Where does the Palestinian will to resist stand today after
68 years of continued attempts at crushing it by every military
means available and with a most formidable regional and global
alliance serving Israel's needs?<br>
<br>
Sound strategic analysis points to Israel's complete and total
failure in achieving any measured success in the two most critical
goals mentioned above. Furthermore, the fact that Israel entered
into this war on Gaza assuming all the initiative and strategic math
was totally in its favor illustrates the gravity of their defeat.<br>
<br>
Murdering 503 babies and children, 302 women, old men, ambulance and
health workers, kids playing soccer on the beach or at U.N.
facilities, 17 journalists, bombing homes, hospitals, schools of all
types, mosques, the electricity generation station, water treatment
plants, camels and zoo animals, and residential towers are not
indicative of victory or gallantry. The major questions according to
Clausewitz would be: did Israel manage to destroy the Palestinian
forces in Gaza and was their will to resist crushed?<br>
<br>
Israel's decision to attack Gaza was based on a profound
miscalculation and self-constructed assumptions not connected to
Palestinian realities. The chaos in the Arab and Muslim worlds was
extrapolated into a number of wrong assumptions about the war
outcomes and a conclusion drawn based on it, but was not connected
to actual Palestinian internal strength and preparedness inside
Gaza. In addition, a self-constructed view about the weakness of the
resistance and their inability to withstand an attack - since all
the political cards in Israel's hands - was mistaken, not to mention
support from key Arab allies was nonexistent.<br>
<br>
The alliance with Egypt, the Palestinian Authority (PA), Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan was wrongly translated
into the magic bullet that will force Gaza to surrender in a few
days, and accept a cease-fire followed by the reintroduction of the
PA structure in Gaza.<br>
<br>
Even though the unity agreement between Hamas and Fatah put forth a
transition plan, it did not involve disarming or neutralizing the
resistance; thus, the attack was intended to crush and weaken the
resistance before the next implementation stage of the unity
government.<br>
<br>
For sure, Gaza's government was (and still is) under extreme
financial stress, and the unity agreement was reached to facilitate
employees' salary payments and the easing of the economic crisis
brought about by the intensification of the siege.<br>
<br>
In addition, regional changes after Egypt's military coup and
Syria's civil war impacted Hamas considerably, and weakened its
economic and political standing.<br>
<br>
Israel started the war at the weakest stage in local, regional and
global support for the Palestinians in general and Hamas in
particular. A hunter moving for the easy kill was the Israeli
leadership's strategic view after Gaza's population was "put on a
diet" for seven years, including total air, land and sea sieges,
crippling land and sea blockades, pummeled twice by military
campaigns in 2008/2009 and 2012.<br>
<br>
A strategic shift occurred in the course of the war, however, and
the hunter lost all advantages. In turn, Israel went on the run,
seeking Egyptian and U.S. help for an early exit strategy: the
initial Egyptian proposal.<br>
<br>
Simply put, Israel faced an emboldened, well-trained and
strategically-savvy Palestinian force, the likes of which Israel had
never seen before in Gaza.<br>
<br>
Ending rocket fire from Gaza was Israel's early expressed goal in
the war, but shifted to finding and destroying the tunnels - whose
presence and sophistication were a total surprise - and caused the
land invasion. In addition, the rockets never stopped; rather, they
demonstrated greater distance and accuracy, coupled with a most
daring development of locally-manufactured drones and sniper rifles
that forced a strategic balance despite the disparity of military
hardware at Israel's disposal.<br>
<br>
What is clear from a strategic perspective is that Israel's military
operational freedom in Gaza came to an end with this
campaign.Another more critical assessment will become clearer in the
months and years to come, which has to do with the total collapse of
Israel's global perception and standing. This collapse is seemingly
irreversible, and global public opinion has shifted so decisively
during the duration of the war on Gaza that it will not be possible
to change it.<br>
<br>
Indeed, Israel will spend hundreds of millions to prop-up the
Hasbara networks, undertake massive lobby efforts to prevent
criminal prosecution of its leaders and campaign to defame
pro-Palestine supporters. However, Israel fails to recognize what
has taken place: war crimes and criminal actions that were witnessed
and internalized at every moment by both a local and global
audience. The war's effects across the world can be seen in the
reemergence of a stronger and creative progressive movement, which
is making "Boycott, Disinvestment, Sanctions (BDS)" campaigns a
focal point across the globe, and linking the local struggles to
that of Gaza and Palestine.<br>
<br>
Gaza's steadfastness, once coupled with the total arrogance of power
exhibited by Israeli leaders, made a historical epistemic shift in
world public opinion, and Israel's unrestrained violence including
intentionally targeting children and civilians is the primary cause
for this strategic swing. The Israeli leadership will draw a number
of conclusions.<br>
<br>
One possibility is the realization that a real end to the
occupation, settlements and the dehumanization of Palestinians is no
longer tenable and change must be swiftly undertaken.<br>
<br>
However, knowing the right wing coalition, personalities and parties
at the helm of the Israeli Apartheid state, the most likely
conclusion will be that not enough force was used or problems
persisted during the planning; Thus, next time, more force is needed
as well as a campaign of assassination and machination against the
Palestinians. If this is the Israeli conclusion - and I believe it
will be -then Israel is back to square one in its attempt to shoot
its way out of a serious political problem. Certainly, killing more
Palestinians is not a solution, and if it is pursued, then the
future results will not go according to Israel's right wing
strategic dreams or liking because of increasing global frustration
with Israel's crimes and catastrophic actions. <i><br>
</i>
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