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<div class="entry-date"><big><big><small><small>March 26, 2014
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<div class="subheadlinestyle">An Interview with Abdullah al-Arian<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/03/26/where-is-egypts-post-coup-left/">http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/03/26/where-is-egypts-post-coup-left/</a><br>
</div>
<big><big> </big></big>
<h1 class="article-title"><big><big>Where is Egypt’s Post-Coup Left?</big></big></h1>
<big><big> </big></big>
<div class="mainauthorstyle"><big><big>by PAUL GOTTINGER</big></big></div>
<big><big> </big></big>
<div class="main-text"><big><big> </big></big>
<p><big><big><i>Abdullah al-Arian is assistant professor of history at
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. He is a
frequent contributor to Al Jazeera English and his forthcoming book is
entitled </i><i><a
href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0199931275/counterpunchmaga"
onclick="javascript:_gaq.push(['_trackEvent','outbound-article','http://www.amazon.com']);"
target="_blank">Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Egypt</a>.</i><i> Our
conversation focuses on the political and social situation in Egypt
since the July 3, 2013 coup, which deposed Egypt’s first democratically
elected leader, Mohamed Morsi.</i></big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>***</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><em><b>Paul Gottinger:</b><strong> Some elements of the
left and liberal sectors of Egyptian society seem to have been taken in
by the idea that Sisi and the military government is somehow a
continuation of the revolution. How do you see progressive forces in
the country faring?</strong></em></big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><b>Abdullah al-Arian:</b> It’s important to distinguish
between them. Some people saw the transition, which began in 2011, as
being coopted by elements of the pre-existing regime. These groups
maintained a consistent position by rejecting the presidency of Mohamed
Morsi outright. So it wasn’t surprising that they were helping to
cheerlead the call for Morsi’s ouster in favor of a more revolutionary
track.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>The problem was that the revolutionary groups’ support for
the coup was very shortsighted. They didn’t understand that the
problems of the transition would allow the military an excuse to
reclaim power. The result was not just taking Egypt back to square one,
but back into the negative column. The military used the problems of
the transition as a pretext for ending discussion of any revolutionary
transition. So I think that decision to support the coup against Morsi
by many progressive elements of Egyptian society has irreparably cost
Egypt any chance at revolutionary changes, at least in the near term.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>The progressive factions naively believed that once the
military was done with the complete repression of the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) it would somehow stop there and allow the resumption
of some kind of free and open political climate. However, history shows
that in these situations the repression is going to be total and
complete. What we see now is an unabashed attempt at the complete
return of the old party politics of the Mubarak era.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>Then there are those who are called liberals, but are
actually ideologically bankrupt political opportunists. These are
people within the ranks of the old political elite, who tried to
reinvent themselves within a revolutionary context by engaging in
democratic politics. But when they found that democratic engagement
wasn’t favoring them, they simply reverted back to their authoritarian
political arrangements. These people called on the military to come in
and do their dirty work for them. When they couldn’t get elected at the
ballot box, they wanted to come to power on the back of a tank. It was
incredibly naïve to think that this tactic would work, but they did it
nonetheless.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>People that fall into this category include everyone from <a
href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/20/mohamed-elbaradei-facing-court-case"
onclick="javascript:_gaq.push(['_trackEvent','outbound-article','http://www.theguardian.com']);"
target="_blank">Mohamed ElBaradei</a>, Hamdeen Sabahi, Amr Moussa, and
other failed political idols that make up Egypt’s political scene. To
their everlasting shame, these figures will be remembered for the fact
that they supported a military coup that overturned whatever
possibility existed for any revolutionary change in Egypt. One could go
even further and say these figures helped legitimize the
disproportionate state violence that took place in the aftermath of the
coup.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><strong><em>PG: One of the things we’ve been seeing in
Egypt over the last few years is the mobilization of the labor
movement. The many strikes over the last few years have certainly not
gone unnoticed by Egyptian authorities. In fact, one of the first
statements that Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb made after his
appointment on March 1 was that there should be a ”Stop [to] all kinds
of sit-ins, protests and strikes”. Can you give some background for the
labor movement in Egypt and what potential it has to push the country
in the more progressive direction?</em></strong></big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><b>AA:</b> The labor movement has a very rich history in
Egypt, which goes back to the colonial era. The labor movement led some
of the most important actions of national resistance against colonial
occupation, then against the monarchy, then against the authoritarian
dictatorships, which emerged after the 1952 revolution. Part of the
tragedy of the 2011 revolution is that the labor movement was used as
pawns in the emerging political calculus among the various political
forces. This includes those that supported the revolution, and those
that were responsible for the counter-revolution. Although organized
labor were helping to lead the protest movement since 2011, they were
frequently being asked by all the different factions to put their main
concerns aside for the interests of the nation.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>This was done during the transition period, and this was
done under the Morsi government. The MB government created the sense
that somehow organized labor action was going to destabilize an
economy, which Morsi was aiming to improve. Then once again after the
coup, which was supported by some segments of organized labor within
Egypt, labor was told that their interests would have to wait. They
were told that they would have to sacrifice for the broader interests
of the Egyptian economy. Labor hasn’t been included in any meaningful
way in any of the discussions of the political realignments that have
been taking place over the last three years.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><em><b>PG:</b> <strong>There has been a steady level of
protest since the coup took place last July. To what degree is this the
result of significant problems having to do with Egyptian quality of
life, which haven’t improved since the coup?</strong></em></big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><b>AA:</b> Try as the military might to rewrite history,
the 2011 uprising was a revolution launched by people who were
struggling for basic needs. The Egyptian people were calling for
“bread, freedom, and social justice”. The issue of a new social and
economic arrangement is one of the things that has gone almost
completely unaddressed since 2011—but especially in the aftermath of
the coup. Every single indication we see now is that the political
order is moving in the direction to reaffirm the pre-existing
socio-economic arrangements.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>Examples of this include the oligarchy’s continued benefit
from the neoliberal arrangements, which were put in place during the
late Mubarak era, the military’s continued hold over a massive segment
of the Egyptian economy, and the prevention of worker’s rights and any
kind of economic redistribution within the country.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><em><b>PG:</b> <strong>Do you see the ongoing protests and
strikes potentially forcing concessions from the Egyptian military
government?</strong></em></big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><b>AA:</b> It remains to be seen. So far the government
has shown a complete unwillingness to concede on anything whatsoever.
The high degree of repression, the unprecedented use of force and state
violence, and the signals that the military wants to achieve political
power (the military passed a constitution of its own design) all
demonstrate that even in the face of regional isolation and
international condemnation the government is moving forward with its
commitment to revert back to some version of the politics of the
Mubarak era.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><em><b>PG:</b><strong> Nationalist sentiments have become
very popular in Egypt with General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi enjoying
immense popularity for the military’s overthrow of Mohamed Morsi. You
stated earlier that you don’t see Sisi being able to greatly improve
the security situation or economic situation. Given this how long do
you see this overwhelming support for Sisi continuing?</strong></em></big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><b>AA:</b> A big problem with authoritarian systems of
governance is that it is almost impossible to measure popular
sentiments. The number of people who support Sisi, or the number of
Egyptians who supported the referendum on the constitution is
impossible to verify in the current climate of complete and total
repression.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>The popularity of Sisi is really just part of a guessing
game. But it’s safe to say that a cult of personality has arisen around
him. Remember just two years ago no one knew who Sisi was, but now you
can’t go one city block in Cairo without seeing his image. This
mythology has been built at an alarmingly fast rate, all in the last 8
months.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>Just because Sisi has had such a quick rise doesn’t mean
that he’s going to be granted a free hand to do whatever he wants. I
think there will be a certain degree of frustration in the early months
or years of his rule. This will be especially true if the economic and
security situations don’t improve and the atmosphere of fear and total
repression is maintained within Egypt.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>At that point you may see a more revolutionary movement
take hold again. The problem is that this is exactly what the military
and Sisi himself are anticipating, which is why they’re taking as many
steps as they can to try to prevent it preemptively. For this reason
they’re trying to recreate the culture of fear in Egyptian society.
This explains the excessive and in many cases indiscriminate violence,
where at times people on the sidelines of protests have been killed.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>There have been attempts to silence not only the MB, but
also intellectuals. Even university professors have been dragged into
conspiracy cases. They’re showcasing the ex-president Morsi on the soap
opera that they call a trial, all in an attempt to bring back a certain
culture of fear in Egyptian society, and prevent a revolutionary
movement from emerging in the future.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>A recent law states that any gathering, which has ten or
more people, needs to have government approval ahead of time. This
approval would, of course, never be granted in the event of any
anti-government non-violent protest. The military argues that there are
no longer emergency laws in place, but remember emergency laws in
Egypt, which suspended people’s rights, lasted for the entire Mubarak
era. Despite the fact there is no emergency law in place, the
constitution, which was just passed, institutionalizes some these of
emergency laws. It grants law enforcement a much freer hand to abuse
their power and doesn’t guarantee citizen’s rights in a way other
Egyptian constitutions in the past have attempted to do.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><em><b>PG:</b> <strong>Do you see any seeds of a
revolutionary element still existing within Egypt?</strong></em></big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><b>AA:</b> At this stage it’s far too early to tell. First
of all, the most powerful opposition group, the MB, is more or less
defunct at this stage. Its ability to mobilize has been completely
decentralized to the point that low level and midlevel leaders at the
local level are the ones who lead the protests. How sustainable that is
remains to be seen.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>If we move beyond the Muslim Brotherhood the remaining
independent voices are waiting to see if there is an opportunity to try
to engage in some kind of opposition to the new political arrangement.
Some are debating whether or not they should take part in these
elections, whether or not could actually compete within the new rules,
which are being established by Sisi. Others are waiting to see how
widespread this repressive climate will be, how long it’s going to
last, and whether there will be a window to engage in a popular protest
movement.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big>The problem is that the revolutionary movement is quite
divided. This is the legacy of the success of the military and the
interior ministry security forces in keeping these movements as
fractured as possible. You can also say the MB deserves much of the
blame for that because it maintained a very exclusivist approach in its
politics and its protest movement. In fact, even in the face of state
repression targeting all of them, there still is a tremendous amount of
ill will between the MB and the other opposition forces. As long as
this fracturing occurs, these forces will pose no serious threat to
Sisi and the Egyptian military government.</big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big>
<p><big><big><em><strong>Paul Gottinger</strong> is a writer from
Madison, WI. He edits <a href="http://whiterosereader.org"
onclick="javascript:_gaq.push(['_trackEvent','outbound-article','http://whiterosereader.org']);">whiterosereader.org</a> and
can be reached at <a href="mailto:paul.gottinger@gmail.com">paul.gottinger@gmail.com</a></em></big></big></p>
<big><big></big></big></div>
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<div class="moz-signature"><big><big>-- <br>
<small><small>Freedom Archives
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San Francisco, CA 94110
415 863.9977
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