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<h1 class="title" id="page-title">Will Hamas squander its Gaza victory?</h1>
<div class="field-author"> <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/people/hicham-safieddine"
typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Hicham
Safieddine</a> </div>
<div class="field-publisher"> <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/people/electronic-intifada"
typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">http://electronicintifada.net/content/will-hamas-squander-its-gaza-victory/11955<br>
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<div class="field-location"> <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/location/beirut"
typeof="skos:Concept" property="rdfs:label skos:prefLabel">Beirut</a> </div>
<div class="field-publication-date"> <span class="date-display-single"
property="dc:date" datatype="xsd:dateTime"
content="2012-11-30T00:15:00+00:00">30 November 2012</span> </div>
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<p>Will the latest <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/gazaunderattack">attack on
Gaza</a> spell the end of <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/hamas">Hamas</a> as a radical
resistance movement?</p>
<p>Palestinians in Gaza had barely buried their dead and tended to
their wounded in the wake of Israel’s week-long assault when Hamas
leader <a href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/khaled-meshaal">Khaled
Meshaal</a> was doling out concessions on the US mainstream media. The
same day a ceasefire was announced last week, Meshaal told CNN’s
venomous and condescending Christiane Amanpour that a Palestinian state
within the “1967 borders” of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was
acceptable. He went on to insinuate that the <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/right-return">right of return</a>
did not necessarily entail the actual return of refugees. Meshaal
sounded more like a broken record of <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/mahmoud-abbas">Mahmoud Abbas</a>
than that of a resistance leader emerging out of a hard-fought battle (“<a
href="http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=293084">Mashaal:
I accept a Palestinian state on ‘67 borders</a>,” <em>The Jerusalem
Post</em>, 22 November 2012).</p>
<p>Since then, the political flirtation between Hamas and the <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/palestinian-authority">Palestinian
Authority</a> has continued unabated. The latest move was Meshaal’s
enthusiastic endorsement on Monday of Mahmoud Abbas’s theatrical <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/international-recognition-palestinian-state">bid
for virtual statehood at the UN</a> (upgrading the <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/plo">Palestine Liberation
Organization’s</a> observer status to that of a state) (“<a
href="http://www.france24.com/en/20121126-hamas-meshaal-abbas-palestinian-un-status-upgrade?ns_campaign=editorial&ns_source=twitter&ns_mchannel=reseaux_sociaux&ns_fee=&ns_linkname=20121126_hamas_meshaal_abbas_palestinian_un_status&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter">Hamas
backs Abbas bid to upgrade Palestinian UN status</a>,” France 24, 26
November 2012). The Hamas-Fatah rapprochement is increasingly depicted
by media reports as a preamble for resuming national reconciliation
talks between the two factions now that the UN bid is over.</p>
<p><a href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/national-unity">National
unity</a> reasonably remains a top demand for most Palestinians. But
with the Palestinian Authority unequivocally acting as the <em>de facto</em>
native enforcer of Israeli occupation, unity can easily turn into
impunity for the occupier and its agents, and co-optation for the
forces fighting them. Achieving unity is easier said than done;
previous attempts have failed. The future of armed resistance rests on
the outcome of such talks, and those in turn will have to take into
account the fall-out of Israel’s latest attack on Gaza amid an evolving
military and regional political configuration.</p>
<h2>Big Brotherhood</h2>
<p>Few wars in Palestine have been as spun by all sides for political
gain like this latest one. Having alienated many of its supporters due
to its backing of <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/bashar-al-assad">Bashar
al-Assad’s</a> regime in <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/syria">Syria</a>, <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/iran">Iran</a> and its allies
were over eager to take explicit credit for their military and
financial support to Hamas and to reassert that the worthy battle is
that of Palestine not Syria. The opposing “moderate” camp was as eager
to prove that it is equally capable of siding with Palestinian
resistance while fighting its former allies in Damascus.</p>
<p>The fact that Hamas still had one foot in each camp when the attack
began played to the movement’s favor. The highest form of support,
military and financial, continued to flow from Iran, while diplomatic
pressure was exerted by the new Egyptian regime seeking regional
legitimacy to prevent a ground invasion and broker a ceasefire.</p>
<p>In the press conference jointly held by Hamas and the <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/islamic-jihad">Islamic Jihad</a>
to announce the ceasefire, Meshaal tried to appease all actors. He
thanked those in the “moderate” camp such as <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/egypt">Egypt</a>, <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/turkey">Turkey</a> and <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/qatar">Qatar</a>, while
acknowledging the role of Iran (Saudi Arabia was conspicuously absent
from all declarations of gratitude by Hamas officials).</p>
<p>But it was clear from the press conference that Hamas’ new political
patron is Egypt’s <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/muslim-brotherhood">Muslim
Brotherhood</a>. Even the Islamic Jihad, which still maintains some
ties with Damascus and is known for its closer ties to Iran, seemed
more aligned with Hamas’ new allegiance scheme when Islamic Jihad’s
Secretary-General Ramadan Shallah thanked Egypt but not Iran in his
brief interjection (“<a
href="http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?eid=74962&cid=23&fromval=1&frid=23&seccatid=23&s1=1">Resistance
says its word: Zionist entity defeated</a>,” Al-Manar, 21 November
2012).</p>
<p>Both leaders made explicit reference to the positive role that
Egyptian intelligence reportedly played. Long seen as Israel’s ears and
eyes in Gaza and <a href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/sinai">Sinai</a>,
it is hard to take for granted that this blemished Egyptian state
apparatus has turned into a backer of armed resistance without the
necessary purges from its ranks taking place.</p>
<p>Even if the new Egypt, as Hamas claimed, was as firm in warning
Israel of a ground invasion and pushing for an agreement favorable to
the conditions of the resistance, sooner or later, Israel and the US
will demand that Cairo play a more active role in clamping down on the
flow of arms. Washington’s push for an increased Egyptian role in the
prevention or proliferation of weapon smuggling will increase with the
further sidelining of Syria and the search for alternative routes of
weapons transport, namely via <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/sudan">Sudan</a> towards Suez
and Sinai.</p>
<p>With the passage of time, the Brotherhood will have to come clean on
where it stands regarding the question of financial and military
support for Hamas. If precedence is any indication, it will likely seek
to maintain a <em>status quo</em>: no active collusion with Israel in
return for pushing Hamas to reign in radical elements and future armed
operations rather than supply the financial and military assistance
needed.</p>
<p>With Egypt a long way from possibly developing a strong, independent
military purged of US influence and capable of replacing Iran, Hamas
would be taking a foolish gamble if it placed all its eggs in the Cairo
basket. A more reasonable arrangement would be to expect Cairo to
overlook weapons smuggling, and to keep channels open with Tehran as a
source. An Egypt-Iran arrangement of this sort — minus the corrupting
Gulf links and the destabilizing Syria ones — is a new resistance order
Hamas can build on should the political will be there. But this will
seems to lie somewhere else: eyeing a new round of the dangerous game
of national unity.</p>
<h2>National unity trap</h2>
<p>The Egyptian-brokered deal struck between the Hamas-led resistance
factions and Israel suggests that a policy of containment rather than
engagement is in the works for Gaza. In the unlikely event that Israel
adheres to its provision, there are tangible gains to be won: the end
of the <a href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/gaza-siege">siege</a>
and extrajudicial killings, as well as the cessation of all forms of
land, aerial and maritime aggression.</p>
<p>But in return, the resistance has vowed to cease all military action
originating from Gaza. In other words, the agreement is about <em>disengagement</em>,
not <em>rules of engagement</em>. The former is in the spirit of a
truce and leads to a long-term settlement, the latter in the spirit of
a ceasefire and leads to advancing the struggle under new more amenable
regulations.</p>
<p>As they stand, the current terms of agreement favor disengagement,
linking resistance from Gaza to aggression against Gaza <em>alone</em>.
This will further isolate the Strip from the West Bank, which has
already disengaged from linking its struggle to aggression on Gaza.</p>
<p>Emotions aside, the <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/content/anger-rises-west-bank-israel-kills-protesters/11925">shy
protests and clashes with Zionist forces</a> that erupted recently in
the West Bank fell short of what is expected from the territory where
the heart of the struggle is today. Zionists wish Gaza would disappear
off the map, but they see the <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/west-bank">West Bank</a> as
the Eldorado of Zionist expansion.</p>
<p>Without full participation of the West Bank in future resistance,
Gaza’s deterrence will fall short of turning into a long-term strategic
threat. And national unity talks circulating today, as much as unity is
needed, flow in that direction. Current Palestinian Authority
complicity in consolidating occupation is beyond retribution. According
to the 2011 report submitted by Israel to the <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/ad-hoc-liaison-committee">Ad
Hoc Liaison Committee</a> (a 15-member group that includes the <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/european-union">European Union</a>,
the US, the <a href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/world-bank">World
Bank</a> and the <a href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/imf">International
Monetary Fund</a>), the number of joint security operations between
Israel and the PA jumped by 118 percent in one year, with close to
3,000 “instances of coordination” and over 600 bilateral meeting at the
police and “civil defense” levels taking place in 2010 alone (“<a
href="http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/3F532B57-F377-4FEF-99C8-68A810CA7AAC/0/IsraelReportAHLCApril2011.pdf">Measures
taken by Israel in support of developing the Palestinian economy and
socio-economic structure</a>,” State of Israel, 13 April 2011 [PDF]).</p>
<p>The report praises the “professionalism and skill” of the
Palestinian security force, which managed to “escort” more than 600
Israelis out of Area A — the part of the West Bank nominally under
Palestinian Authority control — after the latter had strayed into it.
That skill must have been put on hold when Israeli forces conducted an
extensive arrest campaign in the West Bank against elected Palestinian
officials and Hamas cadres before the ink on the recent ceasefire
agreement had dried (“<a
href="http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=541257">Israeli
forces detain MPs around West Bank</a>,” Ma’an News Agency, 23 November
2012). Buoyed by Arab Gulf money and the comfort zone of ruling over a
disengaged Gaza, Hamas might easily fall into the faltering footsteps
of <a href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/fatah">Fatah</a>, which
has transformed itself from a popular resistance movement into the
mutated occupation-enforcing apparatus it is today.</p>
<h2>Back to resistance basics</h2>
<p>Without a clear and uncompromising roadmap to engage the West Bank
in the resistance project and end the Palestinian Authority’s
stranglehold over it, the Hamas-Fatah rapprochement is bound to lead to
co-optation of the worst kind. Arab resistance to Israel has
historically been beset by a disappointing leadership that either
promises victory and brings defeat or turns military victory into
political loss. The verdict is out on whether the latter is the case in
this war.</p>
<p>There is no question that Israel’s latest attack on Gaza enhanced
the resistance’s deterrence capacity. The coordinated and consistent
launch of an average 200 <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/rockets">rockets</a> a day
and the unprecedented strategic depth of the attacks (<a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/tel-aviv">Tel Aviv</a> and <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/jerusalem">Jerusalem</a>)
reflected a highly disciplined and developed resistance force —
credited by some to the efforts of the assassinated Ahmad al-Jabari.
The movement’s military wing was also capable of breaching Israel’s
broadcasting and telecommunications network and aired propaganda
messages on both while releasing more than 300 media statements about
the developments of battle.</p>
<p>The resistance is, therefore, slowly morphing into a holistic
apparatus that is not dependent on a single person. The active
participation of other resistance groups, namely Islamic Jihad, the <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/pflp">Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine</a> and Fatah’s al-Aqsa Brigades will make a
unilateral decision by Hamas to take a more “moderate” route difficult
to implement without the risk of internecine fighting and factionalism
within Hamas’ own ranks.</p>
<p>This is why the resistance’s best bet was and remains the successful
formula of what may be termed <em>unmediated deterrence</em> and <em>mediated
negotiations</em>. The first principle seeks to ensure that deterrence
becomes fully reliant on the resistance’s own military and intelligence
strength. Deterrence through diplomacy, as was partly the case in this
war, is another strategy but cannot be taken for granted or relied on
in the long run.</p>
<p>The second principle, mediated negotiations, lays out a strict rule
of engagement: that negotiation with the enemy is never made directly
but through honest brokers. Whether the brokers are seen as allies
(Egypt), or not (<a href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/germany">Germany</a>
brokered prisoner exchange deals between Hizballah and Israel) is not
the issue. The litmus test is the reliability of the broker as a
mediator and more importantly perhaps the <em>limited</em> objective
of negotiations: insisting on making incremental gains in the battle
rather than setting an end-game designed to liquidate the resistance.</p>
<p>The resistance, of course, will outlive any attempt to liquidate it
so long as Israeli occupation and <a
href="http://electronicintifada.net/tags/apartheid">apartheid</a>
exist. The risk is losing its cumulative momentum and progressive
strength. For at this critical juncture of the struggle, the loss of
another Ahmad al-Jabari would be one loss too many.</p>
<p><em>Hicham Safieddine is a freelance journalist and researcher of
the Middle East.</em></p>
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