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<font size=2>February 22, 2012 <br>
<a href="http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/02/22/what-really-happened-in-the-yom-kippur-war/" eudora="autourl">
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/02/22/what-really-happened-in-the-yom-kippur-war/<br>
</a>A CounterPunch Exclusive: Collusion and Betrayal on the Suez
Canal<br><br>
</font><h1><b>What Really Happened in the “Yom Kippur”
War?</b></h1><font size=2>by ISRAEL SHAMIR<br><br>
<i>Moscow<br><br>
</i>Here in Moscow I recently received a dark-blue folder dated 1975. It
contains one of the most well-buried secrets of Middle Eastern and of US
diplomacy. The secret file, written by the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo,
Vladimir M. Vinogradov, apparently a draft for a memorandum addressed to
the Soviet politbureau, describes the 1973 October War as a collusive
enterprise between US, Egyptian and Israeli leaders, orchestrated by
Henry Kissinger. If you are an Egyptian reader this revelation is likely
to upset you. I, an Israeli who fought the Egyptians in the 1973 war, was
equally upset and distressed, – yet still excited by the discovery. For
an American it is likely to come as a shock.<br><br>
According to the Vinogradov memo (to be published by us in full in the
Russian weekly <i>Expert</i> next Monday), Anwar al-Sadat, holder of the
titles of President, Prime Minister, ASU Chairman, Chief Commander,
Supreme Military Ruler, entered into conspiracy with the Israelis,
betrayed his ally Syria, condemned the Syrian army to destruction and
Damascus to bombardment, allowed General Sharon’s tanks to cross without
hindrance to the western bank of the Suez Canal, and actually planned a
defeat of the Egyptian troops in the October War. Egyptian soldiers and
officers bravely and successfully fought the Israeli enemy – too
successfully for Sadat’s liking as he began the war in order to allow for
the US comeback to the Middle East.<br><br>
He was not the only conspirator: according to Vinogradov, the
grandmotherly Golda Meir knowingly sacrificed two thousand of Israel’s
best fighters – she possibly thought fewer would be killed in order to
give Sadat his moment of glory and to let the US secure its
positions in the Middle East. The memo allows for a completely new
interpretation of the Camp David Treaty, as one achieved by deceit and
treachery.<br><br>
Vladimir Vinogradov was a prominent and brilliant Soviet diplomat; he
served as ambassador to Tokyo in the 1960s, to Cairo from 1970 to
1974, co-chairman of the Geneva Peace Conference, ambassador to
Teheran during the Islamic revolution, the USSR Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation. He was a gifted painter and a prolific writer; his archive
has hundreds of pages of unique observations and notes covering
international affairs, but the place of honor goes to his Cairo diaries,
and among others, descriptions of his hundreds of meetings with Sadat and
the full sequence of the war as he observed it unfold at Sadat’s hq
as the big decisions were made. When published, these notes will allow to
re-evaluate the post-Nasser period of Egyptian history.<br><br>
Vinogradov arrived to Cairo for Nasser’s funeral and remained there as
the Ambassador. He recorded the creeping coup of Sadat, least
bright of Nasser’s men, who became Egypt’s president by chance, as he was
the vice-president at Nasser’s death. Soon he dismissed, purged and
imprisoned practically all important Egyptian politicians, the
comrades-in-arms of Gamal Abd el Nasser, and dismantled the edifice of
Nasser’s socialism. Vinogradov was an astute observer; not a conspiracy
cuckoo. Far from being headstrong and doctrinaire, he was a friend
of Arabs and a consistent supporter and promoter of a lasting and just
peace between the Arabs and Israel, a peace that would meet
Palestinian needs and ensure Jewish prosperity.<br><br>
The pearl of his archive is the file called <i>The Middle Eastern
Games</i>. It contains some 20 typewritten pages edited by hand in blue
ink, apparently a draft for a memo to the Politburo and to the
government, dated January 1975, soon after his return from Cairo. The
file contains the deadly secret of the collusion he observed. It is
written in lively and highly readable Russian, not in the bureaucratese
we’d expect. Two pages are added to the file in May 1975; they describe
Vinogradov’s visit to Amman and his informal talks with Abu Zeid Rifai,
the Prime Minister, and his exchange of views with the Soviet Ambassador
in Damascus. Vinogradov did not voice his opinions until 1998, and even
then he did not speak as openly as in this draft. Actually, when the
suggestion of collusion was presented to him by the Jordanian prime
minister, being a prudent diplomat, he refused to discuss it.<br><br>
The official version of the October war holds that on October
6, 1973, in conjunction with Hafez al-Assad of Syria, Anwar as-Sadat
launched a surprise attack against Israeli forces. They crossed the Canal
and advanced a few miles into the occupied Sinai. As the war progressed,
tanks of General Ariel Sharon crossed the Suez Canal and encircled
the Egyptian Third Army. The ceasefire negotiations eventually led to the
handshake at the White House.<br><br>
For me, the Yom Kippur War (as we called it) was an important part of my
autobiography. A young paratrooper, I fought that war, crossed the canal,
seized Gabal Ataka heights, survived shelling and face-to-face battles,
buried my buddies, shot the man-eating red dogs of the desert and the
enemy tanks. My unit was ferried by helicopters into the desert where we
severed the main communication line between the Egyptian armies and its
home base, the Suez-Cairo highway. Our location at 101 km to Cairo was
used for the first cease fire talks; so I know that war not by word
of mouth, and it hurts to learn that I and my comrades-at-arms were just
disposable tokens in the ruthless game we – ordinary people – lost.
Obviously I did not know it then, for me the war was a surprise,
but then, I was not a general.<br><br>
Vinogradov dispels the idea of surprise: in his view, both the
canal crossing by the Egyptians and the inroads by Sharon were planned
and agreed upon in advance by Kissinger, Sadat and Meir. The plan
included the destruction of the Syrian army as well.<br><br>
At first, he asks some questions: how the crossing could be a surprise if
the Russians evacuated their families a few days before the war? The
concentration of the forces was observable and could not escape Israeli
attention. Why did the Egyptian forces not proceed after the
crossing but stood still? Why did they have no plans for advancing? Why
there was a forty km-wide unguarded gap between the 2d and the 3d armies,
the gap that invited Sharon’s raid? How could Israeli tanks sneak to the
western bank of the Canal? Why did Sadat refuse to stop them? Why
were there no reserve forces on the western bank of the
Canal?<br><br>
Vinogradov takes a leaf from Sherlock Holmes who said: when you have
eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be
the truth. He writes: These questions can’t be answered if Sadat is to be
considered a true patriot of Egypt. But they can be answered in full, if
we consider a possibility of collusion between Sadat, the US and Israeli
leadership – a conspiracy in which each participant pursued his own
goals. A conspiracy in which each participant did not know the full
details of other participants’ game. A conspiracy in which each
participant tried to gain more ground despite the overall agreement
between them.<br><br>
<b>Sadat’s Plans<br><br>
</b>Before the war Sadat was at the nadir of his power: in Egypt and
abroad he had lost prestige. The least educated and least
charismatic of Nasser’s followers, Sadat was isolated. He needed a war, a
limited war with Israel that would not end with defeat. Such a war would
release the pressure in the army and he would regain his authority. The
US agreed to give him a green light for the war, something the Russians
never did. The Russians protected Egypt’s skies, but they were against
wars. For that, Sadat had to rely upon the US and part with the USSR. He
was ready to do so as he loathed socialism. He did not need victory, just
no defeat; he wanted to explain his failure to win by deficient Soviet
equipment. That is why the army was given the minimal task: crossing the
Canal and hold the bridgehead until the Americans entered the
game.<br><br>
<b>Plans of the US<br><br>
</b>During decolonisation the US lost strategic ground in the Middle East
with its oil, its Suez Canal, its vast population. Its ally Israel had to
be supported, but the Arabs were growing stronger all the time. Israel
had to be made more flexible, for its brutal policies interfered with the
US plans. So the US had to keep Israel as its ally but at the same time
Israel’s arrogance had to be broken. The US needed a chance to “save”
Israel after allowing the Arabs to beat the Israelis for a while. So the
US allowed Sadat to begin a limited war.<br><br>
<b>Israel <br><br>
</b>Israel’s leaders had to help the US, its main provider and supporter.
The US needed to improve its positions in the Middle East, as in 1973
they had only one friend and ally, King Feisal. (Kissinger told
Vinogradov that Feisal tried to educate him about the evilness of Jews
and Communists.) If and when the US was to recover its position in the
Middle East, the Israeli position would improve drastically. Egypt was a
weak link, as Sadat disliked the USSR and the progressive forces in the
country, so it could be turned. Syria could be dealt with militarily, and
broken.<br><br>
The Israelis and Americans decided to let Sadat take the Canal while
holding the mountain passes of Mittla and Giddi, a better defensive line
anyway. This was actually Rogers’ plan of 1971, acceptable to Israel. But
this should be done in fighting, not given up for free.<br><br>
As for Syria, it was to be militarily defeated, thoroughly. That is why
the Israeli Staff did sent all its available troops to the Syrian border,
while denuding the Canal though the Egyptian army was much bigger than
the Syrian one. Israeli troops at the Canal were to be sacrificed in this
game; they were to die in order to bring the US back into the Middle
East.<br><br>
However, the plans of the three partners were somewhat derailed by the
factors on the ground: it is the usual problem with conspiracies; nothing
works as it should, Vinogradov writes in his memo to be published in full
next week in Moscow’s <i>Expert</i>.<br><br>
Sadat’s crooked game was spoiled to start with. His presumptions did not
work out. Contrary to his expectations, the USSR supported the Arab side
and began a massive airlift of its most modern military equipment right
away. The USSR took the risk of confrontation with the US; Sadat had
not believed they would because the Soviets were adamant against
the war, before it started. His second problem, according to Vinogradov,
was the superior quality of Russian weapons in the hands of Egyptian
soldiers better than the western weapons in the Israelis’
hands.<br><br>
As an Israeli soldier of the time I must confirm the Ambassador’s words.
The Egyptians had the legendary Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, the
best gun in the world, while we had FN battle rifles that hated sand and
water. We dropped our FNs and picked up their AKs at the first
opportunity. They used anti-tank Sagger missiles, light, portable,
precise, carried by one soldier. Saggers killed between 800 and 1200
Israeli tanks. We had old 105 mm recoilless jeep-mounted rifles, four men
at a rifle (actually, a small cannon) to fight tanks. Only new American
weapons redressed the imbalance.<br><br>
Sadat did not expect the Egyptian troops taught by the Soviet specialists
to better their Israeli enemy – but they did. They crossed the Canal much
faster than planned and with much smaller losses. Arabs beating the
Israelis – it was bad news for Sadat. He overplayed his hand. That is why
the Egyptian troops stood still, like the sun upon Gibeon, and did not
move. They waited for the Israelis, but at that time the Israeli army was
fighting the Syrians. The Israelis felt somewhat safe from Sadat’s side
and they sent all their army north. The Syrian army took the entire punch
of Israeli forces and began its retreat. They asked Sadat to move
forward, to take some of the heat off them, but Sadat refused. His army
stood and did not move, though there were no Israelis between the Canal
and the mountain passes. Syrian leader al Assad was convinced at that
time that Sadat betrayed him, and he said so frankly to the Soviet
ambassador in Damascus, Mr Muhitdinov, who passed this to Vinogradov.
Vinogradov saw Sadat daily and asked him in real time why he was not
advancing. He received no reasonable answer: Sadat muttered that he does
not want to run all over Sinai looking for Israelis, that sooner or later
they would come to him.<br><br>
The Israeli leadership was worried: the war was not going as expected.
There were big losses on the Syrian front, the Syrians retreated but each
yard was hard fought; only Sadat’s passivity saved the Israelis from a
reverse. The plan to for total Syrian defeat failed, but the Syrians
could not effectively counterattack.<br><br>
This was the time to punish Sadat: his army was too efficient, his
advance too fast, and worse, his reliance upon the Soviets only grew due
to the air bridge. The Israelis arrested their advance on Damascus and
turned their troops southwards to Sinai. The Jordanians could at this
time have cut off the North-to-South route and king Hussein proposed this
to Sadat and Assad. Assad agreed immediately, but Sadat refused to accept
the offer. He explained it to Vinogradov that he did not believe in the
fighting abilities of the Jordanians. If they entered the war, Egypt
would have to save them. At other times he said that it is better to lose
the whole of Sinai than to lose a square yard on the Jordan: an insincere
and foolish remark, in Vinogradov’s view. So the Israeli troops rolled
southwards without hindrance.<br><br>
During the war, we (the Israelis) also knew that if Sadat advanced,
he would gain the whole of Sinai in no time; we entertained many
hypotheses why he was standing still, none satisfactory. Vinogradov
explains it well: Sadat ran off his script and was waited for US
involvement. What he got was the deep raid of Sharon.<br><br>
This breakthrough of the Israeli troops to the western bank of the Canal
was the murkiest part of the war, Vinogradov writes. He asked Sadat’s
military commanders at the beginning of the war why there is the forty km
wide gap between the Second and the Third armies and was told that this
was Sadat’s directive. The gap was not even guarded; it was left wide
open like a Trojan backdoor in a computer program.<br><br>
Sadat paid no attention to Sharon’s raid; he was indifferent to this
dramatic development. Vinogradov asked him to deal with it when only the
first five Israeli tanks crossed the Canal westwards; Sadat refused,
saying it was of no military importance, just a “political move”,
whatever that meant. He repeated this to Vinogradov later, when the
Israeli foothold on the Western bank of became a sizeable bridgehead.
Sadat did not listen to advice from Moscow, he opened the door for the
Israelis into Africa.<br><br>
This allows for two explanations, says Vinogradov: an impossible one, of
the Egyptians’ total military ignorance and an improbable one, of
Sadat’s intentions. The improbable wins, as Sherlock Holmes
observed.<br><br>
The Americans did not stop the Israeli advance right away, says
Vinogradov, for they wanted to have a lever to push Sadat so he would not
change his mind about the whole setup. Apparently the gap was build into
the deployments for this purpose. So Vinogradov’s idea of “conspiracy” is
that of dynamic collusion, similar to the collusion on Jordan between the
Jewish Yishuv and Transjordan as described by Avi Shlaim: there were some
guidelines and agreements, but they were liable to change, depending on
the strength of the sides.<br><br>
<b>Bottom line<br><br>
</b>The US “saved” Egypt by stopping the advancing Israeli troops. With
the passive support of Sadat, the US allowed Israel to hit Syria
really hard.<br><br>
The US-negotiated disengagement agreements with the UN troops in-between
made Israel safe for years to come.<br><br>
(In a different and important document, “Notes on Heikal’s book <i>Road
to Ramadan</i>”, Vinogradov rejects the thesis of the unavoidability of
Israeli-Arab wars: he says that as long as Egypt remains in the US
thrall, such a war is unlikely. Indeed there have been no big wars since
1974, unless one counts Israeli “operations” in Lebanon and
Gaza.)<br><br>
The US “saved” Israel with military supplies.<br><br>
Thanks to Sadat, the US came back to the Middle East and positioned
itself as the only mediator and “honest broker” in the area.<br><br>
Sadat began a violent anti-Soviet and antisocialist campaign, Vinogradov
writes, trying to discredit the USSR. In the Notes, Vinogradov charges
that Sadat spread many lies and disinformation to discredit the USSR in
the Arab eyes. His main line was: the USSR could not and would not
liberate Arab soil while the US could, would and did. Vinogradov
explained elsewhere that the Soviet Union was and is against offensive
wars, among other reasons because their end is never certain. However,
the USSR was ready to go a long way to defend Arab states. As for
liberation, the years since 1973 have proved that the US can’t or won’t
deliver that, either – while the return of Sinai to Egypt in exchange for
separate peace was always possible, without a war as well.<br><br>
After the war, Sadat’s positions improved drastically. He was hailed as
hero, Egypt took a place of honor among the Arab states. But in a year,
Sadat’s reputation was in tatters again, and that of Egypt went to an all
time low, Vinogradov writes.<br><br>
The Syrians understood Sadat’s game very early: on October 12, 1973 when
the Egyptian troops stood still and ceased fighting, President Hafez el
Assad said to the Soviet ambassador that he is certain Sadat was
intentionally betraying Syria. Sadat deliberately allowed the Israeli
breakthrough to the Western bank of Suez, in order to give Kissinger a
chance to intervene and realise his disengagement plan, said Assad to
Jordanian Prime Minister Abu Zeid Rifai who told it to Vinogradov during
a private breakfast they had in his house in Amman. The Jordanians also
suspect Sadat played a crooked game, Vinogradov writes. However, the
prudent Vinogradov refused to be drawn into this discussion though he
felt that the Jordanians “read his thoughts.”<br><br>
When Vinogradov was appointed co-chairman of the Geneva Peace
Conference, he encountered a united Egyptian-American position aiming to
disrupt the conference, while Assad refused even to take part in it.
Vinogradov delivered him a position paper for the conference and asked
whether it is acceptable for Syria. Assad replied: yes but for one line.
Which one line, asked a hopeful Vinogradov, and Assad retorted: the
line saying “Syria agrees to participate in the conference.” Indeed the
conference came to nought, as did all other conferences and
arrangements.<br><br>
Though the suspicions voiced by Vinogradov in his secret document have
been made by various military experts and historians, never until now
they were made by a participant in the events, a person of such exalted
position, knowledge, presence at key moments. Vinogradov’s notes allow us
to decipher and trace the history of Egypt with its de-industrialisation,
poverty, internal conflicts, military rule tightly connected with the
phony war of 1973.<br><br>
A few years after the war, Sadat was assassinated, and his hand-picked
follower Hosni Mubarak began his long rule, followed by another
participant of the October War, Gen Tantawi. Achieved by lies and
treason, the Camp David Peace treaty still guards Israeli and American
interests. Only now, as the post-Camp David regime in Egypt is on the
verge of collapse, one may hope for change. Sadat’s name in the pantheon
of Egyptian heroes was safe until now. In the end, all that is
hidden will be made transparent.<br><br>
Postscript. In 1975, Vinogradov could not predict that the 1973 war and
subsequent treaties would change the world. They sealed the fate of the
Soviet presence and eminence in the Arab world, though the last vestiges
were destroyed by American might much later: in Iraq in 2003 and in
Syria they are being undermined now. They undermined the cause of
socialism in the world, which began its long fall. The USSR, the
most successful state of 1972, an almost-winner of the Cold war,
eventually lost it. Thanks to the American takeover of Egypt, petrodollar
schemes were formed, and the dollar that began its decline in 1971 by
losing its gold standard – recovered and became again a full-fledged
world reserve currency. The oil of the Saudis and of sheikdoms being sold
for dollars became the new lifeline for the American empire. Looking
back, armed now with the Vinogradov Papers, we can
confidently mark 1973-74 as a decisive turning point in our
history.<br><br>
<b><i>ISRAEL SHAMIR</b> has been sending dispatches to CounterPunch from
Moscow.<br><br>
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