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<font size=4><b>Al Jazeera and U.S. Foreign Policy: <br>
</font><font size=3>What WikiLeaks' U.S. Embassy Cables Reveal about U.S.
Pressure and Propaganda<br>
</b></font>by Maximilian C. Forte <br><br>
<a href="http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte220911.html" eudora="autourl">
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte220911.html<br><br>
</a>
<dl>
<dd>"Al Jazeera is a vital component to the USG's strategy in
communicating with the Arab world." --
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08DOHA792.html">Joseph E.
LeBaron, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, November 6, 2008</a><br><br>
<dd>"Al Jazeera Board Chairman Hamed bin Thamer Al Thani has proven
open to creative uses of Al Jazeera's airwaves by the USG beyond
straightforward interviews." --
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DOHA103.html#par6">Joseph
E. LeBaron, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, February 10, 2009</a><br><br>
</dl>The U.S. Embassy cables published by WikiLeaks present numerous very
interesting stories about how Al Jazeera was brought to heel by the U.S.
Government. The U.S. Embassy in Doha, and officials from
Washington, used a variety of direct and indirect methods of ensuring a
greater degree of compliance on the part of Al Jazeera. These
methods included placing speakers on Al Jazeera news programs; supplying
information approved by the U.S. Government; providing U.S. training for
Al Jazeera's journalists; demanding editorial distortion of aired
programs; securing Al Jazeera's agreement to check first with U.S.
officials before airing "sensitive" programs; monitoring of Al
Jazeera in minute detail, ranging from its news coverage to its internal
structure and policies; lodging complaints with Qatari government
ministers; constant, personal visits to Al Jazeera's headquarters;
developing familiarity and close personal contacts with Al Jazeera staff;
and going over the head of the Managing Director of Al Jazeera to ensure
that "objectionable content" was removed and never
repeated.<br><br>
Mainstreaming, professionalism, balance, and objectivity emerge as the
chosen tropes for a journalism that favors U.S. foreign policy.
U.S. officials did not overtly</i> threaten Al Jazeera staff, nor did
they engage in any crass form of bribery. The intervention was more
polite, prolonged, and intimate. In the process of reading these
cables we learn that, for the U.S. Government, Al Jazeera was valued as a
strategic tool, as a credible proxy for U.S. "public
diplomacy." We hear senior Al Jazeera executives describe
themselves as "partners" and "assets" of the
U.S. We also learn about the degree to which Al Jazeera is
controlled by the Qatari state and used as a foreign policy
instrument. We witness the degree to which Al Jazeera English is
almost entirely a foreign import, not even pretending to speak as the
"voice of the Arabs" and operating as a colonial
transplant. The picture of Al Jazeera revealed through the cables
is a grim one, and it is not likely that Al Jazeera can proceed
unscathed.<br><br>
Meet Mr. Al Mahmoud<br><br>
</b>By March of 2006, Abdul Aziz Al Mahmoud, the director of the Al
Jazeera Arabic website, had enough and quit. Al Mahmoud had become
disillusioned both with the channel and with the Managing Director, Wadah
Khanfar (much more about/from Khanfar follows below). Al Mahmoud, a
U.S. educated citizen of Qatar and a former military man, was described
by U.S. diplomats as
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DOHA328.html">"a close
Embassy contact"</a> (one of many as it turns out --
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06DOHA219.html">"Embassy
Doha has built cooperative personal relationships within Al
Jazeera"</a>). What about Al Jazeera had changed, so much so
that he had to resign? In the explanation related to us by then
U.S. Ambassador, <a href="http://www.untermeyer.com/">Chase
Untermeyer</a>, Al Mahmoud is
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DOHA328.html">reported</a>
to say:<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>In the old days [2001] . . . Al Jazeera was buzzing with idealism and
alive with passionate debate between partisans of different ideologies
(Arab nationalists, Islamists, secularists, socialists etc), and that it
had a genuinely revolutionary atmosphere about it. Now, he said,
people come to work from 9 to 5 like bureaucrats and Al Jazeera has
become part of the mainstream establishment.<br><br>
</dl>The Al Jazeera described above, prior to its transformation,
resembles the one shown in the carefully done, in-depth documentary,
<a href="http://icarusfilms.com/new2003/jaz.html">Al Jazeera: Voice of
Arabia</a></i>.<br><br>
The "mainstreaming" of Al Jazeera, in part due to U.S. pressure
and regular U.S. coordination with Al Jazeera directors and editors on
questions of news coverage, is one of the persistent themes in the
cables, published by WikiLeaks, from the U.S. Embassy in Doha (some of
which were previously
<a href="http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte150911.html">collated
by
</a><a href="http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte150911.html">
MRZine</a></i>). Becoming "responsible" and
"professional" meant, in practice, becoming answerable to the
U.S. and to the Emir of Qatar, just as the U.S. discovered the value of
Al Jazeera's voice in the Arab world, and just as the Emir used his media
giant to attack Arab rivals when convenient, most notably Libya.<br><br>
A Day in the Life of Al Jazeera Answering to the U.S. Government<br><br>
</b>It was
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1734.html">October 13,
2005</a>.<br><br>
Al Mahmoud may have missed the idealism, but he was part of Al Jazeera's
move towards greater service to U.S. interests in the Middle East.
On that day in October of 2005 he met separately with U.S. Ambassador
Chase Untermeyer and the U.S. Embassy's Public Affairs Officer (PAO),
<a href="http://qatar.usembassy.gov/about-us/chief-of-mission/deputy-chief-of-mission2.html">
Mirembe Nantongo</a>. They sought out Al Mahmoud over objections
they had to content on the Al Jazeera Arabic website. Al Mahmoud
"acknowledged that some of the material was unacceptable as
published and had been changed on his instructions" -- indeed, we
are told, all</i> of the "objectionable" content was
removed</i>, not just changed, and not just in part. (The
objectionable content had to do, in part, with the image of the U.S. in
the Middle East and a visit by
<a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Karen_P._Hughes">
Karen Hughes</a>, who was then Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs and would later visit Al Jazeera personally;
and a 9/11 slideshow that neglected to stress enough just how much of a
victim the U.S. was and how great was its humanitarian record in the
Middle East.)<br><br>
Chase Untermeyer first went to speak to an official in Qatar's Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, about the website content. Untermeyer
"stressed that this was the sort of irresponsible reporting that
produced problems and tensions in relations between Qatar and the United
States" -- turning an Al Jazeera issue into a Qatari government
issue and an international relations issue. Right here we see how
the idea of "responsible" journalism is framed: journalism that
responds</i> to the concerns of the U.S. and Qatari regimes. <br><br>
Apparently the U.S. <a href="http://www.dia.mil/">Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA)</a> was also busy producing frequent reports tallying the
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1734.html">
"incidence of objectionable content."</a> Ambassador
Untermeyer went to Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs armed with one
such report to help make his case. In
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05DOHA1593.html">another
cable</a>, we learn that the DIA would regularly send such reports to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would then pass them on to Wadah
Khanfar, Al Jazeera's Managing Director (more below). On one
occasion Wadah Khanfar commented on the nature of a DIA report:
"Clearly the person who writes this report is not a
journalist.
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DOHA317.html">The report is
politically oriented</a>." This also tells us something about
the politicization of "professionalism" as conceptualized by
U.S. diplomats.<br><br>
The PAO, Mirembe Nantongo, apparently gave Al Mahmoud quite the
browbeating: "objected to the slide show's depiction of the
9/11" . . . "those attacks were cowardly acts" . . .
"rejected the slide show's assertion. . ." . . . "gave a
narrow, distorted view" . . . "omission of any mention of the
US role in liberating Muslims," and so on. The PAO noted that
the slide show was removed from the site, but, not pleased enough with
the effect of her interference in the editorial decisions of an
independent media agency, she asked Al Mahmoud to confirm</i> its
removal. Not satisfied even with that, the PAO then slapped down a
packet of U.S. certified and authorized views for Al Jazeera to
repeat:<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>PAO also encouraged Al Mahmoud to draw on the many information
resources available to him and his staff via the Public Affairs Section,
and left him a folder with fact sheets and links relating to USG [U.S.
Government] assistance in the region, including USG emergency aid and
details of USG exchange programs.<br><br>
</dl>Al Jazeera's Managing Director, Wadah Khanfar, had not only
instructed Al Mahmoud to
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1734.html">completely
remove the slideshow</a> from the server (not just amending it, and not
just archiving it, as Al Mahmoud preferred) but also was apparently the
one to warn Al Mahmoud to expect a U.S. visitor. Al Mahmoud was
thus, as noted by the PAO, prepared for the latter's visit. Al
Mahmoud meekly responded that "a mistake was made." The
PAO surmises that Khanfar had in turn been pressured by the Qatari
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after Ambassador Untermeyer's
visit.<br><br>
The PAO ends one cable by commenting that:<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>Al Mahmoud is clearly very wary of attracting negative attention from
his chain of command, and is aware that
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1734.html">an irritated
USG means trouble for him</a>. He urged PAO to call him directly
any time the Embassy observes troubling material on the website.<br><br>
</dl>Freedom of the press, one of the values the U.S. asserts in
inventing its public image in the Middle East, is belied by actual
practice. Al Jazeera for its part failed to assert editorial
autonomy.<br><br>
Under the Microscope<br><br>
</b>
<dl>
<dd>"They [Al Jazeera] know they are under the microscope, and want
to be taken seriously. Al Jazeera's growing globalization will only
increase the pressure upon them to adhere to international standards of
journalism and result in an organization that can be dealt with upon
familiar ground, and within a framework already established by the
mainstream media." --
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06DOHA219.html">U.S. Embassy,
Doha, February 13, 2006</a><br><br>
</dl>Officials of the U.S. Embassy, as we see in the WikiLeaks cables for
Doha, in fact made a
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1765.html">habit of
visiting and contacting Al Jazeera</a>, hoping to build that
"familiar ground" and establish a reliable relationship that
would respond to norms favorable to U.S. policy. Just as Al Mahmoud
had told the Embassy's PAO to contact him directly any time the Americans
noted material they found troubling, so the U.S. Embassy kept a detailed
list of Al Jazeera contacts -- see
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08DOHA493.html">"Contact
Information for Engaging Qatar on Objectionable
Broadcasts."</a> Another cable, from
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05DOHA1593.html">September
18, 2005</a>, details a meeting between the PAO and Al Jazeera's Managing
Director, Wadah Khanfar, a Palestinian, as they note. It appears
that Khanfar tried to be a sort of middleman, gracious and understanding
toward the U.S., remembering fondly how prior to 9/11 Al Jazeera
"was regarded by the USG and the western world as a great asset</i>
and symbol of progress in the region" (emphasis added), and yet
paying some respect to being independent and critical.<br><br>
When the PAO (Nantongo appears as an indelicate person, hardly
diplomatic, rather colonial) asked Khanfar how he viewed Al Jazeera's
relations with the U.S. Government, Khanfar at first held back and
shifted the focus to Arab governments. While noting
"mistakes" on both</i> sides between Al Jazeera and the U.S.,
the diplomatic Khanfar seemed cheered and optimistic that a
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05DOHA1593.html">
"turning point"</a> had recently been reached in U.S.-Al
Jazeera relations, that is, "when detailed, practical exchanges
began to take place between the two sides." "AJ remains
open to such input and indeed welcomes it," said Khanfar: "We
have been more able to respond since we have received input. It is
now a practical discussion, a much more healthy relationship."
Khanfar asserted: "Al Jazeera is not there to be
anti-American. Absolutely not."<br><br>
Karen Hughes, Bush's public diplomacy envoy to the Middle East mentioned
above,
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DOHA317.html">personally
paid a visit to Al Jazeera</a> in 2006 and had a meeting with Khanfar and
four other senior Al Jazeera staff members (Chief Editor Ahmed Sheikh,
Deputy Chief Editor Ayman Gaballa, and senior presenters Mohamed Krishan
and Jamil Azar). Hughes complained that Al Jazeera's Iraq coverage
was not neutral and "respectful" enough. In response,
Khanfar made some telling remarks, criticizing the Iraqi resistance and
promising partnership with the U.S. and its goals of occupation:<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>We see ourselves as your partners in this, not as something to create
problems. We are interested in stability in Iraq. It is clear
that incitement has led nowhere. . . . We see ourselves as
partners. <br><br>
</dl>Hughes objected to Al Jazeera showing any</i> videotapes at all that
came from the insurgents or Al Qaeda, effectively seeking to ban the rest
of us from ever hearing or learning from those fighting the U.S. (a
policy mirrored by YouTube). Hughes then told Khanfar that she
would place "two or three USG spokespeople on a permanent basis in
Dubai's Media City, who would be available for comment at any time on a
complete range of issues." Khanfar was open to this and
requested U.S. speakers with expertise on U.S. policy in Iraq, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and other areas. He added that he
would appreciate having U.S. Government spokespeople "on
tap." In 2008, in a cable section subtitled
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08DOHA845.html">"Hand
Holding Appears to Work,"</a> the PAO notes that Al Jazeera had
requested that the U.S. "Embassy provide names of well-known
Americans who may be willing to appear" -- the PAO agreed and
further offered "to show producers how to search for academics,
authors, think-tank members and former USG officials and state officials
who could offer their views on specific topics." In 2008, the
U.S. Embassy sensed "goodwill" from Al Jazeera and much more
"balanced" coverage (i.e. favorable to the U.S.). The
Embassy vowed "to take advantage of this positive trend by seeking
placement of more U.S. voices, both official and private, on Al Jazeera
in the coming months and
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08DOHA845.html">closely
monitoring the performance</a> of producers and
interviewers."<br><br>
Also to be noted is that when Hughes spoke of issues of
"professionalism" she directly tied the notion to Al Jazeera's
content</i>, "particularly as it relates to Iraq coverage and to the
airing of terrorist-provided videotapes." It is quite clear
here what professionalism</i> means and why it become the handy trope for
U.S. political interference. Hughes called for a more "civil
and respectful dialogue," a classic line commonly used by those who
would practice counterinsurgency through discourse, schooling opponents
in "manners" that will, it is hoped, render them more quiet and
docile. The U.S. team accompanying Hughes to Al Jazeera, which
included Ambassador Chase Untermeyer, the Near Eastern Affairs/Press and
Public Diplomacy Director Alberto Fernandez, and PAO Mirembe Nantongo,
asked Al Jazeera to hand over a copy of its editorial policy, while
complaining of the "caliber" of the people Al Jazeera invited
as guests on its talk shows.<br><br>
Two years after Hughes, during the
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08DOHA581.html">visit of
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Member Perry Cammack</a>, the
point was raised with Khanfar about the obviously lessened coverage of Al
Qaeda on Al Jazeera. This was in part due to Al Jazeera trying to
"curry favor" with the Iraqi government, seeking to have Al
Jazeera allowed back into Iraq. In a meeting that same year (2008)
with Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy,
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_K._Glassman">James K.
Glassman</a>, Wadah Khanfar stated that relations with the U.S.
Government are "much better than before" and that Al Jazeera no
longer airs "extremist" recordings unedited, and it
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08DOHA633.html">
"attempts to check facts with the USG before airing coverage of
incidents involving the U.S. military."</a><br><br>
Khanfar, <a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05DOHA1976.html">on
other occasions</a>, would repeat that Al Jazeera is not
"anti-US" and "does not espouse any kind of 'anti-US
editorial policy'." As if sensing that Khanfar feared the
conversation would shape up to be one where he would be humiliated into
assuming the role of a mere U.S. puppet, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs,
<a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/134069.htm">Gordon Gray</a>,
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05DOHA1976.html">said to
him</a>: "We are not asking Al Jazeera to become a tool of the US
Government; what we are asking for is its professionalism."
DAS Gray asked Khanfar if he would like to see greater cooperation
between Al Jazeera and the U.S. Government, "in the area of boosting
Al Jazeera's professionalism</i>"(emphasis added), and he mentioned
the U.S. International Visitor program. Note how Gray characterizes
Khanfar's response: "Khanfar acquiesced</i> immediately"
(emphasis added). Khanfar went as far as saying that his staff hold
a very generalized picture of the U.S. and could benefit from more
exposure. Khanfar also pleaded for more U.S. Government officials
to appear on Al Jazeera. Indeed, Khanfar was openly resentful of
the U.S. favoritism displayed toward Al Arabiya, its Saudi-owned
competitor (and
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DOHA80.html">again in
2009</a> he repeated this invidious complaint).<br><br>
Professionalism, once more, became the way of framing the manner in which
the U.S. government would exert direct influence over Al Jazeera.
That there has been substantial influence is evidenced by the range of
documents -- but clearly that influence would only be acceptable to
senior people at Al Jazeera as long as it was respectfully packaged in
terms of professional integrity, rather than outright political
subservience.<br><br>
When it came to coverage of Haiti, on Al Jazeera English, we see a
glaring example of the U.S. exercising pressure to fundamentally
transform Al Jazeera's coverage and of the manner in which the latter
quickly acquiesced. In a cable from
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10DOHA24.html">January 20,
2010</a>, written by the U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, Joseph LeBaron, we see
his hackles raised at the way Al Jazeera English depicted the U.S.
"humanitarian intervention" in Haiti in terms similar to an
occupation. We learn that within hours of Ambassador LeBaron
notifying Near Eastern Affairs/Press and Public Diplomacy, the U.S. had
one of its officials appear on Al Jazeera English. Judith McHale,
Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, also
contacted Tony Burman, Director of Al Jazeera English -- the U.S. Embassy
in Doha first contacted Burman and "ensured that Burman was ready
for the call and understood the serious concerns that the Under Secretary
would convey." The U.S. Embassy continued to monitor Al
Jazeera's coverage, and noted that within three days "AJE's coverage
had evolved markedly." Ambassador LeBaron added the final note
to this,
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10DOHA24.html#par5">promising
more intervention</a> should Al Jazeera English depart in any way from
representing the U.S. in less than laudatory terms:<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>Ambassador has directed Embassy staff to continue monitoring AJE's
reporting, and to communicate these observations immediately to
Washington. If AJE, or any of Al Jazeera's channels, revert to
inaccurate coverage, Ambassador will not hesitate to intervene at higher
levels, starting with the Qatari Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Al Jazeera Network.<br><br>
</dl>Imported Journalism: High Quality Always Comes from Away (Say the
Colonized)<br><br>
</b>Driven to go global, Al Jazeera established an
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06DOHA104.html">international
advisory body</a>, "consisting of respected international journalism
figures to assess and advise on Al Jazeera operations," known as the
"Al Jazeera International Board of Visitors." This group,
which would play a quality assurance role (more below), includes the
input of such people as CNN's <a href="http://www.franksesno.net/">Frank
Sesno</a>; <a href="http://csis.org/expert/richard-r-burt">Richard
Burt</a>, senior adviser to the Washington Center for Strategic
International Studies (CSIS), a former U.S. ambassador and a former New
York Times</i> correspondent; and a range of other journalists, from
France 3 Television, Die Zeit</i>, to the BBC.<br><br>
Institutions of British and French journalism have worked to
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/11/05DOHA1803.html">train the
staff</a> of Al Jazeera, which has also developed a relationship with the
University of Missouri's School of Journalism. Al Jazeera's
training center has no staff of its own, but "imports trainers on an
as-needed basis from various British/French/US journalism
institutions," including the UK's Thomson Foundation and France's
Ecole Superieure de Journalisme de Lille. Al Jazeera's training
courses are conducted in English. The training center -- which
functions as a foreign assimilation agent -- aims to spread its influence
throughout the Arab world, by training staff from the region's media
outlets. It reported dozens of courses in a single year, with
thousands of participants. Al Jazeera's training center also
participated in the U.S.
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_East_Partnership_Initiative">
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)</a>, established by Secretary
of State Colin Powell during the first term of the George W. Bush
administration, and supervised by Liz Cheney, to aid local "agents
of change" in the region.<br><br>
It should be understood that the Al Jazeera training center also sought
to teach
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06DOHA104.html">
"political awareness"</a> according to Al Jazeera's Managing
Director -- keep in mind where the trainers come from and where the
trainees go -- and that trainers from the UK's Thomson School of
Journalism would teach local staff about the "philosophical,
historical and political aspects of their job" (he might have meant
what is now the
<a href="http://www.trust.org/services/reuters-institute/">Reuters
Institute</a> in the Department of Politics and International Relations
at Oxford).<br><br>
Al Jazeera English, launched in 2006, involved a fast track to mimicking
mainstream corporate journalism by in fact hiring directly from
mainstream corporate circles --
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06DOHA104.html">
"big-name media recruits from all parts of the world"</a> were
to join Al Jazeera's colony in Doha (I mean that literally, as the
journalists live in gated communities with little prospect of interacting
with locals). One of their American hires,
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08DOHA283.html">Dave
Marash</a>, "excoriated the station for taking on an anti-American
bent" and left -- although Al Jazeera staff downplayed his stated
reasons, noting that he had much more personal grievances and that in any
case the charge of anti-Americanism was leveled not</i> at the Qatari and
other Arab staff, but rather at
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08DOHA283.html">the British
employees</a>. Al Jazeera's local staff, for their part, complained
about the British staff for being arrogant and "acting like
colonialists."<br><br>
In 2006, control of the English website was handed over to Al Jazeera
English and its editor-in-chief,
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DOHA328.html">Russell
Merryman</a>, a British national. Al Jazeera's website director, Al
Mahmoud, previously responsible for both the English and Arabic versions,
was clearly
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1734.html#par8">
unhappy</a> with this rearrangement.<br><br>
Even those who are not themselves outsiders to the Middle East and North
Africa, such as
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1786.html">Jaafar Abbas
Ahmed</a>, are BBC-trained, Abbas being one who took up residence in Doha
after working for the BBC for over a decade. We are told that a
"significant number" of the earliest Al Jazeera journalists
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1786.html">came from
the BBC</a>. Al Jazeera's quality assurance team (more on this
below) will regularly "record BBC and CNN coverage" of an event
also covered by Al Jazeera "and compare it critically to AJ's
coverage." In addition, Al Jazeera English produced a
"code of conduct" for its journalists that is virtually
<a href="http://wikileaks.cabledrum.net/cable/2006/05/06DOHA793.html#par8">
indistinguishable from the BBC's document</a>.<br><br>
The Emir of Qatar and Al Jazeera<br><br>
</b>The Doha cables are interesting for other points, which
contextualized how Qatar deploys Al Jazeera and how Qatar constructs its
foreign policy. The Qatari regime is, after all, one of the nations
that actively engaged in bombing Libya and has been funding and arming
the opposition to Col. Gaddafi. One of the stated reasons for the
foreign military intervention in Libya is that of creating a new
democracy, with political freedoms for the opposition. How ironic
it is to be reminded of the absence of these freedoms in Qatar. As
the speakers in
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05DOHA1039.html">one
cable</a> explain, "economic and political power are overwhelmingly
in the hands of the state. . . . Qatar does not have a formal
opposition. In fact, political parties are not legal . . .
criticizing the government brings the risk of losing benefits and
preferences for themselves and their families, such as housing and
education." Promised democratic reforms are viewed by Qatari
critics as merely designed to enhance the international image of the
regime. The Emir can withdraw any amount of money from the
Treasury, at will, and not have to answer to anyone: state funds are
personal funds. Even with the reforms, the ruling family remains
unanswerable to any national institution. Individuals can be
detained and held without charge for up to six months (or longer, subject
to the approval of the Prime Minister), in the "public
interest." Members of the Al-Murra tribe have been stripped of
their Qatari nationality. And, much as U.S. commentators criticized
Qatar for sponsoring a unit like Al Jazeera, which seemingly gave play to
jihadist voices, the fact revealed in one cable is that the government of
Qatar
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08DOHA301.html">
"sometimes 'helps' Israel's security service."</a><br><br>
One cable makes it clear that Qatari officials "view AJ, both
English and Arabic, as
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08DOHA283.html">important
tools of Qatari foreign policy</a>." In a meeting with Senator
John Kerry on February 13, 2010, Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim
Al Thani declared that
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10DOHA71.html#par18">"we
would stop Al Jazeera for a year"</a> if it meant that Egypt would
alter its foreign policy on the Palestinians, which clearly shows where
the real power ultimately lies in determining Al Jazeera's content and
that the content is open to negotiation between the parties that have
power over Al Jazeera. As for Al Jazeera English, it is made to hew
"<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08DOHA283.html">as
closely to Doha's political line</a> as AJ's Arabic
channel."<br><br>
We should also note that the Managing Director, Khanfar, stated that the
Emir does not interfere in Al Jazeera's
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08DOHA633.html">operations</a>
</i>, which might be a very careful choice of words from someone who
seems to always choose his words very carefully. However, as the
U.S. Embassy noted,
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09DOHA318.html">"Al
Jazeera has resolutely steered away from . . . reporting on anything
politically controversial in Qatar."</a> The Chairman of Al
Jazeera is himself a member of the royal family that rules
Qatar.<br><br>
Likewise, we must note that the U.S. Embassy told Washington that it was
ready to help exploit Al Jazeera's openness
"<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DOHA103.html#par9">
through direct diplomacy with Qatar's ruling family</a> and members of Al
Jazeera's Doha headquarters." Elsewhere, Ambassador LeBaron
insisted that,<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>to help improve the USG's image on the Arab street, we need to step
up USG senior-level engagement of the Qatari leadership.
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DOHA116.html">Better
relations with the ruling al-Thani family will translate into changes in
al-Jazeera coverage that will gradually help improve the image of the
United States in the Arab street</a>.<br><br>
</dl>While admitting that Al Jazeera has been great for Qatar's, and the
Emir's, international public profile, Khanfar asserted that Al Jazeera
did not see itself as part of any reform movement,
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08DOHA633.html">nor was it
the voice of the Arabs</a>.<br><br>
Responsible + Professional = Imperial<br><br>
</b>Indeed, Khanfar demonstrated how in practice U.S. inputs and
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05DOHA1593.html">
"quality assurance"</a> to ensure "professionalism,"
"balance," and "objectivity" would tilt the news
coverage to better favor U.S. interests. Khanfar told the PAO about
Al Jazeera's daily quality assurance meeting that "meeting is very
tight, tighter even than your list." (We do not know what
list</i> the PAO had with her.) Khanfar described how Al Jazeera
changed its choice of terms, to mollify U.S. concerns: instead of
"the resistance," they would now refer to "military
groups"; instead of "the occupation," they would now
blandly speak of the "multinational force" -- all of which
perfectly echoes the way NATO's ISAF frames its daily press narrative in
Afghanistan.<br><br>
It is also significant to note that the
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1786.html">U.S.
Embassy's PAO would also meet with the head of Al Jazeera's "quality
assurance" team</a>, Jaafar Abbas Ahmed, thereby having a direct
input into what was discussed at the quality assurance meetings, even if
the participants might not be aware of the PAO's prior meeting with their
director. Abbas notes resistance from the older generation of
journalists in Al Jazeera and praises Wadah Khanfar, who opened Al
Jazeera to the U.S. Embassy, as a "source of strength"
(presumably in strengthening Abbas' hand vis-à-vis the recalcitrant
holdouts). Abbas describes his QA unit as a "tumor" that
staff have come to live with -- he also promised a computerized database
of all Al Jazeera staff, keeping them under surveillance for any
"biased" remarks. It is interesting to note Abbas' chatty
friendliness with the PAO, as if speaking to an insider, or a fellow
director, as they roll their eyes at the unruly natives. Similarly,
on another occasion, Abbas went as far as calling Al Jazeera's interview
producers
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08DOHA845.html#par2">
"idiots,"</a> when speaking to the Embassy's PAO.<br><br>
Khanfar was there to be America's "Mr. Fix It": "Where
there is a problem -- whether we learn about it from you, from our QA
team, or from another source -- we fix it immediately."
Khanfar in fact asked that he too should directly receive the DIA's
reports analyzing Al Jazeera's coverage, because the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was too slow in passing them on. The Embassy agreed, noting
that Khanfar "clearly takes them seriously." The U.S.
continued to insist that Al Jazeera not broadcast insurgent videos or
"provocative interviews." The
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05DOHA1593.html">U.S. Embassy
praised Khanfar</a> as someone who is "clearly committed to bringing
Al Jazeera up to professional international standards of journalism"
and who "seems to be not only open to criticism but to welcome
it." On numerous occasions Khanfar is clearly responsive to
U.S. criticisms of Al Jazeera content, especially on its
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1765.html">website</a>
.<br><br>
Questions of Complicity<br><br>
</b>
<dl>
<dd>"[W]e should make strategic use of the Al Jazeera television
network." --
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DOHA103.html">Joseph E.
LeBaron, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, February 10, 2009</a><br><br>
</dl>It is important to note -- since some will want to raise this issue
as solid proof that the U.S. related to Al Jazeera as it would to any of
its enemies, i.e. by planning lethal actions -- that here too the cables
are useful. Written from insiders, and meant for private
consumption by other insiders in the U.S. foreign relations apparatus,
former Ambassador Untermeyer utterly dismisses as
<a href="http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05DOHA1937.html">
"absurd"</a> any notion that Bush planned to bomb the Doha
headquarters of Al Jazeera. As he logically points out, it would be
absurd because it would in fact be a military attack on a friendly
nation, and he calls on his government to issue a stronger denial than it
had to date.<br><br>
When it comes to the substance of U.S. relations with Al Jazeera, the
questions that should come to mind are: What does responsible</i>
mean? Responsible for what</i>? Responsible to
whom</i>? What is balance</i>, and how is the truth balanced when
the idea itself implies that something else must be a lie? Why is
balance important, when airing long-suppressed and regularly marginalized
voices? What is objectivity</i>, when one is subject to pressure
and made to fear for his/her career? What is professionalism</i>
and why does it always seemingly resolve to a default position of not
upsetting the status quo?<br><br>
When the U.S. government is so clearly bent on dominating the message, on
performing routine acts of daily censorship through intimate and
secretive pressure behind the scenes, and when notions of
professionalism, balance, and objectivity become mere imperial code for
subservience to U.S. interests, it is no wonder that WikiLeaks itself
should be accused of being . . . guess what? Irresponsible,
unprofessional, and anti-American! Long live irresponsibility,
because journalism certainly is dead.<br><br>
It should come as no surprise that there will be those who read these
cables and yet, wishing to preserve a veneer of legitimacy and
credibility for Al Jazeera, stress that it is not a "simple
mouthpiece" for the U.S. Government. A simple</i>mouthpiece it
is not -- the tilt in Al Jazeera's coverage is something that evidently
needs to be negotiated and reaffirmed daily. Where American
journalists practice self-censorship, consciously or not, there are also
broadly cultural and narrowly ideological reasons for doing so, and the
solidarity between the press corps and the imperial state may be an
"organic" one. Not being steeped in U.S. politics and
culture, Al Jazeera requires a more hands-on form of instruction -- hand
holding -- and, here, any solidarity is more of a "mechanical"
one. The relationship that the U.S. has with Al Jazeera could put
<a href="http://video.google.ca/videoplay?docid=6737097743434902428">
OutFoxed!</a></i> in a somewhat minor light: as much as many revile the
power of Murdoch and Fox News, that outfit has yet to impact a population
targeted by U.S. foreign policy as much as Al Jazeera, and is certainly
not owned by a state, with an air force and troops, and an active
combatant in Libya to boot.<br><br>
Notes:<br><br>
1.</b> Full disclosure:</i> Following an hour-long interview on Al
Jazeera Arabic in 2010, I agreed to write a series of paid columns for
the Al Jazeera Arabic website. This article is not written on the
basis of any of my very minimal insider knowledge, and I should indicate
that at no point did any Al Jazeera staff seek to impose an editorial
policy on my writing. In my interactions with Al Jazeera staff I
have never known them to be anything other than extremely professional,
patient, and generous. In March of 2011 I terminated my
relationship with Al Jazeera, for political reasons, on the basis of its
coverage of Libya and Bahrain, and the political ends to which Al Jazeera
was used by the Qatari state and its U.S. ally in the war against
Libya.<br><br>
2. </b>The complete package of 40 cables on which much of this
article was based </i>have been compiled and made available as a PDF
download, which can also be embedded online:
<a href="http://www.box.net/shared/96u7jio1b62px9trp1on">please click
here</a>.<br><br>
<hr>
Maximilian C. Forte is an associate professor in anthropology at
Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. His website is at
<a href="http://www.openanthropology.org">www.openanthropology.org</a>
. Cf. Maximilian Forte,
<a href="http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte200411.html">"The
War in Libya: Race, 'Humanitarianism,' and the Media"</a>
(MRZine</i>, 20 April 2011); Maximilian Forte,
<a href="http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte100811.html">
"Libya -- Lather, Rinse, Repeat -- Syria: Liberal Imperialism and
the Refusal to Learn"</a> (MRZine</i>, 10 August 2011); Maximilian
Forte, <a href="http://bit.ly/rbi7FS">"The Top Ten Myths in the War
against Libya"</a> (CounterPunch</i>, 31 August 2011) <br><br>
<br>
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