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<font size=4><b>The Palestine Papers<br>
<br>
The al-Madhoun assassination <br><br>
</b></font><font size=3>
<a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers/2011/01/201112512109241314.html" eudora="autourl">
http://english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers/2011/01/201112512109241314.html<br>
<br>
</a>Documents include handwritten notes of 2005 exchange between PA and
Israel on plan to kill Palestinian fighter in Gaza.<br>
David Poort Last Modified: 25 Jan 2011 20:08 GMT <br><br>
Hassan al-Madhoun and a senior Hamas leader were killed by Israeli
missiles in 2005 [EPA]<br><br>
The Palestinian Authority (PA) has shown operational willingness to
co-operate with Israel to kill its own people, the Palestine Papers
indicate.<br><br>
</font><h4><b>Madhoun's family reacts</b></h4><font size=3>Among the
documents are notes, handwritten in Arabic,
<a href="http://transparency.aljazeera.net/document/5240">revealing an
exchange in 2005</a> between the PA and Israel on a plan to kill a
Palestinian fighter named Hassan al-Madhoun, who lived in the Gaza
strip.<br><br>
Al-Madhoun (born 1973) was a leading figure within the Al Aqsa Martyr’s
Brigade, a movement aligned to Fatah, which at that stage still held
power in Gaza. Al-Madhoun had been accused by Israel of planning deadly
bombings at Israel’s Ashdod port and the Qarni crossing between Gaza and
Israel.<br><br>
In a <a href="http://www.ajtransparency.com/en/document/5240">joint
committee meeting on fugitives in mid-2005</a> in Tel Aviv between Shaul
Mofaz, the then-Israeli defence minister, and Nasser Youssef, the PA
minister of interior, the PA was asked to kill al-Madhoun.<br><br>
</font>
<dl>
<dd>Mofaz:</b> “[…] Hassan Madhoun, we know his address and Rasheed Abu
Shabak [chief of the Preventative Security Organisation in Gaza] knows
that. Why don't you kill him? Hamas fired [Qassam rockets] because of the
elections and this is a challenge to you and a warning to Abu Mazen
[Mahmoud Abbas, the PA president].”<br><br>
<dd>Youssef:</b> “We gave instructions to Rasheed [Abu Shabak] and will
see.”<br><br>
<dd>Mofaz:</b> “Since we spoke, he has been planning an operation, and
that's four weeks ago, and we know that he wants to strike Qarni or Erez
[another border crossing between Gaza and Israel]. He is not Hamas and
you can kill him.”<br><br>
<dd>Youssef:</b> “We work, the country is not easy, our capabilities are
limited, and you haven't offered anything.”<br><br>
<dd>Mofaz:</b> “I understand that nothing has been accomplished in the
[Gaza] Strip.”<br><br>
</dl>Less then a month after this meeting, on November 1, 2005,
al-Madhoun
<a href="http://www.breakingnews.ie/world/senior-al-aqsa-gunman-killed-in-gaza-refugee-camp-228180.html">
was killed in his car</a> by a missile fired from an Israeli Apache
helicopter over the skies of Gaza. The attack also killed a wanted Hamas
activist and wounded three other people.<br><br>
The very next day, Mofaz, who by that time was in Washington, pledged to
ease the lives of Palestinians and to pursue peacemaking with President
Abbas.<br>
The US president should write that the US "must withdraw from the
peace process."<br><br>
"We want to deal with President Abbas," Mofaz said after
meeting with Condoleezza Rice, the then-US Secretary of State, before
going to the White House to confer with Stephen Hadley, the then-national
security adviser.<br><br>
"We are waiting to see how the Palestinian Authority will deal with
terrorist groups," the Israeli minister said.<br><br>
The Palestine Papers appear to reveal two primary motives for the
Palestinian Authority’s collaboration with Israel and their crackdown on
dissent.<br><br>
Firstly, it serves to maintain the movement’s political supremacy at a
time when it is being questioned. Secondly, it is an attempt to signal to
the US that it wants to remain a trusted partner in peace talks,
regardless the costs.<br><br>
Saeb Erekat, the PA’s chief negotiator acknowledged the cost of gaining
US approval and Israeli trust, in
<a href="http://transparency.aljazeera.net/document/4827">a meeting on
September 17, 2009</a> with David Hale, the deputy US Middle East
envoy.<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>Erekat:</b> We have had to kill Palestinians to establish one
authority, one gun and the rule of law. We continue to perform our
obligations. We have invested time and effort and killed our own people
to maintain order and the rule of law.<br><br>
</dl>It is not clear as to which killings Erekat is referring to but the
discussion about the plan to kill al-Madhoun is just one example of how,
since the death of Yasser Arafat, Fatah’s policy of resistance to Israel
has become one of collaboration.<br><br>
The Palestine Papers show how the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade, once the
spearhead of action against the Israeli occupation, has been transformed
into a body that helps maintaining it.<br><br>
During the
<a href="http://transparency.aljazeera.net/document/2312">Annapolis talks
in 2008</a>, Ahmed Qurei, the former Palestinian prime minister also
known as Abu Ala, and his Israeli counterpart Tzipi Livni, discussed
collaboration between the brigade and the Israeli security
forces.<br><br>
“Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade is part of the Fatah movement and they agreed
to be part of the current security apparatus, even though this was not my
position when I was a prime minister. I wanted the Brigade to remain as
it was to confront Hamas,” Qurei told Livni.<br><br>
With the common goal of destroying Hamas, the Palestine Papers reveal the
extent to which the PA, the US and Israel were willing to work together,
and the extent to which the PA
<a href="http://transparency.aljazeera.net/document/2769">linked the fate
of Hamas</a> with its own political survival.<br><br>
“[…] reaching an agreement is a matter of survival for us. It’s the way
to defeat Hamas,” Erekat told Marc Otte, the EU negotiator, in June
2008.<br><br>
Earlier that year,
<a href="http://transparency.aljazeera.net/document/2304">on January
22</a>, Qurei told Livni; “We’ll defeat Hamas if we reach an agreement,
and this will be our response to their claim that gaining back our land
can be achieved through resistance only.”<br>
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<font size=3>
<a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers/2011/01/201112511595595810.html%A0" eudora="autourl">
http://english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers/2011/01/201112511595595810.html
<br><br>
</a></font><font size=4><b>Erekat: "I can't stand Hamas"
<br><br>
</b></font><font size=3>For Fatah, the Annapolis process seems to have
been as much about crushing Hamas as about ending Israel's
occupation.<br>
Laila Al-Arian Last Modified: 25 Jan 2011 19:35 GMT <br><br>
The Annapolis process was meant to be a round of peace talks aimed at
reaching an agreement to solve the decades-long Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. But instead of focusing on resolving the core issues at hand,
why did Palestinian negotiators spend so much time during the meetings
denigrating their political rivals, Hamas?<br><br>
</font><h4><b>Controlling the mosques</b></h4><font size=3>The Palestine
Papers reveal that Fatah was obsessed with maintaining political
supremacy over Hamas, with Israel’s cooperation, especially following the
2006 electoral victory of the Islamist movement. Documents obtained by Al
Jazeera also show the extent to which the Palestinian Authority cracked
down on Hamas institutions to weaken the group and strengthen its own
relationship with Israel.<br><br>
At the height of negotiations, on April 7, 2008, Israeli foreign minister
Tzipi Livni was unequivocal in summing up Israel’s policy: “Our strategic
view is to strengthen you and weaken Hamas.”<br><br>
Working with Israel to weaken Hamas also appeared to be in the
Palestinian Authority’s interest. During a
<a href="http://transparency.aljazeera.net/document/2520">May 6, 2008
security meeting</a> between Yoav Mordechai, the head of the Israeli army
civil administration in the West Bank, and Hazem Atallah, the head of the
Palestinian Civil Police, Hamas was a prominent subject of
discussion.<br><br>
</font>
<dl>
<dd>Yoav Mordechai:</b> How is your fight against “civilian” Hamas: the
officers, people in municipalities, etc. This is a serious
threat.<br><br>
<dd>Hazem Atallah:</b> I don’t work at the political level, but I agree
we need to deal with this.<br><br>
<dd>Yoav Mordechai:</b> Hamas needs to be declared illegal by your
President. So far it is only the militants that are illegal.<br><br>
<dd>Atallah:</b> There is also the request for tear gas canisters. You
previously gave us these back in 96.”<br><br>
<dd>Yoav Mordechai:</b> We gave some to you for Balata 2 weeks ago. What
do you need them for?<br><br>
<dd>Atallah:</b> Riot control. We want to avoid a situation where the
security agencies may be forced to fire on unarmed civilians.<br><br>
</dl>Never mind that tear gas canisters have proven that
<a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/01/20111265223661981.html">
they can be just as deadly</a> as live bullet rounds, the exchange also
foreshadows a crackdown on Hamas’ social institutions in the West
Bank.<br><br>
PLO chief negotiator Saeb Erekat made his contempt for his rivals known
in 2007, when he
<a href="http://transparency.aljazeera.net/document/5177">told the
Belgian foreign minister</a> Karel de Gucht, “I can’t stand Hamas or
their social programs.”<br><br>
<h3><b>"The way to defeat Hamas"</b></h3><font size=3>By
September 17, 2009, Erekat
<a href="http://transparency.aljazeera.net/document/4827">was bragging to
U.S. officials</a> that the PA had complete control over “zakat”
committees, or Muslim charities, in the West Bank, as well as the weekly
Friday sermons.<br><br>
</font><h4><b>Related</b></h4><font size=3>
<a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers/2011/01/201112512459777415.html">
Qurei to Israel: "Occupy the crossing"</a><br><br>
Top PA negotiator offers to allow Israel to reoccupy the Philadelphi
corridor on the Gaza-Egypt border.<br><br>
<a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers/2011/01/2011125144345427365.html">
Ali Abunimah: Cutting off a vital connection</a><br><br>
Palestinian officials were often more concerned with applying pressure to
Hamas than easing a humanitarian crisis.<br><br>
“We have invested time and effort and even killed our own people to
maintain order and the rule of law,” Erekat said. “The Prime Minister is
doing everything possible to build the institutions. We are not a country
yet but we are the only ones in the Arab world who control the Zakat and
the sermons in the mosques. We are getting our act together.”<br><br>
In 2007, Reuters
<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL059215920070706">reported
that Fatah</a> was “increasing pressure on ‘zakat’ charity committees
that support the network of Islamic schools and health clinics which
helped fuel Hamas's rise to power.” On one occasion, the news service
reported, 20 gunmen stormed a dairy funded by such a zakat committee but
were ultimately persuaded to leave.<br><br>
At the time, Akram al-Rajoub, who headed the Preventive Security service
in Nablus said, “There is absolutely no cooperation with Israel in our
activities" but that claim is belied by the conversations documented
in The Palestine Papers.<br><br>
On February 11, 2008, Atallah
<a href="http://transparency.aljazeera.net/document/2324">presented the
Israelis with a laundry list</a> of actions the PA took against Hamas,
and complained that Israeli actions in the West Bank city of Nablus the
previous month were harmful. He was likely
<a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2008/01/2008525135941444137.html">
referring to the three-day incursion</a> by the Israeli military, in
which 40 Palestinians were injured and 20 detained. 70,000 residents of
the city were placed under curfew.<br><br>
“We made arrests, confiscated arms, and sacked security individuals
affiliated with Hamas,” Atallah said, “but you keep on deterring our
efforts, and this is what’s happening in Nablus.”<br><br>
While security cooperation against Hamas and its institutions dominated
some meetings, often Palestinian negotiators merely wanted to vent to
their Israeli counterparts about their deep-seated desire to defeat their
political opponents.<br><br>
“Hamas must not feel that it is achieving daily victories, sometimes with
Israel and sometimes with Egypt, and Al Jazeera Channel praises these
victories,” Ahmed Qurei, a senior Palestinian negotiator, told Livni on
February 4, 2008.<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>“I hope Hamas will be defeated, not military I mean because we didn’t
try this; we didn’t engage in a civil war. President Abu Mazen was wise
enough not to give orders to Fateh members to use arms, otherwise, we’d
have had many casualties.”<br><br>
</dl>According to the Palestine Papers, for Fatah, the Annapolis process
seems to have been as much about crushing Hamas as it was about ending
Israel’s occupation and establishing an independent, Palestinian
state.<br><br>
“We continue with a genuine process,” Saeb Erekat confided to European
Union Special Representative Marc Otte
<a href="http://transparency.aljazeera.net/document/2769">on June 18,
2008</a>, “reaching an agreement is a matter of survival for us. It’s the
way to defeat Hamas.”<br>
<br><br>
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