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<font size=3>Losing Latin America<br>
What Will the Obama Doctrine Be Like?<br><br>
<a href="http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/17881" eudora="autourl">
http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/17881<br><br>
</a>June 10, 2008 By Greg Grandin <br>
Source: <a href="http://www.tomdipatch.com">TomDispatch</a> <br><br>
Google "neglect," "Washington," and "Latin
America," and you will be led to thousands of hand-wringing calls
from politicians and pundits for Washington to "pay more
attention" to the region. True, Richard Nixon once said that
"people don't give one shit" about the place. And his National
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger quipped that Latin America is a
"dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica." But Kissinger also
made that same joke about Chile, Argentina, and New Zealand -- and, of
the three countries, only the latter didn't suffer widespread political
murder as a result of his policies, a high price to pay for such a
reportedly inconsequential place. <br>
<br>
Latin America, in fact, has been indispensable in the evolution of U.S.
diplomacy. The region is often referred to as America's
"backyard," but a better metaphor might be Washington's
"strategic reserve," the place where ascendant foreign-policy
coalitions regroup and redraw the outlines of U.S. power, following
moments of global crisis. <br>
<br>
When the Great Depression had the U.S. on the ropes, for example, it was
in Latin America that New Deal diplomats worked out the foundations of
liberal multilateralism, a diplomatic framework that Washington would put
into place with much success elsewhere after World War II. <br>
<br>
In the 1980s, the first generation of neocons turned to Latin America to
play out their "rollback" fantasies -- not just against
Communism, but against a tottering multilateralist foreign-policy. It was
largely in a Central America roiled by left-wing insurgencies that the
New Right first worked out the foundational principles of what, after
9/11, came to be known as the Bush Doctrine: the right to wage war
unilaterally in highly moralistic terms. <br>
<br>
We are once again at a historic crossroads. An ebbing of U.S. power --
this time caused, in part, by military overreach -- faces a mobilized
Latin America; and, on the eve of regime change at home, with George W.
Bush's neoconservative coalition in ruins after eight years of disastrous
rule, would-be foreign policy makers are once again looking south. <br>
<br>
Goodbye to All That <br>
<br>
"The era of the United States as the dominant influence in Latin
America is over," says the Council on Foreign Relations, in a new
<a href="http://www.cfr.org/publication/16279/">report</a> filled with
sober policy suggestions for ways the U.S. can recoup its waning
influence in a region it has long claimed as its own. <br>
<br>
Latin America is now mostly
<a href="http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060501/grandin">governed</a> by
left or center-left governments that differ in policy and style -- from
the populism of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela to the reformism of Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva in Brazil and Michelle Bachelet in Chile. Yet all share a
common goal: asserting greater autonomy from the United States. <br>
<br>
Latin Americans are now courting investment from China, opening markets
in Europe, dissenting from Bush's War on Terror, stalling the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas, and sidelining the International Monetary Fund
which, over the last couple of decades, has served as a stalking horse
for Wall Street and the Treasury Department. <br>
<br>
And they are electing presidents like Ecuador's Rafael Correa, who
recently announced that his government would not renew the soon-to-expire
lease on Manta Air Field, the most prominent U.S. military base in South
America. Correa had previously suggested that, if Ecuador could set up
its own base in Florida, he would consider extending the lease. When
Washington balked, he offered Manta to a Chinese concession, suggesting
that the airfield be turned into
<a href="http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7009268582">
"China's gateway</a> to Latin America." <br>
<br>
In the past, such cheek would have been taken as a clear violation of the
Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in 1823 by President James Monroe, who
declared that Washington would not permit Europe to recolonize any part
of the Americas. In 1904, Theodore Roosevelt updated the doctrine to
justify a series of Caribbean invasions and occupations. And Presidents
Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan invoked it to validate Cold War
CIA-orchestrated coups and other covert operations. <br>
<br>
But things have changed. "Latin America is not Washington's to
lose," the Council on Foreign Relations report says, "nor is it
Washington's to save." The Monroe Doctrine, it declares, is
"obsolete." <br>
<br>
Good news for Latin America, one would think. But the last time someone
from the Council on Foreign Relations, which since its founding in 1921
has represented mainstream foreign-policy opinion, declared the Monroe
Doctrine defunct, the result was genocide. <br>
<br>
Enter the Liberal Establishment <br>
<br>
That would be Sol
<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48682-2005Mar18.html">
Linowitz</a> who, in 1975, as chair of the Commission on United
States-Latin American Relations, said that the Monroe Doctrine was
"inappropriate and irrelevant to the changed realities and trends of
the future." <br>
<br>
The little-remembered Linowitz Commission was made up of respected
scholars and businessmen from what was then called the "liberal
establishment." It was but one part of a broader attempt by
America's foreign-policy elite to respond to the cascading crises of the
1970s -- defeat in Vietnam, rising third-world nationalism, Asian and
European competition, skyrocketing energy prices, a falling dollar, the
Watergate scandal, and domestic dissent. Confronted with a precipitous
collapse of America's global legitimacy, the Council on Foreign
Relations, along with other mainline think tanks like the Brookings
Institute and the newly formed Trilateral Commission, offered a series of
proposals that might help the U.S. stabilize its authority, while
allowing for "a smooth and peaceful evolution of the global
system." <br>
<br>
There was widespread consensus among the intellectuals and corporate
leaders affiliated with these institutions that the kind of anticommunist
zeal that had marched the U.S. into the disaster in Vietnam needed to be
tamped down, and that "new forms of common management" between
Washington, Europe, and Japan had to be worked out. Advocates for a
calmer world order came from the same corporate bloc that underwrote the
Democratic Party and the Rockefeller-wing of the Republican Party. <br>
<br>
They hoped that a normalization of global politics would halt, if not
reverse, the erosion of the U.S. economic position. Military
de-escalation would free up public revenue for productive investment,
while containing inflationary pressures (which scared the bond managers
of multinational banks). Improved relations with the Communist bloc would
open the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China to trade and investment. There
was also general agreement that Washington should stop viewing Third
World socialism through the prism of the Cold War conflict with the
Soviet Union. <br>
<br>
At that moment throughout Latin America, leftists and nationalists were
-- as they are now -- demanding a more equitable distribution of global
wealth. Lest radicalization spread, the Trilateral Commission's executive
director Zbignew Brzezinski, soon to be President Jimmy Carter's national
security advisor, argued that it would be "wise for the United
States to make an explicit move to abandon the Monroe Doctrine." The
Linowitz Commission agreed and offered a series of recommendations to
that effect -- including the
<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/books/review/Lewis-t.html">
return of the Panama Canal</a> to Panama and a decrease in U.S. military
aid to the region -- that would largely define Carter's Latin American
policy. <br>
<br>
Exit the Liberal Establishment <br>
<br>
Of course, it was not corporate liberalism but rather a resurgent and
revanchist militarism from the Right that turned out to offer the most
cohesive and, for a time, successful solution to the crises of the 1970s.
<br>
<br>
Uniting a gathering coalition of old-school law-and-order anticommunists,
first generation neoconservatives, and newly empowered evangelicals, the
New Right organized an ever metastasizing set of committees, foundations,
institutes, and magazines that focused on specific issues -- the SALT II
nuclear disarmament negotiations, the Panama Canal Treaty, and the
proposed MX missile system, as well as U.S. policy in Cuba, South Africa,
Rhodesia, Israel, Taiwan, Afghanistan, and Central America. All of them
were broadly committed to avenging defeat in Vietnam (and the "stab
in the back" by the liberal media and the public at home). They were
also intent on restoring righteous purpose to American diplomacy. <br>
<br>
As had corporate liberals, so, now, neoconservative intellectuals looked
to Latin America to hone their ideas. President Ronald Reagan's
ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, for instance, focused mainly on
Latin America in laying out the foundational principles of modern
neoconservative thought. She was particularly hard on Linowitz, who, she
said, represented the "disinterested internationalist spirit"
of "appeasement" -- a word
<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0839956720080515">
back with us</a> again. His report, she insisted, meant "abandoning
the strategic perspective which has shaped U.S. policy from the Monroe
Doctrine down to the eve of the Carter administration, at the center of
which was a conception of the national interest and a belief in the moral
legitimacy of its defense." <br>
<br>
At first, Brookings, the Council on Foreign Affairs, and the Trilateral
Commission, as well as the Business Roundtable, founded in 1972 by the
crème de la CEO crème, opposed the push to remilitarize American society;
but, by the late 1970s, it was clear that "normalization" had
failed to solve the global economic crisis. Europe and Japan were not
cooperating in stabilizing the dollar, and the economies of Eastern
Europe, the USSR, and China were too anemic to absorb sufficient amounts
of U.S. capital or serve as profitable trading partners. Throughout the
1970s, financial houses like the Rockefellers' Chase Manhattan Bank had
become engorged with petrodollars deposited by Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Venezuela, and other oil-exporting nations. They needed to do something
with all that money, yet the U.S. economy remained sluggish, and much of
the Third World off limits. <br>
<br>
So, after Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential victory, mainstream
policymakers and intellectuals, many of them self-described liberals,
increasingly came to back the Reagan Revolution's domestic and foreign
agenda: gutting the welfare state, ramping up defense spending, opening
up the Third World to U.S. capital, and jumpstarting the Cold War. <br>
<br>
A decade after the Linowitz Commission proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine no
longer viable, Ronald Reagan invoked it to justify his administration's
patronage of murderous anti-communists in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El
Salvador. A few years after Jimmy Carter announced that the U.S. had
broken "free of that inordinate fear of communism," Reagan
quoted John F. Kennedy saying, "Communist domination in this
hemisphere can never be negotiated." <br>
<br>
Reagan's illegal patronage of the Contras -- those murderers he hailed as
the "moral equivalent of America's founding fathers" and
deployed to destabilize Nicaragua's Sandinista government -- and his
administration's funding of death squads in El Salvador and Guatemala
brought together, for the first time, the New Right's two main
constituencies. Neoconservatives provided Reagan's revival of the
imperial presidency with legal and intellectual justification, while the
religious Right backed up the new militarism with grassroots energy.
<br>
<br>
This partnership was first built -- just as it has more recently been
continued in Iraq -- on a mountain of mutilated corpses: 40,000
Nicaraguans and 70,000 El Salvadorans killed by U.S. allies; 200,000
Guatemalans, many of them Mayan peasants, victimized in a scorched-earth
campaign the UN would
<a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A05E3D9173CF935A15751C0A96F958260">
rule</a> to be genocidal. <br>
<br>
The End of the Neocon Holiday from History <br>
<br>
The recent Council on Foreign Relations report on Latin America, arriving
as it does in another moment of imperial decline, seems once again to
signal a new emerging consensus, one similar in tone to that of the
post-Vietnam 1970s. In every dimension other than military,
<i>Newsweek</i> editor Fareed Zacharia argues in his new book, <i>The
Post-American World</i>, "the distribution of power is shifting,
moving away from American dominance." (Never mind that, just five
years ago, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, he was insisting on the
exact opposite -- that we now lived in a "unipolar world" where
America's position was, and would be, "unprecedented.") <br>
<br>
To borrow a
<a href="http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/235">phrase</a> from
their own lexicon, the neocons' "holiday from history" is over.
The fiasco in Iraq, the fall in the value of the dollar, the rise of
India and China as new industrial and commercial powerhouses, and of
<a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/174929">Russia as an energy
superpower</a>, the failure to secure the Middle East, soaring oil and
gas prices (as well as skyrocketing prices for other key raw materials
and basic foodstuffs), and the consolidation of a prosperous Europe have
all brought their dreams of global supremacy crashing down. <br>
<br>
Barack Obama is obviously the candidate best positioned to walk the U.S.
back from the edge of irrelevance. Though no one hoping for a job in his
White House would put it in such defeatist terms, the historic task of
the next president will not be to win this president's Global War on
Terror, but to negotiate America's reentry into a community of nations.
<br>
<br>
Parag Khanna, an Obama advisor, recently
<a href="http://www.paragkhanna.com/2008/01/waving_goodbye_to_hegemony.html">
argued</a> that, by maximizing its cultural and technological advantage,
the U.S. can, with a little luck, perhaps secure a position as third
partner in a new tripartite global order in which Europe and Asia would
have equal shares, a distinct echo of the trilateralist position of the
1970s. (Forget those Munich analogies, if the U.S. electorate were more
historically literate, Republicans would get better mileage out of
branding Obama not Neville Chamberlain, but Spain's Fernando VII or
Britain's Clement Richard Attlee, each of whom presided over his
country's imperial decline.) <br>
<br>
So it has to be asked: If Obama wins in November and tries to implement a
more rational, less ideologically incandescent deployment of American
power -- perhaps using Latin America as a staging ground for a new policy
-- would it once again provoke the kind of nationalist backlash that
purged Rockefellerism from the Republican Party, swept Jimmy Carter out
of the White House, and armed the death squads in Central America? <br>
<br>
Certainly, there are already plenty of feverish conservative think tanks,
from the Hudson Institute to the Heritage Foundation, that would double
down on Bush's crusades as a way out of the current mess. But in the
1970s, the New Right was in ascendance; today, it is visibly decomposing.
Then, it could lay responsibility for the deep and prolonged crisis that
gripped the United States at the feet of the "establishment,"
while offering solutions -- an arms build-up, a renewed push into the
Third World, and free-market fundamentalism -- that drew much of that
establishment into its orbit. <br>
<br>
Today, the Right wholly owns the current crisis, along with its most
immediate cause, the Iraq War. Even if John McCain were able to squeak
out a win in November, he would be the functional equivalent not of
Reagan, who embodied a movement on the march, but of Jimmy Carter, trying
desperately to hold a fraying coalition together. <br>
<br>
The Right's decay as an intellectual force is nowhere more evident than
in the fits it throws in the face of the Left's -- or China's -- advances
in Latin America. The self-confidant vitality with which Jeane
Kirkpatrick used Latin America to skewer the Carter administration has
been replaced with the tinny, desperate shrill of despair. "Who lost
Latin America?"
<a href="http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=42783012-BC3A-442C-95DB-87A751958BAD">
asks</a> the Center for Security Policy's Frank Gaffney -- of pretty much
everyone he meets. The region, he
<a href="http://www.macleans.ca/article.jsp?content=20060522_127060_127060&source=srch">
says</a>, is now a "magnet for Islamist terrorists and a breeding
ground for hostile political movements... The key leader is Chávez, the
billionaire dictator of Venezuela who has declared a Latino <i>jihad</i>
against the United States." <br>
<br>
Scare-Quote Diplomacy <br>
<br>
But just because the Right is unlikely to unfurl its banner over Latin
America again soon doesn't mean that U.S. hemispheric diplomacy will be
demilitarized. After all, it was Bill Clinton, not George W. Bush, who,
at the behest of Lockheed Martin in 1997, reversed a Carter
administration ban (based on Linowitz report recommendations) on the sale
of high-tech weaponry to Latin America. That, in turn, kicked off a
reckless and wasteful Southern Cone arms race. And it was Clinton, not
Bush, who dramatically increased military aid to the murderous Colombian
government and to corporate mercenaries like Blackwater and Dyncorp,
further escalating the misguided U.S. "war on drugs" in Latin
America. <br>
<br>
In fact, a quick comparison between the Linowitz report and the new
Council on Foreign Relations study on Latin America provides a sobering
way of measuring just how far right the "liberal establishment"
has shifted over the last three decades. The Council does admirably
advise Washington to normalize relations with Cuba and engage with
Venezuela, while downplaying the possibility of "Islamic
terrorists" using the area as a staging ground -- a
<a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/82089/grandin_on_rumsfeld_s_latin_american_wild_west_show">
longstanding fantasy</a> of the neocons. (Douglas Feith, former Pentagon
undersecretary, <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/id/54775">suggested</a>
that, after 9/11, the U.S. hold off invading Afghanistan and instead bomb
Paraguay, which has a large Shi'ite community, just to
"surprise" the Sunni al-Qaeda.) <br>
<br>
Yet, where the Linowitz report provoked the ire of the likes of Jeane
Kirkpatrick by writing that the U.S. should not try to "define the
limits of ideological diversity for other nations" and that Latin
Americans "can and will assess for themselves the merits and
disadvantages of the Cuban approach," the Council is much less
open-minded. It insists on presenting Venezuela as a problem the U.S.
needs to address -- even though the government in Caracas is recognized
as legitimate by all and is considered an ally, even a close one, by most
Latin American countries. Latin Americans may "know what is best for
themselves," as the new report concedes, yet Washington still knows
better, and so should back "social justice" issues as a means
to win Venezuelans and other Latin Americans away from Chávez. <br>
<br>
That the Council report regularly places "social justice"
between scare quotes suggests that the phrase is used more as a marketing
ploy -- kind of like "New Coke" -- than to signal that U.S.
banks and corporations are willing to make substantive concessions to
Latin American nationalists. Seven decades ago, Franklin Roosevelt
supported the right of Latin American countries to nationalize U.S.
interests, including Standard Oil holdings in Bolivia and Mexico, saying
it was time for others in the hemisphere to get their "fair
share." Three decades ago, the Linowitz Commission recommended the
establishment of a "code of conduct" defining the
responsibilities of foreign corporations in the region and recognizing
the right of governments to nationalize industries and resources. <br>
<br>
The Council, in contrast, sneers at Chávez's far milder efforts to create
joint ventures with oil multinationals, while offering nothing but pablum
in its place. Its centerpiece recommendation -- aimed at cultivating
Brazil as a potential anchor of a post-Bush, post-Chávez hemispheric
order -- urges the abolition of subsidies and tariffs protecting U.S.
agro-industry in order to advance a "Biofuel Partnership" with
Brazil's own behemoth agricultural sector. This would be an environmental
<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/30/business/worldbusiness/30food.html">
disaster</a>, pushing large, mechanized plantations ever deeper into the
<a href="http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg18825265.400">Amazon
basin</a>, while doing nothing to generate decent jobs or distribute
wealth more fairly. <br>
<br>
Dominated by representatives from the finance sector of the U.S. economy,
the Council recommends little beyond continuing the failed corporate
"free trade" policies of the last twenty years -- and, in this
case, those scare quotes are justified because what they're advocating is
about as free as corporate "social justice" is just. <br>
<br>
An Obama Doctrine? <br>
<br>
So far, Barack Obama promises little better. A few weeks ago, he traveled
to Miami and
<a href="http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2008/05/obama_latin_america_speech_in.html">
gave</a> a major address on Latin America to the Cuban American National
Foundation. It was hardly an auspicious venue for a speech that promised
to "engage the people of the region with the respect owed to a
partner." <br>
<br>
Surely, the priorities for humane engagement would have been different
had he been addressing not wealthy right-wing Cuban exiles but an
audience, say, of the kinds of Latino migrants in Los Angeles who have
revitalized the U.S. labor movement, or of Central American families in
Postville, Iowa, where immigration and Justice Department authorities
recently staged a massive
<a href="http://www.alternet.org/rights/85934/">raid</a> on a meatpacking
plant, arresting as many as 700 undocumented workers. Obama did call for
comprehensive immigration reform and promised to fulfill Franklin
Roosevelt's 68 year-old Four Freedoms agenda, including the
social-democratic "freedom from want." Yet he spent much of his
speech throwing red meat to his Cuban audience. <br>
<br>
Ignoring the not-exactly-radical advice of the Council on Foreign
Relations, the candidate pledged to maintain the embargo on Cuba. And
then he went further. Sounding a bit like Frank Gaffney, he all but
accused the Bush administration of "losing Latin America" and
allowing China, Europe, and "demagogues like Hugo Chávez" to
step "into the vacuum." He even raised the specter of Iranian
influence in the region, pointing out that "just the other day
Tehran and Caracas launched a joint bank with their windfall oil
profits." <br>
<br>
Whatever one's opinion on Hugo Chávez, any diplomacy that claims to take
Latin American opinion seriously has to acknowledge one thing: Most of
the region's leaders not only don't see him as a "problem," but
have joined him on major economic and political initiatives like the Bank
of the South, an alternative to the International Monetary Fund and the
Union of South American Nations, modeled on the European Union,
<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=abWOMOeJUK7Y&refer=home">
established</a> just two weeks ago. And any U.S. president who is sincere
in wanting to help Latin Americans liberate themselves from
"want" will have to work with the Latin American left -- in all
its varieties. <br>
<br>
But more ominous than Obama's posturing on Venezuela is his position on
Colombia. Critics have long pointed out that the billions of dollars in
military aid provided to the Colombian security forces to defeat the FARC
insurgency and curtail cocaine production would discourage a negotiated
end to the civil war in that country and potentially provoke its
escalation into neighboring Andean lands. That's exactly what happened
last March, when Colombia's president Alvaro Uribe ordered the bombing of
a rebel camp located in Ecuador
(<a href="http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1191/68/">
possibly</a> with U.S. logistical support supplied from Manta Air Force
Base, which gives you an idea of why Correa wants to give it to China).
To justify the raid, Uribe explicitly invoked the Bush Doctrine's right
of preemptive, unilateral action. In response, Ecuador and Venezuela
began to mobilize troops along their border with Colombia, bringing the
region to the precipice of war. <br>
<br>
Most interestingly, in that conflict, an overwhelming majority of Latin
American and Caribbean countries sided with Venezuela and Ecuador,
categorically condemning the Colombian raid and reaffirming the
sovereignty of individual nations recognized by Franklin Roosevelt long
ago. Not Obama, however. He essentially endorsed the Bush
administration's drive to transform Colombia's relations with its Andean
neighbors into the one Israel has with most of the Middle East. In his
Miami speech, he swore that he would "support Colombia's right to
strike terrorists who seek safe-havens across its borders." <br>
<br>
Equally troublesome has been Obama's endorsement of the controversial
Merida Initiative, which human rights groups like Amnesty International
have
<a href="http://www.lagunajournal.com/amnesty_international_joins_oppo.htm">
condemned</a> as an application of the "Colombian solution" to
Mexico and Central America, providing their militaries and police with a
massive infusion of money to combat drugs and gangs. Crime is indeed a
serious problem in these countries, and deserves considered attention.
It's chilling, however, to have Colombia -- where death-squads now have
infiltrated every level of government, and where union and other
political activists are executed on a regular basis -- held up as a model
for other parts of Latin America. <br>
<br>
Obama, however, not only supports the initiative, but wants to expand it
beyond Mexico and Central America. "We must press further south as
well," he said in Miami. <br>
<br>
It seems that once again that, as in the 1970s, reports of the death of
the Monroe Doctrine are greatly exaggerated. <br>
<br>
<br>
<i>Greg Grandin teaches history at New York University. He is the author
of
<a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/0805083235/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20">
Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the
New Imperialism</a> and
<a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/0226305724/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20">
The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War</a>.<br>
</i> <br>
[This article first appeared on
<a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/">Tomdispatch.com</a>, a weblog of
the Nation Institute, which offers a steady flow of alternate sources,
news, and opinion from Tom Engelhardt, long time editor in publishing,
co-founder of <a href="http://www.americanempireproject.com/">the
American Empire Project</a>, author of
<a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/155849586X/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20">
The End of Victory Culture</a> (University of Massachusetts Press),
thoroughly updated in a newly issued edition covering Iraq, and editor
and contributor to the first best of Tomdispatch book,
<a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/1844672573/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20">
The World According to Tomdispatch: America in the New Age of Empire</a>
(Verso).]<br>
<br><br>
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