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<font face="Verdana" size=2>May 24 / 25, 2008<br>
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<a href="http://www.counterpunch.org/valdes05242008.html" eudora="autourl">
http://www.counterpunch.org/valdes05242008.html<br><br>
</a></font><font face="Times New Roman, Times" size=4><b><i>The Politics
of Unequal Exchange <br><br>
</i></font><h1><font face="Times New Roman, Times" size=5 color="#990000">
<b>The Buying of "Democracy" Agents in Cuba
</b></font></h1><font face="Times New Roman, Times" size=4>By NELSON P.
VALDÉS <br><br>
</font>
<dl>
<dd><font face="Verdana" size=2>"The populace may hiss me, but when
I go home and think of my money, I applaud myself. " <br><br>
<dl>
<dd>Horace (c. 25 BC)<br><br>
</dl>
<dd>"Unequal exchange, as practiced by the conquerors with the
natives purchasing gold with mirrors, marbles and European trinkets,
must cease." <br><br>
<dl>
<dd>Fidel Castro, 1998<br><br>
</font>
</dl>
</dl><font size=6 color="#990000">I</font><font face="Verdana" size=2>n
fiscal year 2008-2009 the United States government has budgeted
$45,000,000 to finance the opposition against the revolutionary
government in Cuba. The money is used to fund rightwing exile
organizations, eastern European rightwing politicians involved with Cuba
and money oriented "civil society" promoters. Some of the money
ends up in Cuba. The details of such counterrevolutionary program
is little known by the world. The Cubans within the island who receive
the so-called "assistance" claim to be involved in promoting
"civil society" and "democracy." They maintain that
what they are doing is not subversive. The official line from the United
States government is that the money it supplies has a humanitarian
intent. The recipients, however, are agents of a foreign power if we
follow US law definitions. [1] It is unknown how much money the United
States government is really spending to bring an end to the revolutionary
government in Havana. [2]<br><br>
The videos, photos, documents and phone conversation logs transmitted
over the Mesa Redonda TV program in Havana during three consecutive
days (May 19, 20, 21) disclosed some of the mechanisms used to provide
money payments to dissidents via Marta Beatriz Roque, a sort of
dissident paymaster/accountant in Havana. She describes herself in her
emails to rightwing exiles and US officials, as Tia McPato (as in the
Disney character - Aunt Scrooge McDuck. )<br><br>
The money provided to the "dissidents" seem to be mere peanuts,
when compared to the total amount of money appropriated by the US
Congress. Indeed, it is obvious, that the "dissidents" provide
the "cover" for the real entrepreneurs in Florida to enrich
themselves. One can very well assume that if the US AID grants a lump sum
of, say, $5 million to a Miami "democracy promotion
organization" and then the organization puts the money in a bank to
get yearly earnings - the earnings might be sufficient to finance the
"dissidents". Miami, of course, will keep the lion's share of
the grant. And the "grant" [our tax dollars at work] will be
renewed the following years. Both Republicans and Democrats in the
Congress approve of a "foreign aid" that ends up in Coral
Gables and the Florida keys.<br><br>
In a sense, the "dissidents" in the island face all the
political and economic costs but receive very little of the financial
benefits - when compared to exile “donors.” Granted, a monthly payment of
$200-1,500 US dollars is certainly 100 times what the average Cuban
earns. Yet, the island "dissidents" thank the exile
"donors" abroad when in fact; the exile entrepreneurs should be
thanking the "dissidents." Or, to put it differently, the
"dissidents" are the proletarians while the Miami hustlers are
the bourgeois employers.<br><br>
The logic of such political opposition is NOT to be too successful in the
REAL recruiting of thousands of political opponents inside Cuba. To do so
would be a major logistical and financial conundrum - for that success
would imply much more financial accounting. Rather, the best strategy is
to CLAIM a lot of political proselytizing in order to obtain as much
funding from abroad as possible.<br><br>
The Miami promoters/handlers need the "dissidents" but do not
want them to get too much of a claim over the capital available. This is
accomplished by obtaining invoices for all services rendered. In a sense,
this whole enterprise moves millions of dollars in Florida and elsewhere,
but it comes to "penny capitalism" in Havana.<br><br>
Marta Beatriz Roque distributes an average of $200 per
"dissident". Thus, if 10 "dissidents"= $200x10=$2000;
100 "dissidents", $20,000 and so forth. By playing such a role
Marta Beatriz Roque is not a political "leader" but rather a
financial "accountant." She knows so and calls herself Tia
MacPato. How much money she receives determines how many people she
could, potentially recruit. Of course, she could increase the monthly
payments of those who are already recruited. On the other hand, that some
of the "dissidents" do not seem to get any money payment,
perhaps behaving on the basis of “moral incentives” or not realizing that
everyone gets a fee for services rendered.<br><br>
Interestingly, the money is supplied on a monthly basis rather than as a
lump sum. Tia McPato would like to get lump sums - that would provide her
with discretionary power. But it will reduce the political influence that
Miami would have over Havana. The one with the money commands. Thus,
payments are done on a monthly basis - although this is a cumbersome
logistical mechanism. But it is revealing what the method
accomplishes:<br><br>
1. It reminds the recipient of the funds who is the boss - that is
Santiago Alvarez. 2. It makes the recipients financially dependent on a
monthly basis, which is a form of control: you don’t deliver political
acts, you don’t get paid. This is measured on the basis of the foreign
press reporting on the actions. 3. The monthly payments, delivered by
Marta Beatriz, is a form of political control. The money payments is a
tool of political recruitment and a form of retainer, from month to
month. 4. The monthly payments allow the people with the capital in
Florida (who received the money from the US government and other
undisclosed sources) to set up an account that earns interests. Thus, if
AID supplies the "non profit" organization in Miami with the
capital, then the money is put in an interest earning account.<br><br>
The relationship between the Miami promoters/bourgeoisie and the Havana
"dissident"/proletarians is a very unique exchange. Miami has
US-government supplied financial capital; Havana "dissidents"
claim to have political capital. The latter is seemingly correlated with
time served in a Cuban prison or openly challenging the Cuban
authorities; both generate more political capital in the eyes of the
Miami and Washington DC promoters of long-distance "democracy".
Those who have been arrested or answer to the behest of the US Interest
Section have a higher exchange value than those who do not. Moreover,
those who served some prison time but do not continue their day to day
"demonstration politics" then do not get pay as much as those
who do. Tia McPato who is the money distributor among the
"dissidents" claims the political leadership over the
proletarians.<br><br>
In such a relationship, it becomes imperative for the proletarians to try
to extort as much from the employers abroad. This requires that the
actions of the "dissidents" be covered by the foreign press.
["If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does
it make a sound?"] In other words, political "show and
tell" is the very stuff of such "demonstration politics".
No TV time or press headlines, no pay. It is imperative, then, to
cultivate the foreign media stationed in Havana. The foreign media plays
the part of the stock analyst who keeps the market ratings on
"dissidence" high. Seemingly, the correspondents' job is to
tout the market value of the "dissidents" whose stock
would be worthless if their real value were exposed.<br><br>
The Cuban government has challenged the US government, the foreign media
stationed in Cuba, or the island's "dissidents" to answer
head-on the evidence that has been disclosed and the substantive charges.
It is doubtful that any of the players will do so. Meanwhile the
commercial enterprise called "democracy promotion" will
continue.<br><br>
Perhaps the promotion of democracy should begin with exporting to Cuba
some legislation from the United States. I propose that our country
persuade the government in Havana to adopt from the US Code 18 U.S.C.A. §
953 [1948] - better known as the Logan Act.<br><br>
The Act reads in part, "Any citizen of the United States, wherever
he may be, who, without authority of the United States, directly or
indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with
any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, with intent to
influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or of any
officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies
with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both." [3] All that would be necessary is for the Cuban
government to replace the phrase "United States" and include
"Republic of Cuba."<br><br>
Now, that might be an interesting way of furthering democracy.<br><br>
Nelson P. Valdés</b> is a Professor of Sociology at the University of New
Mexico.<br><br>
This essay was originally published by Cuba-L Analysis. <br><br>
</font><font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000">Notes<br><br>
</b></font>[1] See the essay by Salim Lamrani: 05/07/08 - Rebelión
(Madrid) - Las contradicciones de Amnistia Internacional.<br><br>
[2] There is a concurrent effort, also financed by the United States
government, to prepare the "transition teams" that will be sent
once the Cuban revolutionary regime is overthrown. Just on May 8th, 2008
AID requested proposals to the tune of $30 million from five US
corporations who have been involved in such "transitions"
elsewhere. Source: AID email, May 8, 2008 entitled: COMPETITIVE
TASK ORDER SOLICITATION IN SUPPORT OF THE CUBA DEMOCRACY AND CONTINGENCY
PLANNING PROGRAM (CDCPP). <br><br>
[3] See: U.S. Code, Title 19, Part I, Chapter 45, § 953<br><br>
<br><br>
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