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<font size=3>How United States Intervention in Venezuela Works, part 3 of
3<br>
Analysis of Four USAID Contracts with with Republican and Democratic
Party Foundations in Venezuela<br>
</font><font size=3 color="#666666">Sunday, Sep 11,
2005</font><font size=3> <br><br>
<a href="http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/print.php?artno=1550" eudora="autourl">
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/print.php?artno=1550<br><br>
</a><i>By: Philip Agee<br><br>
</i><b>Part 1:
<a href="http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1548">How
United States Intervention Against Venezuela
Works</a></b>
<a href="http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1548"> </a>
<br><br>
<b>Part 2:
<a href="http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1549">Use of
a Private U.S. Corporate Structure to Disguise a Government
Program</a></b>
<a href="http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1549">
</a><br><br>
<b>Part 3: below<br><br>
2. AID/OTI Contract with the International Republican Institute (IRI) to
Organize and Train Political Party Poll Watchers to Monitor the Recall
Referendum and the Possible Elections Afterwards. <br><br>
</b>This contract, dated September 15, 2003, resulted from the May 2003
agreement between the government and the opposition to hold a recall
referendum and new elections if the opposition won. The value was
$284,989 for the period of September 2003 to September 2004, and IRI was
obligated to report to OTI on finances and progress every three
months. <br><br>
In the introduction to this 25-page document, OTI recognizes that the
activities covered by the contract are “extraordinary” and that “the
current political situation in Venezuela is very unique and requires
unprecedented coordination.” Therefore “close collaboration and joint
participation” of IRI with the OTI representative in the Embassy will be
essential for the success of the program. It adds that OTI will be
working through several institutions “to accomplish its objective of
supporting a peaceful, democratic, and electoral solution to the crisis
in Venezuela.” It also adds that “to avoid duplication of efforts among
grantees and to navigate in the sensitive political waters in Venezuela,”
AID will establish a coordinating committee in Washington. These same
paragraphs are found in the three additional contracts that follow below:
3) OTI/IRI; 4) OTI/NDI and 5) another OTI/NDI contract, all of which
establish programs related to the referendum and the possible elections
afterwards. <br><br>
According to the project description submitted by IRI’s headquarters in
Washington and included in the contract, the IRI office in Caracas agreed
to establish an organization and training program for voluntary poll
watchers belonging to the different political parties. The need for the
project was based on doubts about the integrity of the Venezuelan
electoral system: "With controversy and tensions rising, it is clear
that proper checks and balances need to be in place for the eventual
referendum and possible elections to help ensure the integrity of the
vote. Party poll watchers (<i>fiscales</i>) will play a key role in
guaranteeing the transparency and integrity of the processes."
<br><br>
It goes on to say, “Key to both ballot security and public confidence in
the veracity of the ballot are political party poll watchers. IRI’s
experience throughout the region and the world has shown that party
representatives at the polling stations are the best check against
fraud.”<br><br>
The contract finances training courses for poll watchers that will be
organized by IRI along with “a local non-governmental organization (NGO)”
that significantly is not named but has already been “approved by the
CTO” of AID/OTI in Washington, Mr. Russell Porter. (The unnamed NGO
probably is the anti-Chavez civic organization Súmate, created by NED,
that was the major force in promoting the recall vote.) This NGO,
according to the contract, will contact all of the Venezuelan political
parties to recruit paid volunteers to be trained as trainers of others.
The weeklong workshops will instruct about 50 volunteers each. These new
volunteer instructors will be assigned to Caracas and the capitals of the
states of Zulia, Carabobo, Tachira and Anzoátegui where they will prepare
other volunteers who will be assigned to voting stations on the day of
the referendum and, if the opposition wins, on the day of the new
elections. <br><br>
The contract requires that the Foreign National Program Coordinator, who
will direct the project, and each voluntary trainer receive prior
approval of their employment from the CTO of OTI in Washington. Prior
approval by the CTO is also necessary for IRI to distribute money under
subcontracts with Venezuelan organizations. Additionally the contract
requires IRI to submit a report on finances and progress every three
months and immediate reports on problems that may affect the
project. <br><br>
The role of the poll watchers in the referendum will be to observe
closely the voting procedure in order to discover, identify, and report
any irregularity. <b>The system of reporting irregularities is the most
interesting part of the contract.</b> Each volunteer will have the duty
to report irregularities only to the NGO partner of IRI and not to
his/her party or to the electoral authorities. The NGO will transmit the
details to IRI in Caracas, which in turn will report, in English, the
details witnessed by the volunteers to OTI’s CTO in Washington. The CTO
then will have the power to decide what information is to be announced
and how, and it will advise the IRI in Caracas in this regard. The IRI,
only after approval by the CTO, will permit its partner NGO to notify one
of the political parties for publication of the information. Obviously
this contract gives total control of the operation to OTI/AID in
Washington which, doubtless in coordination with the Department of State,
will decide on the use of the information gathered by the network of
voluntary observers excluding, if it wishes, the National Electoral
Commission. <br><br>
<b>3. AID/OTI Contract with the International Republican Institute (IRI)
to Strengthen Political Parties for the Recall Referendum and the
Possible Elections afterwards. <br><br>
</b>This contract, dated September 15, 2003, is to finance a program of
the Caracas IRI office to teach Venezuelan political parties how to
organize electoral campaigns. It too resulted from the agreement between
the government and the opposition to hold a recall referendum and, if the
opposition won, new elections. It provided $450,000 and was valid until
September 2004. The contract required that IRI prepare quarterly progress
and financial reports for OTI in Washington. <br><br>
The project description, written by IRI and included in this 26-page
document, observes that IRI has had a program in Venezuela since 1999 for
the purpose of “strengthening” Venezuelan political parties. Without
naming the parties, it says that the participating parties span the
“political spectrum." The program is carried out not only in Caracas
but also in the states of Zulia, Carabobo and Anzoátegui. The main focus
of this already existent program, financed by NED and the State
Department, is the development of a system of national surveys, political
platforms, and internal democratization of the parties. <br><br>
The new project covered by this contract, financed by AID/OTI instead of
NED, is only dedicated to preparations for the referendum and the
possible subsequent elections. The goal is to establish regional
workshops with one-week political courses in Caracas, Zulia, Carabobo,
Anzoátegui and Táchira in an effort to cover the whole country. Leaders
and electoral campaign workers of all parties will be invited to
participate, and the courses will have two phases. In the first, the
instruction will focus on how to create a “strong party campaign
organization, including preparing candidates for debates and public
forums, the various stages of campaign development, and strategies to
overcome party weaknesses and capitalize on party
strengths." <br><br>
In the second phase the instruction will be focused on political research
through preparation and interpretation of surveys and studies of
demographic, social and economic statistics in order to “better
understand the political environment in which they must function
effectively." The contract includes a list of 12 topics that can be
included in the courses such as the organization and structure of a
campaign; the recruitment and motivation of the campaign’s rank and file
personnel; the use of voter registration lists; creating coalitions;
development of a campaign schedule; identification and targeting of voter
blocks; developing a campaign budget and fund raising; and organizing
door to door surveys. <br><br>
For this project IRI will hire a foreign expert, with previous approval
of the CTO in Washington, as Foreign National Program Coordinator for the
whole period of the contract throughout the referendum and the electoral
campaign if it happens. This person will dedicate all of his/her time to
the project working in the IRI office in Caracas and traveling throughout
the country and maintaining contacts with political party leaders. IRI
will also contract and bring to Venezuela experts in political
campaigning from Latin America, Europe and the U.S. to teach the courses
and perform follow up tasks after the courses. These are called
International Party Training Experts and Advisors, and the hiring of each
one also requires prior approval by the CTO in Washington.
<br><br>
In the “Conclusions” to this contract there is a comment that IRI has
organized similar political and electoral training courses in other
countries such as Guatemala, Peru, Cambodia, Indonesia, Nigeria and
Macedonia.<br><br>
<b>4. AID/OTI Contract with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to
Foment a Coalition Among Political Parties of the Opposition and to
Strengthen These Parties <br><br>
</b>This 32-page contract dated September 24, 2003 and valid until the
end of September 2004 allotted $550,000 for an NDI program at its Caracas
office in order to “build coalitions and to strengthen political
parties." The program also resulted from the May 2003 agreement
between the government and the opposition to hold a recall referendum and
elections to follow if the recall was successful. The contract required
that NDI report to AID/OTI every 3 months on the program’s finances and
progress. <br><br>
The objectives of the program were “to assist political parties in
Venezuela to engage in coalition building and become more representative,
inclusive, internally democratic, and ethical.” The need for this program
is expressed in terms of the collapse of the old political system:
“However, new political movements and the traditional political parties,
suffering from internal rifts and lacking credibility and funds, have
proven ineffective in offering convincing alternatives to Chávez’s
leadership.” Thus: “In response NDI would continue to promote internal
reform and renewal efforts by the main political parties and
movements.”<br><br>
The description of the program contained in the contract, as written by
NDI, begins with comments on the political situation. “The collapse of
the party system remains one of the root causes of the political
stalemate in Venezuela.” “In recent years Venezuelan society has split
over the populist policies and authoritarian leadership of President Hugo
Chávez.” “President Hugo Chávez has emerged as one of the most
controversial and polarizing leaders in Venezuelan history.” In 1998,
“Chávez was swept into power by an electorate deeply disillusioned with
the nation’s traditional leaders.” “Once in office, President Chávez
quickly moved to consolidate his power by abolishing the Senate, markedly
increasing the power of the presidency, suspending public funding of
political parties and traditional non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and creating his own set of 'Bolivarian' societal organizations. He
pursued controversial land reform measures, politicized the judicial
system, and attacked his critics in the media." <br><br>
The contract continues with a list of proposed activities under this
program: <br><br>
</font>
<dl>
<dd>a) Coalition-Building with Opposition Political Parties and
Movements</u>. As an example, says the document, NDI is considering an
invitation by the President of Costa Rica to organize a strategic meeting
of opposition representatives to discuss the formation of a coalition.
The program in Venezuela will consist of: consultations to negotiate the
formation of a coalition and the development of a common strategy; the
design of a plan of communications among the parties; a plan to attract
support for the coalition from other groups; the development of a common
platform that unites the parties; the design of procedures for decisions
about leadership of the coalition and its candidates in future elections;
and a plan for the leadership of the coalition after the referendum.
<br><br>
<dd>For these consultations NDI will bring experts to Venezuela from its
own team and also experts and political “practitioners” experienced in
building coalitions in other countries such as Chile, Nicaragua, Poland
and the Czech Republic. <br><br>
<dd>b) Promoting Acceptance of the Referendum Process with the Chavez
Coalition.</u> “To help affirm support for the referendum within the
Chavez government, NDI would seek out reformist elements of President
Chávez's party, the MVR, and share lessons learned by practitioners or
experts from countries where confidence-building measures were necessary
such as: Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, Portugal and Spain. These
practitioners would underscore the importance of taking pro-active,
public steps to remove doubt about President Chávez’s commitment to the
process."<br><br>
<dd>c) Building and Renewing Political Parties and Movements.</u> This
part of the program will be a continuation of the activities that NDI
already has underway and that are financed by NED until September of
2003. They will consist of bringing “international practitioners” to
Venezuela to assist political parties in areas such as outreach to
“underrepresented” sectors like “youth, women, racial minorities, and the
poor; strengthening state and local chapters; ethics and transparency;
political negotiation; internal party communication; coalition-building;
and relations between political parties and civil society.” The parties
named for this program are AD, COPEI, MAS, Primero Justicia, Proyecto
Venezuela, and the Chavez party, Movimiento Quinta República.<br><br>
<dd>d) Public Opinion Analysis.</u> In support of these activities with
the parties, NDI will establish a new system for surveying public
opinion, contracting the Argentine polling firm Romer and Associates with
assistance from a Venezuelan firm like Consultores 21.<br><br>
</dl>To carry out this program NDI will hire a National Director for its
office in Caracas who has extensive experience with political parties and
elections. A Project Assistant will also be hired. These appointments
must be previously approved by the CTO of AID-OTI in Washington. The same
approval is required for all the practitioners, experts, and advisers
that NDI plans to bring to Venezuela from abroad. Finally NDI commits to
coordinate the program closely with IRI and with the Carter Center in
Atlanta.<br><br>
5. AID/OTI Contract with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to
Guarantee the Credibility of the Referendum and Possible Elections
through a Group of Venezuelan NGO’s that will Monitor the Process
<br><br>
</b>The period of this 34-page contract is from September 2003 to
September 2004, and like the others that OTI/AID has with IRI and the NDI
it followed the May 2003 agreement between the opposition and the
government to carry out the referendum that could result in subsequent
elections. The total value is $769,487 but NDI is obliged under the
contract to seek additional funding from Venezuelan and international
sources, which opens the door for the CIA to channel money to this
project. The purpose is to establish, finance, train and direct a group
of Venezuelan NGOs that will monitor the referendum process before,
during and after the voting. The funds will also support this
organization for the possible presidential elections in case the
opposition wins the referendum, and even further to assure its long-term
permanence. The Venezuelan NGOs that the contract mentions as
possible participants in the program are Súmate</i> (Join Up), Red de
Veedores</i> (Network of Monitors), Mirador Democrático</i> (Democratic
Observer), Queremos Elegir </i>(We Want to Choose), and Ciudadanía
Activa</i> (Active Citizenry). <br><br>
With this program NDI hoped to attract to the NGOs participating in this
unnamed civic-electoral organization thousands of volunteers for training
and assignment to diverse tasks that cover the entire referendum process.
The goal is also to overcome a problem: "Venezuelans do not have
confidence in the administration of a referendum or electoral process,
expecting bias from the elections authorities and other state
institutions, including manipulation of the voting and counting processes
(on) elections day." <br><br>
NDI writes in the description of the program that it has carried out
similar election monitoring projects in 65 countries over 20 years. In
Venezuela it has worked since 1995 “assisting Venezuelan civic groups
with electoral reform and election observation initiatives.” It mentions
the Escuela de Vecinos</i> de Venezuela </i>(School of Neighbors of
Venezuela) and Queremos Elegir</i> as two of its Venezuelan partners. NDI
claims that this project’s objective is “to promote citizen confidence
and participation in upcoming referendum and electoral processes.”
<br><br>
To carry out this program NDI will hire a Field Representative who will
advise participating NGOs “on all the aspects of the program” on a daily
basis. The Field Representative will also organize visits and schedules
of NDI and foreign experts including Latin American members of an
election observation network called El Acuerdo de Lima</i> (The Lima
Agreement). As in all AID/OTI contracts, prior approval by the CTO in
Washington is necessary for recruiting the Field Representative and all
the experts and consultants. Likewise prior approval by the CTO is
required for all the subcontracts necessary to give money to the
participating Venezuelan NGOs. <br><br>
In the project description NDI enumerates the steps to take in forming
the coalition of NGOs. These include the formation of a board directors
of prominent and respected citizens such as civic activists, academics,
business leaders and clerics. These should represent the various ethnic,
religious, geographical and social sectors of Venezuelan society and give
prestige and credibility to the NGO coalition. Another step is an
agreement on the procedures for making decisions and choosing of
spokespersons, as well as the assignment of such tasks as administration,
control of funds, public relations and recruitment. It will also be
necessary to make a work plan that includes a tasks time-table and a plan
for connecting with government and electoral authorities, political
parties, media, the delegations of international monitors, international
organizations and the public in general. Finally, it will be necessary to
organize a system to collect funds from national and international
donors. <br><br>
The description of the program then details in several pages the tasks to
complete during the pre-electoral period and on election day as well as
short and long term post-election tasks. Of special interest is the quick
count method to calculate the probable results before the official count
is completed. This system is based on the selection of voting stations
from which probable results can be extrapolated before the official count
is available. The purposes of the quick count, according to the document
are “1) identify and expose electoral fraud when it occurs or to deter
potential fraud from occurring; and 2) raise public confidence in the
election results and reduce the potential for post-election conflict.”
The uses of the quick count result can include its announcement “to
provide an independent check on the official count.” <br><br>
NDI attaches much importance to the continuance of this coalition of NGOs
after its first election-monitoring event, that is to say the recall
referendum. It emphasizes that the NGOs should retain the thousands of
volunteers throughout the country active and interested between electoral
processes through work evaluations, planning, and other civic
activities. The contract doesn't say it, but obviously the
possibility exists of transforming this civic coalition of NGOs into a
political party itself as has happened in other countries.<br><br>
D. Comments and Conclusions<br><br>
</b>The contracts analyzed here are only five among dozens agreed upon
between U.S. government agencies and Venezuelan organizations of the
political opposition, according to the declassified documentation
published at
<a href="http://www.venezuelafoia.info/" eudora="autourl">
http://www.venezuelafoia.info</a>. However they reveal an extraordinary
effort at penetration and manipulation of the Venezuelan political
process by the Caracas offices of IRI, NDI and DAI under control of the
U.S. Embassy and AID and the Department of State in Washington. The role
played by the CIA has not been revealed, but one can be sure that the
Agency takes part in clandestine funding and other support tasks. There
is also a good possibility that the DAI operation in Venezuela is in fact
a covert operation of the CIA.<br><br>
The documents analyzed fail to reveal the criteria applied to decisions
about which of the agencies should distribute support to the different
activities and beneficiaries, that is, which funds should be channeled
through NED and its foundations, which AID/OTI should channel to IRI or
the NDI directly, and which funds should be channeled through DAI. In any
case, these would be collective decisions made in Washington by the
committee representing all of the agencies participating in the
intervention, assigning responsibilities and trying to avoid duplications
of tasks. <br><br>
All the analyzed programs have the goal of developing and strengthening
the political parties opposed to the Bolivarian Revolution along with
several civil, supposedly non-partisan, associations that are in fact
also opposed to President Chávez's program. The activities are disguised
as support for democracy, but several of the leaders of the recipient
organizations signed the Carmona Decree that abolished democracy in
Venezuela during the brief and unsuccessful coup of April 2002.
<br><br>
The contracts show disdain for President Chávez and his program, and they
blame him for the “crisis” in Venezuela and for the polarization of the
country. Likewise, they show distrust in the National Electoral Council,
and they underline the necessity to watch over the electoral process
closely to discover and denounce fraud. Prominent among the objectives of
these programs is the formation of a coalition of opposition parties that
is able to attract new members and new voters for the electoral
campaigns. Although the contracts examined last one year, or two in the
case of the DAI, they can be extended or new contracts can give
continuation to the activities while allowing for adjustments demanded by
a changing situation.<br><br>
There is no doubt that these programs will continue as long as the
current political process continues in Venezuela, since the United States
will never accept the taking of power by popular forces in Latin America.
Since the adoption of Project Democracy in 1983, the US has attempted to
establish and strengthen, in various countries around the world, pro-US
“democracies” controlled by elites who identify with the U.S. political
class and who can take advantage of the “bought democracy” that the U.S.
seeks to impose. In this way, the U.S. aims to eliminate the danger that
a truly democratic government of working people would represent to its
interests. Secretary of State Rice underlined these policies on January
18, 2005 in her hostile comments toward Venezuela and Cuba before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Two days later President Bush, in
the inaugural speech of his second term, reaffirmed the great priority
that the U.S. will continue giving to these foreign political
interventions. Both of them and others continued during the following
months to emphasize the “promotion of democracy” as a fundamental program
of the administration. In Latin America, an increase in these programs
should be expected in order to counteract the growth in recent years of
electoral victories by popular forces. <br><br>
President Chávez's coalition has two significant advantages working in
its favor that the Frente Sandinista government in Nicaragua in the 1980s
did not have. The first is a growing economy, thanks to oil revenues.
This has assured the success of the social programs, the misiones</i>,
and the beginning of the redistribution of national income. The other
advantage is the absence of an internal guerrilla war that terrorizes and
massacres the population while it destroys the economy. <br><br>
Nevertheless, large quantities of dollars continue to flow to the
opposition, and in 2005 and 2006 these funds should increase considerably
for the election campaigns. Only a 10% swing is needed in national
voting, from the August 2004 referendum, to produce a dead heat between
the Chávez coalition and the opposition. One should understand that for
the U.S. the 2006 presidential campaign has already begun, and if they
achieve a coalition of opposition parties, a kind of “union for national
salvation,” it is not inconceivable that a great surprise could occur, as
when very similar interventionist activities took place in Nicaragua in
1989/1990.<br><br>
In the United States, it is a crime to request or to accept foreign funds
destined to influence elections, and Venezuela has similar legislation.
In 2004, the Venezuelan government reacted to U.S. intervention by
initiating criminal proceedings against leaders of Súmate</i>, which had
received financing from NDI to promote the recall referendum against
Chávez. This action naturally provoked expressions of support for
Súmate</i> from the U.S. Ambassador, NED, and members of Congress. But in
July of 2005 a judge ruled that the case against the four leaders of
Súmate</i> could proceed. (For more information about the Súmate</i> case
see http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1500.)<br><br>
The Venezuelan government always has the option of closing the offices of
NDI, IRI and DAI and expelling the U.S. citizens and other foreigners
working in these offices. Such an action, although completely justified,
without a doubt would cause screams of outrage in Washington, although it
would not put an end to the operations. The three offices would probably
relocate to Miami where they would continue distributing money to their
Venezuelan partners. However, it would make it much more difficult to
direct the activities in Venezuela that they finance, and it would
require constants trips between Miami and Caracas for meetings. In any
event, U.S. interventionist policies to put an end to the Bolivarian
Revolution and make possible the return to power of the old oligarchy
will not change. They will continue as long as there is a government in
Venezuela that gives priority to the interests of the poor, maintains
strong relationships with the Cuban Revolution, and promotes regional
integration without the United States.<br><br>
Translated by Dawn Gable<br><br>
</i><x-sigsep><p></x-sigsep>
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522 Valencia Street<br>
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(415) 863-9977<br>
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