[News] Iran is being driven towards the nuclear threshold

[Anti-Imperialist News]

breakthroughnews.org
<https://breakthroughnews.org/2026/08/24/iran-is-being-driven-towards-the-nuclear-threshold/>
Iran is being driven towards the nuclear threshold
Vijay Prashad
August 24, 2026
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[image: image.png]

Taking a step toward nuclear would constitute an entirely new stage in the
history of West Asia. But it would be the consequence of an existential
war, not evidence that Iran had always secretly intended to reach this
point.

The gravest danger in the present war is not that Iran has already decided
to manufacture a nuclear weapon. There is no verified evidence of such a
decision. The danger is that another major US escalation could convince
Tehran that remaining a non-nuclear state inside the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) no longer provides protection, recognition, or even the
elementary security that the treaty was supposed to guarantee. Washington
may therefore produce precisely the outcome that it claims to be trying to
prevent.

Iran is approaching its NPT red line. Withdrawal from the treaty is no
longer discussed merely as rhetorical retaliation. Iranian institutions,
including parliament, have examined it as a practical response to attacks
upon safeguarded nuclear facilities, the International Atomic Energy
Agency’s failure to condemn those attacks, and the suspicion that
information gathered through inspections has found its way into US and
Israeli targeting processes. In late March 2026, a triple-urgency bill
proposing Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT was uploaded
<https://www.tasnimnews.ir/fa/news/1405/01/10/3552338/%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D8%B2-npt-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%84%DB%8C>
to the Iranian parliament’s legislative system, although it had not yet
been debated or adopted.

The NPT permits withdrawal when a state concludes
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20729/v729.pdf> that
“extraordinary events” have jeopardized its supreme interests. Iran can
plausibly argue that the bombing of its nuclear facilities by nuclear-armed
states constitutes precisely such an event. Iranian officials who advocate
withdrawal have stressed that such a step would not necessarily signal a
decision to manufacture a bomb. Alaeddin Boroujderdi, a member of
parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, argued
<https://www.irna.ir/news/86114094/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-NPT-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA>
in March 2026 that Iran should leave the NPT while insisting, “We are not
seeking a nuclear bomb.” Such a move would, however, terminate or radically
reduce the inspection system through which the IAEA monitors Iran’s nuclear
material. That distinction is legally significant but strategically thin.
Once Iran has left the treaty, restricted inspectors and increased
enrichment, other governments will necessarily assume that it is preparing
a weapon.

Reporting by Transition Protocol shows
<https://www.youtube.com/@Transition_Protocol> that Iran has decided to
move its uranium stockpile to 90% enrichment. Iran had accumulated roughly
440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% before inspectors lost the ability
to establish the location and condition of the entire stock. Uranium
enriched to 60% is already far beyond the level ordinarily required for
civilian power generation, although it is not in itself a nuclear weapon.
Enriching this material to approximately 90% would bring it into the range
conventionally described as weapons-grade.

Conversations with people in Iran have revealed that Iranian authorities
have instructed the nuclear establishment to prepare to process much of
this material towards 90% if the United States escalates again. Enriching
uranium, converting it into suitable form, constructing an explosive device
and developing a deliverable weapon are related but distinct stages.
Nevertheless, if the intelligence is accurate, the direction is
unmistakable. Another major US attack could cause Iran to leave the NPT,
enrich uranium to weapons grade, and move to threshold deterrence. Tehran
might then assemble a device without testing it, or it might conduct an
underground or demonstrative detonation to remove any doubt that it had
crossed the threshold. Such a detonation would constitute an entirely new
stage in the history of West Asia. But it would be the consequence of an
existential war, not evidence that Iran had always secretly intended to
reach this point.
*Korea vs. Libya*

The choice Iranian strategists confront is increasingly described through
two precedents: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Libya.

Libya surrendered its embryonic nuclear and missile programs in 2003. It
transferred equipment and documents to the United States, accepted
intrusive inspections, and sought normal relations with the West.
Washington and London presented Muammar Gaddafi’s decision as proof that
disarmament would produce security and international rehabilitation. Eight
years later, NATO used a United Nations resolution ostensibly intended to
protect civilians to conduct a war for regime change. The Libyan state was
destroyed, and Gaddafi was captured and killed.

The DPRK followed the opposite course. It withdrew from the NPT in 2003,
tested a nuclear device in 2006, and gradually developed a survivable
nuclear and missile capability. North Korea has endured sanctions,
isolation, military exercises and repeated threats. Yet no US government
has attempted a full-scale invasion or regime-change war against it.
Washington negotiates
<https://countercurrents.org/2026/08/why-north-korea-rejected-trumps-peace-gesture/>
with Pyongyang under conditions fundamentally different from those it
imposed upon Baghdad, Tripoli, or Tehran because the consequences of
attacking the DPRK cannot be confidently controlled.

The lesson drawn in Tehran, Pyongyang, and elsewhere is devastatingly
simple: Gaddafi relinquished his deterrent, opened his country and received
no durable guarantee against Western attack. His compliance removed an
obstacle to regime change rather than ensuring Libya’s sovereignty. This is
not an endorsement of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons are
instruments of mass destruction, and their abolition remains a human
necessity. It is an explanation of the strategic calculation produced by
Western conduct. The nuclear powers have failed to fulfill the NPT’s
disarmament bargain, protected Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal,
attacked non-nuclear states, and demanded that selected adversaries remain
permanently vulnerable. They have turned nuclear possession into the most
credible insurance policy against forcible overthrow.

Iran has so far resisted this logic. Its official position remains that
nuclear weapons are religiously prohibited, militarily unnecessary, and
incompatible with its declared doctrine. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi
reiterated after earlier attacks that Iran had not abandoned this policy
and continued to regard the production, stockpiling and use of weapons of
mass destruction as inhuman and un-Islamic. He also explained that Iran
raised enrichment to 60% to demonstrate that threats and pressure would not
compel capitulation. Yet doctrines are not immune to changes in material
circumstances. If a state is repeatedly attacked while observing a
prohibition, and if its attackers openly discuss destroying
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pHwZBFCuAxc> its government (even with
nuclear weapons), its leaders will inevitably reconsider whether moral
restraint has become strategic exposure. The debate within Iran has already
moved from whether nuclear weapons are desirable to whether nuclear latency
may become indispensable for national survival.

Should Iran cross the threshold, it would almost certainly present the
decision as the construction of a shield, not preparation for an offensive
war. Iran has repeatedly said that it does not seek territorial conquest,
nuclear coercion, or attacks upon neighboring peoples. Its immediate
purpose would be to convince Washington and Tel Aviv that no campaign to
destroy the Iranian state could proceed without unacceptable consequences.

A deterrent, however, cannot be made entirely safe by declaring it
defensive. Other governments cannot know future intentions with certainty.
An Iranian weapon could stimulate nuclear hedging by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye,
Egypt or others. Israel might attempt a preventive attack before Iran
completes weaponization. The transition period – between enrichment to 90%
and establishment of a credible deterrent – would be particularly
dangerous. Miscalculation could produce the catastrophe that all parties
claim to oppose.

That is why the decisive responsibility now lies with the states choosing
whether to escalate. If the United States attacks again, intensifies an
economic siege designed to break the Iranian state, or makes negotiations
indistinguishable from an ultimatum, it will strengthen those in Tehran who
argue that the Libyan road ends in death and only the DPRK road guarantees
survival.

Iran appears to be preparing to endure rather than capitulate. It is
hardening its command arrangements, preserving missile and drone capacity,
and organizing for a prolonged economic war. Tehran’s wager is that it can
absorb immense pressure until the US coalition confronts mounting military
costs, commercial disruption, and political disagreement (particularly
after the US mid-term elections in November). The nuclear question now sits
inside that wider strategy of survival.

The choice is therefore stark. Washington can accept a verifiable agreement
that recognizes Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology, guarantees
non-aggression, and restores credible inspection. Or it can continue a war
that destroys the remaining constituency for restraint inside Iran. If it
chooses escalation, it should not pretend to be surprised when Iran
concludes that treaties provide no shield, inspections bring no safety, and
only possession of the ultimate weapon prevents another Libya.

*Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of
forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World,
The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer
Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International
Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the
executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
<http://thetricontinental.org/>, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter,
and the chief editor of LeftWord Books <https://leftword.com/> (New Delhi).
He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).*

*This article was produced by Globetrotter <https://globetrotter.media/>.*
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