[News] The Lebanon Conspiracy: Massacres, Negotiations, and a New Order

[Anti-Imperialist News]

palestinechronicle.com
<https://www.palestinechronicle.com/the-lebanon-conspiracy-massacres-negotiations-normalization-and-a-new-order/>
The Lebanon Conspiracy: Massacres, Negotiations, and a New OrderApril 9,
2026
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Lebanese President Joseph Aoun (R) and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. (Photo:
Al Mayadeen)

*By Ramzy Baroud <https://www.palestinechronicle.com/writers/ramzy-baroud>*


Massacres and negotiations converge as Beirut aligns with Israel’s strategy
to isolate Hezbollah and undermine Iran’s regional position.

Israel’s latest war on Lebanon is not only being waged from the air. It is
being reinforced politically from within, as Beirut moves in step with
US-Israeli efforts to isolate Hezbollah and weaken Iran’s negotiating
position.

In a previous article, we examined the seven messages
<https://www.palestinechronicle.com/seven-messages-can-israel-survive-defeat-without-setting-the-region-ablaze/>
that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to communicate
through mass killings in Lebanon.

These messages were aimed at reshaping regional dynamics, asserting
deterrence, and forcing new political realities on the ground.

Those massacres have already resulted in hundreds of Lebanese killed and
more than a thousand wounded, alongside vast destruction of civilian
infrastructure, according to Lebanese civil defense figures.

The scale and intensity of the violence were not incidental, however. They
were meant to create urgency, fear, and ultimately, compliance.

At the time, we argued that Israel’s actions were part of a broader attempt
to impose a new regional order through blood. Since then, new developments
have confirmed that this military escalation was coordinated with parallel
political moves—specifically, an effort to separate the Iran-US negotiation
track in Pakistan from the war on Lebanon.

This separation is not a technical detail. It is the core of the current
geopolitical struggle.

As Israeli bombs continue to fall across Lebanon, Netanyahu announced that
he had instructed his government to begin direct negotiations with Lebanon
“as soon as possible,” emphasizing that these talks would focus on
disarming Hezbollah and establishing “peaceful relations.”

This shift did not occur in a vacuum. It followed one of the deadliest
waves of Israeli attacks on Lebanon in years, and it came at a moment when
Iran had explicitly linked its participation in the Islamabad talks to a
ceasefire in Lebanon.

In other words, Israel escalated militarily while simultaneously opening a
political channel designed to bypass Iran’s conditions.

What makes this strategy particularly consequential, however, is not
Israel’s role alone—but the response from Beirut.

>From the outset of the Israeli war on Lebanon, the government of Prime
Minister Nawaf Salam has taken steps that align closely with US and Israeli
objectives.

Rather than framing the conflict primarily as Israeli aggression, key
Lebanese officials have emphasized the need to rein in the resistance,
repeatedly raising the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons and the necessity of
placing all arms under state control.

This position is not neutral. It reflects a political choice. More
importantly, it creates the very framework that Israel seeks to impose: one
in which the central issue is no longer occupation, aggression, or civilian
massacres, but rather the “problem” of resistance itself.

The Lebanese government’s willingness to engage in direct negotiations with
Israel—something historically avoided outside the narrow framework of
indirect or mediated contacts—marks a dangerous precedent.

Even if framed as conditional or tactical, such engagement constitutes an
implicit political recognition of Israel at a moment when Lebanese
civilians are still being buried under the rubble of Israeli strikes.

This contradiction is not lost on domestic actors.

According to Al Mayadeen, figures affiliated with Hezbollah have sharply
criticized the government’s direction, with some describing it as a
betrayal of the highest order. The criticism reflects a deeper fear that
Lebanon is being pulled into a political track that will ultimately serve
to delegitimize the resistance and reshape the country’s internal balance
of power.

This concern is reinforced by the sequence of events itself. Lebanon has
not yet received a formal date from the United States to begin
negotiations, according to Al Mayadeen’s correspondent in Beirut. Lebanese
officials have insisted that a ceasefire must precede any talks, yet Israel
has made clear that its objective is precisely the opposite: to use
negotiations as a tool to impose new realities, including Hezbollah’s
disarmament.

At the same moment, Iran has made its stance unmistakably clear. Its
delegation has conditioned participation in the Islamabad talks on linking
any ceasefire to a full halt of Israeli operations in Lebanon. Iranian
officials have gone further, emphasizing that no long-term arrangement is
possible without ending Israeli aggression altogether.

This creates a direct clash of political visions. On one side, Iran is
attempting to integrate Lebanon into a broader regional settlement that
preserves the role of resistance as a central actor. On the other hand, the
United States, Israel, and their regional allies are working to fragment
that framework—isolating Lebanon, sidelining Hezbollah, and reasserting a
US-led order.

In this context, the behavior of the Lebanese government cannot be
understood as independent.

Beirut’s political establishment has long operated within a system shaped
by external pressures, particularly from Washington and its regional
allies. The current moment is no exception. The push toward negotiations,
the emphasis on disarmament, and the political framing of the conflict all
reflect a broader alignment with the pro-American camp.

This camp is facing a strategic dilemma. Its inability to impose a decisive
outcome on Iran—whether militarily or economically—has already shifted the
balance of power. The Strait of Hormuz crisis, the resilience of the
Iranian state, and the failure to neutralize Hezbollah have all exposed the
limits of US influence.

Allowing Lebanon to be included in an Iran-led negotiating framework would
deepen that shift.

It would effectively marginalize pro-Western actors in Beirut and open the
door to a new regional arrangement in which Iran holds significant
leverage. For Washington, Tel Aviv, and their allies, this is an
unacceptable outcome.

Thus, the current strategy: bombard Lebanon, then rush into negotiations
with the Lebanese government itself.

This dual approach is not contradictory. It is deliberate. The massacres
create pressure. The negotiations create an alternative political
pathway—one that excludes Iran and reframes the conflict around disarmament
and normalization.

Crucially, both Israel and segments of the Lebanese political establishment
share a common objective: the weakening, and ultimately the defeat, of
Hezbollah. Direct talks are only the first step.

In the ideal scenario envisioned by the US and Israel, this process would
evolve into an international consensus—possibly through the United
Nations—that formally delegitimizes Hezbollah and, by extension, all forms
of armed resistance. Such a shift would not only reshape Lebanon internally
but would also strike at the core of the broader resistance axis.

But such scenarios rarely unfold as planned.

The main obstacle remains Iran’s insistence on linking Lebanon to any
broader agreement. As long as this linkage holds, attempts to isolate
Lebanon will face significant resistance—not only from Tehran but from
actors within Lebanon itself.

The outcome of this struggle will not be confined to Lebanon.

It will determine whether the region moves toward a fragmented order
dominated by US-backed states, or toward a new balance in which resistance
movements and their allies retain a decisive role.


*– Dr. Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author and the Editor of The Palestine
Chronicle. He is the author of eight books. His latest book, ‘**Before the
Flood*
<https://www.sevenstories.com/books/4779-before-the-flood?srsltid=AfmBOorgPOepR8fLBeCXLViw_awRDNTNNerbwDJ4V2X5Jza-ajlZ6_bm>*,’
was published by Seven Stories Press. His other books include ‘Our Vision
for Liberation’, ‘My Father was a Freedom Fighter’ and ‘The Last Earth’.
Baroud is a Non-resident Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Islam and
Global Affairs (CIGA). His website is **www.ramzybaroud.net*
<http://www.ramzybaroud.net/>
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