[News] No rule without resistance: Gaza’s post-war future and the collapse of foreign illusions

[Anti-Imperialist News]

  No rule without resistance: Gaza’s post-war future and the collapse of
  foreign illusions

As western powers push technocracy over sovereignty, Palestinian 
resistance movements warn that there can be no reconstruction without 
liberation.

Mohammad al-Ayoubi <https://thecradle.co/authors/mohammad-al-ayoubi>

OCT 13, 2025 - 
https://thecradle.co/articles/no-rule-without-resistance-gazas-post-war-future-and-the-collapse-of-foreign-illusions


Photo Credit: The Cradle

In the aftermath of the devastating war on Gaza, the most pressing 
question is no longer about a ceasefire 
<https://thecradle.co/articles-id/33645> or reconstruction, but about 
who will govern 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/the-fight-starts-over-gazas-next-leaders> 
the enclave.

This is a struggle over meaning, legitimacy, and sovereignty. Will the 
future of Gaza be shaped by its people, or by the same foreign powers 
that helped destroy it under the banner of “salvation”?

Every time the gates of ‘reconstruction’ and ‘aid’ are opened, the 
windows of sovereignty are slammed shut. What unfolds is a recurring 
colonial spectacle 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/blairs-second-coming-gaza-under-colonial-trusteeship>: 
a Palestinian political order remade under foreign supervision, where 
‘political realism’ is promoted as a substitute for justice, and 
‘technocracy’ is marketed as a sterile alternative to resistance.

*The day after*

Senior Hamas official Ayham Shananaa tells /The Cradle/ that the war’s 
outcome cannot be measured by the standards of traditional inter-state 
conflict, but must be understood as “an existential struggle between a 
people seeking liberation and an occupation backed by the west.”

He says the very survival of Hamas in the political arena after the 
two-year war constitutes a strategic victory as Israel failed 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israeli-leaders-made-every-possible-mistake-during-gideons-chariots-leaked-document-reveals> 
to achieve its stated objectives, even with unprecedented international 
backing.

This view is echoed by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) official Haitham 
Abu al-Ghazlan, who affirms that “the resistance is now more entrenched 
than ever,” and insists that the true measure of victory lies not in 
material destruction, but in the failure of the Zionist project to 
displace the population and break Palestinian will.

Shananaa adds that the resistance “has imposed itself as a key actor 
that cannot be bypassed in any discussion about Gaza’s future,” arguing 
that its steadfastness transformed it from a purely military actor into 
a national project with a vision and strategy.

Most significantly, he adds, “this war marked a shift in global 
consciousness,” citing unprecedented solidarity with Palestinians, 
massive protests, and symbolic recognitions 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/majority-of-us-citizens-support-global-recognition-of-palestine-poll> 
of the State of Palestine, all pointing to a deep shift in western 
public opinion about the occupation.

*Reconstruction as leverage: The new face of occupation*

International proposals for Gaza’s administration – whether in the form 
of a technocratic 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/trump-claims-israel-agreed-to-withdrawal-as-part-of-20-point-gaza-plan> 
government or a transitional authority – are being sold as humanitarian 
necessities. In truth, they are little more than cosmetic rebrands of 
the old control mechanisms.

In this context, Abu al-Ghazlan stresses that any such proposal “must be 
the result of an inclusive Palestinian national dialogue, not foreign 
agreements or international tutelage.” He affirms that “reconstruction 
is a human right, not a political bargaining chip,” and rejects any 
attempt to link it to disarmament or restrictions on the resistance.

*The politics of governance: Can resistance yield to technocracy?*

One of the central debates now confronting Palestinian factions is 
whether resistance authority can morph into technocratic governance – 
whether the separation of security and political decision-making is 
possible or even desirable.

Shananaa is unequivocal: “The resistance’s arms are a red line as long 
as the occupation exists.” While Hamas does not oppose a civil 
administration to manage daily life in Gaza, he insists that the 
movement will not compromise on the core of its security apparatus.

Abu al-Ghazlan, speaking from the PIJ perspective (which, unlike Hamas, 
<https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/08/10/unlike-hamas-islamic-jihad-has-no-desire-to-exercise-political-power_5993159_4.html> has 
no political agenda), affirms the same red line: “All peace processes 
that stripped the resistance of its weapons ended in more aggression and 
settlement expansion.”

What emerges is a shared formula: A civil government is possible, but 
sovereignty – particularly security sovereignty – remains non-negotiable.

The idea of a “temporary civil administration” may appear moderate, but 
in reality, it is governance without power – a managerial shell devoid 
of political agency.

This model seeks to govern Gaza, not liberate it; manage, not emancipate 
it. What Washington and Tel Aviv are trying to construct is a hollow 
Palestinian model that presents the illusion of “self-rule” under the 
ceiling of occupation.

Shananaa and Abu al-Ghazlan both emphasize that any future arrangements 
“must be based on protecting the rights of the people, not on foreign 
pressure.”

The term “national consensus” may sound appealing in rhetoric, but it 
often functions as a mask for political illusion. True consensus 
requires real sovereignty and independent Palestinian will, while 
externally imposed consensus is merely renewed tutelage in disguise.

*The survival equation: Hamas, legitimacy, and the resistance street*

While the Palestinian Authority (PA) chases lost legitimacy 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/the-pas-west-bank-crackdown-a-crisis-of-legitimacy> 
through donor channels, Hamas draws its authority from survival amid the 
rubble. The people of Gaza – though exhausted – see in Hamas not 
perfection, but defiance, a refusal to capitulate in the face of 
annihilation.

On the question of a national unity government spanning Gaza and the 
occupied West Bank, Shananaa says this proposal is not new. Hamas has 
long called for real national partnership, he says, referencing repeated 
reconciliation attempts with Fatah in Cairo, Algiers, Moscow, and 
notably Beijing <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/26068>.

However, none were implemented because of PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s 
refusal to share power or accept a balanced framework, he explains:

    “Hamas does not object to the Palestinian Authority playing a
    supervisory or financial role in reconstruction arrangements, as
    long as this is done within clear agreements that preserve the
    resistance’s arms and prevent any foreign interference in security
    decisions.”

Abu al-Ghazlan adds that trust between the PA and the resistance “cannot 
be built with words, but with positions. When the people feel that the 
political decision protects the resistance and does not constrain it, 
then we can say we have begun the path to rebuilding national trust.”

Gaza’s future appears confined to three possible scenarios, shaped by 
the power balances established by the war and the scope of international 
and regional interventions in shaping the so-called “day after 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israel-tasks-uae-with-governing-post-war-gaza-report>.”

*Scenario 1: Resistance-led governance – Hamas fills the vacuum*

This is the most likely outcome, with a probability of around 60 
percent. It rests on the principle of “imposed reality,” where Hamas 
reasserts its grip on Gaza in the vacuum left by the Israeli military’s 
withdrawal from the Yellow Line areas.

 From the first day of the ceasefire, Hamas’s National Security Forces 
redeployed in streets <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce8482418plo>, 
intersections, and liberated zones, visibly re-establishing a security 
architecture that had partially collapsed during the war.

Shananaa makes this clear when he confirms that “about 70 percent of the 
strip is under the control of Hamas-formed Palestinian security forces,” 
reflecting a field reality that cannot easily be overturned.

This scenario implies that the strip will remain under Hamas’s political 
and security administration for at least one to two years, until 
internal and external understandings mature enough to form a national 
unity technocratic government acceptable to both Palestinian and 
international actors.

This phase would amount to “transitional rule by force” – a hybrid of 
resistance authority and provisional civil administration, pending a 
wider political statement.

*Scenario 2: Pre-2005 redux – security coordination and foreign oversight*

Favored by the US and some regional powers, this scenario (estimated at 
25 percent likelihood) envisions a return to pre-2005 arrangements: 
tripartite coordination between the Israeli occupation, the PA, and a 
US-led supervisory body – possibly with Egyptian and Qatari backing.

In this framework, “internationally acceptable” Palestinian forces would 
oversee Gaza’s administration, border security, disarmament efforts, and 
aid distribution under a central international committee.

But this vision collapses under two contradictions:

First, Hamas has no intention 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/weapons-are-our-right-hamas-rejects-disarmament> 
of surrendering its political or military position 
<https://thecradle.co/articles-id/33634> after surviving the war and 
forcing a ceasefire.

Second, years of security collaboration 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/in-the-west-bank-another-gaza-genocide-unfolds> 
with the occupation have left the PA with zero public trust.

In short, this remains a western fantasy, not a viable roadmap.

*Scenario 3: Engineered chaos – a controlled descent into conflict*

The least probable scenario (15 percent), but the most dangerous, 
foresees a relapse into armed clashes among Palestinian factions – or 
between resistance groups and Israeli-backed militias 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/yasser-abu-shabab-israels-agent-of-chaos-in-gaza>, 
or the occupation army – if the ceasefire collapses or political 
negotiations falter.

This is Tel Aviv’s preferred outcome, as it ensures ongoing attrition of 
the resistance and keeps Gaza in turmoil, preventing the formation of 
any stable or unified political order.

Nonetheless, despite its risk, this scenario is unlikely in the near 
term, as regional actors – especially Egypt and Qatar – are working 
intensively to prevent a new explosion that could dismantle what remains 
of the political process.

*Tel Aviv’s political implosion: Netanyahu’s fall and the crisis of Zionism*

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wanted to etch his name into 
history as the man who crushed Hamas. Instead, he may be remembered as 
the architect of his own downfall 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israel-kill-the-king-to-preserve-the-kingdom> 
– a view echoed even within Israeli political circles, from Yair Lapid 
to Bezalel Smotrich 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/smotrich-no-longer-believes-netanyahu-can-win-decisive-victory-in-gaza> 
and Itamar Ben Gvir 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/ben-gvir-to-blow-up-netanyahus-coalition-if-hamas-continues-to-exist-after-trump-deal>.

The ceasefire agreement was, in effect, an admission of Zionist failure 
<https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2025/10/11/the-ideological-disarmament-of-religious-zionism-is-imperative_6746335_23.html>. 
The war’s goals – eliminating Hamas and freeing captives by force – 
evaporated in the face of resistance.

Even if Netanyahu goes, the Israeli security and political establishment 
will still seek control over Gaza, but without the unified narrative 
that once justified killing in the name of survival.

Shananaa says the ceasefire agreement deepened Israel’s internal crisis 
and weakened the cohesion of the far-right coalition, describing 
Netanyahu’s government as “a fascist, extremist one that has lost 
legitimacy even inside Israeli society.”

    “More than 1.5 million Israelis protested against the war, and the
    opposition grows by the day. American support is what keeps
    Netanyahu politically alive, but his fall is only a matter of time.”

The war’s aims shifted from “eliminating Hamas” to “surviving failure.” 
It was a descent from strategic vision to tactical reaction; from a 
state making history to a state struggling to survive its own present.

In the end, the question ‘Who rules Gaza after the war?’ is an 
existential one rather than an administrative one. Who holds real 
legitimacy? Who defines the future? Who decides when the war ends?

Shananaa answers clearly. “There is no authority above the resistance, 
and no reconstruction without sovereignty.”

Legitimacy is not awarded by donors or imposed through frameworks. It is 
forged under fire, seized from the rubble. And the “day after” will not 
begin with signatures, but with the dismantling of the occupation.

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