[News] Southern Syria: Where Israel redraws the Levant through water and gas

[Anti-Imperialist News]

  Southern Syria: Where Israel redraws the Levant through water and gas

Behind Israel’s military push in southern Syria lies an effort to 
command the region’s lifelines – its water and gas – and with them, its 
future influence.

Aghiad Hegazi <https://thecradle.co/authors/aghiad-hegazi>

OCT 30, 2025 
-https://thecradle.co/articles/southern-syria-where-israel-redraws-the-levant-through-water-and-gas


Photo Credit: The Cradle

Since the fall 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/the-fall-of-the-syrian-arab-republic-now-at-the-mercy-of-regional-and-global-power-plays> 
of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's government, Israeli 
incursions into Syria have expanded steadily. Tel Aviv now controls 
strategic high points, including Jabal al-Sheikh (Mount Hermon 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israeli-army-occupies-syrian-side-of-mount-hermon-facing-no-resistance>), 
which stands at 2,814 meters and overlooks Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
and occupied Palestine.

 From this vantage, Israel can monitor air activity stretching from 
Gibraltar to Syria, a capability enhanced by advanced surveillance systems.

In Quneitra Governorate, Israel has entrenched itself across nearly the 
entire area 
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20241219-israel-takes-control-of-vital-water-source-in-syria/:~:text=ويعتقد%20أن%20جيش%20الاحتلا%25D>, 
establishing multiple checkpoints and fortified positions. Its forces 
have even advanced into the Damascus countryside, reaching as far as the 
dissolved 78^th Brigade – just five kilometres from Qatna and 20 from 
central Damascus.

Israeli positions now extend to Rakhla 
<https://www.almayadeen.net/latestnews/2025/7/4/:~:text=مصادر%20سورية%20محلية%3A%20قو%D8%25A>, 
opposite the Lebanese town of Yahmar. Rakhla is a strategic point that 
rises 1,500 meters and overlooks three vital roads linking Damascus to 
Baalbek and Beirut, as well as overlooking the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, 
and is about 30 kilometers from the Masnaa crossing – the main road 
between Damascus and Beirut.

Further east, Suwayda province has effectively slipped from Damascus’s 
authority. Following Israel’s declared “protection 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israel-bombs-syrian-tanks-in-suwayda-as-druze-call-for-international-protection>” 
of the Druze community – reiterated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu and other officials – local factions have formed a 
3,000-strong “National Guard” under unified command, reportedly funded 
directly 
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/under-us-pressure-syria-israel-inch-toward-security-deal-2025-09-16/:~:text=وقال%20القائدان%20الدرزي%D8%25A> 
by Israel, according to /Reuters/.

While these territorial gains are often discussed through a security 
lens, their implications go far beyond the battlefield. Israel’s control 
over geography is increasingly intertwined with control over resources – 
particularly water 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/stealing-water-israels-covert-war-on-syria-lebanon-and-jordan> 
and gas 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israel-signs-largest-ever-gas-export-deal-with-egypt-worth-35bn> 
– two commodities that define power and survival in the Levant.

*Water and gas as instruments of power*

Tel Aviv’s recent advances have turned southern Syria into a theater 
where resource competition is reshaping regional politics. Beyond 
military encroachment, Israel’s ambition lies in dominating the Yarmouk 
Basin 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israeli-army-raids-southern-syria-amid-talks-for-humanitarian-corridor-to-suwayda> 
– an essential water reservoir feeding Syria, Jordan, and occupied 
Palestine.

Its integration into Israel’s existing water grid, stretching from the 
Galilee to the desert, would mark a significant expansion of Israeli 
hydro-hegemony.

Yet water is only part of the story. Southern Syria also sits at the 
crossroads of energy ambitions. Israel seeks to obstruct any future 
route of the long-proposed Qatari–Turkish gas pipeline that would pass 
through Syria on its way to Europe – an alternative 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/syria-inaugurates-qatari-funded-gas-pipeline-from-azerbaijan-via-turkiye> 
that could undermine Israel’s EastMed 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/the-mediterranean-arc-washingtons-new-war-front-to-box-in-china-and-turkiye> 
gas export corridor.

In this sense, southern Syria is turning into a point of contact between 
the water and gas projects, as Tel Aviv seeks to monopolize suppliers as 
geostrategic leverage that gives it the ability to remap energy and 
sovereignty in the Levant.

*The Qatari–Turkish pipeline and Israel’s counter-moves*

The Qatari–Turkish gas pipeline 
<https://thecradlearabic.com/articles-id/:~:text=%22مشروع%20أنبوب%20الغاز%20ال%D9%258> 
– originally conceived in 2009 – was meant to carry Qatari gas through 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria to Turkiye and onward to Europe. 
Damascus rejected it then, siding with Moscow’s competing interests.

But with the EU planning to end its dependence on Russian gas by 2027, 
the idea has regained traction – especially after the collapse of 
Syria’s central government.

On 9 December 2024, a day after the fall of Damascus, Turkish Energy 
Minister Alp Arslan Bayraktar publicly suggested the project could be 
revived 
<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/energy-diplomacy/turkiye-qatar-natural-gas-pipeline-could-be-revived-says-turkish-energy-minister/:~:text=قال%20وزير%20الطاقة%20والمو%25D> 
“if Syria achieves its (territorial) integrity and stability.” He added, 
“If so, this pipeline must be safe. We hope so. If so, there are many 
projects waiting to be implemented.”

Israel, though not a participant in the pipeline, is watching closely 
<https://besacenter.org/the-syrian-pipeline-game-how-turkeys-plans-affect-israels-regional-ambitions/:~:text=ومع%20ذلك،%20ثمة,غاز%20شرق%20ا%D9%25>. 
Over the past decade, it has positioned itself as an energy exporter to 
Europe, with the Leviathan and Tamar gas fields at the core of its 
strategy. Through the EastMed pipeline to Cyprus and Greece, and exports 
to Egypt for liquefaction and re-export, Israel has built an energy 
architecture designed to cement its regional role 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/the-eastern-mediterranean-quartet-big-talk-less-action>.

Analyses from Israeli think tanks, including the Begin–Sadat Center for 
Strategic Studies, warn 
<https://besacenter.org/the-syrian-pipeline-game-how-turkeys-plans-affect-israels-regional-ambitions/:~:text=الدكتور%20إيلاي%20ريتيج%20أ%25D> 
that a Qatari–Turkish pipeline would directly compete with Israel’s 
projects by offering Europe cheaper gas. Turning Turkiye into the main 
energy gateway 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/beyond-the-eastmed-pipedream-can-turkey-become-europes-gas-hub> 
would also undermine Tel Aviv’s ambition to serve as the region’s 
principal hub.

Some Israeli researchers concede that while linking Turkiye to the Arab 
Gas Pipeline through Egypt and Jordan could benefit Israeli exports, a 
revived Qatari route would severely diminish Israel’s leverage.

^Map showing the Qatari–Turkish gas pipeline route.

*Southern Syria: The new energy corridor*

Economist Amer Deeb, head of the Syrian Renaissance Council, tells /The 
Cradle/ that the renewed conflict in the south cannot be separated from 
these resource equations. Security and economy now move along the same 
axis, he says, describing the region stretching from Deraa and Suwayda 
to Quneitra and the occupied Golan as the most sensitive zone for 
energy, agriculture, and water.

Deeb points out that Israel's discovery of the Leviathan field marked a 
turning point in the status of Israel, which, since 2024, has exported 
more than 13.1 billion cubic meters of gas to Egypt 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israel-to-expand-gas-exports-to-egypt> and 
Jordan, and seeks to expand its production to become a direct competitor 
to Qatari or Iranian gas projects.

Any revival of the Qatari–Turkish line, Deeb explains, would upend 
existing energy dynamics, noting that it would shift the balance of 
influence toward Doha and Ankara and directly threaten Israeli exports.

*The battle for water supremacy*

Parallel to its energy ambitions, Israel has intensified control over 
southern Syria’s water network 
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israeli-army-bombs-damascus-outskirts-seizes-control-of-syrian-water-sources>, 
focusing on the Yarmouk River Basin and the Wahda Dam on the 
Syrian–Jordanian border. This basin sustains much of southern Syria and 
northern Jordan, providing roughly a tenth of their water needs.

This control is part of a broader plan that includes Jabal al-Sheikh, 
the Baniyas spring, and dams in Quneitra 
<https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/israel-wages-war-for-land-and-water-in-syrias-south/>, 
where Tel Aviv has expanded over the past months to smaller dams such as 
Al-Mantara (that covers about two percent of the region's irrigation), 
Ein al-Ziwan (1.5 percent), and the headwaters of the Raqqad River, 
which constitutes about eight percent of the south's water resources.

By controlling the Yarmouk River, which covers about 20 percent of the 
southern water supply, Israel is able to influence the reservoir of the 
Wahda Dam (with a capacity of 110 million square meters), on which the 
governorates of southern Syria and northern Jordan depend for about 10 
percent of their water needs.

In a recent development, Israeli forces have moved toward the Jubailiya 
Dam 
<https://www.nextcenturyfoundation.org/occupied-waters/#:~:text=Recent%20developments%20in%20Syrian%20occupied,with%20an%20already%20low%20rainfall.> 
in the western countryside of Deraa (which covers about three percent of 
local irrigation).

These shifts threaten Jordan with the loss of a strategic water resource 
and turn southern Syria into an arena of regional influence controlled 
by Israel through water, not just military power.

Speaking to /The Cradle/, political analyst Jaafar Khaddour explains:

    "Israeli control over southern Syria comes in strategic estimation,
    not only from the security aspect, but also from the social and
    energy resources aspect. Israeli policy in southern Syria has begun
    to take on a new dimension that is not limited to incursions, as the
    month of September 2025 witnessed the destruction of water lines in
    the villages of Zubaydah al-Sharqiyah in the central countryside of
    Quneitra and Al-Hamidiyah in the northern countryside of Quneitra,
    which led to the cutting off of water to the local population."

He adds that “It is a prelude to pressure the population and possibly 
their displacement later,” stressing that “settlement is based on 
substitution and abolition, that is, bringing settlers to replace the 
indigenous population, and it relies for many of its resources on water, 
especially agricultural settlements, of which water is the main artery.”

A report 
<https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/syrian-arab-republic/heat-risk> 
by Israel’s Knowledge Center for Climate Change Preparedness argued that 
future security escalations in Syria are inevitable and even 
“necessary,” citing projections that Syria’s population will grow by 60 
percent by 2050 amid severe drought. Such conditions, the report 
claimed, justify Israel’s pre-emptive control of water as a strategic 
buffer and negotiation tool.

*Water, agriculture, and demographic control*

Deeb notes that the Golan Basin alone supplies more than 30 percent of 
Israel’s agricultural water. This means any expansion into southern 
Syria ensures long-term water supremacy in an already resource-starved 
region. The fertile stretch from Quneitra to Deraa, he adds, is being 
eyed for Israeli-backed agricultural projects positioned for export to 
nearby markets in Jordan and Israel.

The area is directly linked to the Yarmouk and Golan water networks, 
which are historically some of the most important sources of water in 
the Levant, he explains, and includes fertile agricultural lands that 
have played a major role in Syrian agricultural production.

The importance of the south is no longer limited to agriculture; it has 
become geo-energy, as the area constitutes a potential land corridor for 
any gas or oil pipeline connecting the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean 
Sea or Turkiye, making its control a common goal for regional actors.

Khaddour elaborates further:

    “The strategic security origin of Israel's settlement policy gives
    Tel Aviv the upper hand to provide blackmail cards in any
    negotiations, as Jordan, for example, buys water from the Zionist
    entity, and since 1967, Israel has taken more than 80 million cubic
    meters of Syrian water, and the total amount it extracts from the
    surrounding countries is more than 1,280 million cubic meters annually.”

“All these delicate and dangerous details make the energy file a 
security and political title in the Israeli strategy, as it is not only 
about water resources as natural resources, but also as a tool for 
control and domination, especially in a dry and desert region like 
ours,” Khaddour adds.

*Resource wars and the future of the south*

Southern Syria’s conflict has evolved far beyond traditional warfare. It 
now represents a multidimensional struggle over geography, sovereignty, 
and survival. Water and gas – once natural resources – have become the 
linchpins of Israel’s regional strategy.

Amid worsening climate conditions, Israel is turning its environmental 
vulnerabilities into geopolitical assets. By controlling key basins and 
blocking rival pipelines, it is transforming scarcity into leverage. For 
Syria’s transitional authorities, the challenge is existential: to 
defend what remains of the nation’s strategic lifelines under conditions 
of economic collapse and foreign encroachment.

The outcome of this contest will determine more than the fate of 
southern Syria. It will shape the next chapter of West Asia’s balance of 
power – one defined not by frontlines, but by who controls the flow of 
water and energy across the region’s fractured map.

Beyond Syria, Israel’s strategy of resource-based leverage extends deep 
into the Persian Gulf. Through firms like IDE Technologies, Tel Aviv has 
embedded its desalination and water-recycling systems 
<https://thecradle.co/articles-id/33977> at the core of Saudi and 
Kuwaiti infrastructure, often via consortia that conceal Israeli 
participation behind European intermediaries. Israeli hydrogeology 
experts recommend <https://www.ynetnews.com/business/article/bjts9a3pkl> 
that Tel Aviv cooperate with Damascus in managing water resources after 
the fall of Assad’s government, highlighting Israel’s strategic control 
over groundwater development and agricultural projects. This approach 
could give Israel significant influence over water management in Syria, 
particularly regarding the Eastern Hermon Aquifer, which feeds the 
Baniyas and Dan Rivers and Wadi Barada – the main water source for 
Damascus. This has evolved into a regional model of influence, where 
dependence on Israeli water technology quietly advances normalization 
without diplomacy or declarations.

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