[News] Syria's Druze: Caught between old loyalties and new threats

[Anti-Imperialist News]

 Syria's Druze: Caught between old loyalties and new threats

In HTS-governed Syria, the Druze community faces an uncertain future –
caught between Salafi extremist rule, Israeli overtures, and their
historical fight for self-preservation. Whether they secure autonomy or
become geopolitical pawns, their next move will impact the region.

Musa Ozugurlu <https://thecradle.co/authors/musa-ozugurlu>

MAR 3, 2025 -
https://thecradle.co/articles/syrias-druze-caught-between-old-loyalties-and-new-threats
Photo Credit: The Cradle

The Druze neighborhood of Jaramana, near Damascus, was the first bloody
flashpoint in the latest developments concerning this Syrian minority
community. On 1 March, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led security forces and
the Druze clashed <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/29164> for the first
time, resulting in one death and nine injuries. What unfolds next will have
profound implications, especially in Suwayda and its surrounding areas,
where the Druze community is densely concentrated.

Understanding the evolving dynamic between the Druze and the new Syrian
administration is impossible without factoring in Israel's recent maneuvers
<https://thecradle.co/articles/syrian-druze-take-to-the-streets-of-suwayda-in-protest-against-israeli-turkish-occupation>
in Syria. Tel Aviv has been working to establish a legal and operational
foothold in southern Syria under the guise of supporting the Druze. This
shift in policy saw Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instruct the
Israeli military to “protect” a community that had long resisted Israeli
overtures.

*A history of resistance and hard choices *

This is not the first time Syria's Druze have faced a historical
crossroads. Nearly a century ago, the French offered them autonomy, an
attractive proposition that was ultimately rejected. Instead, they fiercely
resisted French rule between 1925 and 1927, and later played a significant
role in Syria's fight for independence in 1947 under the leadership of
Sultan Pasha al-Atrash. Now, the Druze find themselves at another pivotal
moment, but the conditions have changed dramatically.

The regime change war in Syria, which spanned nearly 14 years, culminated
in the collapse
<https://thecradle.co/articles/hts-declares-end-of-syrian-government-as-extremists-swarm-damascus>
of the government of former president Bashar al-Assad last December.
Virtually all civilian actors who shaped the early uprising have been
sidelined.

In their place, HTS, a former Al-Qaeda affiliate that few expected to reach
power, has taken control. With Idlib as its launching pad, HTS's rapid
territorial gains bear the hallmarks of Israeli involvement. Now, Israel is
deepening its influence in southern Syria, with the Druze emerging as a key
target in its broader strategic calculations.

For the Druze, history presents both a challenge and an opportunity. The
community has long grappled with tensions, not only with Salafi extremist
factions that, from the earliest days of the uprising, derided the Druze
way of life, but also with the Syrian government. From the very first days
of the war, the extremists were disparaging the community in Deraa mosques
with refrains such as, “Druze women in Suwayda are walking around in
skirts.”

While some Druze commanders, like the late Issam Zahreddin
<https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2017/10/18/Brigadier-General-Issam-Zahreddine-Commander-of-Syrian-forces-killed-in-Deir-al-Zor>e,
fought on behalf of the Syrian army in the past, younger Druze largely
opted to withdraw to their own regions rather than fight for Assad.
Recognizing this reality, Assad conceded to their demands.

*The struggle for autonomy *

Roughly 18 months before his fall, Druze in Suwayda openly rebelled against
Assad's government in Damascus, raising the banners of democracy and
freedom. But with HTS now in control, the Druze are reassessing their de
facto semi-autonomy, and are seeking full autonomy instead.

The Druze remain wary of their new Islamist overlords in Damascus. Their
deep-rooted secular values make them resist external interference,
particularly from extremist factions whose austere vision of society is
fundamentally at odds with their way of life.

The administration of President Ahmad al-Sharaa
<https://thecradle.co/articles/ahmad-al-sharaa-named-transitional-president-of-syria-constitution-dissolved>
does not reflect the diverse fabric of Syrian society, and unlike in
Assad’s era, the Druze now face outright exclusion from power. Their
security concerns have also escalated.

Past traumas, including HTS’s land seizures in Idlib
<https://npasyria.com/en/116729/> and the 2015 Qalb Loze massacre
<https://joshualandis.com/blog/the-massacre-of-druze-villagers-in-qalb-lawza-idlib-province/>
in which 30 Druze were killed by Nusra Front (precursor to HTS) militants,
have made them deeply cautious. HTS has also pressured Druze communities to
convert to Sunni Islam. Furthermore, the fate of Syria's Alawite minority,
who suffered massacres and rights violations after surrendering their arms,
serves as a grim warning.

The Druze's sole purpose today, as in history, is to protect
themselves. The community has long brandished the motto “protecting the
land and the after (honor).” In other words, they act with the dual
intention of protecting both their own geography and their people from all
kinds of threats.

*Refusing to disarm *

For these reasons, the Druze have refused to disarm or allow HTS forces to
enter their regions without constitutional guarantees. Their resistance was
evident in Jaramana, where the community openly barred HTS militants from
entering their district.

While united in their goal of self-preservation, they are not monolithic in
their approach. Speaking to *The Cradle*, Syrian journalist Sarkis
Kassargian identifies three key Druze factions:

The first is Maher Sharaf al-Din’s
<https://thecradle.co/articles/us-lawmaker-discusses-suwayda-protests-with-druze-religious-leader>
faction, which enjoys backing from certain Arab states but has lost
credibility due to its ties with the new administration.

The second is Rijal al-Karami
<https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/the-situation-in-al-suwayda-and-the-new-syria-a-rijal-al-karama-perspective>
(“Men of Dignity”), led by Leith Al-Balous, a militia that prioritizes
Druze self-defense while maintaining distance from the HTS government.

The third is the Suwayda Military Council
<https://www.newarab.com/news/what-suweida-military-council-and-why-did-it-appear-now>
(SMC), an organization of former Syrian army officers that was officially
announced in February but has been active for over two years. Led by Tariq
al-Shafi, the SMC consists of approximately 900 former officers, NCOs, and
soldiers, and its mission is to protect the Druze, curb smuggling, and
prevent extremist infiltration.

Some reports claim the SMC has received tacit approval from spiritual
leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari
<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/12/world/middleeast/syira-druse-diplomacy.html>,
the most influential Druze cleric in Syria. Later, Al-Hajari's side
announced that he would remain “equidistant” from all of the factions as
his main role was “religious and not political.” The cleric's support of
any one of these groups can bestow instant legitimacy - such is his clout
in the closed Syrian Druze community.

The second important dynamic is the faction of Maher Sharaf al-Din and his
supporters, which has the smallest number of adherents but has secured
support from some key Arab states.

Notably, Sharaf al-Din was residing in Qatar – a major supporter of the
regime change war against Syria – before being summoned back home by HTS's
Sharaa. It is, however, his good relations with the new administration that
significantly reduces his chances to lead the Druze. Like Sharaa, Sharaf
al-Din invokes talking points that emphasize the “territorial integrity” of
Syria.

Sharaf al-Din’s reception at the People's Palace by Sharaa, along with the
statements he made following the visit – and his appearances with
diplomatic representatives from certain Arab countries – indicate that he
maintains a cooperative relationship with the new government. This
alignment is further reflected in his posts <https://x.com/mahersharafeddi>
on X, which many believe have the backing of Turkiye.

*The Druze in a web of regional interests *

Kassargian points out that the US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) has shown interest in the Druze cause, and that Kurdish
representatives visited Suwayda months before the Military Council was
officially formed. While no formal alliance exists, the similarity between
the SMC's flag <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/29073> and that of the
Kurdish region suggests a degree of ideological alignment.

In these developments, Israel sees an opportunity. As Syrian journalist
Somer Sultan emphasizes to *The Cradle*, the occupation state seeks to
prevent another “Axis of Resistance” from forming among the Druze, as it
once did under Lebanese Druze revolutionary Samir Kuntar
<https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/21/middleeast/lebanese-militant-samir-kuntar-dead/index.html>,
who was assassinated by Israel in 2015.

Netanyahu’s rhetoric on southern Syria reveals Tel Aviv’s desire to
establish a pliable Druze ally. Jordan may become a key player if a
Druze-controlled border crossing in Suwayda is opened – an old demand that
Damascus has promised to consider, says Sultan.

If realized, this crossing could serve as an economic lifeline for the
Druze, bypassing the Nasib crossing in Deraa. However, Jordan’s stance
remains unclear, and Israel could exert pressure on Amman to block the
initiative.

Tariq al-Ahmet, one of the leaders of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party
(SSNP), visited Suwayda approximately 1.5 years ago after the anti-Assad
demonstrations began in Suwayda and again after Assad was overthrown.

“As political parties,” he says, "we formed a joint committee and visited
and held meetings with various places in the country. We also met with
Mazlum Abdi in Hasakah in various provinces and places such as Suwayda and
Damascus. We also visited Suwayda and met with Sheikh Hikmet al-Hajari,
Sheikh Hinnavi, and Sheikh Cerbu. In other words, these are the ‘Sheikhs of
Reason’ [in the Druze community, clerics are called ‘Sheikh al-Aql’ – which
translates to ‘Sheikhs of Reason’].”

But Ahmet draws attention to the fact that Israel attacked the Syrian army
immediately after Damascus fell and that the army was then disbanded by the
successive rulers. Despite the pontifications of HTS, he tells *The Cradle:*


“There is simply no army to protect the unity of Syria anymore."

He adds: “The Arab countries with whom we have a defense agreement,
and Turkiye, which directs this administration, do nothing, and there is no
serious activity to protect Syrian lands from Israeli aggression.”

“This situation is very dangerous,” Ahmet stresses. “The idea of some
Syrian groups establishing relations with Israel and the idea of separation
is being heavily advanced by some parties.” Today, however, the main powers
in Suwayda do not want separation and want to stay with their own country.

*Israeli calculations and the Druze factor *

According to Sultan, in addition to external calculations, the occupation
state treats the Syrian Druze differently than the Alawites in order not to
lose the support of the Palestinian Druze, who carry Israeli citizenship
and are Tel Aviv's frontline troops <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/24127>
on many of its borders.

“In the past few years, Israel has managed to weakened  the resistance
project that developed among the Druze under the command of Lebanese Druze
revolutionary Samir Kuntar with the support of Hezbollah. He was killed by
Israel along with Jihad al-Mughniye, the son of Hezbollah’s legendary
commander Imad Mughniyeh)”

A century after rejecting foreign-imposed autonomy, the Druze once again
face a historic decision. They face a situation where power is fragmented,
and alliances are fluid. While internal divisions persist, their collective
goal remains unchanged: securing their survival and autonomy.

The outcome of this struggle will shape not only the future of Syria’s
Druze but also the broader geopolitical balance in West Asia. Whether they
manage to carve out an independent path or become pawns in a larger game,
the next chapter of Druze history in Syria is being written in real-time.
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