[News] From the War of the Cities to True Promise 3: Iran's ballistic program and the path to networked deterrence

[Anti-Imperialist News]

 From the War of the Cities to True Promise 3: Iran's ballistic program and
the path to networked deterrence

The Islamic Republic’s long-range missile doctrine is not just a tale of
arsenal accumulation, but a four-decade transformation from survivalist
improvisation to operational supremacy in the face of western and Israeli
air dominance.

Abbas Al-Zein <https://thecradle.co/authors/abbas-al-zein>

JUN 28, 2025 -
https://thecradle.co/articles/from-the-war-of-the-cities-to-true-promise-3-irans-ballistic-program-and-the-path-to-networked-deterrence
Photo Credit: The Cradle

Under a regional sky long dominated by US and Israeli air and intelligence
superiority, Iran made a fateful decision decades ago. It would not attempt
to match its adversaries tank-for-tank or plane-for-plane, but would
instead build an asymmetric deterrent from scratch.

Rather than chase the mirage of classical military parity, Tehran developed
an indigenous ballistic missile arsenal that is now the largest and most
formidable in West Asia. This was no short-term, tactical gambit. Iran's
missile doctrine was forged in an existential struggle, refined over war
and siege, and ultimately transformed into a cornerstone of national
defense policy
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250115-irans-deterrence-doctrine-from-horizontal-resilience-to-vertical-strength/>
.

*The War of the Cities: Birth under siege (1980–1988)*

The first phase of Iran's missile journey began in the crucible of the
devastating Iran–Iraq War, specifically during the infamous "War of the
Cities <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000651421.pdf>." As the
Baathist government in Baghdad launched Soviet-supplied Scud-B missiles
deep into Iranian urban centers, it did so under the protective umbrella of
western intelligence and funding from Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The
intent was clear: to break Iranian civilian morale through systematic
terror from the sky.

Caught without a missile deterrent of its own, besieged diplomatically, and
encircled by western-aligned forces, Iran turned to whatever resources it
could muster. It secured limited quantities of Scud-B missiles from Libya,
Syria, and North Korea. These early acquisitions, modest as they were,
formed the embryonic core of a deterrent force placed under the direct
command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

But these were more than mere missiles. They were weapons of national
dignity in a war for survival for the nascent Islamic Republic. Iran's
leadership came to view missile capability not simply as a tactical asset,
but as a psychological and political necessity.

Military historian Pierre Razoux notes in *The Iran-Iraq War*
<https://archive.org/details/the-iran-iraq-war_202209?> (2014) that it was
during this phase that Iran’s leadership came to the unshakable conclusion:
without a retaliatory missile force, no psychological or strategic
deterrence was possible.

The Iranian response was neither ad hoc nor passive. Alongside importing
missiles, Iranian engineers began dismantling, studying, and maintaining
the systems. They built smuggling networks, circumvented embargoes, and
reverse-engineered technology.

North Korea emerged as a critical partner, acting as a conduit for Soviet
missile know-how. A 2010 RAND Corporation report
<https://military.ddns.net/Docs/Irans_Ballistic_missile_Capabilities_A_Net_assessment.pdf>
titled *Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment* noted that
Iran had become capable not only of replicating but also of redesigning and
expanding missile technology independently. Between 2000 and 2010, Iran
pivoted from mass production to innovation, prioritizing accuracy, range,
and operational readiness.

The foundations of Iran's ballistic doctrine were thus laid: sovereignty
through technological independence, and defense through deterrence.

*From imitation to innovation (1989–2009)*

With the Imposed War over, Iran's military establishment—spearheaded by the
IRGC—began restructuring its defense priorities. The goal was no longer
just to have missiles but to produce them independently and on a large
scale.

At the heart of this transformation was the late martyred Brigadier General
Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam
<https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/506203/IRGC-commemorates-martyrdom-anniversary-of-father-of-Iran-s>,
a strategic thinker and technical mastermind hailed as the ‘father of
Iran's missile program.’ He understood that deterrence was not about
launching missiles, but about mastering their lifecycle: production,
concealment, deployment, and precision.

Under his leadership, Iran transitioned from a user to a manufacturer. The
Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 were enhanced variants of the Scud-B and Scud-C. But
the real breakthrough came in 2003 with the Shahab-3
<https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shahab-3/>, boasting a range
exceeding 1,300 kilometers—a capability that placed US bases in the Persian
Gulf and occupied Palestine within striking distance. The Shahab lineage
would later give way to the Ghadr class, with better range and multiple
warhead capabilities.

The most significant leap, however, came with the adoption of solid-fuel
propulsion. The Sejjil <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/sejjil/>
missile (2,000–2,500 km range), unveiled by the end of the 2000s, was
Iran's first medium-to-long-range system not reliant on Scud technology. It
signaled a new era of technological self-sufficiency and rapid-launch
capability.

During this phase, Iran undertook sweeping strategic steps: adopting
solid-fuel for easier storage and rapid deployment, establishing
underground and mobile launch facilities to avoid detection, building
decentralized manufacturing to reduce vulnerability to strikes, and
integrating missile research into academic institutions to develop a
domestic cadre of experts.

A 2010 report
<http://military.ddns.net/Docs/Irans_Ballistic_missile_Capabilities_A_Net_assessment.pdf>
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) titled *Iran’s
Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment* noted that by this stage,
Iran had moved beyond simply replicating foreign missile systems and had
begun designing its own through local R&D and systematic redesign,
including the establishment of underground manufacturing. From 2000 to
2010, Iran’s program pivoted decisively from quantity to quality, enhancing
range, precision, and operational readiness.

When Moghaddam was killed in a suspicious explosion
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/8887322/Iran-missile-development-commander-killed-in-explosion.html>
at the "Defenders of the Sky" base in November 2011, Iran declared it a
national loss. While Israel neither confirmed nor denied responsibility,
the *Yediot Aharonot* newspaper reported that “some assessments” indicated
that the blast was “the result of a military operation based on
intelligence information.”

Nevertheless, his legacy endured. He had not merely built a weapons system;
he had established a sustainable missile doctrine rooted in adaptability
and local expertise. His death marked the end of one era, but it also
catalyzed the birth of Iran's next missile generation.

*Smart missiles and precision strikes (2010–2020)*

By the 2010s, Iran's goal had shifted from mass deterrence to precision
deterrence. Engineers focused on guidance systems using inertial navigation
paired with domestic GPS and anti-jamming technologies. The result was a
suite of short- and medium-range guided missiles with enhanced tactical
utility.

This generation included the Zolfaghar
<https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/zolfaghar/> (750 km), the highly
precise and compact Fateh-313 designed for preemptive strikes, and the
Qiam—Iran's first finless missile, engineered for stealth and
maneuverability.

Iran also entered the low-altitude cruise missile domain, developing
systems such as the Soumar (with a range of over 2,000 km) and Hoveizeh
(with a range of 1,350 km), both capable of evading conventional radar and
penetrating advanced air defenses.

These weapons were not theoretical. In June 2017, Iran launched six
medium-range missiles
<http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/18/middleeast/iran-launches-missiles-into-syria/index.html.>
from its territory targeting ISIS command centers in Deir Ezzor, Syria—its
first operational cross-border use since the 1980s.

In January 2020, in direct retaliation for the US assassination of IRGC
Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani, Iran struck the Ain al-Asad base in
Iraq with Qiam and Fateh missiles. Satellite imagery showed sub-five-meter
accuracy, hitting aircraft hangars and troop shelters. The *New York Times*
described
<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/world/middleeast/Iran-missile-attack-American-base.html>
it as one of the most accurate missile strikes on a US facility in modern
history.

This decade marked Iran's shift from "deterrent" missiles to "executive"
missiles—systems where political power was expressed through precision. It
was no longer about maximum range, but maximum effect. The missile became a
scalpel, not a hammer, paving the way for Iran's most advanced deterrent
doctrine yet.

*The rise of networked deterrence (2021–2023)*

By the 2020s, Iranian missiles were no longer stand-alone assets. They had
become the final phase of a broader, integrated offensive system. Missiles
now worked in tandem with kamikaze drones, electronic warfare units, cyber
surveillance, and decentralized command structures. This was networked
deterrence: a synchronized, multi-domain approach designed to penetrate and
paralyze advanced air defense systems.

Under this doctrine, Iran developed new missiles tailored for layered
operations. The Kheibar Shekan
<https://thecradle.co/articles/iran-debuts-multi-warhead-kheibar-shekan-3-in-latest-strikes-on-israel>
hypersonic missile (1,450 km, 500 kg warhead), most recently deployed in a
multi-warhead configuration during Operation True Promise III
<https://thecradle.co/articles/irgc-claims-total-air-dominance-over-israel>
against the occupation state, exemplifies this evolution.

Other critical systems include the Khorramshahr-4 (over 2,000 km), Raad-500
(solid-fuel, rapid launch), Zolfaghar Basir (optically guided, 1,000+ km),
and Haj Qassem (1,400 km, 500 kg warhead)—all integral to Iran’s expanding
offensive architecture.

By 2023, Iran fielded around 30 missile systems with ranges spanning 200 to
2,500 km. These systems, guided by jam-resistant platforms and launched
from mobile or underground sites, were designed to render preemptive
strikes both difficult and strategically ineffective.
Table of Iran's Missile Arsenal (fdd.org).

*From blueprint to battlefield: True Promise 3 (2024–2025)*

In June, Iran operationalized its full deterrent
<https://thecradle.co/articles/perception-vs-reality-what-the-israel-iran-war-actually-reveals>
in True Promise III, a massive retaliatory strike against the occupation
state and its US backers. Triggered by Israeli aggression and building on
limited predecessors, the operation was a turning point. It marked the
battlefield culmination of four decades of Iranian missile doctrine.

What distinguished True Promise III was not just the firepower but the
integration. Iran coordinated ballistic strikes, drone swarms, and
electronic attacks into a single operational framework. For the first time,
the world witnessed the seamless fusion of Iran's missile and drone
capabilities in a real war scenario.

The outcome upended assumptions in Washington and Tel Aviv. The missiles
that struck deep
<https://thecradle.co/articles/high-profile-israeli-military-intelligence-sites-hit-by-iranian-missiles-report>
into Israeli territory were not just instruments of reprisal. They were
shields for the program itself—offensive deterrents capable of defending
Iran's retaliatory power by disabling enemy assets before they could act.
The strike was not just a response; it was a preemption of the enemy's
preemption.

None of this can be divorced from Iran's nuclear posture. The ballistic and
nuclear programs may appear distinct, but they operate on the same
doctrinal axis. The nuclear program
<https://thecradle.co/articles/iran-vows-uninterrupted-nuclear-enrichment-after-us-israeli-war>
symbolizes sovereignty; the missile program enforces it. Together, they
dismantled the western fantasy that Israel could neutralize Iran's
deterrent capacities in a single blow.

That era is over. Iran's missile shield is no longer just a threat. It is a
reality, already in motion.
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