[News] The enemy within: Arab states that trade with Israel

[Anti-Imperialist News]

 The enemy within: Arab states that trade with Israel

West Asian exports to Israel have skyrocketed since 2020. These are the
Arab and Muslim governments that put goods on Israeli shelves, despite
their public stances supporting Gaza.

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan <https://thecradle.co/authors/mohamad-hasan-sweidan>
-
https://thecradle.co/articles/the-enemy-within-arab-states-that-trade-with-israel

JAN 31, 2024
Photo Credit: The Cradle

Israeli import data reveals that a number of Arab countries play a
significant role in buoying the occupation state’s trade volume, despite
attempts by other regional nations to weaken Israel's economy.

Since this decade's onset, Israeli ports have been teeming with the arrival
of goods from across the region. Each shipment not only boosts the
occupation state's economy, but also weaves a narrative that goes beyond
trade statistics as these economic interactions carry a hidden stream of
political significance.

Although not an Arab country, Turkiye was the first Muslim state to
establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, and today leads the pack of
West Asian states boosting Israeli imports. In 2020 alone, the value of
Turkish exports spiked to $5.7 billion, constituting 6.2 percent
<https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/imports/turkey> of total Israeli
imports that year.

Iron and steel ($1.06 billion), plastics ($464.67 million), electrical and
electronic equipment ($346.83  million), vehicles ($331.48  million),
machinery ($298.89 million), metals ($261.66 million),  and building
materials ($188.39 million) form the cornerstone of Turkish exports to the
Zionist entity.

In second place is the UAE, which normalized ties with Tel Aviv as part of
the US-brokered Abraham Accords in 2020, and was the first Arab state to
sign a free-trade agreement <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/3856> (2022)
with Israel as part of a plan to boost mutual trade to $10 billion
annually. The Persian Gulf state’s exports were valued at $1.89 billion i
<https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/imports/united-arab-emirates>n 2022,
accounting for 2.1 percent of all Israeli imports.

Particularly intriguing is the 1543 percent surge in the value of Emirati
exports to Israel since the normalization agreement. Noteworthy export
categories include precious metals and stones ($525.32 million), iron and
steel ($483.95 million), electrical and electronic equipment ($210.71
million), and oil ($94.55 million).

*Business as usual *

Taking third place is Jordan, whose exports to Israel in 2022 reached
$469.25 million, a massive 489 percent increase
<https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/imports/jordan> from 2018. Key export
categories from the Hashemite Kingdom include plastics ($135.2 million),
electrical and electronic equipment ($127.93 million), and iron and steel
($74.35 million).

As for Egypt, the first Arab state to make peace with and recognize Israel,
its 2022 exports to the occupation state amounted to $179.31 million
<https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/imports/egypt>. Notable export
categories include inorganic chemicals, precious metals compounds ($61.15
million), building materials ($14.26 million), foodstuffs ($12.78 million),
and plastics ($11.32 million).

Surprisingly, in fifth place is Algeria, with Israel-bound exports
reaching $21.38
million <https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/imports/algeria> in 2022, the
majority of which are inorganic chemicals, precious metals compounds, and
isotopes. The revelation of trade relations between Algeria and Israel by
the UN database raises questions about Algeria's long-held stance against
normalization, including its criminalization
<https://thecradle.co/articles/algerian-lawmakers-submit-bill-to-criminalize-normalization-with-israel>
two years ago.

Morocco stands in sixth place, with exports to Israel amounting to $17.92
million <https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/imports/morocco> in 2022,
predominantly composed of foodstuffs. Rabat resumed diplomatic and trade
relations with Israel as part of the 2020 accords.

Finally, Bahrain's exports to Israel in 2022 reached $10.58 million,
reflecting an astounding 12,083 percent increase
<https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/imports/bahrain> from 2020, the year
of the normalization agreement between Manama and Tel Aviv. Key exports
include aluminum ($8.78 million) and iron and steel ($2.62 million).

As such, the combined exports of West Asian countries to Israel surged by
$4,359.530,000 between 2020 and 2022, marking an increase of almost 111
percent.

*Israeli Energy Imports*

Israel depends heavily on oil and natural gas for its power generation,
with these sources constituting 80 percent of its total energy supply. It
is a net exporter of natural gas, having sent 9.4 billion cubic meters
abroad in 2022, with 6.5 billion cubic meters going to Egypt and 2.9
billion cubic meters
<https://www.europeangashub.com/the-geopolitical-ripple-effect-of-israels-natural-gas-exports.html#:~:text=In%202022%20alone%2C%20according%20to,the%20global%20LNG%20market%20strain.>
to Jordan.

In contrast, Israel imports all its oil supply, and consumes approximately
220 thousand barrels per day. Of this, 62 percent comes from two
Muslim-majority countries, namely Kazakhstan (93 thousand barrels) and
Azerbaijan (45 thousand barrels). The remainder is sourced from West
African countries, including Gabon, Nigeria, and Angola, in addition to
Brazil, and an undisclosed amount is transported illegally from Iraqi
Kurdistan <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/20650>.

To facilitate the import of most of Israel's oil, the Turkish port of
Ceyhan in southeastern Turkiye plays a crucial role. It serves as a loading
point for oil tankers carrying crude from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan through
the Caspian Sea via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Tankers also
transport oil from Iraqi Kurdistan along the eastern Mediterranean Sea to
the ports of Haifa and Ashkelon.

Oil tankers arrive in the occupied state via two main seaports: the
aforementioned Ashkelon, equipped with 22 tanks holding 11 million barrels,
and Eilat in the south, with 16 large oil tanks capable of holding about
1.4 million cubic meters of oil. The latter has seen an 85 percent fall in
activity amid increased naval operations
<https://thecradle.co/articles-id/14235> executed by Yemen’s
Ansarallah-aligned forces in the Red Sea against vessels bound for Israel.

Approximately 180,000 barrels per day reach Ashkelon, from where internal
pipelines transport the oil to the ports of Ashdod and Haifa. Both ports
have oil refineries with capacities of 100,000 and 197,000 barrels per day,
respectively. Additionally, a pipeline connects Ashkelon and Eilat,
traversing the Negev desert with a capacity of 1.2 million barrels per day.

Despite the growing tensions and sharp rhetoric by some regional states
toward Israel since its military assault on the Gaza Strip commenced, trade
activity remains largely uninterrupted. Turkiye, despite calling Israel a
“terrorist” state, contributes heavily to Israel's economic well-being by
helping Tel Aviv circumvent the Yemeni blockade, increasing its overall
exports to Israel, and playing a pivotal role in oil transportation.

Despite the war on Gaza, Turkish exports grew
<https://thecradle.co/articles/turkiye-israel-trade-soared-in-2023> from 319.5
million dollars in November 2023 to 430.6 million dollars in December —
higher even than the 408.3 million dollars exported in July, prior to the 7
October Al-Aqsa Flood operation.

Exports to Israel from the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco are hardly
surprising: these are the Arab states most vested in championing regional
policies that serve the interests of the occupation state. The more
surprising connection, however, is the trade relations — however minimal —
between Algeria and Israel.

To understand the true positions of states means to skip over the official
rhetoric and examine the economic ties that politics often conceals.
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