[News] Five myths about the Venezuelan elections
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Wed Aug 7 13:04:16 EDT 2024
Five myths about the Venezuelan elections
* Tim Anderson
<https://english.almayadeen.net/authors/1491380/tim-anderson>
* Source: Al Mayadeen English
* August 7, 2024
-https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/analysis/five-myths-about-the-venezuelan-elections
64d147ce-4765-49ec-aeb4-4bb0717c18b2.jpg
Here is the lesson for future Venezuelan politicians: Will they join
national institutionality or simply become the latest creatures of
comprador coup culture?
In the global culture wars, there persists a notion that independent
countries must somehow gain approval from large, predatory military or
financial powers. This of course misses the point that the right to
self-determination of peoples and the independence of nations
presupposes separation from and resistance to those same imperial powers.
Ever since the phenomenon of Hugo Chavez in the late 1990s dispensed
with the moribund two-party system in Venezuela, the great hegemonic
power to the north has struggled to recognise even one of Chavismo’s
many electoral victories. Venezuela had long been a source of oil for
the US war machine
<https://academic.oup.com/jah/article/99/1/24/854919?login=false> and
those old certainties were gone.
It is in this important context that we should consider the polemics
over the 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections, and the rejectionist
logic of the US government and its proxies. Several western myths have
been articulated by Washington and then copied by states wishing to
ingratiate themselves with the US regime.
In this article, I consider the myths of Washington as an honest broker,
the notion of a Venezuelan ‘dictatorship’ which controls everything,
including the electoral system, the use of partisan polls, the
disqualification of political opponents, and the claim that Chavismo
ruined the country’s economy.
c9f0e3d0-f728-462a-b6f1-bd757484b11f.jpg
1. Washington as an honest broker?
The first myth is the idea that Washington is somehow an authoritative
arbiter of “democracy and human rights” in other nations. The experience
of Latin America has dozens of examples of anti-democratic interference
to suit the interests of the great northern neighbour. In 1889, Cuban
nationalist Jose Martí observed
<https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-dirty-war-on-syria-and-the-globalization-of-war-special-offer/5560516>
the cynical false pretexts mobilized to intervene, steal victory from
Cuban freedom fighters, create a Spanish-American war, and seize Spanish
territories in the Caribbean, “They want to provoke a war to have a
pretext to intervene and, with the authority of being mediator and
guarantor, to seize the country … There is no more cowardly thing in the
annals of free people; nor such cold blooded evil”. Since then, there
have been dozens of US interventions
<https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/united-states-interventions/>,
mainly to seize resources or change nationalist governments not fully in
accord with US regional interests.
Washington has intervened in Venezuela
<https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14263/> many times since the 1998
Bolivarian Revolution, which aimed to restore sovereign control over oil
resources. Washington backed the 2002 coup attempt.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/27734144> which kidnapped elected
President Hugo Chavez, and then ran another failed coup attempt in 2020
<https://apnews.com/article/miami-us-news-ap-top-news-venezuela-south-america-79346b4e428676424c0e5669c80fc310>.
As part of their hybrid wars, successive US regimes imposed unilateral
coercive measures (“sanctions”) in attempts to damage the economy,
collapse Venezuelan society, and seize the country and its resources.
Notable aggressions were Obama’s declaration of Venezuela
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/3/10/obama-declares-venezuela-a-national-security-threat>
as a “security threat” to the US and Trump’s imposition of multiple
“sanctions” <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10715>,
which he said were expected to collapse the nation
<https://twitter.com/african_stream/status/1818690351831347516>, paving
the way for the US to seize its oil. The Biden regime carried on the
Obama-Trump legacy.
This brief history is enough to demonstrate why Washington can never be
considered an independent arbiter or mediator; its every move against
Venezuela is tainted with bad faith and criminal self-interest.
Washington has been unable to reconcile itself with strongly nationalist
regimes which reject its hegemonic claims; the chagrin is so much
greater over nationalist regimes which had been a key energy source. In
this respect we should compare the CIA’s 1954 coup in Iran
<https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days>
(after oil nationalization) with the CIA-backed attempted coup in
Venezuela
<https://peoplesworld.org/article/venezuela-2002-the-coup-heard-around-the-world/>
in 2002 (during partial oil renationalization).
Washington cannot be an honest broker as regards Venezuela.
2. Doesn’t a Maduro 'dictatorship' control the electoral system?
A common mythical theme in Western reports is that Venezuela under
Presidents Chavez and Maduro has been a “dictatorship” which also
controls the electoral system. In fact, the 1999 constitution and the
subsequent electoral law
<https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Venezuela/LOPE2009.pdf> (updated
in 2009) established Electoral Power as a separate arm within the state,
distinct from the Executive. Members of the National Electoral
Commission
<https://orinocotribune.com/venezuelan-national-electoral-council-cne-its-origins-and-contemporary-importance/>
(CNE) are appointed by the National Assembly or the Supreme Court (TSJ).
On top of that, the mechanized voting system is a unique Venezuelan
invention which builds in security and audits. This system was praised
<https://www.commentary.org/ben-cohen/jimmy-carter-gives-seal-of-approval-to-venezuela-election/>
by former US President Jimmy Carter back in 2013, “Venezuela probably
has the most excellent voting system that I have ever known.”
During the 2024 elections, the Carter Centre, minus its founder,
reverted to the standard Washington line, as run by US Secretary of
State Anthony Blinken,
<https://www.state.gov/assessing-the-results-of-venezuelas-presidential-election/>
the CNE results could not be credible because they had not published
(within the first few days) the full disaggregated voting results. This
became the mantra of ‘fraud’ claims.
While recognising the strong (60%) participation, Blinken said, “The
CNE’s rapid declaration … came with no supporting evidence. The CNE has
still not published disaggregated data or any of the vote tally sheets”.
The Carter Centre similarly argued
<https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-073024.html>, “the
authority’s failure to announce disaggregated results by polling station
constitutes a serious breach of electoral principles”.
In fact, the process was quite normal, and well ahead of US election
standards. The CNE issued its initial result for Maduro (51.2% after 80%
of votes counted
<https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/29/nicolas-maduro-claims-victory-in-venezuela-s-presidential-election_6703817_4.html>)
and a second report on August 2
<https://www.diario.red/articulo/america-latina/cne-publica-segundo-recuento-9687-dando-victoria-maduro-5195-votos-frente-4318-edmundo-gonzalez/20240802210629033583.html>,
after 96.87% had been counted. That second report gave Maduro 51.95%
(6.4 million votes) and 43.18 % (5.3 million) for González. The results
came despite “massive informatic attacks” on the CNE infrastructure and
“terrorist” attacks on and the burning of CNE offices and centres of voting.
Contrary to Blinken and the Carter Centre, under the Organic Law of
Electoral Processes
<https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Electoral/Venezuela/LOPE2009.pdf> (2009)
the CNE has to publish full results “within 30 days”. So for the Carter
Centre to demand these results on 30 July, i.e. within 48 hours, and to
claim non-publication had “violated numerous provisions” of the law, was
disingenuous. A week after the election the data and the disputes were
referred
<https://www.telesurenglish.net/venezuelas-supreme-court-requests-the-cne-to-deposit-documents-of-presidential-elections/>
to Venezuela’s Supreme Court (TSJ).
By contrast, the USA has no national electoral body and its final
results <https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-54096399> usually
take more than two months to finalise. Yet, like Venezuela, the winner
is announced by election officials and media outlets when one candidate
is believed to have an “unbeatable lead”. Unlike in Venezuela, in the
USA there is no direct election of the President, as the final vote
falls to the states under an Electoral College system. There are five
examples of US Presidents
<https://www.history.com/news/presidents-electoral-college-popular-vote>
(Adams, Hayes, Harrison, G. W. Bush, and Trump) who did not win the
popular vote but won the election.
3. Didn’t independent polls predict the defeat of Maduro?
The media warfare before and during
<https://orinocotribune.com/chavistas-warn-about-escalation-of-media-warfare-against-venezuelas-elections-machado/>
the elections was intense. US media was in open campaigning mode, with
the /New York Times/ running headlines like
<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/19/opinion/venezuela-elections-maduro.html>:
"This Is Venezuela’s Moment. It Needs the World’s Help”. /CNN/, for its
part, falsely claimed that Maduro threatened a "bloodbath" if he did not
win; in fact he was referring to planned opposition tactics and their
long history of violence and non-compliance. In fact, Maduro predicted
the opposition organised violence the day after the poll. There had been
25 years
<https://redaccionrosario.com/2024/08/05/venezuela-25-anos-de-violencia-golpista/>
of such “golpista” (coup-oriented) violence.
Maduro denounced media misinformation
<https://www.telesurtv.net/presidente-nicolas-maduro-denuncia-censura-de-medios-de-comunicacion-sobre-la-verdad-de-venezuela/?noamp=available>,
saying he was trying to prevent a war and that the US-backed opposition
wanted to convert the country into a neoliberal disaster like Argentina
under Milei. Nevertheless, /CNN/ argued that the election
<https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/23/americas/analysis-venezuela-election-maduro-intl-latam/index.html>
was "a chance to rebuild Venezuela's economic power", while /The
Financial Times/ claimed
<https://www.ft.com/content/6d83211a-b537-40f2-8c25-a03aec290ad3> polls
show a "crushing defeat" was coming for Maduro, if there were a “clean
vote”.
The polls were weaponised. In the lead-up to the elections, several
US-commissioned polls (Datanálisis, Delphos, Consultores 21 y ORC
Consultores) conditioned a narrative that the opposition candidate
Edmundo Gonzalez
<https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240721-guerra-de-encuestas-tensi%C3%B3n-e-incertidumbre-marcan-el-ambiente-electoral-en-venezuela>
– a former CIA operative who helped form the notorious death squads
<https://en.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/noticias/politica/revelan-pasado-sanguinario-de-edmundo-gonzalez/>
in Central America in the 1980s but who was barely known in Venezuela
<https://www.as-coa.org/articles/poll-tracker-venezuelas-2024-presidential-election>
until quite recently – was 20 or 30 points ahead
<https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/elecciones-venezuela-2024/asi-van-las-encuestas-presidenciales-en-venezuela-2024-gonzalez-lleva-ventaja/>
in public opinionو and therefore Nicolas Maduro could only win by fraud.
The /LA Times/ claimed polls were predicting
<https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/opinion-venezuelas-president-nicol%C3%A1s-maduro-could-lose-a-landslide-election-but-will-it-matter/ar-BB1qpkgE>
a landslide for Gonzalez. It said that, for Maduro to win, "given his
opponent’s 25- to 30-point lead in the polls, would require massive
fraud". Poll tracker, also citing Dataincorp, Meganálisis and ORC
Consultores
<https://www.as-coa.org/articles/poll-tracker-venezuelas-2024-presidential-election>
gave Gonzalez a huge lead of 50-70% over Maduro's 12-18%.
Western reports studiously avoided polls by Hinterlaces, Paramétrica and
Ámbito, which predicted
<https://www.telesurtv.net/encuestas-ubican-a-nicolas-maduro-como-ganador-de-elecciones-en-venezuela/>
pretty much what the CNE would announce in the early hours of July 29.
Ámbito in July had Maduro winning with between 51.74% and 71.6% of the
vote, with Gonzalez securing between 20.5 and 24%. Paramétrica had
Maduro on 51.74% and Gonzalez on 29.06%. On participation, 68% said they
would turn out to vote, with their minds focused on the economy.
Hinterlaces in June had President Maduro leading
<https://orinocotribune.com/hinterlaces-poll-president-maduro-leads-voter-preference-with-55-6-support-while-far-rights-edmundo-gonzalez-gets-22-1/>
with 55.6% support, with the far right’s Edmundo González on 22.1%.
There was even a “war of exit polls”
<https://es-us.noticias.yahoo.com/deportes/elecciones-venezuela-guerra-sondeos-boca-221808334.html>,
with Hinterlaces giving Maduro 54.6% and Gonzalez 42.5% at 12 midday,
while the US-oriented Meganálisis gave Gonzalez 65.8% at 3 pm. The
United States and opposition also cited a 3 pm exit poll which supported
their claimed victory, conducted by Edison Research
<https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/exit-poll-used-by-venezuela-opposition-sourced-from-us-gov-l>,
a company linked to the CIA. None of this was conclusive.
The US government has notoriously funded media and poll bodies to suit
its ends. For example, the International Republican Institute (IRI) used
‘snowball polls’ in 2012 to suggest internal Syrian support for armed
intervention
<https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/201220August201720IRI20Syria20Index2C20June201-July2022C202012.pdf>
during the attempted ‘color revolution’ in Syria. Such deeply biased
‘polls’, which start with friends and move to friends of friends, have
no representative validity at all. It is likely that similar techniques
were used in Venezuela to inflate expectations of victory and then
claims of fraud when the US-backed candidate did not win.
One crack in this media war was shown in an interview on MSN
<https://www.msn.com/es-us/noticias/other/maduro-podría-ganar-esta-elección-sin-fraude-electoral-dice-experta/vi-BB1qwc36>,
where conservative lawyer and international consultant Eglée
González-Lobato acknowledged that Maduro could win “without electoral
fraud”. “Venezuela's electoral system is quite robust, leaving enough
traces for automation experts to detect any errors”, she said.
All candidates except Gonzalez signed a statement
<https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/venezuela-candidates-sign-agreement-to-accept-electoral-results-us-backed-opposition-abstains/>
saying they would accept the CNE’s result. The ‘Unified Platform’, it
seems, was determined to not recognise
<https://www.globovision.com/nacional/24589/plataforma-unitaria-cantara-fraude-no-reconocera-resultados-del-cne-sino-sus-propias-actas>
any results announced by the CNE. They expected defeat and were crying
“fraud” well before
<https://www.globovision.com/nacional/24589/plataforma-unitaria-cantara-fraude-no-reconocera-resultados-del-cne-sino-sus-propias-actas>
the election.
This writer was one of more than one thousand international guests,
called to observe the elections. Most reported favourably on the general
climate in the lead-up to and during the elections, and on the integrity
of the voting process itself. The Venezuelan government did not allow in
as observers
<https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-election-european-union-electoral-observers-maduro-5e05e255f0b67bf9f476aa7a1b889016>
those who had attacked the country, such as an EU delegation which had
backed illegal US economic siege measures against the country.
Nevertheless, Washington and the /BBC /reported that anonymous
“international observers” had condemned the election. This was highly
misleading. Consider these favourable and ‘free and fair’ reports from
Chilean observers
<https://www.lacacerola.cl/2024/08/05/hubo-fraude-en-las-elecciones-presidenciales-en-venezuela/>
and South African observers
<https://www.citizen.co.za/news/news-world/south-african-observers-venezuela-elections-fair/>.
4. Doesn’t Maduro bar his opponents from running for election?
US sources often cite the disqualification of some Venezuelan candidates
as an example of the “dictatorship”. In fact, disqualifications are done
by law and not by executive order. In the past, some far-right
opposition figures have been disqualified for serious crimes. Leopoldo
López
<https://theconversation.com/who-is-leopoldo-lopez-the-newly-freed-opposition-leader-behind-venezuelas-uprising-116336>,
for example, was convicted and in 2014 sentenced to a long prison term
for public incitement, criminal conspiracy, and instigating arson and
criminal damage. The US media presented him as a freedom fighter. López
was released from jail early in 2017.
In the case of Maria Corina Macahado
<https://orinocotribune.com/maria-corina-machado-and-the-betrayal-of-venezuela/>,
the opposition leader who could not run in 2024, the reported reasons
for her disqualification included decisions of the Supreme Court that:
* She supported US unilateral sanctions
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/27/venezuela-court-disqualifies-leading-opposition-presidential-candidate>,
had been involved in corruption, and helped cause losses of
Venezuela’s foreign assets, including the United States-based oil
refiner Citgo and chemicals company Monomeros (in Colombia);
* She was involved
<https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/27/venezuela-s-supreme-court-disqualifies-opposition-leader-from-running-for-president_6469941_4.html>
in “the corruption plot orchestrated by the usurper Juan Guaido",
which led to a "criminal blockade of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, as well as the shameless dispossession of the companies
and wealth of the Venezuelan people abroad, with the complicity of
corrupt governments";
* She had been an appointed Panamanian diplomat
<https://x.com/LuisaKnuckles/status/1819503532028187139>, which is
prohibited under articles 149 and 191 of the constitution,
In many other countries, she would be serving a very long prison
sentence, not just facing disqualification from public office. For
example, US Code § 2381 says
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2381> that “Whoever, owing
allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to
their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or
elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be
imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not
less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under
the United States.”
5. Didn’t Chavismo ruin the country’s economy?
It is true that, after the death of Chavez in 2003, many of the
tremendous social gains <https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/8133/>
such as the reduction of poverty and extreme poverty were compromised,
but that was mainly due to the economic warfare carried out against
Venezuela by the Obama and Trump regimes.
In 2015, Obama declared Venezuela a threat to US security
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/3/10/obama-declares-venezuela-a-national-security-threat#:~:text=Washington%20slaps%20seven%20officials%20with,calling%20Caracas%20a%20security%20threat.&text=US%20President%20Barack%20Obama%20has,placed%20sanctions%20on%20seven%20officials.>,
imposing a series of coercive measures on the country. To this, Trump
added another 200 measures
<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10715>, intended to
bring Venezuela to its knees. The artificial proclamation of unelected
Juan Guaido as “President” added a device by which the Trump
administration could steal
<https://www.reuters.com/article/venezuela-politics-citgo-idUKL1N1ZS16U/>
billions of dollars in Venezuelan foreign assets, including gold
reserves held by the Bank of England and the entire Citgo petroleum
business in the USA.
In 2021, UN rapporteur Alena Douhan reported on the drastic social
impact <https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/15323/> of Washington’s
unilateral coercive measures (illegal under international law). Those
wide-reaching “sanctions” against Venezuela had a “devastating” effect
on the entire population’s living conditions.
Damage to the economy was worst in 2019-2020, when Venezuelan oil export
earnings (and therefore state capacity for social spending) fell to 1%
of those in 2012. Salaries fell to very low levels with inflation and
devaluation of the currency. However, by 2021, oil exports resumed and
inflation fell
<https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/37958eeb-086e-4771-a381-631ab55be76e/content>
to very low levels, according to CEPAL. In 2022, Iran also helped
restart <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/3932> some damaged refineries.
Oil exports continued to grow through 2023 and 2024
<https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/venezuela-exporto-276-millones-barriles-petroleo-enero-febrero-2024/>.
With this growth and better management, the currency stabilized and
social investment remained very high
<http://www.psuv.org.ve/temas/noticias/venezuela-se-recupera-esfuerzo-propio-y-reencuentro-empresarial/>,
as much as 77% of the budget in 2024.
By late 2023, President Maduro said there had been some important
achievements, and renewed prosperity was on course for 2024. This
prosperity would be underwritten
<http://www.psuv.org.ve/portada/presidente-maduro-exalta-ocho-logros-alcanzados-2023-y-augura-un-2024-prosperidad/>
by economic growth, social cohesion and popular participation. Community
level education and health programs could advance. Better relations with
neighbouring Colombia helped stabilize security, alongside support from
other Latin American nations.
By 2024, Maduro drove the public housing program into the construction
of more than 5 million new homes, social security was personalised into
a Homeland card (Carnet de la Patria), which is exercised through a
phone app and guarantees food, fuel and other subsidised goods and
services. The opposition and US media called this card an “utterly evil”
instrument of repression
<https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2018/11/15/reuters-confirms-the-carnet-de-la-patria-is-utterly-evil/>,
supposedly because of its surveillance potential; but that claim
confirmed their intention to dismantle this foundation of social security.
Online sources
<https://misionverdad.com/venezuela/memoria-y-cuenta-logros-y-metas-alcanzadas-en-2023>
and electoral pamphlets reminded citizens that, by investment of
increased oil exports, the government had stabilized the currency,
increased food production, supported the social missions e.g. providing
100 million free health consultations, removing illiteracy and
stimulating community projects and diverse small business.
By January 2024 a Hinterlaces poll showed
<https://www.eluniversal.com/venezuela/172783/el-82-de-los-venezolanos-considera-que-le-ira-mejor-en-este-2024-segun-hinterlaces>
that 82% of Venezuelans saw things as getting better in 2024. That
certainly improved Maduro’s prospects of re-election. On the other side,
the opposition mostly relied on
<https://venezuelanalysis.com/columns/the-same-old-path-and-the-dangerous-one/>
slogans of ‘freedom’ and anti-Chavismo, masking the typical liberal
plans to sell off the country’s assets and dismantle social security.
The US backed opposition dared not present publicly a plan that promised
alarming “structural adjustments."
National Institutionality or Coup Culture?
On 2 August (5 days after the election) President Maduro referred the
opposition claims against the CNE – plus complaints over hacking attacks
on the CNE - to the Supreme Court (TSJ) under a "writ of amparo". The
TSJ in turn called on all candidates
<https://www.telesurenglish.net/venezuelas-supreme-court-requests-the-cne-to-deposit-documents-of-presidential-elections/>
to present their complaints and data. 9 out of 10 did so, except Edmundo
Gonzalez.
Notwithstanding Washington’s latest fraudulent attempt to declare
Gonzalez
<https://www.state.gov/assessing-the-results-of-venezuelas-presidential-election/>
as “elected president”, Maduro’s re-election internally seems quite
secure, with the CNE, the National Assembly, and the military,
announcing their full support, alongside mass rallies in support of
their institutions and their democracy. Contrary to western media,
pro-government rallies have been consistently bigger than those of the
US backed opposition.
US external pressures will continue and aggravate the ongoing split in
opposition strategies, of either (1) participating in national
institutions or (2) abandoning that for refuge in North American backed
coups.
Former opposition leaders Manuel Rosales and Henrique Capriles, both
linked to the 2002 coup attempt and prosecuted for economic crimes, at
different times, nevertheless resumed their engagement in the political
process. Both failed in presidential campaigns but both also enjoyed
successive terms as governors of the states of Zulia and Miranda,
respectively.
On the other side, we see failed fake, unelected “president” Juan Guaido
sitting in Miami, the refuge of many extremist Latin leaders. It seems
that Maria Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez, if they are not arrested
and jailed, will join Juan Guaido as cast off agents of coups, on behalf
of their masters in Washington. Therein lies a lesson for future
Venezuelan politicians: Will they join national institutionality or
simply become the latest creatures of comprador coup culture?
The opinions mentioned in this article do not necessarily reflect the
opinion of Al mayadeen, but rather express the opinion of its writer
exclusively.
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