[News] The real reason Israel is assassinating Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, and why it won’t stop the resistance

[Anti-Imperialist News]

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The real reason Israel is assassinating Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, and
why it won’t stop the resistance
Abdaljawad Omar
July 31, 2024
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[image: 310724_Iran_IPO_003-1024x682.jpg]

On the night of July 30, Israel escalated its military operations,
targeting its adversaries across multiple fronts, including Lebanon, Iran,
and Palestine. The Israeli government claimed a significant success with
the assassination of a Hezbollah commander in the densely populated
neighborhood of southern Beirut. Simultaneously, Israel launched a bold
strike in the heart of Tehran, killing Ismail Haniyeh, the current
politburo chief of Hamas.

After ten months of slowly but steadily losing the escalation dominance it
had maintained for decades, Israel is now attempting to reclaim the
initiative and reestablish the upper hand by targeting both Beirut and
Tehran in under 24 hours.

Israel’s actions are not merely about projecting strength; they are also
designed to increase pressure on the axis of resistance. The strategic
objective here is to fracture the unity of this coalition by leveraging its
military capabilities to flirt with the prospect of an all-out war — an
outcome that neither Israel nor Hezbollah, and by extension Iran, truly
desire. This calculated brinkmanship aims to unsettle the adversaries,
forcing them to reconsider their unified stance and possibly leading to
concessions in Israel’s favor.

Israel is banking on the notion that fear of further escalation will push
Hezbollah and Iran to exert pressure on Hamas to meet some of Israel’s
demands during ceasefire negotiations. Additionally, Israel anticipates
that any real escalation — particularly one provoked by its targeted
actions — would compel the United States and its allies to offer military
and diplomatic support. While Washington may not actively seek a major
conflict, Israel is confident that the U.S. will not hesitate to come to
its aid if the situation escalates. In other words, Israel is pursuing a
policy of entanglement and in doing so is taking calculated risks, knowing
that if things go awry, the American military will rush to its defense in
another war in the Middle East.

For some time now, Israel has been gauging the reactions of its
adversaries, particularly noting the subdued Palestinian response to its
proclamations that it had successfully assassinated
<https://mondoweiss.net/2024/07/testimonies-from-the-mawasi-massacre-90-people-buried-in-the-sand/>
Hamas’s military commander in Gaza, Muhammad al-Deif. This observation has
led Israeli strategic planners to conclude that while a diplomatic deal
remains a priority, such targeted assassinations are unlikely to derail
these efforts.

Additionally, Israel’s calculations suggest that although Hezbollah and
Iran might view incursions into Beirut or Tehran as significant escalations
requiring a response, both actors are likely to avoid triggering an all-out
conflict that could lead to open warfare. This belief underscores Israel’s
confidence in its ability to carry out targeted actions without provoking a
broader regional conflict.

These maneuvers would likely have taken place regardless of the incident in
Majdal Shams
<https://mondoweiss.net/2024/07/who-are-the-syrian-druze-of-majdal-shams/>.
The current operations and series of escalations are occurring at a moment
when Israel stands to benefit strategically, even if it ultimately signs an
agreement. By accumulating tactical successes, Israel aims to reassert its
escalation dominance in its ongoing conflicts with adversaries. This
approach reflects a calculated effort to strengthen its negotiating
position while ensuring it maintains a decisive upper hand in any potential
confrontation. It also seeks to showcase its resilience and will to fight
even though the war has dragged on for months on end, with signs of
fractures within Israeli society and the loss of trust in the military.
This has most recently culminated in mutinous and insurrectionary riots
outside the notorious prison of Sde Teiman protesting the detainment of
nine Israeli soldiers accused of gang-raping a Palestinian prisoner.
*Israel’s history and policy of assassinating Palestinian leaders*

The notion of assassination is deeply embedded in the history of the Arab
region, with the term itself originating from the region. During the 11th
to 13th centuries, amid the turmoil of the Crusades, the Nizari Ismailis —
commonly known as the “Hashashin” — employed assassination as a strategic
tool to eliminate leaders who opposed their cause. Yet, the significance of
assassination in the region extends far beyond mere etymology. This region,
long subjected to colonial encroachment and artificially induced disunity,
has become a theater where the conventional rules of war can be suspended.
In this context, political actors who do not align with Western hegemonic
interests are often rendered exceptions, making their leaders legitimate
targets in ways that violate rules and norms upheld elsewhere.

Israel has refined the practice of targeted assassinations, often coupled
with the arrest of key leaders, to eliminate influential political and
military figures. This strategy is not merely about neutralizing immediate
threats; it is also about shaping the composition and character of the
resistance it faces in the region.

In the past century, Israel has refined the practice of targeted
assassinations, often coupled with the arrest of key leaders, to eliminate
influential political and military figures. This strategy is not merely
about neutralizing immediate threats; it is also about shaping the
composition and character of the resistance it faces in the region. Through
these lethal interventions, Israel seeks to cultivate a leadership class
within Palestine and the broader Arab world that aligns more closely U.S.
and Israeli interests, thereby manipulating the dynamics of resistance
against its policies of land appropriation, ethnic cleansing, and
colonization.

These tactics have proven effective in removing key Palestinian leaders at
critical junctures of the struggle. For instance, during the pre-Oslo
years, the assassinations of pivotal figures such as Yasser Arafat’s second
and third in command — Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) and Abu Jihad (Khalil
al-Wazir) — cleared the way for the emergence of a more pliant leadership,
which now has been ultimately epitomized by Mahmoud Abbas.

During the Second Intifada, Israel arrested popualr Fatah leader Marwan
Barghouti and PFLP General Secretary Ahmad Saadat. It also possibly
poisoned Yasser Arafat, and it assassinated the PFLP’s military commander,
Abu Ali Mustafa, along with key figures within Hamas such as Abdul Aziz
Rantisi and Hamas’s founder, Ahmad Yassin, ensuring that no real opposition
to the entrenchment of Palestine’s own comprador class could gain dominance
in Palestinian politics. Through such operations, Israel sought to remold
the consciousness of the very leadership class that opposed it. After all,
if Palestinians, Arabs, or their leaders give up on the cause, then there
would be no cause to speak of. New leaders would not only fear for their
lives but would also be more amenable to Israeli goals and objectives.

This policy has served Israel well in the past but has also created
unintended consequences.

This policy has served Israel well in the past but has also created
unintended consequences. Today, Palestinian disunity is not within a
specific coalition or political group; it is disunity marked by a pragmatic
comprador class ruling the West Bank, while more homogenous resistance
groups operate from places like Gaza. While the PLO once incorporated
various currents, like the stance of Mahmoud Abbas, into its organizational
fabric, the current disposition of resistance groups contains fewer
disagreements about its strategies vis-à-vis Israel. What differences do
exist among the resistance are largely tactical or tied to choices of
alliance systems. In other words, assassinating Ismail Haniyeh does not
automatically lead to more compliant leadership emerging in his place,
because the movement from which Haniyeh descends remains united around the
framework of resistance.

Moreover, Israel’s rejectionism and refusal to accommodate figures like
Mahmoud Abbas, or to grant Palestinians even a bantustan state, have shaped
Palestinian consciousness in a way that reinforces the belief that only
resistance can bring about strategic shifts. This attitude has been
bolstered by the fact that negotiations are futile with an Israeli society
that is both arrogant and supremacist, epitomized recently by the riots in
the Sde Teiman protests for the right to rape Palestinian prisoners.
The declining efficacy of Israeli assassinations

Israel’s fear of peace, coupled with its insistence on maintaining
dominance through force and the ironic presence of figures like Mahmoud
Abbas, who, by enabling Israel’s colonization in the West Bank without
resistance, have led Palestinians and Palestinian resistance groups to
dismiss any serious approach towards negotiated solutions. These dynamics
have deepened the conviction that meaningful change cannot be achieved
through dialogue with a state that continues to prioritize force and
hegemony over genuine peace efforts.

Moreover, Palestinians have both reframed their resistance and
institutionalized its organizational structures. The character of these
organizations has evolved, becoming less dependent on a cult of personality
or deep emotional ties with individual leaders, and more focused on
organizational roles and operational efficacy. Gone are the days when
resistance groups would collapse into disarray following the loss of a key
figure.

Today, Palestinian and Lebanese resistance movements have adapted to the
reality that the assassination of a prominent leader may cause a tactical
setback, but it does not lead to the disintegration of their operations. In
fact, in many instances, these groups have demonstrated resilience, using
such incidents as a catalyst for the further consolidation and
strengthening of their organizational frameworks. This shift reflects a
maturing of the resistance movements, where the focus is on sustainability
and continuity rather than on the influence of individual leaders or
specific clientelist networks bent on building influence within a specific
political formation.

So, beyond the immediate tactical impact, what do these assassinations
achieve? In some cases, they can backfire, as seen with the assassination
of Hezbollah leader Abbas Musawi, which paved the way for the rise of Hasan
Nasrallah. In other instances, these actions may even facilitate the
emergence of more innovative and adaptable commanders who can take on key
positions. By removing one leader, Israel may inadvertently create space
for another often more formidable leader to emerge. One only needs to look
at the development of both Hamas and Hezbollah in the wake of various
assassinations at various historical stages to realize that these
operations lost much of their power.

These assassinations reinforce the bond between political-military
organizations and the broader society within which they are enmeshed. . .
Instead of weakening their opponents, such tactics can unintentionally
solidify unity and resolve.

These assassinations reinforce the bond between political-military
organizations and the broader society within which they are enmeshed,
making it much harder for any real schism to develop. Instead of weakening
their opponents, such tactics can unintentionally solidify unity and
resolve, bridging the gap between militant factions and the larger
population. The killing of Hamas leaders such as Ismail Haniyeh, who left
Gaza, loosens internal dissent.

The real reason for Israel’s current policy of assassinations serves more
as a mechanism to galvanize its own society rather than genuinely altering
the political or military stance of its adversaries. The efficacy of such
tactics in destabilizing Israel’s enemies has severely diminished,
revealing a shift in the purpose of these operations. Instead of crippling
opposition forces, these targeted killings now function primarily as a tool
for internal cohesion, rallying Israeli national sentiment, and showing
Israel’s intelligence and operational capabilities. It also permits Israel
to claim that it gained the upper hand in the moves to dominate the
escalation ladder with its adversaries.

The real reason for Israel’s current policy of assassinations serves more
as a mechanism to galvanize its own society rather than genuinely altering
the political or military stance of its adversaries.

Ultimately, these acts are displays of tactical prowess designed to
enshrine the supremacy of Israeli power, largely aimed at impressing
Israelis themselves at a time when Israelis feel that their army and
intelligence apparatus failed them. When Israel talks about a “loss of
deterrence,” it is not so much concerned with how its enemies perceive it
but rather with how it perceives itself. The rhetoric of deterrence is less
about external threats and more about maintaining an internal narrative of
strength and invincibility, ensuring that the image of Israeli power
remains intact in the collective psyche of its own society.
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