[News] Israel's 'victory' celebration was premature: the defining war in Gaza Is yet to be fought

[Anti-Imperialist News]

middleeastmonitor.com
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220815-israels-victory-celebration-was-premature-the-defining-war-in-gaza-is-yet-to-be-fought/>
Israel's 'victory' celebration was premature: the defining war in Gaza Is
yet to be fought
Dr Ramzy Baroud - August 15, 2022
------------------------------
[image: image.png]

For years, Palestinians and Israelis have laboured to redraw the battle
lines. The three-day Israeli war on Gaza, starting
<https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/israeli-strikes-on-gaza-kill-8-including-senior-militant.html>
on 5 August*, *manifested this reality clearly. Throughout its military
operation, Israel underscored
<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/08/world/middleeast/gaza-hamas-israel-islamic-jihad.html>
the point repeatedly that the war was targeting Islamic Jihad only, not
Hamas or any other Palestinian faction.

A somewhat similar scenario had transpired in May 2019 and again in
November of the same year. The May clashes began when two Israeli soldiers
were wounded by a Palestinian sniper at the nominal border fence separating
besieged Gaza from Israel. Mass weekly protests had taken place near the
fence for years, demanding an end to the Israeli siege on the Gaza Strip.
Over 200 unarmed Palestinians were killed
<https://www.972mag.com/gaza-return-march-idf/> by Israeli snipers, who
were dispatched <https://www.unrwa.org/campaign/gaza-great-march-return> to
the fence area as early as March 2018. The unexpected Palestinian shooting
of the Israeli snipers was a temporary reversal of the bloody norm in that
area.

Israel blamed Islamic Jihad for the attack. On 3 May, Israel responded by
bombing Hamas positions so that the latter would put pressure on Islamic
Jihad to cease its operations near the fence. The unstated goal, however,
was to sow the seeds of disunity among Palestinian groups in Gaza which
have, for years, operated under the umbrella
<https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2018/06/hamas-islamic-jihad-armed-factions-joint-operations-israel.html>
of the joint armed operations room. Like the latest August 2022 war, the
2019 war was also brief and deadly.

The war which followed <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62464016>
in November 2019 involved Islamic Jihad alone. Many Palestinians were
killed and wounded.

Although Israel failed to damage Palestinian unity, a debate took place in
occupied Palestine, especially following the November clashes, as to why
Hamas did not take a more active part in the fighting. The conventional
wisdom at the time was that Israel must not be allowed to impose the time,
place and nature of the fight on the Palestinians, as was often the case,
and that it is far more strategic for Palestinian resistance groups to make
these determinations.

That position might be defensible when understood in a historical context.
For Israel, maintaining the status quo in Gaza is politically and
strategically advantageous. Moreover, the status quo is financially
profitable as new weapons are tested and sold at exorbitant prices, making
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-ranked-worlds-10th-largest-weapons-exporter-in-past-five-years/>
Israel the world's 10th-largest international weapons exporter over the
past five years, as of 2022.

*READ: **Abraham Accords Conference called off by Israel as Arab States
refuse to join
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220815-abraham-accords-conference-called-off-by-israel-as-arab-states-refuse-to-join/>*

Israeli wars on Gaza are also a political insurance, as they reaffirm
Washington's support for Tel Aviv, in word and deed. "My support for
Israel's security is long-standing and unwavering," US President Joe Biden
said on 7 August even as Israeli bombs rained down on Gaza, killing
<https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/130404> 49 Palestinians, 17 of whom
were children. It is the exact same position of every US administration in
every Israeli military offensive.

The Israeli military establishment also embraced this seemingly unchanging
reality. It refers
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/05/14/israel-gaza-history/> to
its occasional deadly offensives against Gaza as "mowing the grass".
Writing in the *Jerusalem Post* in May 2021, David M Weinberg of the
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security explained
<https://www.jpost.com/opinion/israel-must-prove-it-has-freedom-to-defend-itself-opinion-668124>
the Israeli strategy in the most dehumanising terms: "Just like mowing your
front lawn, this is constant, hard work. If you fail to do so, weeds grow
wild, and snakes begin to slither around in the brush."

For its part, the political establishment in Tel Aviv has learned to adapt
and benefit from the routine violence. In 2015, former Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu summed up
<https://www.972mag.com/no-netanyahu-we-refuse-to-keep-living-by-the-sword/>
his country's position in a short but loaded sentence: "I am asked if we
will live forever by the sword — yes."

Ironically, in May 2021, the Palestinians were the ones unleashing
<https://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/ramzy-baroud/bennett-must-tread-carefully-%E2%80%98sword-jerusalem%E2%80%99-could-be-unleashed-again>
the "sword". Instead of keeping the tit-for-tat battle in Gaza confined to
that small geopolitical space, the resistance groups took the unusual step
of striking at Israel in response to events transpiring in a small
Palestinian neighbourhood of Occupied East Jerusalem. Within hours, Tel
Aviv lost the political plot and its control over the war narrative. It
seemed as if every inch of Palestine and Israel suddenly became part of a
larger battle, the outcome of which was no longer determined by Israel
alone.

The Palestinians call those events the "Sword of Jerusalem battle". The
name was coined
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220407-the-sword-of-jerusalem-awaits-israels-guardian-of-the-walls-2/>
in Gaza. Ever since, Israel has been fishing for a new battle that would
help it regain the initiative.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, for example, attempted
<https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/05/israel-high-alert-ahead-sundays-jerusalem-march>
to provoke such a fight in May, but failed. He thought that by moving
forward with the provocative Flag March in Occupied Jerusalem he would be
able to drag Gaza into another war. Instead of war, Palestinians responded
with mass protests and popular mobilisation.

The latest August war last week was another such attempt, this time by the
country's new Prime Minister, Yair Lapid. However, all that the
militarily-inexperienced Lapid could obtain was what Israeli military
analysts refer
<https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/defense/1659963436-analysis-a-significant-tactical-victory-but-no-strategic-outcome>
to as a "tactical victory".

It was hardly a victory, though. To claim any kind of victory, Israel
simply redefined the war objectives. Instead of "destroying the terror
infrastructure of Hamas", as is often the declared goal, it instigated a
fight with Islamic Jihad, killing two of its military commanders.

The typical Israeli media reporting on the war shifted discreetly, as if
Hamas and other Palestinian groups were never enemies of Israel. It was all
about Islamic Jihad.

"Fighting with the terror group would eventually have to resume," the *Times
of Israel* wrote on 12 August, citing
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/operation-breaking-dawn-was-a-tactical-success-but-wont-be-last-round-of-fighting/>
Israeli military sources. No reference was made to the other "terror
groups".

Unlike previous wars, Israel was in desperate need to end the fighting very
quickly, as Lapid was keen on clinching a "tactical victory" that will
surely be promoted heavily prior to the general election in November.

Both Israeli military and political establishments, however, knew too well
that they would not be able to sustain another all-out conflict like that
of May 2021. The war had to end, simply because a bigger war was unwinnable.

Hours after a mediated truce
<https://www.voanews.com/a/egypt-brokers-truce-in-israel-gaza-border-violence/6690276.html>
was declared, the Israeli military killed three fighters
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220809-3-martyred-40-wounded-in-israel-attack-on-nablus/>
belonging to the ruling Fatah Movement in Nablus in the West Bank. Lapid
aimed to send another message of strength, though in reality he simply
confirmed that the lines of battle have been redrawn permanently.

The resistance groups in Gaza commented on the killing of the Nablus
fighters by declaring
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220809-hamas-next-move-is-critical-palestinian-resistance-faces-greatest-test-yet/>
that the conflict with Israel has entered a new phase. Indeed, it has, but
the defining war in Gaza has yet to be fought.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not
necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
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