[News] Argentina’s Military Coup of 1976 - evidence of contacts between the coup plotters and U.S. officials
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Tue Mar 23 11:30:27 EDT 2021
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Argentina’s Military Coup of 1976: What the U.S. Knew
March 23, 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coup leaders Admiral Massera and General Videla.
U.S. had ample forewarning of coup plotting, Documents Show
Officials maintained channel of communications with plotters
Ford Administration knew Argentine military planned to commit human
rights violations
U.S. Ambassador aborted pre-coup visit by a former CIA deputy director
*Washington, D.C., March 23, 2021* - On the eve of the 45th anniversary
of the military coup in Argentina, the National Security Archive is
today posting declassified documents revealing what the U.S. government
knew, and when it knew it, in the weeks preceding the March 24, 1976,
overthrow of Isabel Peron’s government. The documents provide evidence
of multiple contacts between the coup plotters and U.S. officials.
“[Admiral] Massera sought opportunity to speak privately with me,”
U.S. Ambassador to Argentina Robert Hill reported in a cable sent one
week before the putsch after meeting with a leading coup plotter.
“[H]e said that it was no secret that military might have to step into
political vacuum very soon.”
The documents posted today record the U.S. government knowledge of the
plotters, their preparations for the coup, and their potential plans for
what State Department officials described as “military rule for an
extended duration and of unprecedented severity.” They show that the
U.S. “discreetly” advised the military more than a month before the
actual coup that Washington would recognize the new regime.
In the first substantive report to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on
a “Possible Coup in Argentina,” in mid-February 1976, Assistant
Secretary of State William Rogers flagged the likelihood of human rights
violations after a military takeover. “We would expect [the
military government] to be friendly toward the United States,” he
apprised Kissinger. “However, in stepping up the fight against the
guerrillas, an Argentine military government would be almost certain to
engage in human rights violations such as to engender international
criticism. This could lead to U.S. public and Congressional pressures
which would complicate our relations with the new regime.”
Anticipating problems with the United States over the repression against
subversion they would implement, the Argentine “military planning
group” approached officials in their own foreign ministry to advise
“as to how the future military govt can avoid or minimize the sort of
problems the Chilean and Uruguayan govts were having with the U.S. over
[the] human rights issue.”
Perhaps to discuss that very issue, the documents show that the
Argentine military sought to meet with Kissinger in advance of the
coup—an idea discouraged by Ambassador Hill. On February 13, 1976,
Hill met with an Argentine-born U.S. businessman named “Mr.
Carnicero” who informed him that “several high-ranking military
officers have asked him to arrange a meeting between an appropriate
military representative and Secretary Kissinger” so that they could
explain why they needed to take power and seek assurances of prompt
recognition. The ambassador rejected that idea on the grounds that
“Such a meeting, should it become public knowledge, could be
misinterpreted to the detriment of the officers themselves as well as of
Secretary Kissinger.” In a revealing passage, Hill reminded the
emissary that “the embassy has discreetly and through third parties
already indicated to the military that the USG will recognize a new
government in Argentina….”
As D-Day for the coup approached, the Argentine military appeared to
reach out to other influential policy actors. In a mission that remains
imbued with mystery, FBI and State Department cables revealed that the
retired director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Daniel
O. Graham, arrived in Buenos Aires just 12 days before the putsch,
accompanied by arch-conservative Senator Jesse Helms and his aides.
Fearing that the presence of Graham (who had served as CIA deputy
director before assuming command of the DIA) would spark rumors of U.S.
involvement in coup preparations, Ambassador Hill urged him to quickly
leave the country. “I hope this problem has been put behind us,”
Hill cabled Washington later. “It could have been extremely
embarrassing at the least, however, and at most very damaging to our
relations.” FBI sources reported that the top coup plotter, General
Jorge Videla, had hoped to have an emissary meet with Graham “in order
to explore in detail the General’s recommendations concerning the
public relations aspect of the Argentine Armed Forces projected coup
d’état against the government….”
According to the documents, Ambassador Hill himself decided to leave the
country on March 17th before the coup, to counter the expected
accusations of U.S. knowledge and involvement. “I therefore, believe
that it is in the best interest of the USG that I proceed with my plans
as though we had no forewarning,” Hill cabled the State Department as
he prepared for his departure. “The fact that I would be out of the
country when the blow actually falls would be, I believe, a fact in our
favor indicating noninvolvement of Embassy and USG.”
Just one day before the coup took place, Ambassador Hill reported to the
National Security Council that Washington needed to be ready to engage
the Argentine military. “As [this document] is being written,
Argentina is in a state of flux,” Hill advised the NSC.� “Argentina
has been one of our principal interlocutors and this is not likely to
change even under a new government… for no matter who might
immediately replace Mrs. Peron (if and when she is replaced), the fact
is that Argentina needs the U.S. certainly as much as we need her…
[eventually] she will probably come back to political normalcy in
desperate need of investment. The U.S. can expect to be the first
country to which the Argentines will turn.”
“There is no evidence that the U.S. instigated the coup,” said
Carlos Osorio, Director of the National Security Archive Southern Cone
Documentation Project. “But the United States accepted, and tacitly
supported, regime change because Washington shared the military’s
position that the putsch was the only alternative to chaos in
Argentina.” The documents, Osorio noted, “indicate that U.S.
officials wanted to believe that General Videla, the coup leader, was a
moderate. The military dictatorship that followed killed and disappeared
more than 20,000 people.”
READ THE DOCUMENTS
document thumbnail
Document 1
CIA National Intelligence Bulletin, “Argentina: Military preoccupied
with coup prospects,” Top Secret, February 7, 1976.
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=20519370-01>
1976-02-07
*Source:* Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
Since December 1975, U.S. agencies had received an increasing number of
reports about a possible military coup against the shaky presidency of
Isabel Peron in Argentina. This CIA bulletin reports:
“Recent events in Argentina suggest that the military is getting in a
position to take over the government, but there is no firm evidence that
they have made a decision to move yet. Reported discussions in the high
command no longer focus on whether a coup is necessary or feasible, but
on how and when it should be undertaken.”
The bulletin identifies top-level military officers placed in strategic
positions for the coup: the Army chief in Buenos Aires, General Suarez
Mason; the head of the Federal Police, General Harguindeguy; Navy
commander Admiral Massera; and Army commander-in-chief General Videla.
Their names today evoke memories of a seven-year dictatorship
characterized by disappearances, torture, and murder. All of them were
eventually indicted and three convicted. Harguindeguy passed away before
being brought to trial.
document thumbnail
Document 3
U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires, Cable, Ambassador Robert Hill to Acting
Assistant Secretary for Latin America, “Military Allegedly Wish to
Send Representative to Meet with Secretary Kissinger,” Secret, EXDIS,
February 16, 1976.
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=20519372-03>
1976-02-16
*Source:* Digital National Security Archive
In a highly restricted cable for Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Hewson Ryan (Assistant Secretary Williams Roger was traveling to
Caracas), Ambassador Robert Hill reports that an American-Argentine
citizen named “Carnicero” is trying to arrange a meeting between an
Argentine military representative and Secretary Kissinger, “… so
that they can explain the political situation in Argentina.”
“I discouraged Carnicero from going forward with this idea,” the
Ambassador writes, for “Such a meeting, should it become public
knowledge, could be misinterpreted to the detriment of the officers
themselves as well as of Secretary Kissinger. Further, I said, it seemed
to me unnecessary. The embassy has discreetly and through third parties
already indicated to the military that the USG will recognize a new govt
in Argentina ...”
document thumbnail
Document 5
CIA National Intelligence Bulletin,” Argentina: Coup prospects,” Top
Secret, March 1, 1976
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=20519374-05>
1976-03-01
*Source:* Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
This CIA bulletin reports that “A number of key [Argentine]
congressmen have told the US embassy in Buenos Aires that a military
coup against President Peron is now inevitable.”
“It appears likely that, in the event of a coup, army Commander in
Chief General Videla would be named president by a military junta.
Civilians probably prefer Videla because he resisted early calls for a
military take-over and is widely considered a man of moderate political
views.”
document thumbnail
Document 7
FBI Cable, Legal Attaché Buenos Aires to the Director, “Foreign
Political Matters – Argentina,” Secret, March 15, 1976.
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=20519376-07>
1976-03-15
*Source:* Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
In a cable to the director of the FBI, the legal attaché in Buenos
Aires, Robert Scherrer, reports that an American citizen, Raymond
Molina, has gathered information from an Argentine military source:
“The Argentine armed forces would oust President Peron between
Wednesday, March 17, 1976 and Thursday, March 18, 1976 … The Argentine
military desire close cooperation with the United States.”
Scherrer continues: “Molina was contacted by the legal attaché at the
specific request of Ambassador Hill. Molina arrived in Buenos Aires
3/12/76, accompanied by General Graham, former CIA Deputy Director, and
several other individuals from Washington connected with U.S. senators
Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond.” (Both senators were Republicans and
known for their conservatism. Helms was from North Carolina and Thurmond
from South Carolina.)
document thumbnail
Document 8
U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires, Cable, Ambassador Robert Hill to William D.
Rogers, “Ambassador's Conversation with Admiral Massera,” Secret,
March 16, 1976
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=20519377-08>
1976-03-16
*Source:* Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
U.S. Ambassador Robert Hill describes his Tuesday, March 16, 1976,
meeting with Argentine Navy chief Admiral Emilio Massera: “Political
Counselor and I had distinct impression that Massera was talking about a
coup which will probably come within the next few days, possibly before
the weekend.” Hill concludes that “every newspaper and magazine is
now speculating that the golpe [coup] may come shortly, but that is only
hearsay. The fact that I would be out of the country when the blow
actually falls would be, I believe, a fact in our favor indicating
noninvolvement of Embassy and USG. Hence, I intend to depart on schedule
…”
document thumbnail
Document 10
U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires, Ambassador Robert Hill to William D. Rogers,
Cable, “Strange Involvement of US Group with Return of Jorge
Antonio,” Secret, Nodis, Stadis, Eyes Only, March 17, 1976.
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=20519379-10>
1976-03-17
*Source:* Argentina Declassification Project, April 2019
Ambassador Robert Hill addresses this highly restricted cable to
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, William Rogers:
“I was called on Mar 11 by aides to Senators Thurmond and Helms and
told they would arrive in Argentina the next day. I urged them not to
come when they told me Gen Graham (retired Dep Dir of CIA and Dir of
DIA) was coming with them.”
“I further advised General Graham and his associates that they would
do well to get out of Argentina as soon as possible. If press found out
they were here or had any inkling as to why, all hell could break loose.”
Relieved that he has persuaded the group to leave the same day they
arrived, on March 12, the ambassador adds: “I hope this problem has
been put behind us. It could have been extremely embarrassing at the
least, however, and at most very damaging to our relations.
document thumbnail
Document 13
U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires, Cable, Williams Beal to Department of State,
“Analysis of Argentine Political Situation,” 18 March, 1976.
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=20519382-13>
1976-03-18
*Source:* Digital National Security Archive
While Ambassador Hill is in Washington, Chargé D’affaires Williaml
commends the Department of State’s intelligence bureau, INR, for an
analysis paper on Argentina. He goes on to say that the embassy
disagrees with the conclusion that “senior military commanders” who
“at this point appear to be planning a moderate coup and a caretaker
government,” will be able to see the plan through. Instead, “while
the caretaker government seems the most likely to emerge initially, the
dynamics of the situation are such that it may very well give way to the
second option indicated in the paper -- that of military rule for an
extended duration and of unprecedented severity.”
document thumbnail
Document 14
Ambassador Robert Hill, “Ambassador’s Overview,” in NSC paper,
“Country Analysis & Strategy Paper, Argentina,” March 23, 1976.
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=20519383-14>
1976-03-23
*Source:* Digital National Security Archive
The day before the military coup, Ambassador Hill knew it was
underwayand was of the view that the U.S. had to engage the Argentine
military. In this item prepared for the National Security Council, he
writes: “As the CASP [Country & Strategy Paper] is being written,
Argentina is in a state of flux … Argentina has been one of our
principal interlocutors and this is not likely to change even under a
new government … for no matter who might immediately replace Mrs.
Peron (if and when she is replaced), the fact is that Argentina needs
the U.S. certainly as much as we need her … [Eventually] she will
probably come back to political normalcy in desperate need of
investment. The U.S. can expect to be the first country to which the
Argentines will turn.”
--
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