[News] Bolivian Ex-Minister of Defense Plotted a Second Coup Using U.S. Mercenaries

[Anti-Imperialist News]

https://theintercept.com/2021/06/17/bolivia-coup-plot-mercenaries/


  Bolivian Ex-Minister of Defense Plotted a Second Coup Using U.S.
  Mercenaries

Laurence Blair <https://theintercept.com/staff/laurence-blair/>, Ryan 
Grim <https://theintercept.com/staff/ryangrim/>- June 17 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------

_A top official_ in the outgoing Bolivian government plotted to deploy 
hundreds of mercenaries from the United States to overturn the results 
of the South American country’s October 2020 election, according to 
documents and audio recordings of telephone calls obtained by The Intercept.

The aim of the mercenary recruitment was to forcibly block Luis Arce 
from taking up the presidency for Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS, the 
party of former Bolivian President Evo Morales. The plot continued even 
though Arce, a protégé of Morales, trounced a crowded field, winning 55 
percent of first-round votes and eliminating the need for a runoff election.

In one of the leaked recordings, a person identified as the Bolivian 
minister of defense said he was “working to avoid the annihilation of my 
country.” The armed forces and the people needed to “rise up,” he added, 
“and block an Arce administration. … The next 72 hours are crucial.”

Disagreements between ministers and divisions within the armed forces, 
strained under the weight of Arce’s convincing victory on October 18, 
2020, appear to have undermined the plan. It was never executed, and 
several top officials of the outgoing government have either fled 
Bolivia or been arrested 
<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-minister-government-bolivia-owner-florida-based-company-and-three-others-charged> 
on separate charges linked to corruption and their alleged role in the 
2019 coup.

For over a year prior, Bolivia had been plunged into a rolling crisis. 
In October 2019, when Morales was on the ballot for a controversial 
fourth term, the opposition accused 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/world/americas/bolivia-election-evo-morales.html> 
him of rigging the election, and the Organization of American States, or 
OAS, quickly echoed the charge. Amid widespread protests, a police 
mutiny, and pressure from the army, Morales was forced to step down and 
flee the country. Jeanine Áñez, a little-known evangelical senator, was 
hastily sworn in as caretaker president, promising to hold new elections 
within weeks.

Instead, she reoriented the government away from Morales’s leftist 
approach and toward Donald Trump’s White House, adopted a strident 
Christian tone 
<https://www.foxnews.com/world/bolivia-interim-president-bible-palace-elections> 
in contrast to Morales’s championing of Indigenous Andean culture, and 
issued a decree preemptively shielding soldiers from prosecution. The 
armed forces soon afterward carried out 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/20/bolivia-el-alto-violence-death-protest> multiple 
massacres 
<https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2019/321.asp> while 
suppressing opposition to the new interim government.

Prosecutors and gangs persecuted MAS supporters in the courts and the 
streets. After 14 years of growth under Morales, thousands were dragged 
<https://www.inesad.edu.bo/2021/03/22/cepal-pobreza-subio-64-puntos-y-afecta-al-375-de-la-poblacion/> 
back into poverty during the Covid-19 pandemic — which Áñez repeatedly 
cited as a reason to postpone a rerun of the vote. Amid mass 
demonstrations demanding new elections, Áñez finally allowed the 
balloting last fall. She also ran for president herself, only to drop 
out of the race after polls placed her a distant fourth.

Arce’s eventual victory last fall, in a closely scrutinized election, 
was a stunning rejection of the right-wing shift overseen by Áñez. The 
long-serving economy minister under Morales, Arce also distanced 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/20/bolivias-luis-arce-says-no-role-for-morales-in-new-govt> 
himself from his former boss. “We have recovered democracy,” Arce told 
<https://www.pagina12.com.ar/300167-luis-arce-hemos-recuperado-la-democracia> 
supporters, vowing to work to stabilize and unify the country.

The Bolivian right wing, however, was not ready to relinquish power. The 
call with Áñez’s defense minister, in which the speakers suggest several 
other top officials are likely to be on board, sketches a coup plot even 
more flagrant than the one in October 2019.

Several of the plotters discussed flying hundreds of foreign mercenaries 
into Bolivia from a U.S. military base outside Miami. These would join 
forces with elite Bolivian military units, renegade police squadrons, 
and vigilante mobs in a desperate bid to keep the country’s largest 
political movement from returning to power.

The phone calls, along with leaked emails discussing a mass deployment 
of hired guns to coincide with the elections, reveal how Bolivia could 
have seen fresh bloodshed late last year.

Two U.S. military sources confirmed that the Special Operations commands 
that they work for had gotten wind of the Bolivia coup plot. But nothing 
ever came of it, they told The Intercept. One special ops source added, 
“No one really took them seriously as far as I know.”

LA PAZ, BOLIVIA - JULY 20: Minister of Defense and Health Luis Fernando 
López (R) looks on without a face mask during the promotion ceremony for 
high ranking officers of Bolivian Armed Forces at Gran Cuartel de 
Miraflores on July 20, 2020 in La Paz, Bolivia. (Photo by Gaston 
Brito/Getty Images)

Former Minister of Defense Luis Fernando López, right, during the 
promotion ceremony for high ranking officers of Bolivian Armed Forces at 
Gran Cuartel de Miraflores on July 20, 2020, in La Paz.

Photo: Gaston Brito/Getty Images


      “The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces”

The longest of the recordings is a 15-minute phone call with a person 
The Intercept has identified as Luis Fernando López, a former 
paratrooper and businessman appointed defense minister by Áñez in 
November 2019. López, who is referred to in the call as “Mr. Minister,” 
can be identified through references to his work as minister with the 
armed forces, and by comparing the voice of the relevant speaker and 
claims he makes in the recording to his publicly available speeches.

The other main participant appears to be Joe Pereira, a former civilian 
administrator with the U.S. Army who was based in Bolivia at the time. 
Pereira, who has previously boasted of links to U.S. special forces 
and been held in a Bolivian jail awaiting trial on fraud charges, is 
identifiable by references to the use of a company that he has directed, 
as well as the leaked text of emails that describe him as organizing a 
mission involving mercenaries in Bolivia. Two of the people included in 
the emails confirmed to The Intercept that the emails are authentic and 
that Pereira was the lead organizer. An ex-employee of Pereira’s who 
listened to the audio said that he had no doubt that the voice on the 
recordings was his former boss. Members of Pereira’s church said the same.

In a separate recording, Pereira identifies his translator as “Cyber 
Rambo,” while in a later phone call he is referred to directly as 
“Luis.” “Cyber Rambo” is a nickname given to Luis Suárez, a Bolivian 
American former U.S. Army sergeant known 
<https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/01/31/how-an-army-vet-became-the-cyber-rambo-in-an-alleged-bolivian-coup/> 
for creating an algorithm that boosted anti-Morales tweets during the 
2019 political crisis. Reached for comment by The Intercept, Suárez 
denied having been in contact with López and Pereira or having any 
involvement in the coup plot. He said that after he was contacted by The 
Intercept in June, he found a previously unread and unanswered message 
from Pereira. Suárez speculated that Pereira could have been trying to 
fool López into believing he was involved. López did not respond to 
questions sent via his lawyer, who said his client did not want to speak 
to the press and was seeking asylum abroad. Pereira could not be reached 
for comment via telephone and did not respond to questions emailed in 
October or May.

References to Arce’s election win indicate the call took place after 
October 18, and it appears to have been made before November 5, when 
López fled Bolivia for neighboring Brazil — three days before Arce’s 
inauguration.

The recording begins mid-conversation, with the man identified as López 
saying, “armaments and other military equipment are obviously highly 
important to reinforce what we are doing.”

“Following the phone call I’m having with you, I’m going to do the same 
to coordinate with the police authorities.”

“The military high command is already in preliminary talks,” he 
continues. “The struggle, the rallying cry, is that they [MAS] want to 
replace the Bolivian armed forces and the police with militias, Cubans, 
and Venezuelans. That is the key point. They [the police and armed 
forces] are going to allow Bolivia to rise up again and block an Arce 
administration. That’s the reality.”

López further suggests that the commander of the armed forces is 
“already” mulling over a preemptive coup d’état and will be the one who 
“initiates the military operation.”

“I want to emphasize the following. The commander of the armed forces is 
working on all of this,” López says. The top general appointed by Áñez 
was Sergio Orellana. Believed to have fled 
<https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/el-excomandante-de-las-ffaa-salio-del-pais-rumbo-a-colombia_223634> 
Bolivia for Colombia in November, he could not be reached for comment.

“We’ve been working on this all week,” López emphasizes. “I can 
guarantee you that right now we have a united armed forces — not 100 
percent, because there are obviously blues,” he stipulates, in apparent 
reference to the official color of the MAS. Some military officers are 
likely to back “the winning horse [Arce] because he won the election,” 
he admits, but insists that they are “very few.”

“I guarantee you that 95, 98 percent are super patriotic and don’t want 
to disappear,” he concludes. “I’ve been working for 11 months to ensure 
that the armed forces have dignity, have morale, are tried and tested, 
and think of the fatherland above all. I guarantee you that this won’t 
fail.”

A day before Arce’s inauguration, Morales — at that point still in exile 
in Buenos Aires — claimed 
<https://www.la-razon.com/lr-article/morales-denuncia-que-el-comandante-de-las-ffaa-trato-de-encaminar-una-junta-militar-para-tomar-el-poder/> 
that Orellana had been trying to persuade senior officers to establish a 
“military junta,” using the rationale that Arce planned to replace the 
armed forces with militias. Morales suggested that a pro-MAS general had 
overruled Orellana — and that although orders had been given to mobilize 
elite troops, these had quickly been canceled. At the time, 
international media largely ignored Morales’s claim.

“I heard rumors to the effect, but nothing concrete, nothing about 
[troop] movements,” said Tomás Peña y Lillo, a retired general and army 
chief of operations until 2010, when asked about the plot by The 
Intercept. “I imagine that it was nothing more than a wish.”

Yet Bolivian military figures remain genuinely concerned that MAS 
harbors designs of sidelining the army by arming its own supporters, 
Peña y Lillo argued. “This is the intention of the [Arce] government,” 
he added. “They would obviously like to do that, they might try. But the 
constitution doesn’t allow it. And the army will abide by the constitution.”

Bolivia's President Evo Morales and the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces, Williams Kaliman, attend the commemoration of the 140th 
anniversary of the Battle of Calama -in which Chile took control of 
Antofagasta region, at that time part of Bolivia- in La Paz, on March 
23, 2019. - Bolivian President Evo Morales resigned on November 10, 
2019, caving in following three weeks of sometimes-violent protests over 
his disputed re-election after the army and police withdrew their 
backing. With no sign of violent protests abating, the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Williams Kaliman, asked Morales 
"to resign his presidential mandate to allow for pacification and the 
maintaining of stability, for the good of our Bolivia." (Photo by AIZAR 
RALDES / AFP) (Photo by AIZAR RALDES/AFP via Getty Images)

Former Bolivian President Evo Morales and the former commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces, Williams Kaliman, attend the commemoration of the 
140th anniversary of the Battle of Calama in La Paz on March 23, 2019.

Photo: Aizar Raldes/AFP via Getty Images


      “Armed Militias of the People”

During his 14 years in power, a cordial relationship between Morales — 
himself a conscript as a young man — and Bolivia’s armed forces, much of 
whose senior command was trained by the United States, deteriorated 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/veteran-presidents-rift-with-bolivian-military-helped-drive-his-early-exit-11575541801> 
into an open rift.

His praise for Ernesto “Che” Guevara — who was captured and killed in 
Bolivia with CIA support in 1967 — and the creation of an 
“anti-imperialist” military academy angered many soldiers. Gripes about 
pay were also shared by the police. Their refusal 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-election-ticktock-insight-idUSKBN1XO2PQ> 
to quell protests in the wake of the contested 2019 vote was pivotal in 
forcing Bolivia’s longest-serving president into exile, first in Mexico, 
then in neighboring Argentina.

But the suggestion that top generals were deliberating about how to 
block the MAS from returning to power under Arce a year later — 
disregarding the 2020 election result and contravening the constitution 
— indicates that distrust of the country’s dominant popular movement 
among some senior military figures has strayed into paranoia.

In his call with Pereira, López stressed, “My work right now is focused 
on avoiding the annihilation of my country and the arrival of Venezuelan 
and Cuban troops, and from Iran.” In a speech given in October 2020 to 
mark the anniversary of Guevara’s killing, López similarly vowed 
<https://www.nodal.am/2020/10/bolivia-luis-fernando-lopez-ministro-de-defensa-de-facto-cubanos-venezolanos-y-argentinos-que-vengan-a-subvertir-encontraran-la-muerte/>that 
foreign invaders “of any nationality, Cubans, Venezuelans or Argentines 
… will find death in our territory.”

The claim that Cuban, Venezuelan, and Iranian operatives have 
successfully infiltrated governments, left-wing parties, and protest 
movements across Latin America has become a frequent right-wing talking 
point across the region in recent years, but — outside of Venezuela 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-cuba-military-specialreport-idUSKCN1VC1BX> 
itself — has little concrete evidence to back it up.

In January 2020, while in exile in Buenos Aires, Morales told MAS 
supporters that if he returned to Bolivia, he would seek to organize 
<https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2020/01/16/alerta-evo-morales-se-retracta-de-sugerir-creacion-de-milicias-armadas-en-bolivia/> 
“armed militias of the people” along Venezuelan lines. His rivals 
alleged that his comments betrayed plans for a pro-MAS paramilitary 
force. Morales subsequently claimed that he was referring to a tradition 
of local self-defense patrols in Andean communities.

Eduardo Gamarra, a Bolivian political scientist and professor at Florida 
International University, suggested a simpler reason why the generals 
who helped topple Morales might have wanted to keep Arce out of power. 
“Was there unrest in the armed forces? Were they worried? Yes,” Gamarra 
said. “They were rightly concerned there was going to be a major purge. 
The MAS was going to be furious.”

Pereira was also monitoring the former MAS leader’s whereabouts. In 
another phone call, he speaks amicably with an older man, Manuel, who 
informs him that Morales has moved from a temporary residence near an 
American school in the La Lucila suburb of Buenos Aires.

“What a pain. What a pain our buddy Evo has … gone from that place,” 
says Pereira.

“We’ll have to find out where he is,” replies Manuel. “He’s got to be 
somewhere.”


      “I Can Get Up to 10,000 Men With No Problem”

During the 15-minute call, Pereira says that the request for weapons is 
“not a problem” and asks how many Hercules C-130 aircraft the defense 
minister has available. López’s response: There are only three C-130s in 
all of Bolivia, and he only has control of one, while the national 
police have two. Pereira reassures him, “Following the phone call I’m 
having with you, I’m going to do the same to coordinate with the police 
authorities. With high command.”

“We have a lot of moving players, a lot of moving parts.”

The aircraft, Pereira says, are needed “to pick up personnel in Southern 
Command in Homestead Air Force Base in Miami.”

“By the time the C-130s get inbound, I’ll have them contracted, I’ll 
have them geared up, and … all their weapons ready,” he adds.

The translator further spells out the arrangement: The troops will be 
collected “in such a way as if they were private contractors, under no 
representation of the American state.”

“We are going to put all those people under shell contracts for Bolivian 
companies operating already in-country,” Pereira continues, with López 
agreeing on each point.

    “I will have them fly in as undercover, like if they were
    photographers, they were pastors, they were medics, they were tourists.”

“I can get up to 10,000 men with no problem. I don’t think we need 
10,000,” he stipulates. “All special forces. I can also bring about 350 
what we call LEPs, Law Enforcement Professionals, to guide the police. … 
With me [in Bolivia] I have a staff of personnel that can handle various 
different jobs. … If there’s something else I need, I will have them fly 
in as undercover, like if they were photographers, they were pastors, 
they were medics, they were tourists.”

David Shearman, one of the U.S.-based recruiters Pereira had asked to 
organize those men, later told The Intercept that the 10,000 number was 
absurd. “You couldn’t get 10,000 people even if Blackwater was back in 
business and going back to Iraq,” Shearman told The Intercept in June.

Pereira, in the audio, suggests that this cohort of mercenaries will be 
welcomed with open arms by Bolivians — 3.2 million of whom had voted to 
return the MAS to power just days previously. “We have done a lot of 
infiltration. … They are not going to go and try to persuade people to 
follow the MAS. More people want liberty for your country.”

29 March 2021, Bolivia, La Paz: Supporters attend the 26th anniversary 
of the founding of the ruling party MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo - 
Movement for Socialism). Evo Morales of the MAS was forced to resign 
after allegations of fraud against him in the October 2019 elections led 
to a serious political crisis. Luis Arce won the subsequent elections in 
October 2020 with over 55 percent of the vote. Photo: Radoslaw 
Czajkowski/dpa (Photo by Radoslaw Czajkowski/picture alliance via Getty 
Images)

Supporters attend the 26th anniversary of the ruling Movimiento al 
Socialismo party’s founding on March 29, 2021, in La Paz.

Photo: Radoslaw Czajkowski/picture alliance via Getty Images

Pereira adds that he will need to talk with Arturo Murillo, then the 
interior minister and responsible for the police, “so he is not making 
mistakes, being scared.” In the weeks before the 2020 election, Murillo 
repeatedly warned in public and private that the MAS was planning an 
armed insurrection if it lost the vote. In October, Murillo traveled to 
Washington, D.C., for meetings with U.S. diplomats, the OAS, and the 
White House, where he said 
<https://eldeber.com.bo/politica/murillo-dice-que-el-mas-arma-a-jovenes-para-convulsionar-el-pais_202867> 
that matters of “national security” and “threats” to the elections were 
discussed. At the time, Murillo told the press 
<https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2020/10/1/murillo-dice-que-el-mas-arma-jovenes-para-el-18-de-octubre-270008.html> 
that “the United States can help with many things,” later confirming 
<https://www.paginasiete.bo/seguridad/2020/10/5/murillo-admite-compra-de-armas-para-defender-la-democracia-al-precio-que-sea-270448.html> 
that Bolivia was buying weapons in order to “defend democracy” at “any 
price.” In May 2020, he boasted of having met with the CIA, claiming 
that Mauricio Claver-Carone, the Trump administration’s point person on 
Latin American affairs, had “opened many doors for us.” Murillo did not 
respond to requests for comment made by The Intercept in October.

But Pereira, in the call, maintains that there should be no trace of 
U.S. involvement. “Whether they see us as mercenaries or they see us as 
[a] contract state or however they want to look at us, I could care less 
as long as they cannot tie us into direct Special Forces, Army, or Air 
Force [involvement],” he says.

The translator asks the minister a question directly “as a Bolivian.” 
How ready “are all of you,” he asks, “to make this work? Are you ready 
to carry out psychological operations, are you ready to manipulate 
information in the same way as the MAS?” The response is unequivocal: 
“One hundred percent.”

“Mr. Minister, I’m going to ask you something as a Bolivian.”

“I really have no clue about that,” Suárez told The Intercept, 
stipulating that he was now a software engineer based in Texas but not 
involved in cybersecurity or government-related work.

“I had no intention to prevent Arce from taking power,” Suárez said, “I 
think he won the election fair and square and not like Evo Morales with 
fraud.”


      “Come and Help Us”

Another call entirely in Spanish, which Pereira appears to have held 
after his conversation with the minister, indicates that Pereira may 
have exaggerated the level of military support for the planned coup.

“Last night I was up until two in the morning, almost 2:30, [with] 
intelligence reports, counterintelligence … speaking of rumors, 
maneuvers, and strategies,” Pereira complains to the recipient, who is 
unidentified. “It’s very worrying. … People are going from left to 
right, right to left, as they please. … They’re afraid,” he surmises, 
adding that bribes, self-interest, and even social media are affecting 
soldiers’ loyalties.

“We’re looking for the weapons, I already have all the information you 
asked me for. We already know who we can count on,” Pereira’s 
interlocutor reassures him, mentioning a police colonel who “wants 
nothing to do with the MAS,” is “100 percent with us,” and “has lots of 
people who back him.”

“They are tired of their bosses getting everything while they expose 
themselves to the bullets for nothing. There are strategic people in 
each unit who are completely for us,” he explains.

Pereira singles out the need to secure the backing of special forces 
based at the Condors paratrooper academy and Bolivia’s elite Rangers 
regiments.

“We need to look at everything we talked about several months ago,” 
Pereira says on the call. “We spoke about the action plan, [the] case of 
demonstrating force, of taking strategic places. I think that with what 
we have now, we’re in a much better position, in that we won’t have to 
confront Bolivian troops. We will have to show efficiency, seriousness, 
manpower, and once they see it for themselves, I think they will invite 
us inside and say ‘Come and help us.’”


      “Things Are Moving Forward”

Pereira’s promises to bring in planeloads of guns-for-hire to aid the 
insurrection were likely overblown. But evidence seen by The Intercept 
suggests that plans to deploy hundreds of mercenaries, including former 
U.S. service members, to coincide with the election were well advanced 
in the weeks leading up to October 18.

In the text of emails shared before the vote with The Intercept by a 
retired security contractor — who asked not to be named because he 
feared retaliation — Pereira is named as one of three organizers of the 
mission. The other two, David Shearman and Joe Milligan, have extensive 
experience in overseas counterinsurgency and covert operations.

The first message, which is written by Milligan and whose recipients are 
described as being on the “LEP/Medic email chain,” indicates that at 
least 250 contractors, including Law Enforcement Professionals and 
medics, have signed up for “the Bolivia project.” It stipulates those 
who have “put in for the Red Team” will be contacted separately. In the 
call between López and Pereira, the translator refers to Pereira with 
the codename “Red.”

According to the email, the deployment was delayed due to the July 23 
postponement of elections, from September 6 to October 18. “We are still 
on track to get you in early enough to do the train up and gear issue,” 
Milligan continues.

“This project is very sensitive right now,” Milligan cautions. “I have 
only put it out on a few Facebook sites that I know LEP’s and the Medics 
are on and some police pages. So, let’s keep this secure as possible. 
There is a lot of moving parts to this and we don’t want to jam up the 
other guys that are working on the ground to make this happen.”

Recipients of the email are asked to call a number registered to 
Milligan, a licensed gun dealer in Dallas, Texas. A LinkedInpage 
<https://www.linkedin.com/public-profile/in/joe-milligan-5920ba27?challengeId=AQFLCgxvP10RfQAAAXS6kWWKD3N8ZGhaOB__9YH9f7TSI3H2UuIr7-DfgtlfzBIX5vMiR2EYOjzgWo2Qn55z921ZVLRU0PONng&submissionId=e9551504-cd63-3716-5fb8-d41ba43ec418> 
describes Milligan as a police and military trainer and head of security 
for a Dallas scrap metals company. Between 2006 and 2012, he worked on 
counterinsurgency and bomb-disposal operations in Afghanistan with 
private military firm MPRI, and trained Iraqi police with Blackwater, 
notorious for perpetrating a massacre of civilians 
<https://theintercept.com/2020/12/23/blackwater-massacre-iraq-pardons/> 
in Baghdad in 2007.

Reached by telephone on the given number before the election, Milligan 
denied any knowledge of the operation, saying first that he was a truck 
driver, then that he worked at a scrap metals firm. “It must be another 
Joe Milligan, there are several on Facebook,” he added, before hanging 
up. Reached again in June, he acknowledged that the emails were 
authentic, and that Pereira, organizing the effort, had reached out 
through a mutual network. He maintained that he had no specific 
knowledge of what Pereira was planning in Bolivia.

“I really don’t put much stock in what people say to me until I see a 
paycheck or airplane ticket. I’ve worked overseas for years, so I don’t 
even worry about what they think they’re going to do or what they’re 
talking about until it actually materializes with a paycheck,” he said.

Shearman, the other listed contact, describes himself in an online 
biography as a former U.S. Marine who has worked “around the world” on a 
variety of “covert operations,” including protecting U.S. officials in 
Iraq and South America. In a second email, Shearman’s name, email, phone 
number, and blog — named Viper One Six after his military call sign in 
Afghanistan — are appended in the form of a signature.

“Things are moving forward. We continue to seek more interested 
professionals with tenured law enforcement experience and who are 
interested in this type of unique mission,” Shearman’s message begins. 
He proceeds to ask interested recipients to email a nondisclosure 
agreement to Pereira to receive further instructions, and to “Think 
low-profile … Jeans, casual pants, long and short sleeve shirts capable 
of concealed carry.”

“If you have a pilot’s license, the company will pay all fees regarding 
renewals, etc. for you while you are down there. School up and Guerilla 
Group – MSA, the main foe down there,” Shearman adds, potentially 
scrambling the abbreviation for MAS. “Our program is adding to an 
existing program and our program is still being stood up.”

The emails hint that the project is politically sensitive. “Updated 
timeline appears to be late September into early October. The date 
revolves around politics there. Groups will move staggered and you will 
be advised of your movement group and more information on travel will 
follow as you proceed in the process,” Shearman writes. “You all will be 
getting briefings when we travel, and you will get a more enhanced view 
of the operation, mission, and the concerns/sensitivity of it.”

Shearman concludes by promising that an “HQ South” will handle all 
“company in-processing, equipment issue, and range quals” — referring to 
firearms certificates — and offer a “full medical/dental facility.” It 
remains unclear whether the group had the use of a new or preexisting 
base in Bolivia or not.

Reached by telephone before the election, Shearman said he was retired 
and denied being involved in any project in Bolivia. Warning that 
handling the leaked messages could be illegal, he said: “If a person 
were to release sensitive documents that may be a serious legal 
liability for any individual involved.”

In June, Shearman acknowledged he had sent the emails, and explained 
that Pereira had reached out to him for help with recruitment and 
administration for what he had understood to be a legitimate 
police-training project. “Unfortunately, if I had to do it over again, I 
wouldn’t have helped them out, but those emails seem to paint a picture 
of some fantastical thing, and so I can see the intrigue from the 
outside looking in,” he said, adding that the contents of the emails had 
largely been provided by Pereira. “A lot of that stuff was just repeated 
from Joe.”

Shearman also said he wasn’t paid for the work, and he hasn’t heard from 
Pereira in months. He said Pereira told him the project involved “work 
with the Bolivian government to provide law enforcement training — 
training of their law enforcement agencies down there in regular police 
tactics. … That’s the extent of what I know and the extent of what the 
recruitment effort was. Anything beyond that, I don’t have any clue 
because I was not privy to any of that.”


      “SOCOM Will Never Fail Me”

Pereira arrived in Bolivia roughly a decade ago. Members of a Baptist 
church in the eastern city of Santa Cruz, a hotbed of opposition to 
Morales, said he was believed to be an ex-soldier and pastor working in 
the oil industry. For a while, he ran Bridge 2 Life Foundation, which 
claims to bring pastors, doctors, and teachers to work across Latin 
America and the Middle East. A 2014 advertisement for a motivational 
talk by Pereira describes him as an “ex-Army Officer of the Special 
Forces” and an “ex-marine,” though public documentation refers to him as 
a civilian contractor. According to an internal bulletin 
<https://static.dvidshub.net/media/pubs/pdf_8276.pdf>, he had previously 
worked as a reserve affairs mobilization planner at the John F. Kennedy 
Special Warfare Center and School in Fort Bragg, North Carolina — an 
Army training center for United States Special Operations Command, or 
SOCOM — in 1999. Another publication describes 
<https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8YzPWlD-YIoC&pg=PA392&lpg=PA392&dq=joe+pereira+fort+bragg&source=bl&ots=KlL4B_LmlB&sig=ACfU3U2KT5vNR_Osz9D1wA-INCpSeyK68g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjkjPmR55nxAhUClFwKHZVBBWYQ6AEwD3oECBsQAw#v=onepage&q=joe%20pereira%20fort%20bragg&f=false> 
him as a civilian contractor in the same role in 2002.

A Facebookpage <https://www.facebook.com/joelili.pereira/photos> for 
Pereira lists him as “President Oil & Gas at China National Group” from 
March 2017 onward. Headquartered in Santa Cruz, the firm’s now-inactive 
Facebook page describes it as occupying a “platform” left by a previous 
company working with Chinese investors.

In October 2020, China National Group’s offices in central Santa Cruz 
were empty and up for rent. An official registry showed the firm had 
officially closed before the end of March 2019. Yet the leaked emails 
from September 2019 suffix Pereira’s email address with the letters 
“cng,” and the contractors are asked to sign a nondisclosure agreement 
labeled “CNG-NDA.”

A judicialsummons 
<https://www.edictos.bo/edicto-para-jose-eduardo-pereira-urioste-y-rebeca-carola-lichtman-bustamante/> 
from November 2016 outlines fraud charges against Pereira and his wife. 
A court ruling from July 2019 indicates 
<https://jurisprudenciaconstitucional.com/resolucion/39179-sentencia-constitucional-plurinacional-0239-2019-s3> 
Pereira was in pretrial detention as of November 5, 2018, and that a 
police colonel had threatened to transfer him to a different cell block 
unless Pereira returned him $80,000. It is not known whether the case 
was pursued or Pereira was convicted or acquitted.

The suggestion of deceptive business practices tallies with his promises 
to López that he could use “shell contracts” to bring foreign 
mercenaries into Bolivia “undercover” in the guise of pastors, doctors, 
and tourists.

Pereira’s first recorded Facebook “check-in” was in Santa Cruz on 
November 16, 2019: six days after Morales fled the country and Añez took 
power. In February 2020, he posted screenshots of a WhatsApp 
conversation to Facebook 
<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=211182806721427&set=pcb.211182976721410&type=3&theater>, 
claiming to be in charge of troops on a base in Bolivia, and joking — in 
the context of a lost bet on the Super Bowl — that “SOCOM will never 
fail me.”

Among Pereira’s 535 Facebook friends are dozens of current and former 
U.S. military personnel and private security contractors. Phone calls to 
a number for the China National Group were unanswered. Pereira did not 
respond to emailed questions. His current location is unknown.

Bolivian Interim Minister of Government Arturo Murillo (L) greets 
members of the GAT anti-terrorist unit during its presentation in La 
Paz, on December 3, 2019. - The interim government of Bolivia on Tuesday 
activated the GAT anti-terrorist unit with 60 police officers to 
"dismantle" groups of foreigners who "are threatening" the country's 
peace, according to the Ministry of Government (Interior) and the 
Police. (Photo by AIZAR RALDES / AFP) (Photo by AIZAR RALDES/AFP via 
Getty Images)

Interior minister of Bolivia’s interim government Arturo Murillo, left, 
greets members of the GAT anti-terrorist unit during its presentation in 
La Paz on Dec. 3, 2019.

Photo: Aizar Raldes/AFP via Getty Images


      “Alive, Free, or as President of Bolivia”

A further pair of recorded conversations reviewed by The Intercept 
suggest that disagreements between defense minister López and Murillo — 
as interior minister, ultimately in control of the police — may have 
derailed the coup. They appear to have taken place soon before López 
fled the country on November 5. The recordings suggest that López was 
not only involved, but also that the plotters had dangled the prospect 
of his becoming president instead of Arce.

A woman who refers to herself as a relative of López’s says in one call 
that he is under pressure “not to unmask Murillo’s plan,” referring to 
the interior minister. “It seems like he’s afraid, he says even he 
doesn’t know what he’s going to do,” she adds.

“So the issue is simple,” responds the speaker, who is called by 
Suárez’s first name, Luis, the same first name as the “Cyber Rambo” who 
Pereira said was translating on the call between and López. “It’s 
Murillo that’s putting an obstacle in our way.” The woman responds, 
“Exactly, he says that they’re threatening him.”

Far from the bravado of some days prior, the former paratrooper appears 
to have gone to ground. “Tell López’s mother,” the speaker continues, 
“that probably his only option of getting out of this alive, free, or as 
president of Bolivia is for him to pick up our call. … Her son is 
already in a lot of danger,” he adds, “I have to talk with him, and he 
has to stop committing errors.”

In a subsequent recording, Pereira concludes: “He’s shitting in his 
pants right now.”

In the event, the coup never materialized, and the threat to Bolivian 
democracy appears to have subsided. Arce was sworn in as president of 
Bolivia on November 8, 2020, a day after most mainstream media outlets 
called the U.S. presidential election for Joe Biden. Morales returned 
<https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201111-bolivia-s-morales-ends-homecoming-tour-with-rally> 
to Bolivia soon afterward and has appeared at MAS party rallies, but has 
not taken a formal government post. Arce fired the military commanders 
Áñez promoted, including Orellana, and replaced 
<https://www.notimerica.com/politica/noticia-bolivia-arce-designa-nuevos-cargos-cupula-militar-cesar-vallejos-nombrado-nuevo-comandante-ffaa-20201230053256.html> 
them with officers believed to be more loyal.

Murillo and López fled 
<https://www.la-razon.com/nacional/2020/11/18/interpol-bolivia-supo-de-un-ultimo-favor-a-lopez-y-murillo-para-su-fuga-del-pais/> 
together across the border with Brazil on November 5 with the help of a 
Bolivian Air Force plane, shortly before corruption allegations were 
leveled against them. They are suspected of having received bribes after 
a Florida-based private security company, Bravo Tactical Solutions, 
secured 
<https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-bolivia-business-9d74b17a0eb8be693f8e38c9df2e56de> 
a contract to supply Bolivia’s security forces with tear gas at vastly 
inflated prices.

Murillo, however, found no refuge outside the country. On May 26 of this 
year, the FBI announced 
<https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-bolivia-business-9d74b17a0eb8be693f8e38c9df2e56de> 
it had arrested him on charges of conspiring to commit money-laundering 
connected to the tear gas case. The same day, Arce’s interior minister 
indicated 
<https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20210526/gobierno-pide-extradicion-murillo-lopez-caso-gases-lacrimogenos> 
he would also seek López’s extradition from Brazil in connection with 
the case. López has denied wrongdoing, tweeting last month that “the 
Bolivian people know I worked tirelessly for the country, in accordance 
with the constitution.”

Orellana, who fled to Colombia in November, has arrest warrants 
<https://www.telesurenglish.net/amp/news/Bolivia-MAS-Senators-Demand-Report-on-Fleeing-of-Ex-Army-Chief-20210309-0018.html> 
out against him for his role in the ouster of Morales and the subsequent 
killing of protesters by troops. In March, Áñez herself was arrested for 
her involvement in the 2019 coup. She insists her caretaker presidency 
was constitutional.

But there are ongoing rumblings of disquiet 
<https://www.paginasiete.bo/seguridad/2021/4/12/malestar-militar-policial-se-amordaza-por-temor-ascensos-destinos-carcel-290483.html> 
among the military. Peña y Lillo, the retired general, said that by 
jailing military officers “like common criminals,” the Arce 
administration was seeking to “terrify and take vengeance on the armed 
forces” for their role in unseating Morales. He described the 2019 coup 
as a constitutional intervention to “defend society.”


      “There Would Have Been So Much Bloodletting”

Abortive coups often appear slapdash in hindsight, but such plots don’t 
need to be perfectly executed to be successful. The U.S. government 
notoriously overthrew democratically elected leaders in Iran and 
Guatemala in the 1950s, both times in shoestring operations that ended 
up victorious amid the resulting chaos. The 1954 Guatemala coup 
succeeded because the local military correctly perceived the U.S. was 
behind it.

But the plot Pereira was selling does not appear to have had the backing 
of the U.S. government. It more closely resembles the May 2020 efforts 
of Silvercorp USA, a Florida-based private military company that 
launched a botched coup attempt against Venezuelan President Nicolás 
Maduro. Eight participants were killed, and 17 were captured. Among 
those now in jail in Venezuela is the former Green Beret leading the 
operation, who later claimed 
<https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article246819562.html> 
that it was authorized by Donald Trump’s White House. The Trump 
administration denied involvement.

“These [are] yahoos punching above their weight trying to get rich 
quickly,” said Sean McFate, a professor of strategy at Georgetown 
University and former military contractor who reviewed the emails shared 
with The Intercept. “It’s just amateur hour. And we’ve seen a lot of 
that [recently].”

Gamarra, of Florida International University, argued that Pereira’s 
claims to have the support of the U.S. military were most likely false, 
but that they highlighted the problem of weak oversight of 
soldiers-turned-mercenaries around the world.

Such groups of soldiers of fortune became more dangerous after the Trump 
administration encouraged them to “freelance,” he added, referring to 
the alleged discreet endorsement of the White House for Silvercorp’s 
activities in Venezuela.

    “Conspiracies … cause a lot of damage, especially in fragile places
    like Bolivia. All you need is one Pereira to mess things up.”

“These guys are a dime a dozen, they all think they’re generals. … 
They’re dangerous because of what they promise,” said Gamarra. 
“Conspiracies are generally just that, conspiracies, but they cause a 
lot of damage, especially in fragile places like Bolivia. All you need 
is one Pereira to mess things up.”

If the short-lived Bolivian operation were funded by the U.S. 
government, or enjoyed its “tacit or explicit approval,” it would show 
how deep into “reckless cowboy territory” the Trump administration’s 
Latin America policy had gone, said Adam Isaacson, director of the 
Defense Oversight program at the Washington Office on Latin America.

“It beggars belief that professional diplomats or military commanders 
would approve a half-baked mission like this,” Isaacson added.

“The last thing this region needs right now is bands of mercenaries paid 
by who knows whom trying to install their preferred leaders by force,” 
agreed Eric Farnsworth, a former U.S. diplomat and vice president of the 
Council of the Americas, who also reviewed the emails and agreed that 
the plot seemed well advanced. “It’s not democratic and it can’t be 
condoned.”

A grim example of what might have occurred unfolded in November 2019, 
when at least 19 demonstrators, mainly poor and Indigenous MAS 
supporters, were shot dead 
<https://www.la-razon.com/nacional/2020/10/21/comision-muertes-en-sacaba-y-senkata-fueron-por-armas-oficiales/> 
by Bolivian security forces under the oversight of Áñez, Murillo, López, 
and Orellana. Among those killed 
<https://research.reading.ac.uk/coca-cocaine-bolivia-peru/wp-content/uploads/sites/127/Unorganized/Dia-de-la-madre-copy.pdf> 
was Omar Calle Siles, 28, a keen soccer player who left behind a 
5-year-old son.

“We cry every day,” said Omar’s sister, Angélica Calle Siles. “We 
haven’t been able to eat together for the past 17 months because we feel 
his absence at the table.”

“All we want is justice,” she added, “for the people who have destroyed 
so many humble families to pay, so my brother can rest in peace.”

Had the planned coup in 2020 gotten off the ground, Gamarra warned, 
“there would have been so much bloodletting in Bolivia.”

/Jack Murphy <https://jackmurphywrites.com/> contributed reporting. /
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