[News] The Political Marginalization of Palestinian Women in the West Bank
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Mon Jul 29 12:41:45 EDT 2019
https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/the-political-marginalization-of-palestinian-women-in-the-west-bank/
The Political Marginalization of Palestinian Women in the West Bank
by Yara Hawari <https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/yara-hawari/> on July
28, 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Overview*
Though Palestinian women have always played a fundamental role in the
struggle for liberation from the Israeli settler colonial regime, they
have faced consistent political marginalization. This experience has
become more multifaceted and entrenched since the 1990s, when the Oslo
Accords unleashed a myriad of changes in the structure of Palestinian
society and governance.
These changes have included a newfound dependence on international donor
aid among Palestinian civil society, including women’s organizations,
and the bolstering of a corrupt and relentlessly patriarchal Palestinian
Authority (PA) that complements rather than confronts the Israeli
occupation and its oppression of the Palestinian population, both male
and female. Such developments have caused today’s Palestinian women to
endure perhaps even more formidable challenges when it comes to activism
and political participation.
This policy brief addresses these issues, providing a historical
consideration of Palestinian women’s political participation and then
examining the reasons behind their de-politicization with a particular
focus on the West Bank. It concludes by offering some potential avenues
for Palestinian women and their allies to disrupt this process and
revitalize the Palestinian liberation struggle through feminism.
*Palestinian Women as Political Actors*
Palestinian women have long been politicized individuals not just as
wives, sisters, or mothers, but also as fighters, organizers, and
leaders with agency that is not defined by their relationship to men.
Looking back through Palestinian history, women have always been present
and active at crucial political and national moments, though they have
also had to navigate tensions among feminism, nationalism, and
anti-colonial struggle.
In 1917, Palestinian women took part in demonstrations against the
Balfour Declaration. Many women’s associations subsequently organized
themselves under the Arab Women’s Congress
<https://www.palestine-studies.org/jps/abstract/40801>, which convened
in 1929 in Jerusalem. The congress created the Arab Women’s Executive
Committee to carry out decisions, and this served as the beginning of an
organized women’s movement in Palestine. ^1 <#note-10323-1>Many of the
women involved in the committee were of the urban upper and middle
classes, particularly of Jerusalem, and were involved in community
organizing and charitable works. Still, the committee was also a
political body, with members boldly making speeches
<https://jps.ucpress.edu/content/24/3/5>in spaces traditionally
dominated by men, such as the Haram al Sharif and the Church of the Holy
Sepulchre.
During the Palestinian uprising against the British in 1936, Palestinian
women not only participated in demonstrations en masse, but were also
part of smuggling operations delivering weapons and supplies to
guerrilla fighters. Here, rural and working class Palestinian women
played a vital role. They hid guns in their clothing or in the fields
and traversed the terrain, sharing important information with guerillas
such as British troop locations and supply routes. ^2 <#note-10323-2>
Over a decade later, the Nakba, or Palestinian catastrophe, of 1948
ripped apart Palestinian society, devastating the social and
institutional infrastructure that the women’s movement had built in the
preceding decades. The establishment of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) in 1964 provided centralization and an institutional
home for many civil society organizations established before the Nakba.
The fervent institution building that followed created many more
employment opportunities for women. In addition, the General Union of
Palestinian Women (GUPW) formed in 1965 and brought many women’s
organizations under its umbrella, reviving the Palestinian women’s
movement. These organizations
<http://archive.thisweekinpalestine.com/details.php?id=1627&ed=112>offered
educational, medical, legal, social, and vocational services to women,
undertook advocacy, and created links with other women’s organizations
around the world.
After the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the GUPW
began responding to the most immediate needs of Palestinian women and
children, including by establishing health centers and orphanages. In
the late 1960s Fatah took over the GUPW, and has since dominated the
organization. Unlike some leftist political factions Fatah lacked
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2537876?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>an
articulated stance or vision for Palestinian women. Despite this, the
GUPW succeeded in opening branches in the diaspora, and has been
particularly active in the Arab states with large Palestinian refugee
populations. Today, it continues as an institution under the PLO.
Around the time of the formation of GUPW, Palestinian women were also
involved in armed resistance, and most major militant political factions
established training camps for female revolutionaries. A particularly
well-known revolutionary was Layla Khaled, a member of the leftist
Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) who captured
international attention for her role as commander of the Dawson’s Field
operation, which made her the first woman to hijack an airplane. Khaled
went on to become a speaker in the international solidarity scene.
Another member of the PFLP, Shadia Abu Ghazaleh, was among the first
Palestinian women to take part in military resistance after 1967. She
later died while preparing an explosive device. Dalal Mughrabi, a Fatah
member, was involved in a 1978 military operation that resulted in her
own death as well as the deaths of 38 Israeli civilians.
Khaled, Abu Ghazaleh, and Mughrabi broke many traditional and
nationalist conventions that had limited women’s role in the liberation
struggle to caregivers of sons or husbands, whether fighters or
prisoners. Although organizing and participating in armed resistance
helped challenge traditional assumptions about gender roles, tensions
between female emancipation and nationalism remained entrenched. Indeed,
many Palestinian leaders privileged national liberation over the
emancipation of Palestinian women, so much so that this stance became
the norm.
Two decades later images of women and girls throwing stones, challenging
soldiers, and leading marches during the First Intifada showed promising
signs of a social restructuring. Women’s groups were solidifying their
involvement in social works and political organizing during this period.
This allowed women more movement outside of the home under the pretext
of the struggle, bringing them into spaces that had previously been male
only, such as political meetings and the front lines of demonstrations.
This inevitably contributed to an erosion of the familial patriarchal
authority.
Yet the First Intifada is also often romanticized in collective memory
and writing, not only in terms of resistance and community organizing,
but of the role of women in the struggle. It is important to note that
some women faced societal backlash for political participation. For
example, although many women who were imprisoned were glorified during
their incarceration, soon after their release they often faced social
obstacles, including not being able to marry or find employment.
Furthermore, women were still often seen in relation to male figures,
such as mothers and wives, as demonstrated
<https://www.palestineposterproject.org/>by many political posters from
the period.
Several years into the First Intifada, the Palestinian delegation at the
1991 Madrid Conference included two women (Hanan Ashrawi and Zahira
Kamal) out of 21 figures. Yet the Oslo Accords several years later did
not feature any women. Palestinian women were not the only ones to be
marginalized at Oslo, as refugees in the diaspora and Palestinian
citizens of Israel were also excluded. Oslo created a framework, albeit
a limited one, in which the exiled male Palestinian leadership was
empowered, rather than a framework for the empowerment of the
Palestinian people as a whole. This exclusion further increased the
tension between the national struggle and the women’s movement.
*Depoliticizing Palestinian Women*
The tension between nationalism and feminism has continued in the
post-Oslo period, and has been accompanied by the trend of Palestinian
women facing multiple forces that actively suppress their politicization
and participation in political spaces. The overarching force has been
and continues to be the Israeli regime, which has oppressed Palestinian
women since the day it was established through gendered forms of
violence as well empowering patriarchal structures through its
relentless colonization and fragmentation of land and communities. Yet
it is also important to recognize the forces within the Palestinian and
international communities that contribute to the weakened political role
of Palestinian women.
*/The NGO-ization of the Women’s Movement /*
The Oslo Accords not only created a new framework for “peace” and
“state-building;” they also set in motion a fundamental transformation
of Palestinian civil society
<https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/palestinian-civil-society-what-went-wrong/>,including
the women’s movement. Foreign aid flooded into Palestine and created a
situation in which civil society became dependent on external patronage.
Whereas before Oslo political parties mainly supported civil society
organizations, the post-Oslo era saw a deliberate weakening and breaking
of these ties. Many scholars have identified this process as
“NGO-ization,” which Islah Jad aptly describes
<https://www.awid.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/changing_their_world_-_demobilization_of_womens_movements_-_palestine.pdf>as
circumstances in which “issues of collective concern are transformed
into projects in isolation from the general context in which they arise,
without consideration of the economic, social, and political factors
affecting them.”
The professionalization and bureaucratization of civil society
organizations created a distance between them and local grassroots
communities. The focus became centered on project deadlines, budgets,
funding proposals, and annual reports, all of which were answerable to
the international donor community. The shift to a donor-led agenda also
distanced many organizations from the politicized rhetoric of liberation
and nationalism. Many groups and organizations within the women’s
movement were also subject to this transformation.
Many Palestinian leaders have privileged national liberation over the
emancipation of Palestinian women
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This change is particularly noticeable in the post-Oslo lexicon of
women’s rights within Palestinian civil society. Many terms or buzzwords
used to obtain project funding have been defined by UN agencies and
other international organizations that place their own meanings and
conditions upon them. For example, the term “empowerment” is limited
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46526231_Empowerment_as_Resistance_Conceptualizing_Palestinian_women's_empowerment>to
socioeconomic empowerment and participation in “decision-making,” rather
than empowering women to resist the occupation and build a vision for a
postcolonial world. Indeed, many projects
<http://palestine.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment>focus
solely on household economic empowerment, aiming to help women become
financially less dependent on male breadwinners. This stands in stark
comparison to the many female-led cooperatives established before Oslo
that attempted to gain economic independence from Israel and were
articulated as a form of resistance, such as the women’s produce
cooperatives
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/41858974?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>established
by the Palestinian Union of Women’s Work Committees in the West Bank and
Gaza during the First Intifada.
A more recent example of this donor-led transformation can be seen in a
week-long campaign launched in early 2019 by UN agencies, international
organizations, and Palestinian NGOs. The campaign, called “My Rights,
Our Power,” was meant "to raise awareness on women's fundamental human
rights" and domestic violence in particular. It focused on five areas of
concern: the right to a life free of violence, the right to achieve
justice, the right to seek help, the right to equal opportunities, and
the right to make one's own choices. The campaign omitted the Israeli
military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as its
overall structure of apartheid, as major contributing factors to rights
violations committed against Palestinian women. Indeed, the words
“occupation” or “Israel," let alone “apartheid” or “colonialism,” did
not appear in press releases
<https://www.unicef.org/sop/press-releases/my-rights-our-power-joint-campaign-launched-palestine-raise-awareness-womens> and
campaign materials. This reflects a trend in the international aid and
donor community’s discourse in which “issues” and "barriers" to women's
rights are spoken of in a political vacuum to avoid any Israeli
discomfort. This is a clear example in which dependency on the donor
community rendered organizations unwillingly complicit in the
depoliticization of the Palestinian women’s struggle.
While this process of NGO-ization has demobilized many groups within
Palestinian society, women remain disproportionately affected due to
institutional patriarchal tendencies to exclude women from the political
sphere.
*/The Veneer of Institutional Inclusion/*
The return of the PLO to the West Bank and Gaza Strip and its subsequent
devolution into the Palestinian Authority (PA) left many on the ground
frustrated, particularly women grassroots activists from the First
Intifada who then lost their leadership roles to predominately male
politicians, highlighting once again the tensions between the national
struggle and women’s liberation. In 2003, in part to alleviate this
tension, the PA established the Palestinian Ministry of Women’s Affairs,
and between 2012 and 2014 under Minister Haifa Al Agha it created
<http://thisweekinpalestine.com/achieving-gender-equality/>gender units
in all Palestinian governmental agencies. These units are supposed to
deal with gender issues, particularly female participation in
institutional politics, yet their implementation and outcomes remain
minimal. In reality, it is likely that they were established to appease
certain requirements, particularly those of funders, and respond to both
domestic and international pressures to create a more gender-balanced
political structure.
The ‘NGO-ization’ of Palestinian civil society has demobilized many
groups, but women remain disproportionately affected
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The current inclusion of women within institutional Palestinian politics
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remains very shallow. Although the
Palestinian Legislative Council has maintained a 20% quota of women
since 2006 – a development Palestinian activists and women’s
organizations fought hard for – the percentage remains low. Moreover,
other bodies have even lower proportions of inclusion. Of the PLO
Executive Council’s 15 members, only one is female – Hanan Ashrawi. Out
of the 16 governorates in the West Bank and Gaza, only the governorate
of Ramallah and El Bireh has a female governor – Laila Ghannam.
Similarly, the government as of April 2019 headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh
has a mere three female cabinet ministers out of 22 – Mai Kaileh,
Minister of Health; Rola Maayya, Minister of Tourism; and Amal Hamad,
Minister of Women’s Affairs. These women, with the exception of Ashrawi,
come from a Fatah background. This is unsurprising considering the
domination of Fatah over the Palestinian political scene and the recent
efforts
<https://al-shabaka.org/memos/abbas-and-the-farce-of-palestinian-democracy/>by
President Mahmoud Abbas to consolidate power within his party.
These attempts to consolidate power are indicative of the politics
inherent in the PA, namely those of one-man leadership, rule by
presidential decree, and a failure to separate legislative, judicial,
and executive powers. Furthermore, the lack of democracy and democratic
processes – Abbas is well into a decade past his mandated term – has
allowed for nepotism and patronage. It is thus unsurprising that under
the PA patriarchal tendencies have solidified.
The PA attempted to elevate the status of Palestinian women in 2014 when
it acceded to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) without any reservations. It was
the first country in the Middle East and North Africa to do so and was
heralded by some, including those in the international community, as
demonstrating significant progress on women’s rights. Yet several issues
render the accession less significant than it might seem. Firstly, the
CEDAW text has not been published
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/11/human-rights-watch-womens-centre-legal-aid-and-counselling-and-equality-now-joint>in
the PA’s Official Gazette and as such remains non-binding for domestic
law. Secondly, a November 2017 decision by the Supreme Constitutional
Court, which regulates the status of international agreements in the
Palestinian legal system, allows for courts to not apply agreements that
conflict with Palestinian law. This allows for unregulated executive
powers
<https://www.birzeit.edu/en/news/bzu-professor-examines-recent-supreme-constitutional-court-decision>and
for the legislature’s maintenance of theoverarching patriarchal authority.
*/Weaponizing Women’s Bodies/*
The fact that Palestinian women are often lacking the most basic legal
protections and political representation means that they are
particularly vulnerable when it comes to the weaponization of their
bodies. Sexual harassment and violence are sensitive topics in
Palestinian society, and a social stigma is often attached to those who
have suffered them. The threat of sexual violence and the use of sexual
harassment are therefore particularly powerful weapons. Both the Israeli
regime and the PA have used such gendered violence to deter women from
being politically active.
Since its establishment the Israeli regime has systematically used
gendered tactics to oppress Palestinians. This has contributed to the
enforcement of gender stereotypes and patriarchal narratives, excluding
women from the political sphere or targeting those who are politically
active. Targeting manifests itself in a variety of ways and can include
harassment, threats of sexual violence, and imprisonment, the latter
being the most effective way to curtail political work. Indeed, female
political leaders have been consistently imprisoned by the Israeli
regime, including legislator Khalida Jarrar
<https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/11/08/why-is-israel-afraid-of-khalida-jarrar/>.
During imprisonment, Palestinian women are often subjected to gendered
violence in an attempt to “break” them. For example, Khitam Saafin, the
leader of the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees, spent three
months in Israeli administrative detention. During that time she
reported
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/Palestinian-women-haunted-by-abuse-in-Israeli-jails-658416317>that
Israeli soldiers took pictures of her on their phones and subjected her
to unnecessary strip searches. The Israeli prison authorities are also
known <https://jps.ucpress.edu/content/46/4/46>to deny women sanitary
towels and restrict their access to bathrooms when they are menstruating.
The current inclusion of women within institutional Palestinian politics
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remains very shallow
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Interrogations by Israeli soldiers or security forces also often include
sexual harassment or threats of sexual violence to pressure women and
girls to sign confessions or give information. This was demonstrated in
a leaked video <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkkSORwIbnQ>of the
December 2017 interrogation of the teenager Ahed Tamimi, who was
arrested for slapping an Israeli soldier who had invaded her home and
had previously been part of a raid that resulted in her cousin being
shot in the head. Ahed was subjected to an interrogation in which two
male officers verbally harassed her and made comments about her body.
In recent years the PA has increasingly cracked down on activism and
activities that challenge its authoritarianism, using such brutal
techniques
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/23/two-authorities-one-way-zero-dissent/arbitrary-arrest-and-torture-under>as
detention, interrogation, surveillance, limitations on mobilization, and
cyber attacks. It has adopted gendered mechanisms similar to those used
by Israeli forces to deter female participation in political activities.
Demonstrations and protests have often been sites of gendered violence.
PA security forces use insults and insinuations that often amount to
verbal sexual harassment, in addition to telling women they should be at
home and not in the streets. This draws on misogynist and global notions
of honor and shame, which can also be mobilized against women’s
families. PA security forces have been known to visit women’s and girls’
fathers to “discuss” their activism. For some women, this has serious
repercussions and means they are prevented by their families from taking
part in political activities. There have also been cases in which
security forces have gone to a female activist’s place of work and have
spoken to her employer in an attempt to get her fired. This type of
sabotage occurs more easily via social media, as rumors and slanderous
language can be spread quickly and anonymously in ways that become
nearly impossible to refute.
In more severe cases physical sexual harassment occurs, with women
grabbed and groped at demonstrations. This was the case at a June 2018
protest demanding the PA lift the sanctions on Gaza, in which Fatah
loyalists harassed and assaulted women
<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/pa-attacking-people-gaza-sanctions-180615100149988.html>at
the behest of the PA security forces. The sexual harassment of women in
such spaces aims to punish and deter them from taking part, but it also
encourages male activists to deter female participation out of fear for
women’s safety.
It is important to note that Palestinian women have not been passive in
the face of gendered violence. They have, for instance, long confronted
the weaponization of their bodies through such tactics as recognizing
their right to remain silent during interrogations and remaining in
groups or pairs at demonstrations. Another tactic is to mentally
compartmentalize. Indeed, one activist told this author, “I mentally
prepare myself before the demonstration, I tell myself, ‘Today my body
is not mine.’”
*Liberating All Palestinian People *
The aim of this policy brief has not been to romanticize the pre-Oslo
period, but rather to address how the political marginalization of
Palestinian women has accelerated with the entrenchment of the military
occupation, the increasingly repressive Palestinian authorities, and the
weakening connection between civil society and the grassroots. Moreover,
the entire Palestinian liberation project has been geographically,
socially, and politically fragmented, resulting in a situation of
historic vulnerability. While discussions revolve around efforts to
revive it, the important question Palestinians must ask themselves is
whether they can reignite a path to liberation with half of their
population marginalized from the process.
Both the Israeli regime and the Palestinian Authority have used gendered
violence to deter women from being politically active
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With this in mind, what follows are recommendations for disrupting this
process of political marginalization and revitalizing the liberation
struggle through feminism:
*1.* Palestinian women, collectives, groups, and organizations pursuing
women’s rights and gender equality need to be restructured and
revitalized into an autonomous women’s movement that struggles for
women’s liberation in all spheres, including political, economic, and
social spheres. The need for women’s autonomy is imperative in a context
of patriarchy, where male domination is present in all areas.
Organizational autonomy does not mean a separation of struggles, but
rather provides a space for women to think more freely and collectively
about liberation. Women’s rights must be both individual and collective
and must not be separated from the collective right of indigenous
Palestinians to be free of settler colonialism.
*2.* Women’s groups and organizations must find a way to reconnect both
with the grassroots and the liberation discourse. One way to do this is
to return to collectivism and tackle elitism within the NGO network by
making processes more democratic and representative.
<https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/palestinian-civil-society-what-went-wrong/>This
also requires moving toward self-sufficiency to weaken the grip of
donors, which could include a membership-based system, and pave the way
for economic sovereignty.
*3.* Groups and activists must engage with the political marginalization
of women. In particular, men in these spaces need to be aware of the
power dynamics that prevent women from participating and support women
in fighting against them. For example, in meetings, discussions, and
demonstrations, men should step aside and create space so that women can
take leading roles. Additionally, rather than telling women not to stand
on the front line out of fear their bodies will be weaponized against
them, men should join women in coming up with tactics to tackle this
weaponization.
*4.* While bearing in mind the specific context of settler colonialism,
Palestinian women should also examine recent examples of other women in
the region who have been part of processes of great political change,
such as in Tunisia and Sudan. It is equally important to rebuild
historic solidarities, such as with the Kurdish Women’s Movement, rather
than looking toward the West, to learn and develop by example.
*5.* Palestinian nationalism has long focused around macho imagery
embodied in the male fighter or prisoner, with women often only
discussed in relation to men. This has resulted in a liberation politics
that is not only exclusive and dominating of women but also oppresses
men. There is therefore an urgent need to incorporate feminism into the
Palestinian political project through the adoption of a new document of
liberation, a document that would understand feminism not only as a
theory but also as a practice and way of life that works toward the
liberation of all people.
Only through such actions can the Palestinian leadership and civil
society begin to tap the strength of Palestinian women in the
Palestinian struggle for freedom, justice, and equality.
_________________________
Yara Hawari <https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/yara-hawari/>
Yara Hawari is the Palestine Policy Fellow of Al-Shabaka: The
Palestinian Policy Network. She completed her PhD in Middle East
Politics at the University of Exeter. Her research focused on oral
history projects and memory politics, framed more widely within
Indigenous Studies. Yara taught various undergraduate courses at the
University of Exeter and continues to work as a freelance journalist,
publishing for various media outlets, including Al Jazeera English,
Middle East Eye and the Independent.
--
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