[News] Al Jazeera and U.S. Foreign Policy
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Thu Sep 22 13:57:35 EDT 2011
Al Jazeera and U.S. Foreign Policy:
What WikiLeaks' U.S. Embassy Cables Reveal about U.S. Pressure and Propaganda
by Maximilian C. Forte
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte220911.html
"Al Jazeera is a vital component to the USG's
strategy in communicating with the Arab world."
--
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08DOHA792.html>Joseph
E. LeBaron, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, November 6, 2008
"Al Jazeera Board Chairman Hamed bin Thamer Al
Thani has proven open to creative uses of Al
Jazeera's airwaves by the USG beyond
straightforward interviews." --
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DOHA103.html#par6>Joseph
E. LeBaron, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, February 10, 2009
The U.S. Embassy cables published by WikiLeaks
present numerous very interesting stories about
how Al Jazeera was brought to heel by the U.S.
Government. The U.S. Embassy in Doha, and
officials from Washington, used a variety of
direct and indirect methods of ensuring a greater
degree of compliance on the part of Al
Jazeera. These methods included placing speakers
on Al Jazeera news programs; supplying
information approved by the U.S. Government;
providing U.S. training for Al Jazeera's
journalists; demanding editorial distortion of
aired programs; securing Al Jazeera's agreement
to check first with U.S. officials before airing
"sensitive" programs; monitoring of Al Jazeera in
minute detail, ranging from its news coverage to
its internal structure and policies; lodging
complaints with Qatari government ministers;
constant, personal visits to Al Jazeera's
headquarters; developing familiarity and close
personal contacts with Al Jazeera staff; and
going over the head of the Managing Director of
Al Jazeera to ensure that "objectionable content"
was removed and never repeated.
Mainstreaming, professionalism, balance, and
objectivity emerge as the chosen tropes for a
journalism that favors U.S. foreign policy. U.S.
officials did not overtly threaten Al Jazeera
staff, nor did they engage in any crass form of
bribery. The intervention was more polite,
prolonged, and intimate. In the process of
reading these cables we learn that, for the U.S.
Government, Al Jazeera was valued as a strategic
tool, as a credible proxy for U.S. "public
diplomacy." We hear senior Al Jazeera executives
describe themselves as "partners" and "assets" of
the U.S. We also learn about the degree to which
Al Jazeera is controlled by the Qatari state and
used as a foreign policy instrument. We witness
the degree to which Al Jazeera English is almost
entirely a foreign import, not even pretending to
speak as the "voice of the Arabs" and operating
as a colonial transplant. The picture of Al
Jazeera revealed through the cables is a grim
one, and it is not likely that Al Jazeera can proceed unscathed.
Meet Mr. Al Mahmoud
By March of 2006, Abdul Aziz Al Mahmoud, the
director of the Al Jazeera Arabic website, had
enough and quit. Al Mahmoud had become
disillusioned both with the channel and with the
Managing Director, Wadah Khanfar (much more
about/from Khanfar follows below). Al Mahmoud, a
U.S. educated citizen of Qatar and a former
military man, was described by U.S. diplomats as
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DOHA328.html>"a
close Embassy contact" (one of many as it turns
out --
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06DOHA219.html>"Embassy
Doha has built cooperative personal relationships
within Al Jazeera"). What about Al Jazeera had
changed, so much so that he had to resign? In
the explanation related to us by then U.S.
Ambassador, <http://www.untermeyer.com/>Chase
Untermeyer, Al Mahmoud is
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DOHA328.html>reported to say:
In the old days [2001] . . . Al Jazeera was
buzzing with idealism and alive with passionate
debate between partisans of different ideologies
(Arab nationalists, Islamists, secularists,
socialists etc), and that it had a genuinely
revolutionary atmosphere about it. Now, he said,
people come to work from 9 to 5 like bureaucrats
and Al Jazeera has become part of the mainstream establishment.
The Al Jazeera described above, prior to its
transformation, resembles the one shown in the
carefully done, in-depth documentary,
<http://icarusfilms.com/new2003/jaz.html>Al Jazeera: Voice of Arabia.
The "mainstreaming" of Al Jazeera, in part due to
U.S. pressure and regular U.S. coordination with
Al Jazeera directors and editors on questions of
news coverage, is one of the persistent themes in
the cables, published by WikiLeaks, from the U.S.
Embassy in Doha (some of which were previously
<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte150911.html>collated
by
<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte150911.html>MRZine).
Becoming "responsible" and "professional" meant,
in practice, becoming answerable to the U.S. and
to the Emir of Qatar, just as the U.S. discovered
the value of Al Jazeera's voice in the Arab
world, and just as the Emir used his media giant
to attack Arab rivals when convenient, most notably Libya.
A Day in the Life of Al Jazeera Answering to the U.S. Government
It was <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1734.html>October 13, 2005.
Al Mahmoud may have missed the idealism, but he
was part of Al Jazeera's move towards greater
service to U.S. interests in the Middle East. On
that day in October of 2005 he met separately
with U.S. Ambassador Chase Untermeyer and the
U.S. Embassy's Public Affairs Officer (PAO),
<http://qatar.usembassy.gov/about-us/chief-of-mission/deputy-chief-of-mission2.html>Mirembe
Nantongo. They sought out Al Mahmoud over
objections they had to content on the Al Jazeera
Arabic website. Al Mahmoud "acknowledged that
some of the material was unacceptable as
published and had been changed on his
instructions" -- indeed, we are told, all of the
"objectionable" content was removed, not just
changed, and not just in part. (The
objectionable content had to do, in part, with
the image of the U.S. in the Middle East and a
visit by
<http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Karen_P._Hughes>Karen
Hughes, who was then Under Secretary of State for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and would
later visit Al Jazeera personally; and a 9/11
slideshow that neglected to stress enough just
how much of a victim the U.S. was and how great
was its humanitarian record in the Middle East.)
Chase Untermeyer first went to speak to an
official in Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
about the website content. Untermeyer "stressed
that this was the sort of irresponsible reporting
that produced problems and tensions in relations
between Qatar and the United States" -- turning
an Al Jazeera issue into a Qatari government
issue and an international relations
issue. Right here we see how the idea of
"responsible" journalism is framed: journalism
that responds to the concerns of the U.S. and Qatari regimes.
Apparently the U.S. <http://www.dia.mil/>Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) was also busy producing
frequent reports tallying the
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1734.html>"incidence
of objectionable content." Ambassador Untermeyer
went to Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs armed
with one such report to help make his case. In
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05DOHA1593.html>another
cable, we learn that the DIA would regularly send
such reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which would then pass them on to Wadah Khanfar,
Al Jazeera's Managing Director (more below). On
one occasion Wadah Khanfar commented on the
nature of a DIA report: "Clearly the person who
writes this report is not a
journalist.
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DOHA317.html>The
report is politically oriented." This also tells
us something about the politicization of
"professionalism" as conceptualized by U.S. diplomats.
The PAO, Mirembe Nantongo, apparently gave Al
Mahmoud quite the browbeating: "objected to the
slide show's depiction of the 9/11" . . . "those
attacks were cowardly acts" . . . "rejected the
slide show's assertion. . ." . . . "gave a
narrow, distorted view" . . . "omission of any
mention of the US role in liberating Muslims,"
and so on. The PAO noted that the slide show was
removed from the site, but, not pleased enough
with the effect of her interference in the
editorial decisions of an independent media
agency, she asked Al Mahmoud to confirm its
removal. Not satisfied even with that, the PAO
then slapped down a packet of U.S. certified and
authorized views for Al Jazeera to repeat:
PAO also encouraged Al Mahmoud to draw on the
many information resources available to him and
his staff via the Public Affairs Section, and
left him a folder with fact sheets and links
relating to USG [U.S. Government] assistance in
the region, including USG emergency aid and details of USG exchange programs.
Al Jazeera's Managing Director, Wadah Khanfar,
had not only instructed Al Mahmoud to
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1734.html>completely
remove the slideshow from the server (not just
amending it, and not just archiving it, as Al
Mahmoud preferred) but also was apparently the
one to warn Al Mahmoud to expect a U.S.
visitor. Al Mahmoud was thus, as noted by the
PAO, prepared for the latter's visit. Al Mahmoud
meekly responded that "a mistake was made." The
PAO surmises that Khanfar had in turn been
pressured by the Qatari Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, after Ambassador Untermeyer's visit.
The PAO ends one cable by commenting that:
Al Mahmoud is clearly very wary of attracting
negative attention from his chain of command, and
is aware that
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1734.html>an
irritated USG means trouble for him. He urged
PAO to call him directly any time the Embassy
observes troubling material on the website.
Freedom of the press, one of the values the U.S.
asserts in inventing its public image in the
Middle East, is belied by actual practice. Al
Jazeera for its part failed to assert editorial autonomy.
Under the Microscope
"They [Al Jazeera] know they are under the
microscope, and want to be taken seriously. Al
Jazeera's growing globalization will only
increase the pressure upon them to adhere to
international standards of journalism and result
in an organization that can be dealt with upon
familiar ground, and within a framework already
established by the mainstream media." --
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06DOHA219.html>U.S.
Embassy, Doha, February 13, 2006
Officials of the U.S. Embassy, as we see in the
WikiLeaks cables for Doha, in fact made a
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1765.html>habit
of visiting and contacting Al Jazeera, hoping to
build that "familiar ground" and establish a
reliable relationship that would respond to norms
favorable to U.S. policy. Just as Al Mahmoud had
told the Embassy's PAO to contact him directly
any time the Americans noted material they found
troubling, so the U.S. Embassy kept a detailed
list of Al Jazeera contacts -- see
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08DOHA493.html>"Contact
Information for Engaging Qatar on Objectionable
Broadcasts." Another cable, from
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05DOHA1593.html>September
18, 2005, details a meeting between the PAO and
Al Jazeera's Managing Director, Wadah Khanfar, a
Palestinian, as they note. It appears that
Khanfar tried to be a sort of middleman, gracious
and understanding toward the U.S., remembering
fondly how prior to 9/11 Al Jazeera "was regarded
by the USG and the western world as a great asset
and symbol of progress in the region" (emphasis
added), and yet paying some respect to being independent and critical.
When the PAO (Nantongo appears as an indelicate
person, hardly diplomatic, rather colonial) asked
Khanfar how he viewed Al Jazeera's relations with
the U.S. Government, Khanfar at first held back
and shifted the focus to Arab governments. While
noting "mistakes" on both sides between Al
Jazeera and the U.S., the diplomatic Khanfar
seemed cheered and optimistic that a
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05DOHA1593.html>"turning
point" had recently been reached in U.S.-Al
Jazeera relations, that is, "when detailed,
practical exchanges began to take place between
the two sides." "AJ remains open to such input
and indeed welcomes it," said Khanfar: "We have
been more able to respond since we have received
input. It is now a practical discussion, a much
more healthy relationship." Khanfar asserted:
"Al Jazeera is not there to be anti-American. Absolutely not."
Karen Hughes, Bush's public diplomacy envoy to
the Middle East mentioned above,
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DOHA317.html>personally
paid a visit to Al Jazeera in 2006 and had a
meeting with Khanfar and four other senior Al
Jazeera staff members (Chief Editor Ahmed Sheikh,
Deputy Chief Editor Ayman Gaballa, and senior
presenters Mohamed Krishan and Jamil
Azar). Hughes complained that Al Jazeera's Iraq
coverage was not neutral and "respectful"
enough. In response, Khanfar made some telling
remarks, criticizing the Iraqi resistance and
promising partnership with the U.S. and its goals of occupation:
We see ourselves as your partners in this, not as
something to create problems. We are interested
in stability in Iraq. It is clear that
incitement has led nowhere. . . . We see ourselves as partners.
Hughes objected to Al Jazeera showing any
videotapes at all that came from the insurgents
or Al Qaeda, effectively seeking to ban the rest
of us from ever hearing or learning from those
fighting the U.S. (a policy mirrored by
YouTube). Hughes then told Khanfar that she
would place "two or three USG spokespeople on a
permanent basis in Dubai's Media City, who would
be available for comment at any time on a
complete range of issues." Khanfar was open to
this and requested U.S. speakers with expertise
on U.S. policy in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and other areas. He added that he
would appreciate having U.S. Government
spokespeople "on tap." In 2008, in a cable
section subtitled
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08DOHA845.html>"Hand
Holding Appears to Work," the PAO notes that Al
Jazeera had requested that the U.S. "Embassy
provide names of well-known Americans who may be
willing to appear" -- the PAO agreed and further
offered "to show producers how to search for
academics, authors, think-tank members and former
USG officials and state officials who could offer
their views on specific topics." In 2008, the
U.S. Embassy sensed "goodwill" from Al Jazeera
and much more "balanced" coverage (i.e. favorable
to the U.S.). The Embassy vowed "to take
advantage of this positive trend by seeking
placement of more U.S. voices, both official and
private, on Al Jazeera in the coming months and
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08DOHA845.html>closely
monitoring the performance of producers and interviewers."
Also to be noted is that when Hughes spoke of
issues of "professionalism" she directly tied the
notion to Al Jazeera's content, "particularly as
it relates to Iraq coverage and to the airing of
terrorist-provided videotapes." It is quite
clear here what professionalism means and why it
become the handy trope for U.S. political
interference. Hughes called for a more "civil
and respectful dialogue," a classic line commonly
used by those who would practice
counterinsurgency through discourse, schooling
opponents in "manners" that will, it is hoped,
render them more quiet and docile. The U.S. team
accompanying Hughes to Al Jazeera, which included
Ambassador Chase Untermeyer, the Near Eastern
Affairs/Press and Public Diplomacy Director
Alberto Fernandez, and PAO Mirembe Nantongo,
asked Al Jazeera to hand over a copy of its
editorial policy, while complaining of the
"caliber" of the people Al Jazeera invited as guests on its talk shows.
Two years after Hughes, during the
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08DOHA581.html>visit
of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff
Member Perry Cammack, the point was raised with
Khanfar about the obviously lessened coverage of
Al Qaeda on Al Jazeera. This was in part due to
Al Jazeera trying to "curry favor" with the Iraqi
government, seeking to have Al Jazeera allowed
back into Iraq. In a meeting that same year
(2008) with Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy,
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_K._Glassman>James
K. Glassman, Wadah Khanfar stated that relations
with the U.S. Government are "much better than
before" and that Al Jazeera no longer airs
"extremist" recordings unedited, and it
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08DOHA633.html>"attempts
to check facts with the USG before airing
coverage of incidents involving the U.S. military."
Khanfar,
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05DOHA1976.html>on
other occasions, would repeat that Al Jazeera is
not "anti-US" and "does not espouse any kind of
'anti-US editorial policy'." As if sensing that
Khanfar feared the conversation would shape up to
be one where he would be humiliated into assuming
the role of a mere U.S. puppet, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs,
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/134069.htm>Gordon
Gray,
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05DOHA1976.html>said
to him: "We are not asking Al Jazeera to become a
tool of the US Government; what we are asking for
is its professionalism." DAS Gray asked Khanfar
if he would like to see greater cooperation
between Al Jazeera and the U.S. Government, "in
the area of boosting Al Jazeera's
professionalism"(emphasis added), and he
mentioned the U.S. International Visitor
program. Note how Gray characterizes Khanfar's
response: "Khanfar acquiesced immediately"
(emphasis added). Khanfar went as far as saying
that his staff hold a very generalized picture of
the U.S. and could benefit from more
exposure. Khanfar also pleaded for more U.S.
Government officials to appear on Al
Jazeera. Indeed, Khanfar was openly resentful of
the U.S. favoritism displayed toward Al Arabiya,
its Saudi-owned competitor (and
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DOHA80.html>again
in 2009 he repeated this invidious complaint).
Professionalism, once more, became the way of
framing the manner in which the U.S. government
would exert direct influence over Al
Jazeera. That there has been substantial
influence is evidenced by the range of documents
-- but clearly that influence would only be
acceptable to senior people at Al Jazeera as long
as it was respectfully packaged in terms of
professional integrity, rather than outright political subservience.
When it came to coverage of Haiti, on Al Jazeera
English, we see a glaring example of the U.S.
exercising pressure to fundamentally transform Al
Jazeera's coverage and of the manner in which the
latter quickly acquiesced. In a cable from
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10DOHA24.html>January
20, 2010, written by the U.S. Ambassador to
Qatar, Joseph LeBaron, we see his hackles raised
at the way Al Jazeera English depicted the U.S.
"humanitarian intervention" in Haiti in terms
similar to an occupation. We learn that within
hours of Ambassador LeBaron notifying Near
Eastern Affairs/Press and Public Diplomacy, the
U.S. had one of its officials appear on Al
Jazeera English. Judith McHale, Under Secretary
of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,
also contacted Tony Burman, Director of Al
Jazeera English -- the U.S. Embassy in Doha first
contacted Burman and "ensured that Burman was
ready for the call and understood the serious
concerns that the Under Secretary would
convey." The U.S. Embassy continued to monitor
Al Jazeera's coverage, and noted that within
three days "AJE's coverage had evolved
markedly." Ambassador LeBaron added the final
note to this,
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10DOHA24.html#par5>promising
more intervention should Al Jazeera English
depart in any way from representing the U.S. in less than laudatory terms:
Ambassador has directed Embassy staff to continue
monitoring AJE's reporting, and to communicate
these observations immediately to Washington. If
AJE, or any of Al Jazeera's channels, revert to
inaccurate coverage, Ambassador will not hesitate
to intervene at higher levels, starting with the
Qatari Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Al Jazeera Network.
Imported Journalism: High Quality Always Comes from Away (Say the Colonized)
Driven to go global, Al Jazeera established an
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06DOHA104.html>international
advisory body, "consisting of respected
international journalism figures to assess and
advise on Al Jazeera operations," known as the
"Al Jazeera International Board of
Visitors." This group, which would play a
quality assurance role (more below), includes the
input of such people as CNN's
<http://www.franksesno.net/>Frank Sesno;
<http://csis.org/expert/richard-r-burt>Richard
Burt, senior adviser to the Washington Center for
Strategic International Studies (CSIS), a former
U.S. ambassador and a former New York Times
correspondent; and a range of other journalists,
from France 3 Television, Die Zeit, to the BBC.
Institutions of British and French journalism
have worked to
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/11/05DOHA1803.html>train
the staff of Al Jazeera, which has also developed
a relationship with the University of Missouri's
School of Journalism. Al Jazeera's training
center has no staff of its own, but "imports
trainers on an as-needed basis from various
British/French/US journalism institutions,"
including the UK's Thomson Foundation and
France's Ecole Superieure de Journalisme de
Lille. Al Jazeera's training courses are
conducted in English. The training center --
which functions as a foreign assimilation agent
-- aims to spread its influence throughout the
Arab world, by training staff from the region's
media outlets. It reported dozens of courses in
a single year, with thousands of
participants. Al Jazeera's training center also
participated in the U.S.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_East_Partnership_Initiative>Middle
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), established
by Secretary of State Colin Powell during the
first term of the George W. Bush administration,
and supervised by Liz Cheney, to aid local "agents of change" in the region.
It should be understood that the Al Jazeera
training center also sought to teach
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06DOHA104.html>"political
awareness" according to Al Jazeera's Managing
Director -- keep in mind where the trainers come
from and where the trainees go -- and that
trainers from the UK's Thomson School of
Journalism would teach local staff about the
"philosophical, historical and political aspects
of their job" (he might have meant what is now
the
<http://www.trust.org/services/reuters-institute/>Reuters
Institute in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford).
Al Jazeera English, launched in 2006, involved a
fast track to mimicking mainstream corporate
journalism by in fact hiring directly from
mainstream corporate circles --
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06DOHA104.html>"big-name
media recruits from all parts of the world" were
to join Al Jazeera's colony in Doha (I mean that
literally, as the journalists live in gated
communities with little prospect of interacting
with locals). One of their American hires,
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08DOHA283.html>Dave
Marash, "excoriated the station for taking on an
anti-American bent" and left -- although Al
Jazeera staff downplayed his stated reasons,
noting that he had much more personal grievances
and that in any case the charge of
anti-Americanism was leveled not at the Qatari
and other Arab staff, but rather at
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08DOHA283.html>the
British employees. Al Jazeera's local staff, for
their part, complained about the British staff
for being arrogant and "acting like colonialists."
In 2006, control of the English website was
handed over to Al Jazeera English and its
editor-in-chief,
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06DOHA328.html>Russell
Merryman, a British national. Al Jazeera's
website director, Al Mahmoud, previously
responsible for both the English and Arabic
versions, was clearly
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1734.html#par8>unhappy
with this rearrangement.
Even those who are not themselves outsiders to
the Middle East and North Africa, such as
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1786.html>Jaafar
Abbas Ahmed, are BBC-trained, Abbas being one who
took up residence in Doha after working for the
BBC for over a decade. We are told that a
"significant number" of the earliest Al Jazeera
journalists
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1786.html>came
from the BBC. Al Jazeera's quality assurance
team (more on this below) will regularly "record
BBC and CNN coverage" of an event also covered by
Al Jazeera "and compare it critically to AJ's
coverage." In addition, Al Jazeera English
produced a "code of conduct" for its journalists
that is virtually
<http://wikileaks.cabledrum.net/cable/2006/05/06DOHA793.html#par8>indistinguishable
from the BBC's document.
The Emir of Qatar and Al Jazeera
The Doha cables are interesting for other points,
which contextualized how Qatar deploys Al Jazeera
and how Qatar constructs its foreign policy. The
Qatari regime is, after all, one of the nations
that actively engaged in bombing Libya and has
been funding and arming the opposition to Col.
Gaddafi. One of the stated reasons for the
foreign military intervention in Libya is that of
creating a new democracy, with political freedoms
for the opposition. How ironic it is to be
reminded of the absence of these freedoms in
Qatar. As the speakers in
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/06/05DOHA1039.html>one
cable explain, "economic and political power are
overwhelmingly in the hands of the state. . .
. Qatar does not have a formal opposition. In
fact, political parties are not legal . . .
criticizing the government brings the risk of
losing benefits and preferences for themselves
and their families, such as housing and
education." Promised democratic reforms are
viewed by Qatari critics as merely designed to
enhance the international image of the
regime. The Emir can withdraw any amount of
money from the Treasury, at will, and not have to
answer to anyone: state funds are personal
funds. Even with the reforms, the ruling family
remains unanswerable to any national
institution. Individuals can be detained and
held without charge for up to six months (or
longer, subject to the approval of the Prime
Minister), in the "public interest." Members of
the Al-Murra tribe have been stripped of their
Qatari nationality. And, much as U.S.
commentators criticized Qatar for sponsoring a
unit like Al Jazeera, which seemingly gave play
to jihadist voices, the fact revealed in one
cable is that the government of Qatar
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08DOHA301.html>"sometimes
'helps' Israel's security service."
One cable makes it clear that Qatari officials
"view AJ, both English and Arabic, as
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08DOHA283.html>important
tools of Qatari foreign policy." In a meeting
with Senator John Kerry on February 13, 2010,
Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani
declared that
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10DOHA71.html#par18>"we
would stop Al Jazeera for a year" if it meant
that Egypt would alter its foreign policy on the
Palestinians, which clearly shows where the real
power ultimately lies in determining Al Jazeera's
content and that the content is open to
negotiation between the parties that have power
over Al Jazeera. As for Al Jazeera English, it
is made to hew
"<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08DOHA283.html>as
closely to Doha's political line as AJ's Arabic channel."
We should also note that the Managing Director,
Khanfar, stated that the Emir does not interfere
in Al Jazeera's
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08DOHA633.html>operations,
which might be a very careful choice of words
from someone who seems to always choose his words
very carefully. However, as the U.S. Embassy
noted,
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09DOHA318.html>"Al
Jazeera has resolutely steered away from . . .
reporting on anything politically controversial
in Qatar." The Chairman of Al Jazeera is himself
a member of the royal family that rules Qatar.
Likewise, we must note that the U.S. Embassy told
Washington that it was ready to help exploit Al
Jazeera's openness
"<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DOHA103.html#par9>through
direct diplomacy with Qatar's ruling family and
members of Al Jazeera's Doha
headquarters." Elsewhere, Ambassador LeBaron insisted that,
to help improve the USG's image on the Arab
street, we need to step up USG senior-level
engagement of the Qatari
leadership.
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DOHA116.html>Better
relations with the ruling al-Thani family will
translate into changes in al-Jazeera coverage
that will gradually help improve the image of the
United States in the Arab street.
While admitting that Al Jazeera has been great
for Qatar's, and the Emir's, international public
profile, Khanfar asserted that Al Jazeera did not
see itself as part of any reform movement,
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08DOHA633.html>nor
was it the voice of the Arabs.
Responsible + Professional = Imperial
Indeed, Khanfar demonstrated how in practice U.S.
inputs and
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05DOHA1593.html>"quality
assurance" to ensure "professionalism,"
"balance," and "objectivity" would tilt the news
coverage to better favor U.S. interests. Khanfar
told the PAO about Al Jazeera's daily quality
assurance meeting that "meeting is very tight,
tighter even than your list." (We do not know
what list the PAO had with her.) Khanfar
described how Al Jazeera changed its choice of
terms, to mollify U.S. concerns: instead of "the
resistance," they would now refer to "military
groups"; instead of "the occupation," they would
now blandly speak of the "multinational force" --
all of which perfectly echoes the way NATO's ISAF
frames its daily press narrative in Afghanistan.
It is also significant to note that the
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1786.html>U.S.
Embassy's PAO would also meet with the head of Al
Jazeera's "quality assurance" team, Jaafar Abbas
Ahmed, thereby having a direct input into what
was discussed at the quality assurance meetings,
even if the participants might not be aware of
the PAO's prior meeting with their
director. Abbas notes resistance from the older
generation of journalists in Al Jazeera and
praises Wadah Khanfar, who opened Al Jazeera to
the U.S. Embassy, as a "source of strength"
(presumably in strengthening Abbas' hand
vis-à-vis the recalcitrant holdouts). Abbas
describes his QA unit as a "tumor" that staff
have come to live with -- he also promised a
computerized database of all Al Jazeera staff,
keeping them under surveillance for any "biased"
remarks. It is interesting to note Abbas' chatty
friendliness with the PAO, as if speaking to an
insider, or a fellow director, as they roll their
eyes at the unruly natives. Similarly, on
another occasion, Abbas went as far as calling Al
Jazeera's interview producers
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08DOHA845.html#par2>"idiots,"
when speaking to the Embassy's PAO.
Khanfar was there to be America's "Mr. Fix It":
"Where there is a problem -- whether we learn
about it from you, from our QA team, or from
another source -- we fix it
immediately." Khanfar in fact asked that he too
should directly receive the DIA's reports
analyzing Al Jazeera's coverage, because the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was too slow in
passing them on. The Embassy agreed, noting that
Khanfar "clearly takes them seriously." The U.S.
continued to insist that Al Jazeera not broadcast
insurgent videos or "provocative
interviews." The
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05DOHA1593.html>U.S.
Embassy praised Khanfar as someone who is
"clearly committed to bringing Al Jazeera up to
professional international standards of
journalism" and who "seems to be not only open to
criticism but to welcome it." On numerous
occasions Khanfar is clearly responsive to U.S.
criticisms of Al Jazeera content, especially on
its <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1765.html>website.
Questions of Complicity
"[W]e should make strategic use of the Al Jazeera
television network." --
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09DOHA103.html>Joseph
E. LeBaron, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, February 10, 2009
It is important to note -- since some will want
to raise this issue as solid proof that the U.S.
related to Al Jazeera as it would to any of its
enemies, i.e. by planning lethal actions -- that
here too the cables are useful. Written from
insiders, and meant for private consumption by
other insiders in the U.S. foreign relations
apparatus, former Ambassador Untermeyer utterly
dismisses as
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05DOHA1937.html>"absurd"
any notion that Bush planned to bomb the Doha
headquarters of Al Jazeera. As he logically
points out, it would be absurd because it would
in fact be a military attack on a friendly
nation, and he calls on his government to issue a
stronger denial than it had to date.
When it comes to the substance of U.S. relations
with Al Jazeera, the questions that should come
to mind are: What does responsible
mean? Responsible for what? Responsible to
whom? What is balance, and how is the truth
balanced when the idea itself implies that
something else must be a lie? Why is balance
important, when airing long-suppressed and
regularly marginalized voices? What is
objectivity, when one is subject to pressure and
made to fear for his/her career? What is
professionalism and why does it always seemingly
resolve to a default position of not upsetting the status quo?
When the U.S. government is so clearly bent on
dominating the message, on performing routine
acts of daily censorship through intimate and
secretive pressure behind the scenes, and when
notions of professionalism, balance, and
objectivity become mere imperial code for
subservience to U.S. interests, it is no wonder
that WikiLeaks itself should be accused of being
. . . guess what? Irresponsible, unprofessional,
and anti-American! Long live irresponsibility,
because journalism certainly is dead.
It should come as no surprise that there will be
those who read these cables and yet, wishing to
preserve a veneer of legitimacy and credibility
for Al Jazeera, stress that it is not a "simple
mouthpiece" for the U.S. Government. A
simplemouthpiece it is not -- the tilt in Al
Jazeera's coverage is something that evidently
needs to be negotiated and reaffirmed
daily. Where American journalists practice
self-censorship, consciously or not, there are
also broadly cultural and narrowly ideological
reasons for doing so, and the solidarity between
the press corps and the imperial state may be an
"organic" one. Not being steeped in U.S.
politics and culture, Al Jazeera requires a more
hands-on form of instruction -- hand holding --
and, here, any solidarity is more of a
"mechanical" one. The relationship that the U.S.
has with Al Jazeera could put
<http://video.google.ca/videoplay?docid=6737097743434902428>OutFoxed!
in a somewhat minor light: as much as many revile
the power of Murdoch and Fox News, that outfit
has yet to impact a population targeted by U.S.
foreign policy as much as Al Jazeera, and is
certainly not owned by a state, with an air force
and troops, and an active combatant in Libya to boot.
Notes:
1. Full disclosure: Following an hour-long
interview on Al Jazeera Arabic in 2010, I agreed
to write a series of paid columns for the Al
Jazeera Arabic website. This article is not
written on the basis of any of my very minimal
insider knowledge, and I should indicate that at
no point did any Al Jazeera staff seek to impose
an editorial policy on my writing. In my
interactions with Al Jazeera staff I have never
known them to be anything other than extremely
professional, patient, and generous. In March of
2011 I terminated my relationship with Al
Jazeera, for political reasons, on the basis of
its coverage of Libya and Bahrain, and the
political ends to which Al Jazeera was used by
the Qatari state and its U.S. ally in the war against Libya.
2. The complete package of 40 cables on which
much of this article was based have been compiled
and made available as a PDF download, which can
also be embedded online:
<http://www.box.net/shared/96u7jio1b62px9trp1on>please click here.
----------
Maximilian C. Forte is an associate professor in
anthropology at Concordia University in Montreal,
Canada. His website is at
<http://www.openanthropology.org>www.openanthropology.org.
Cf. Maximilian Forte,
<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte200411.html>"The
War in Libya: Race, 'Humanitarianism,' and the
Media" (MRZine, 20 April 2011); Maximilian Forte,
<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/forte100811.html>"Libya
-- Lather, Rinse, Repeat -- Syria: Liberal
Imperialism and the Refusal to Learn" (MRZine, 10
August 2011); Maximilian Forte,
<http://bit.ly/rbi7FS>"The Top Ten Myths in the
War against Libya" (CounterPunch, 31 August 2011)
Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
415 863-9977
www.Freedomarchives.org
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