[News] Israeli Spying in the United States
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Thu Mar 12 11:45:48 EDT 2009
http://www.counterpunch.org/ketcham03122009.html
March 12 , 2009
Full-Spectrum Penetration
Israeli Spying in the United States
By CHRISTOPHER KETCHAM
Scratch a counterintelligence officer in the U.S.
government and they'll tell you that Israel is
not a friend to the United States.
This is because Israel runs one of the most
aggressive and damaging espionage networks targeting the U.S..
The fact of Israeli penetration into the country
is not a subject oft-discussed in the media or in
the circles of governance, due to the extreme
sensitivity of the U.S.-Israel relationship
coupled with the burden of the Israel lobby,
which punishes legislators who dare to criticize
the Jewish state. The void where the facts
should sit is filled instead with the
hallucinations of conspiracy theory -- the kind
in which, for example, agents of the Mossad,
Israels top intelligence agency, engineer the
9/11 attacks, while 4,000 Israelis in the Twin
Towers somehow all get word to escape before the
planes hit. The effect, as disturbing as it is
ironic, is that the less the truth is addressed,
the more noxious the falsity that spreads.
Israel's spying on the U.S., however, is a matter
of public record, and neither conspiracy nor
theory is needed to present the evidence. When
the FBI produces its annual report to Congress
concerning "Foreign Economic Collection and
Industrial Espionage," Israel and its
intelligence services often feature prominently
as a threat second only to China. In 2005 the FBI
noted, for example, that Israel maintains "an
active program to gather proprietary information
within the United States." A key Israeli method,
said the FBI report, is computer intrusion. In
1996, the Defense Intelligence Service, a branch
of the Pentagon, issued a warning that "the
collection of scientific intelligence in the
United States [is] the third highest priority of
Israeli Intelligence after information on its
Arab neighbors and information on secret U.S.
policies or decisions relating to Israel."
In 1979, the Central Intelligence Agency produced
a scathing survey of Israeli intelligence
activities that targeted the U.S.
government. Like any worthy spy service, Israeli
intelligence early on employed wiretaps as an
effective tool, according to the CIA report. In
1954, the U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv discovered
in his office a hidden microphone "planted by the
Israelis," and two years later telephone taps
were found in the residence of the U.S. military
attaché. In a telegram to Washington, the
ambassador at the time cabled a warning:
"Department must assume that all conversations
[in] my office are known to the Israelis." The
former ambassador to Qatar, Andrew Killgore, who
also served as a foreign officer in Jerusalem and
Beirut, told me Israeli taps of U.S. missions and
embassies in the Middle East were part of a "standard operating procedure."
According to the 1979 CIA report, the Israelis,
while targeting political secrets, also devote "a
considerable portion of their covert operations
to obtaining scientific and technical
intelligence." These operations involved, among
other machinations, "attempts to penetrate
certain classified defense projects in the United
States." The penetrations, according to the CIA
report, were effected using "deep cover
enterprises," which the report described as
"firms and organizations, some specifically
created for, or adaptable to, a specific
objective." At the time, the CIA singled out
government-subsidized companies such as El Al
airlines and Zim, the Israeli shipping firm, as deep cover enterprises.
Other deep cover operations included the
penetration of a U.S. company that provided
weapons-grade uranium to the Department of
Defense during the 1960s; Israeli agents
eventually spirited home an estimated 200 pounds
of uranium as the bulwark in Israels secret
nuclear weapons program. Moles have burrowed on
Israels behalf throughout the U.S. intelligence
services. Perhaps most infamous was the case of
Jonathan Pollard, a Jewish-American employed as a
civilian analyst with the U.S. Navy who purloined
an estimated 800,000 code-word protected
documents from inside the CIA, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and numerous other U.S. agencies.
While Pollard was sentenced to life in prison,
counterintelligence investigators at the FBI
suspected he was linked to a mole far higher in
the food chain, ensconced somewhere in the DIA,
but this suspected Israeli operative, nicknamed
"Mr. X," was never found. Following the
embarrassment of the Pollard affair -- and its
devastating effects on U.S. national security, as
testified by then Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger (who allegedly stated that Pollard
"should have been shot") -- the Israeli
government vowed never again to pursue espionage
against its ally and chief benefactor.
Fast-forward a quarter century, and the vow has
proven empty. In 2004, the authoritative Jane's
Intelligence Group noted that Israel's
intelligence organizations "have been spying on
the U.S. and running clandestine operations since
Israel was established." The former deputy
director of counterintelligence at FBI, Harry B.
Brandon, last year told Congressional Quarterly
magazine that "the Israelis are interested in
commercial as much as military secrets. They have
a muscular technology sector
themselves." According to CQ, "One effective
espionage tool is forming joint partnerships with
U.S. companies to supply software and other
technology products to U.S. government agencies."
Best-selling author James Bamford now adds
another twist in this history of infiltration in
a book published last October,
"<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0385521324/counterpunchmaga>The
Shadow Factory," which forms the latest
installment in his trilogy of investigations into
the super-secret National Security
Agency. Bamford is regarded among journalists
and intelligence officers as the nations expert
on the workings of the NSA, whose inner sanctums
he first exposed to the public in 1982. (So
precise is his reporting that NSA officers once
threw him a book party, despite the fact that he
continually reveals their secrets.)
The agency has come a long way in the
half-century since its founding in 1952. Armed
with digital technology and handed vast new
funding and an almost limitless mandate in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks, Bamford writes, the NSA
has today "become the largest, most costly, and
most technologically sophisticated spy
organization the world has ever known." The NSA
touches on every facet of U.S. communications,
its mega-computers secretly filtering "millions
of phone calls and e-mails" every hour of
operation. For those who have followed the
revelations of the NSAs "warrantless
wiretapping" program in the
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.htm>New
York Times in 2005 and the
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120511973377523845.html?mod=hps_us_whats_news%E2%80%9D>Wall
Street
Journal<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120511973377523845.html?mod=hps_us_whats_news%E2%80%9D>
last year, what Bamford unveils in "The Shadow
Factory" is only confirmation of the worst fears:
"There is now the capacity," he writes of the
NSAs tentacular reach into the private lives of
Americans, "to make tyranny total."
Much less has been reported about the high-tech
Israeli wiretapping firms that service U.S.
telecommunications companies, primarily AT&T and
Verizon, whose networks serve as the chief
conduits for NSA surveillance. Even less is
known about the links between those Israeli
companies and the Israeli intelligence
services. But what Bamford suggests in his book
accords with the history of Israeli spying in the
U.S.: Through joint partnerships with U.S.
telecoms, Israel may be a shadow arm of
surveillance among the tentacles of the NSA. In
other words, when the NSA violates constitutional
protections against unlawful search and seizure
to vacuum up the contents of your telephone
conversations and e-mail traffic, the Israeli
intelligence services may be gathering it up too
-- a kind of mirror tap that is effectively a two-government-in-one violation.
***
On its face, the overseas outsourcing of
high-tech services would seem de rigueur in a
competitive globalized marketplace. Equipment
and services from Israels telecom sector are
among the countrys prime exports, courtesy of
Israeli entrepreneurs who have helped pioneer
wireless telephony, voicemail and voice
recognition software, instant messaging, phone
billing software, and, not least, "communications
interception solutions." Israeli telecom
interception hardware and software is appraised
as some of the best in the world.
By the mid-1990s, Israeli wiretap firms would
arrive in the U.S. in a big way. The key to the
kingdom was the 1994 Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which was
Congress solution for wiretapping in the digital
age. Gone are the days when wiretaps were
conducted through on-site tinkering with copper
switches. CALEA mandated that telephonic
surveillance operate through computers linked
directly into the routers and hubs of telecom
companies -- a spyware apparatus matched in
real-time, all the time, to American telephones
and modems. CALEA effectively made spy equipment
an inextricable ligature in telephonic
life. Without CALEA, the NSA in its spectacular
surveillance exploits could not have succeeded.
AT&T and Verizon, which together manage as much
as 90 percent of the nations communications
traffic, contracted with Israeli firms in order
to comply with CALEA. AT&T employed the services
of Narus Inc., which was founded in Israel in
1997. It was Narus technology that AT&T
whistleblower Mark Klein, a 22-year technician
with the company, famously unveiled in a 2006
affidavit that described the operations in AT&Ts
secret tapping room at its San Francisco
facilities. (Kleins affidavit formed the
gravamen of a lawsuit against AT&T mounted by the
Electronic Freedom Foundation, but the lawsuit
died when Congress passed the telecom immunity
bill last year.) According to Klein, the Narus
supercomputer, the STA 6400, was "known to be
used particularly by government intelligence
agencies because of its ability to sift through
large amounts of data looking for preprogrammed
targets." The Narus system, which was maintained
by Narus technicans, also provided a real-time
mirror image of all data streaming through AT&T
routers, an image to be rerouted into the computers of the NSA.
According to Jim Bamford, who cites knowledgeable
sources, Verizons eavesdropping program is run
by a competing Israeli firm called Verint, a
subsidiary of Comverse Technology, which was
founded by a former Israeli intelligence officer
in 1984. Incorporated in New York and Tel Aviv,
Comverse is effectively an arm of the Israeli
government: 50 percent of its R&D costs are
reimbursed by the Israeli Ministry of Industry
and Trade. The Verint technology deployed
throughout Verizons network, known as STAR-GATE,
boasts an array of Orwellian capabilities. "With
STAR-GATE, service providers can access
communications on virtually any type of network,"
according to the companys literature. "Designed
to manage vast numbers of targets, concurrent
sessions, call data records, and communications,
STAR-GATE transparently accesses targeted
communications without alerting subscribers or disrupting service."
As with the Narus system, the point is to be able
to tap into communications unobtrusively, in real
time, all the time. A Verint spinoff firm,
PerSay, takes the tap to the next stage,
deploying "advanced voice mining," which singles
out "a targets voice within a large volume of
intercepted calls, regardless of the conversation
content or method of communication." Verints
interception systems have gone global since the
late 1990s, and sales in 2006 reached $374
million (a doubling of its revenues over
2003). More than 5,000 organizations -- mostly
intelligence services and police units -- in at
least 100 countries today use Verint technology.
What troubles Bamford is that executives and
directors at companies like Narus and Verint
formerly worked at or maintain close connections
with the Israeli intelligence services, including
Mossad; the internal security agency Shin Bet;
and the Israeli version of the NSA, Unit 8200, an
arm of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence
Corps. Unit 8200, which Bamford describes as
"hypersecret," is a key player in the
eavesdropping industrial complex in Israel, its
retired personnel dispersed throughout dozens of
companies. According to Haaretz, the Israeli
daily, "Many of the [eavesdropping] technologies
in use around the world and developed in Israel
were originally military technologies and were
developed and improved by [Unit 8200]
veterans." A former commander of Unit 8200,
cited by Bamford, states that Verint technology
was "directly influenced by 8200
technology
.[Verint parent company] Comverses
main product, the Logger, is based on the Units technology."
The implications for U.S. national security,
writes Bamford, are "unnerving." "Virtually the
entire American telecommunications system," he
avers, "is bugged by [Israeli-formed] companies
with possible ties to Israels eavesdropping
agency." Congress, he says, maintains no
oversight of these companies operations, and
even their contracts with U.S. telecoms --
contracts pivotal to NSA surveillance -- are
considered trade secrets and go undisclosed in company statements.
U.S. intelligence officers have not been quiet in
their concerns about Verint (I reported on this
matter in
<http://www.counterpunch.org/ketcham09272008.html>CounterPunch.org
last September). "Phone calls are intercepted,
recorded, and transmitted to U.S. investigators
by Verint, which claims that it has to be hands
on with its equipment to maintain the system,"
says former CIA counterterrorism officer Philip
Giraldi. The "hands on" factor is what bothers
Giraldi, specifically because of the possibility
of a "trojan" embedded in Verint wiretap
software. A trojan in information security
hardware/software is a backdoor that can be
accessed remotely by parties who normally would
not have access to the secure system.
Allegations of widespread trojan spying have
rocked the Israeli business community in recent
years. "Top Israeli blue chip companies,"
reported the AP in 2005, "are suspected of using
illicit surveillance software to steal
information from their rivals and enemies." Over
40 companies have come under scrutiny. "It is
the largest cybercrime case in Israeli history,"
Boaz Guttmann, a veteran cybercrimes investigator
with the Israeli national police, told
me. "Trojan horse espionage is part of the way
of life of companies in Israel. Its a culture of spying."
In a wide-ranging four-part investigation into
Israel-linked espionage that aired in December
2001, Carl Cameron, a correspondent at Fox News
Channel, reported the distress among U.S.
intelligence officials warning about possible
trojans cached in Verint technology. Sources
told Cameron that "while various FBI inquiries
into [Verint] have been conducted over the
years," the inquiries had "been halted before the
actual equipment has ever been thoroughly tested
for leaks." Cameron also cited a 1999 internal
FCC document indicating that "several government
agencies expressed deep concerns that too many
unauthorized non-law enforcement personnel can
access the wiretap system." Much of this access
was facilitated through "remote maintenance."
The Fox News report reverberated throughout U.S.
law enforcement, particularly at the Drug
Enforcement Agency, which makes extensive use of
wiretaps for narcotics interdiction. Security
officers at DEA, an adjunct of the Justice
Department, began examining the agencys own
relationship with Comverse/Verint. In 1997, DEA
had transformed its wiretap infrastructure with
the $25 million procurement from Comverse/Verint
of a technology called "T2S2" -- "translation and
transcription support services" -- with
Comverse/Verint contracted to provide the
hardware and software. The company was also
tasked with "support services, training,
upgrades, enhancements and options throughout the
life of the contract," according to the DEAs
"contracts and acquisitions" notice. In the wake
of the Fox News investigation, however, the
director of security programs at DEA, Heidi
Raffanello, was rattled enough to issue an
internal communiqué on the matter, dated Dec. 18,
2001. Directly referencing Fox News, she worried
that "Comverse remote maintenance" was "not
addressed in the C&A [contracts and acquisitions]
process
.It remains unclear if Comverse personnel
are security cleared, and if so, who are they and
what type of clearances are on record
.Bottom
line we should have caught it." It is not known
what resulted from DEAs review of the issue of
remote maintenance and access by Comverse/Verint.
Bamford devotes a portion of his argument to the
detailing of the operations of a third Israeli
wiretap company, NICE Systems, which he describes
as "a major eavesdropper in the U.S." that "keeps
its government and commercial client list very
secret." Formed in 1986 by seven veterans of
Unit 8200, NICE software "captures voice, email,
chat, screen activity, and essential call
details," while offering "audio compression
technology that performs continuous recordings of
up to thousands of analog and digital telephone
lines and radio channels." NICE Systems has on
at least one occasion shown up on the radar of
U.S. counterintelligence. During 2000-2001, when
agents at the FBI and the CIA
began investigating allegations that Israeli
nationals posing as "art students" were in fact
conducting espionage on U.S. soil, one of the
Israeli "art students" was discovered to be an
employee with NICE Systems. Among the targets of
the art students were facilities and offices of
the Drug Enforcement Agency nationwide. The same
Israeli employee of NICE Systems, who was
identified as a former operative in the Israeli
intelligence services, was carrying a disk that
contained a file labeled "DEA Groups." U.S.
counterintelligence officers concluded it was a
highly suspicious nexus: An Israeli national and
alleged spy was working for an Israeli wiretap
company while carrying in his possession computer
information regarding the Drug Enforcement Agency
-- at the same time this Israeli was conducting
what the DEA described as "intelligence gathering" about DEA facilities.
***
A former senior counterintelligence official in
the Bush administration told me that as early as
1999, "CIA was very concerned about [Israeli
wiretapping companies]" -- Verint in
particular. "I know that CIA has tried to
monitor what the Israelis were doing --
technically watch what they were doing on the
networks in terms of remote access. Other
countries were concerned as well," said the
intelligence official. Jim Bamford, who notes
that Verint "can automatically access the
mega-terabytes of stored and real-time data
secretly and remotely from anywhere," reports
that Australian lawmakers in 2004 held hearings
on this remote monitoring capability. "[Y]ou can
access data from overseas," the lawmakers told a
Verint representative during the hearings, "but
[the legislature] seems restricted to access data
within that system." The Australians found this astonishing.
In 2000, the Canadian intelligence service, the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, conducted "a probe
related to allegations that [Israeli] spies used
rigged software to hack into Canada's top secret
intelligence files," according to an article in
the Toronto Star. Several sources in the U.S.
intelligence community told me the Canadians
liaised with their American counterparts to try to understand the problem.
According to the Bush administration official who
spoke with me, "the Dutch also had come to the
CIA very concerned about what the Israelis were
doing with this." The Dutch intelligence
service, under contract with Verint, "had
discovered strange things were going on -- there
was activity on the network, the Israelis
uploading and downloading stuff out of the
switches, remotely, and apparently using it for
their own wiretap purposes. The CIA was very
embarrassed to say, We have the same
problem. But the CIA didnt have an answer for
them. We hear you, were surprised, and we understand your concern."
Indeed, sources in the Dutch counterintelligence
community in 2002 claimed there was "strong
evidence that the Israeli secret service has
uncontrolled access to confidential tapping data
collected by the Dutch police and intelligence
services," according to the Dutch broadcast radio
station Evangelische Omroep (EO). In January
2003, the respected Dutch technology and
computing magazine, CT, ran a follow-up to the
EO story, headlined "Dutch Tapping Room not
Kosher." The article states: "All tapping
equipment of the Dutch intelligence services and
half the tapping equipment of the national police
force [is] insecure and is leaking information to Israel."
"The key to this whole thing is that Australian
meeting," Bamford told me in a recent interview.
"They accused Verint of remote access and Verint
said they wont do it again -- which implies they
were doing it in the past. Its a matter of a
backdoor into the system, and those backdoors
should not be allowed to exist. You can tell by
the Australian example that it was certainly a
concern of Australian lawmakers."
Congress doesnt seem to share the
concern. "Part of the responsibility of
Congress," says Bamford, "is not just to oversee
the intelligence community but to look into the
companies with which the intelligence community
contracts. Theyre just very sloppy about
this." According to the Bush administration
intelligence official who spoke with me,
"Frustratingly, I did not get the sense that our
government was stepping up to this and grasping
the bull by the horns." Another former high
level U.S. intelligence official told me, "The
fact of the vulnerability of our telecom backbone
is indisputable. How it came to pass, why
nothing has been done, who has done what -- these
are the incendiary questions." There is also the
fundamental fact that the wiretap technologies
implemented by Verint, Narus and other Israeli
companies are fully in place and no alternative
is on the horizon. "There is a technical path
dependence problem," says the Bush administration
official. "I have been told nobody else makes
software like this for the big digital switches,
so that is part of the problem. Other issues,"
he adds, "compound the problem" -- referring to
the sensitivity of the U.S.-Israel relationship.
And that, of course, is the elephant in the
room. "Whether its a Democratic or Republican
administration, you dont bad-mouth Israel if you
want to get ahead," says former CIA
counterterrorism officer Philip Giraldi. "Most
of the people in the agency were very concerned
about Israeli espionage and Israeli actions
against U.S. interests. Everybody was aware of
it. Everybody hated it. But they wouldnt get
promoted if they spoke out. Israel has a
privileged position and thats the way things
are. Its crazy. And everybody knows its crazy."
Christopher Ketcham is working on a book about
the dissolution of the United States and its
replacement by bioregional republics. He can be
reached at <mailto:cketcham99 at mindspring.com>cketcham99 at mindspring.com
This article originally appeared on <http://www.alternet.org/>Alternet.
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