[News] What Actually Happened in Fatah's Elections?
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Mon Aug 17 11:13:58 EDT 2009
http://www.counterpunch.org/amin08142009.html
August 14-16, 2009
CIA-Trained Security Chiefs Elected to the Palestinian Leadership
What Actually Happened in Fatah's Elections?
By ESAM AL-AMIN
He is our guy.
George W. Bush speaking of Palestinian security
chief Muhammad Dahlan, June 4, 2003
The U.S. government has been meddling in the
Palestinian internal affairs since at least 2003.
Its effort is to transform the Palestinian
national movement for liberation and independence
into a more compliant or quisling government,
willing to accede to Israels political and security demands.
The tactics employed by the U.S. include
military, security, diplomatic, and political
components. With the ascension of Hamas after the
2006 legislative election, U.S. strategy has been
fixed on unraveling the election results. Its aim
for a political comeback of the pro-American camp
within the Palestinian body politic has been
initiated with the convening of Fatahs national conference this last week.
During the week of August 4, 2009, the
Palestinian National Liberation Movement Fatah,
convened its sixth national conference in its
44-year history. Fatahhas historically been
considered the largest Palestinian faction, but
that perception changed when it lost the
legislative elections to Hamas in January 2006.
As the group wrapped up its conference after
eight days, it announced the results of its
elections. The international media, particularly
western outlets, framed the election as fresh
and new faces ascending to power in the
movement. But what actually happened in the vote?
Fatahs internal structure is unlike most
political parties or resistance movements. It is
not hierarchical and its members loyalty largely
follows a system of patronage and factionalism
embodied in a 23-member Central Committee.
The Central Committee is technically supposed to
reflect a system of collective leadership and the
political program of a national liberation
movement. Even its founder, the late Yasser
Arafat, who led the organization from its
inception in 1965 until his death in 2004, did
not have an official title beyond that of a
member of the committee and commander-in-chief of
its military wing. But over time, in the eyes of
many Palestinians, Fatahs leadership has
symbolized, a system of cronyism, corruption,
collaboration with Israel, and political
failures, especially since the Oslo process.
Although its internal charter calls for a
national conference every four years to elect its
leadership, the major questions at the eve of
this conference were: Why did it take Fatah two
decades to convene this one? Did the election of
Fatahs new leadership reflect the aspirations of
the Palestinian people and a new and fresh
approach to the political process? And finally,
who are the backers of the main individuals who
were recently elected to lead it?
Fatahs Central Committee led by Arafat made the
strategic decision in 1988 to negotiate a
political settlement with Israel, and accept the
United States government as the main broker. For
two decades, especially in the aftermath of the
1993 Oslo accords, the Palestinian issue
gradually receded from the international agenda,
becoming an almost exclusive affair between the
U.S, Israel, and the Palestinian leadership
whether it was the PLO or after 1994, the Palestinian Authority (PA).
Most neutral Middle East analysts such as Robert
Malley, the Middle East Program Director at the
International Crisis Group, and a former National
Security Council (NSC) staff member during the
Clinton administration, observe that American
negotiators throughout several administrations
(both Democratic and Republican) have mostly
adopted the Israeli point of view and placed most
of the pressure on the Palestinian leadership
(whether Bill Clinton with Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud
Barak, or George W. Bush with Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert.)
During the first term of the Bush administration,
Arafat, as the head of the PA, was isolated,
while Washington promoted those within the
Palestinian leadership such as Mahmoud Abbas
(imposed on Arafat as prime minister in 2003),
and former security chief Muhammad Dahlan, both
of whom embraced the American strategy in the
region. In 2005, Bush declared his freedom and
democracy agenda, demanding elections in the
Palestinian territories, and hoping for a Fatah
victory to implement his vision.
However, the administration soon abandoned its
agenda of promoting democracy in the Arab world
when Hamas won a landslide victory in the January
2006 legislative elections. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice expressed shock about the
results saying, No one saw it coming. A
Department of Defense official told David Rose of
Vanity Fair in 2008, Everyone blamed everyone
else, We sat there in the Pentagon and said,
Who the f*@# recommended this??
Ever since that election, the American
administration employed three different but
overlapping strategies in order to undo the
results. These efforts by the State Department,
the White House and the Defense Department, were
scantily planned and poorly coordinated.
Throughout 2006 and the first half of 2007, the
State Department used its diplomatic resources
and political muscle to topple the
democratically-elected Palestinian government led
by Hamas. In an April 2008 report, Vanity Fair
disclosed that an American talking point memo
emerged after a U.S. diplomat accidentally left
it behind in a Palestinian Authority building in
Ramallah. The document echoed Rices demand that
Abbas dissolve the national unity government and take on Hamas.
Meanwhile, as detailed by Vanity Fair, neo-con
and NSC deputy director Elliot Abrams was
plotting a coup in Gaza against Hamas with former
Gaza security chief Muhammad Dahlan in the spring
of 2007. It included coordination with Israel,
several Arab countries such as UAE and Jordan,
payments to Dahlan of over $30 million, the
training of five hundred security personnel, a
campaign to destabilize Gaza, and a torture
program against Hamas members and other Islamists.
Dahlan admitted as much to the magazines writer,
David Rose, saying that he told his American
counterpart who was pushing for a confrontation
with Hamas, If I am going to confront them, I
need substantial resources. As things stand, we do not have the capability.
The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported on June 7,
2007, that the American administration had asked
Israel to authorize a large Egyptian arms
shipment, including dozens of armored cars,
hundreds of armor-piercing rockets, thousands of
hand grenades, and millions of rounds of
ammunition. Rose explains that Abramss plan
stressed the need to bolster Fatahs forces in
order to deter Hamas. According to a senior
administration official the desired outcome was
to give Abbas the capability to take the
required strategic political decisions (i.e.
fulfilling the Israeli conditions for a political
settlement) and dismissing the (Hamas led)
cabinet, establishing an emergency cabinet.
But Dick Cheneys Middle East advisor, David
Wurmser, admitted the failed effort when he told
the magazine, It look(ed) to me that what
happened wasnt so much a coup by Hamas but an
attempted coup by Fatah that was pre-empted (by Hamas) before it could happen.
The third effort, was mainly overseen by the
Pentagon, and led by Lt. General Keith Dayton. In
a speech before the pro-Israel think tank, the
Washington Institute on Near East Policy (WINEP)
in May 2009, he said that the Office of the U.S.
Security Coordinator, which he has been leading
since December 2005, is an effort to assist the
Palestinians in reforming their security
services. But according to the notes of a
meeting between Dayton and a Palestinian security
chief in Ramallah in early 2007, the real purpose
of the mission was revealed when Dayton said,
[W]e also need to build up your forces in order to take on Hamas.
Since 2007, Congress has given Dayton $161
million dollars to implement his plan. In
addition, this year Congress appropriated an
additional $209 million dollars to Dayton for the
2009 and 2010 fiscal years, to accelerate his
program after receiving high marks from Israeli
security chiefs. In the past year alone, more
than 1,000 Hamas and Islamic Jihad members have
been arrested and detained without trials, with
many tortured and killed under interrogation, by
U.S.-trained Palestinian security personnel in
the West Bank. Amnesty International and many
other human rights organizations have condemned
these actions and called for an immediate halt to
the human rights abuses of Palestinian detainees in PA prisons.
In his WINEP speech Dayton acknowledged this
crackdown when he said, I don't know how many of
you are aware, but over the last year-and-a-half,
the Palestinians have engaged upon a series of
what they call security offensives throughout the
West Bank, surprisingly well coordinated with the
Israeli army. He further admitted that during
the 22-day Gaza war last winter, U.S.-trained
Palestinian security forces prevented
Palestinians in the West Bank from organizing
mass protests against the Israeli army, which
ironically allowed for the reduction of the
Israeli military presence in the West Bank in
order to redeploy those troops to Gaza. Dayton
added, As a matter of fact, a good portion of
the Israeli army went off to Gaza from the West
Bank think about that for a minute, and the
(Israeli military) commander (of the West Bank)
was absent for eight straight days.
After a failed coup and brutal military offensive
failed to dislodge Hamas from Gaza, the Israeli
and U.S. strategy sought to intensify its
pressure against Hamas through a suffocating
economic siege in Gaza, massive security
detentions in the West Bank, financial squeeze in
the region and political isolation
internationally. Meanwhile, according to several
Hamas spokesmen, including the deposed prime
minister Ismael Haniyya in Gaza and political
chief Khaled Meshal in Damascus, the main
obstacle to any national reconciliation with
Fatah has been the detention of hundreds of Hamas
members and the PAs security collaboration with
the military occupation overseen by Dayton.
The next phase in this effort is to reinvent
Fatah and present it as a viable political
alternative to Hamas and other resistance
movements by improving the living conditions in
the West Bank in contrast to Gazas devastating
siege. But more important, the plan envisions a
new Fatah that is considered a reliable partner
willing to accomodate Israels conditions for a
political settlement. The sixth Fatah conference
and accompanying elections was thus convened to
dispose of its corrupt and dysfunctional image.
For over a year, the Central Committee, the
highest body in its structure, could not agree on
many major issues, including where to hold the
conference (the final decision was to hold it in
the occupied Palestinian territories, which means
that Israel has a veto on which delegates from
abroad would be allowed to participate). They
also squabbled about which delegates would be
appointed to the conference, which would
determine the composition of the new leadership,
as well as the political program and the role of
armed resistance against the occupation. Abbas
and his inner circle vetoed the decision of the
committee, and decided to hold the conference in
Bethlehem, virtually hand-picking all the
participants to guarantee the election outcome.
Historically, the delegates to Fatahs national
conference were elected or appointed by the
Central Committee, but at least fifty-one percent
came from the military apparatus. Since most of
the military wing has either been disbanded or
wanted by the Israelis, a large number of the
delegates to this conference were security
personnel substituting for the military ones.
This fact guaranteed that the election results
would be skewed towards the security chiefs and their supporters.
The original number of delegates was supposed to
be around 700. Then it increased to 1,250 but
eventually mushroomed to 2,355. Less than ten
percent were actually indirectly elected by the
virtue of their positions, while the overwhelming
majority was appointed by a small group in
Ramallah led mainly by Abbas and other power
brokers such as Dahlan and former West Bank
security chief Jibreel Rujoub, who used to hang
the picture of former CIA director George Tenet
above his desk alongside that of Arafat.
The number of Central Committee members was also
increased from 21 to 23, with 19 directly elected
by the delegates. Abbas was to appoint four
members later, but he himself was chosen by
acclamation, to avoid embarrassment if he does
not garner first place in a direct election. The
18 individuals who were elected at the end of the
week-long conference comprised four from the old
guard who are considered close to Abbas, and 14
new members, three of whom are former security
chiefs whove been close to the CIA. These
include Dahlan, Rujoub, and Tawfiq Tirawi, a
former intelligence chief, who is currently
heading a security training academy in Jericho
under the supervision of Gen. Dayton.
From the outset, this conference was heavily
tilted towards delegates from the West Bank.
Unlike previous conferences, Palestinians in the
Diaspora were hardly represented since Israel
allowed only a few people to enter from abroad.
While Gazas population is equal to that of the
West Bank, less than 400 people were selected as
delegates from Gaza, while there were over three
times as many delegates from the West Bank.
But most of the Gaza delegates did not even
attend because Hamas prevented them from leaving
the strip, demanding in return that hundreds of
its detained members in the West Bank be freed by
the PA, which it summarily refused. In short,
aside from Dahlan, who no longer lives in Gaza,
not a single elected person is from or lives in
Gaza. This prompted the entire Fatah leadership
in Gaza, including former Central Committee
member Zakariya al-Agha, to resign en mass one
day after the conference, protesting not only the
results, but also the whole election process.
Similarly, Fatah members abroad did not fare
well. Only two people were elected to the Central
Committee, though more than two-thirds of
Palestinians (eight million) live outside of the
Palestinian territories, many in squalid refugee
camps, with the right of return, considered a
hot- button issue in future negotiations, up in
the air. On the other hand, the overwhelming
majority of the new members were either from the
West Bank or already living in Ramallah as part
of Abbas closest aides, affirming the American-led West Bank first strategy.
Some of the historic old guard who oppose Abbass
political program such as Central Committee
secretary Farouk Kaddoumi or Hani Al-Hassan did
not even attend or run as candidates. Kaddoumi
condemned the conference, questioned its
legitimacy, and went as far as accusing Abbas and
Dahlan of plotting with the Israelis to poison
Arafat, eventually causing his death.
Other former members who ran as candidates were
defeated and cried foul. Former prime minister
and negotiator Ahmad Qurai (Abu Alaa) questioned
the credentials of the delegates and the
integrity of the election procedure. When Abbas
chief of staff, Tayeb Abdel-Rahim lost, he
demanded a recount and was eventually declared a
winner, after the election committee claimed he
was actually tied for last. Many delegates,
especially female candidates, all of whom lost,
criticized this blatant cronyism. Nevertheless,
several popular and clean candidates were able
to win a seat such as Marwan Bargouthi, who is
serving five life sentences in Israel, and
Mahmoud Al-Aloul, a former mayor of Nablus.
As Palestinians watched this conference unfold,
many were hoping that it would be the beginning
of a national reconciliation and the
establishment of a unity government. However, it
seems that as a result of this conference Fatah
itself may further disintegrate, as its Gaza
leaders and Abu Alaa are threatening to launch a
new faction called Fatah Awakening, further
increasing division and tension within the Palestinian ranks.
The next step in the strategy of the pro-American
camp is to hold presidential and legislative
elections in the Palestinian territories next
January, hoping to present a rejuvenated Fatah as
an alternative to Hamas and other resistance
movements. Jonathan Steele of the Guardian
further exposed on June 22, 2007 the U.S. "hard
coup" of June 07, as well as its political
strategy. He detailed US officials' conversations
with several Arab regimes. These were, among
others, to maintain President Abbas and Fatah
as the center of gravity on the Palestinian
scene, avoid wasting time in accommodating
Hamas, undermining Hamass political status,
and calling for early elections.
In the words of Gen. Dayton, the Palestinian
personnel trained by the U.S pledge after their
graduation that they were not sent here to learn
how to fight Israel, but were rather sent here to
learn how to keep law and order. The main
purpose of these security battalions is to halt
any resistance to or rejection of the occupation
including non-violent means. He then added that
senior Israeli military commanders frequently ask
him, "How many more of these new Palestinians can
you generate, and how quickly?
Many of the questions, posed by ordinary
Palestinians before the conference, remain
unanswered. What is Fatahs political program in
light of the current Israeli intransigence and
pre-conditions? What of national reconciliation
with other Palestinian factions and the
establishment of a national unity government?
What is the role of resistance against the
occupation, the suffocating siege against Gaza,
and most importantly, the continuous
collaboration with the Israeli security agencies
and military against their own citizens?
These questions persist while Israels occupation
and its brutal policies, the expansion of
settlements, the separation wall, the detention
of over 11,000 Palestinians, the expropriation of
land, the depopulation of East Jerusalems
Palestinian residents, and the denial of
Palestinian refugees right of return, continue unabated.
Simply put, the U.S. wants a Palestinian
leadership that will answer these questions in a
way that is satisfactory to Israel. As one State
Department official said to Vanity Fair regarding
American objectives in the Israeli-Palestinian
struggle, [W]e care about results, and [we
support] whatever son of a bitch [w]e have to
support. Dahlan was the son of a bitch we happened to know best.
Esam Al-Amin can be reached at:
<mailto:alamin1919 at gmail.com>alamin1919 at gmail.com
Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
415 863-9977
www.Freedomarchives.org
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