[News] The Militarization of the World's Urban Peripheries
Anti-Imperialist News
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Fri Feb 15 11:16:04 EST 2008
The Militarization of the World's Urban Peripheries
Written by Raúl Zibechi
Wednesday, 13 February 2008
Source: <http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4954>Americas Program
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1127/1/
Urban peripheries in Third World countries have
become war zones where states attempt to maintain
order based on the establishment of a sort of
"sanitary cordon" to keep the poor isolated from "normal" society.
"Army sources confirmed that techniques employed
in the occupation of the Morro da Providéncia
favela [slum] are the ones Brazilian soldiers use
in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti."1
This admission by Brazilian armed forces largely
explains the interest of Lula da Silva's
government in keeping that country's troops on
the Caribbean island: to test, in the poor
neighborhoods of Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince,
containment strategies designed for application
in the slums of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and other large cities.
But the news published by the daily Estadão de
São Paulo goes farther in revealing the
military's modus operandi. The commander of the
9th Motorized Infantry Brigade in Haiti, William
Soares, directed the occupation of Morro da
Providéncia by 200 soldiers, who installed
machineguns on "the community's only plaza,
transformed into a military base," which were
later withdrawn in order to facilitate a dialogue
with the population. In the meeting with the
Residents Association [Asociación de Pobladores],
General Soares "promised projects, a Christmas
party with gifts for the children, a vacation
camp, film screenings, medical, and sanitation assistance."
According to the newspaper, "in exchange, the
Army is gathering information on the slum and its
inhabitants. Soldiers filmed and photographed the
meeting and the entire troop deployment." General
Soares made all those promises in order to
"diffuse the revolt by community leaders against
the social project programmed for the slum."
Urban Poor as a Threat
Urban theorist Mike Davis analyzes urban
peripheral areas in terms of a commitment to
social change. A single sentence synthesizes his
analysis: "It's the slum peripheries of poor
Third World cities that have become a decisive
geopolitical space."2 He asserts that Pentagon
strategists are lending great importance to urban
planning theory and architecture, since the
peripheries are "one of the most challenging
terrains for future wars and other imperialist projects."
In fact, a study by the United Nations estimates
that one billion people live in peripheral
neighborhoods outside Third World cities and that
the poor in the largest cities in the world
number some two billion, that is, a third of all
human beings. These statistics will double within
the next 15 or 20 years, and "all future growth
of the world's population will occur in cities,
95% of it in cities of the Global South and the majority in slums."3
The situation is much more serious than the
numbers indicate: urbanization, as Davis
explains, has become disconnected and autonomous
from industrialization as well as from economic
development, which implies the "structural and
permanent disconnection of so many city dwellers
from the formal world economy." On the other
hand, he notes that, "over the last decade ...
the poorand not just the poor in classical urban
neighborhoods [with high levels of
organization]but ... this new poor, on the
fringes of the city, have begun organizing
themselves massively ... whether that's Sadr, in
Iraq, or an equivalent slum-based social movement in Buenos Aires."4
In Latin America the main challenges to elite
domination have arisen in the heart of poor urban
areasfrom the 1989 "Caracazo" riots to the
Oaxaca Commune in 2006. Proof of this are the
popular uprisings in Asunción in March 1999,
Quito in February 1997 and January 2000, Lima and
Cochabamba in April 2000, Buenos Aires in
February 2003, and El Alto in October 2003, just
to name the most relevant cases.
Even more, urban peripheries are spaces from
which subaltern groups have launched the most
formidable challenges to the system, becoming a
sort of popular counter-powers. Davis is right:
control of the urban poor is the most important
objective planned by governments, global
financial organisms, and the armed forces of the most important countries.
Many large Latin American cities seem to border
at times on social explosion, and several have
erupted over the past two decades for various
reasons. Fear among the powerful appears to point
in two directions: postpone or make unviable the
explosion or insurrection, and, also, avoid the
consolidation of those "black holes" outside
state control, where the main challenges to the elites occur.
New Military Strategies
In recent years, publications on military thought
as well as analyses by financial organisms have
dedicated ample space to challenges presented by
gangs and to debates on new problems arising from
urban war. The concepts of "asymmetrical war" and
"fourth generation war" are responses to problems
identical to those created by Third World urban
peripheries: the birth of a new type of warfare
against non-state enemies, in which military
superiority does not play a decisive role.
William S. Lind, director of the Center for
Cultural Conservatism of the Free Congress
Foundation, asserts that the state has lost its
monopoly on war and elites feel that "dangers"
are multiplying. "Almost everywhere, the state is
losing."5 Despite supporting pull-out from Iraq
as soon as possible, Lind defends "total war,"
which engages enemies on all fronts: economic,
cultural, social, political, communications, and also military.
A good example of this full-spectrum war is his
belief that the dangers for United States
hegemony lie in all aspects of daily life, or, if
you prefer, in life itself. For example, he
believes that "in Fourth Generation War, invasion
by immigration can be at least as dangerous as
invasion by a state army." New problems rooted in
the "universal crisis of the legitimacy of the
state" have "non-state enemies" at the center.
This leads him to conclude with a double warning
to military leaders: no state military has
succeeded against a non-state enemy.
This problem is at the heart of new military
modalities of thinking, which must be completely
reformulated to face challenges that used to
correspond to "civilian" areas of the state
apparatus. Militarization of society in order to
regain control of urban peripheries is not
enough, as revealed in recent military experience in the Third World.
Military commanders deployed in Iraq seem to be
clearly aware of the problems they must face.
Cavalry Division Commander General Peter W.
Chiarelli, based on his recent experience on the
outskirts of Baghdad in Sadr City, maintains that
security is the long-term objective, but it will
not be achieved through military action alone.
"Executing traditionally focused combat
operations ... works, but only for the short
term. In the long term, doing so hinders true
progress and, in reality, promotes the growth of
insurgent forces working against campaign objectives."6
This implies that the two traditional armed
forces lines of operationcombat and the training
of local security forcesare insufficient.
Therefore, three "nontraditional" lines of
operation should be undertaken; ones that
previously corresponded to the government and
civil society: essential services provided to the
population, building a legitimate government, and
empowering "economic pluralism," that is, a market economy.
With infrastructure repair projects they attempt
to improve the situation of the poorest sector of
the population and, at the same time, create
employment opportunities to send visible signs of
progress. In the second place, creating a
"democratic" regime is considered an essential
point for legitimizing the whole process. For
United States commanders in Iraq, the "point of
penetration" of their troops occurred with the
Jan. 30, 2005 elections. In strategic thought
democracy was reduced to producing a vote.
Finally, the recruitment ability of the
insurgents can be reduced through the expansion
of market logic, "by 'gentrifying' city centers
and creating business parks," that become a
dynamic sector stimulating the rest of society.7
From then on, the poor population in urban
peripheries becomes, in military jargon, "the
strategic and operational center of gravity."
This combination of mechanisms is what the major
global powers' armed forces today consider the
means to achieve "true long-term security." In
this way, "democracy," expansion of services, and
a market economy will cease being citizens'
rights or morally desirable objectives and become
gears in a strategy of military control over a
population or a region of the world and, of course, its resources.
Security and Cooperation: Two Faces of a Strategy
Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001,
the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) "has played an increasingly
prominent role in the War on Terrorism."8 U.S.
development programs are not directed toward the
population that most needs them, but rather to
the most "at-risk populations and regions," according to Pentagon strategy.
For military strategists like U.S. Army Colonel
(Ret.) Thomas Baltazar, USAID programs "can play
a crucial role in denying terrorists sanctuary
and financing by diminishing the underlying
conditions that cause local populations to become
vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. Moreover,
USAID programs directed at strengthening
effective and legitimate governance are
recognized as key tools with which to address counterinsurgency."
The Pentagon's strategy is to assure security for
the United States, and to this end, it uses
"democracy" and "development assistance" as
complements to military operations. The U.S.
National Security Strategy maintains that
"development reinforces diplomacy and defense,
reducing long-term threats to our national
security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies."9
It seems necessary to emphasize that
international cooperation, development aid, and
the war against povertysome of the favorite
slogans of the World Bank and other financial
agenciesare merely strategies to control and
subordinate the population that is "potentially"
rebellious or resistant to the objectives of U.S.
multinationals. The Pentagon's analysis of
African reality, according to Colonel Baltazar,
identified "the causes of extremism,"
highlighting among others the existence of "large
marginalized and/or disenfranchised populations,
and exclusion from political processes, as key
causes of instability in the region."
Electoral democracy and development are necessary
to prevent terrorism, but they are not objectives
in and of themselves. In countries with weak
states and high concentrations of urban poor, the
armed forces move to take the place of the
sovereign government, reconstruct the state, and
in a totally vertical and authoritarian manner,
initiate mechanisms to assure the continuation of domination.
In Iraq, these policies have their obverse and
complement in the building of large walls to
separate neighborhoods in Baghdad. According to
writer and Arab expert Santiago Alba Rico, the
construction of walls in 10 neighborhoods in the
Iraq capital is intended to turn each into "an
armored closet whose inhabitants are filed away
or abandoned in locked drawers and sealed enclosures."10
The logic is simple: "Neighborhoods that have not
been crushed militarily are walled, enclosed, and
abandoned to their luck. Complete areas of the
city have been demarcated and segregated with
inhabitants confined inside, subjected to entry
and exit controls so ironclad that we can speak
without hesitation of a ghetto policy."
Other parts of the world are not lacking in
cement walls to isolate and separate peripheral
neighborhoods. Symbolic walls are fabricated
according to differences in color, dress, and
ways of occupying space. But the results and
objectives are identical. Control
mechanismswhether dressed in military garb, or
as NGOs for development, or promoting market
economy and electoral democracyare interlaced
and, in extreme cases like the suburbs of
Baghdad, the slums of Rio de Janeiro, or the
shanty towns of Port-au-Prince, they are subordinated to military planning.
In Brazil, to give just one example, different
forms of control are simultaneously applied: the
"Zero Hunger" government plan is compatible with
the militarization of the slums.
In his reflection on Nazism in "On the Concept of
History," German writer Walter Benjamin declared
that "the tradition of the oppressed teaches us
that the state of exception in which we live is
the rule." United States policy since the attacks
of Sept. 11, 2001, fits the concept of a "state
of permanent exception." The "state of
exception," which suspends civil rights and
militarizes areas and complete nations, is
applied in an indiscriminate way to different
situations and for different reasons, from
internal political problems to external threats,
from an economic emergency to a natural disaster.
In effect, the state of exception was applied in
situations such as the Argentine
economic-financial crisis that burst into a broad
social movement in December 2001, the response to
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, and the
containment of the rebellion by poor immigrants
in the peripheries of French cities in 2005. The
common thread, beyond circumstances and
countries, is that in every case it is applied in
order to contain the urban poor.
End Notes
* Dantas, in Estadão (São Paulo).
* Davis, interview.
* Davis, "Mike Davis on a Planet of Slums."
* Davis, interview.
* Lind, 13.
* Chiarelli and Michaelis, 15.
* Chiarelli and Michaelis, 13.
* Baltazar and Kvitashvili, 38.
* Cited in Baltazar and Kvitashvili, 38.
* Alba Rico.
Translated for the Americas Program by Maria Roof.
Raúl Zibechi is an international analyst for
Brecha, a weekly journal in Montevideo, Uruguay,
professor and researcher on social movements at
the Multiversidad Franciscana de América Latina,
and adviser to social groups. He is a monthly
contributor to the Americas Policy Program
(<http://www.americaspolicy.org/>www.americaspolicy.org).
For More Information
Santiago Alba Rico, "Emparedar a la resistencia,"
Diagonal, Madrid, 16 May 2007,
<http://www.diagonalperiodico.net/article3854.html>www.diagonalperiodico.net/article3854.html.
Thomas Baltazar (Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired) and
Elisabeth Kvitashvili, "The Role of USAID and
Development Assistance in Combating Terrorism,"
Military Review, Mar.-Apr. 2007, pp. 38-40.
Peter W. Chiarelli (Major General, U.S. Army) and
Patrick R. Michaelis (Major, U.S. Army), "Winning
the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum
Operations," Military Review, July-Aug. 2005, pp. 4-17.
Pedro Dantas, "Exército admite uso de tática do
Haiti em favela do Rio," Estadão de Hoje (São
Paulo), 15 Dec. 2007, <http://www.estado.com.br/>www.estado.com.br.
Mike Davis, interview with Geoff Manaugh, posted
May 22, 2006,
<http://bldgblog.blogspot.com/2006/05/interview-with-mike-davis-part-1.html>bldgblog.blogspot.com/2006/05/interview-with-mike-davis-part-1.html.
"Los suburbios de las ciudades del tercer mundo
son el nuevo escenario geopolítico decisivo,"
posted 2 Mar. 2007, <http://www.rebelion.org/>www.rebelion.org.
Mike Davis, "Mike Davis on a Planet of Slums,"
interview posted 24 June 2006,
<http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=9073>www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=9073.
"La pobreza urbana y la lucha contra el
capitalismo," trans. Camila Vollenweider, posted
25 June 2006, <http://www.sinpermiso.info/>www.sinpermiso.info.
William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation
War," Military Review, Sept.-Oct. 2004, pp. 12-16.
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