[News] The Road to Tyranny in Colombia
Anti-Imperialist News
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Tue Aug 19 11:35:07 EDT 2008
http://www.counterpunch.org/brittain08192008.html
August 19, 2008
The Road to Tyranny in Colombia
A Third Term in Office
By JAMES J. BRITTAIN
Colombia has been known for having one of the
most stable democracies of the subcontinent
which, while it has not undergone the
dictatorships that other countries have suffered,
is not very inclusive. There has been
considerable progress in terms of civil,
political, social and cultural rights, which were
consecrated in the 1991 constitution, but they
are threatened by the new right in power. The
present government has proved to be strongly
authoritarian, which not only tends to eliminate
the opposition but to de-institutionalize
democracy, relying on the charisma of the president.
Over the past decade, a well-documented rise in
support for the electoral-left has occurred in a
majority of countries throughout Latin America.
Even in a country such as Colombia, the
presidential elections of 2006 saw magnetic
results for the left-of-centre Alternative
Democratic Pole (POLO Democrático Alternativo)
under the leadership of Carlos Gaviria Díaz. The
POLO received over twenty-two percent of the
national vote, a sixteen percent increase from
Luis Eduardo Grazons 2002 run as a
representative for the former Independent
Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Independiente).
When the official poles closed, the POLO had more
than doubled the votes that the historically
influential Colombian Liberal Party (Partido
Liberal Colombiano, PLC) had obtained, thus
becoming the second most supported political
coalition in the country after President Álvaro
Uribe Vélezs Social National Unity Party
(Partido Social de Unidad Nacional, Partido de la
U). Nevertheless, amidst a regional movement
attempting to distance itself from neoliberalism
and un-relinquished US-acceptance, Colombia has
seen its ruling political establishment
increasingly entrench right-of-centre, if not
far-right, reactionary policies to internal and
regional political-economic change. The Rights
stabilization, however, cannot be seen within
the classical confines of twentieth century
authoritarian rule via military dictator as the
civilian-based Uribe administration enjoys broad
popular support. Left with this circumstance, it
is important to analyze what has enabled this
government to sustain political office, policy,
and its fervent measures of internal security?
Several times a year Colombians are exposed to
national popularity polls which attempt to gauge
levels of support for the state and specifically
the Uribe administration. It is assumed that
these surveys offer a representation of faith in
the government and military, while providing the
international community an apparent picture of
stability within the country. Over the years
these polls have repeatedly showed Uribes
approval rating to be well above the seventy
percentile during his first term [2002-2006] and
floating between the mid-eighties and
low-nineties half way through the second
[2006-2010]. Such endorsements have led some to
argue that Uribe garnishes the highest level of
support of any president in the Americas today.
With this broad backing, posturing has begun to
again alter the Colombian constitution so that
the president may run for head of state a third
time. In August, five million petitions were
delivered to election officials supporting an
amendment to the constitution which would make
Uribe an eligible candidate. As this details
extensive support for the president, the context
to which Colombia finds itself politically,
socially, and economically is quite perplexing.
In actuality, Uribes power and apparent
stability is incredibly unique (and somewhat
puzzling) when considering a variety of factors
that could otherwise create an environment of
distrust and political opposition if not
hostility for any Latin American politician sitting in office.
Aside from standing at the top of the worlds
list for highest rates of homicide and
kidnapping, Colombia reluctantly shares the title
of being one of the most economically inequitable
countries in the Western Hemisphere. The Andean
nation is also second only to the Sudan for the
largest number of internally displaced peoples in
the world. According to data presented by the
Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement
(Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el
Desplazamiento, CODHES), roughly ten percent of
Colombians have been forced from their homes and
communities due to threats from paramilitary and
state forces. Alongside these deplorable
conditions has been Colombias on-going
parapolitica scandal. Since 2006, upwards of
eighty governors, mayors, military officials, and
congressional politicians have been alleged or
found guilty for having direct connections,
meetings, and/or contracts with Colombias most
notorious paramilitary organization - the United
Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia, AUC). During said
collaborations hundreds if not thousands of
oppositional political opponents,
trade-unionists, and community organizers became
targets for assassination, were threatened,
and/or disappeared. As a result of testimony from
former paramilitary leaders, who admitted links
with said politicians, countless bodies have been
found in mass-graves reminiscent of those
discovered in Germany during the twentieth
century. Included in this scandal are Colombias
Vice-President Francisco Santos Calderón, his
cousin Defence Minister Juan Manuel Santos,
President Uribes brother Santiago and their
cousin former-Senator Mario Uribe, Senator Carlos
García Orjuela the president of Partido de la
U, three brothers and the step-son of
Colombias Attorney General Eduardo Maya
Villazón, and the list goes on. It has even been
alleged that secret meetings of paramilitary
forces transpired at the presidents personal
farm Guacharacas. The information citing those
implicated in the scandal has however come from
surprising sources. Rather than opponents to the
Uribe administration making statements of
state-paramilitary activity, the majority of
revelations have come from long-time supporters of the current administration.
Salvatore Mancuso, the last leader of the AUC and
one-time neighbour of Uribe, provided a great
deal of information related to the Colombian
states systemic involvement with paramilitaries
over the past fifteen years. The informal leading
commander of the AUC after 2001 and its formal
leader upon the murder of Carlos Castaño in 2004
revealed that the actual number of sitting
politicians linked to paramilitaries rests well
above those that have been investigated,
detained, or sentenced. Citing state officials
alone, Mancuso noted that roughly one-hundred
paramilitary proxies exist in the Colombian
establishment. As links between the AUC and Uribe
became ever clearer in 2008, the president had
the primary leaders and whistle blowers of the
AUC extradited to solitary confinement in the
United States where interviews (and confessions)
would be difficult. Journalist Matthew Thompson
wrote that such testimony and Mancusos
explosive political revelations were aborted near
midnight on May 12, when, without warning, Mr
Uribe had the AUC commander and 13 high-level
colleagues plucked from detention on the
outskirts of Medellin and extradited to the US.
While responsible for the deaths of thousands, if
not tens of thousands, Mancuso provides an
excellent example of how the state, without
hesitation or reprisal, simply uses its power to
silence any and all who reveal the contradictions
of Colombias political institutions. However,
Uribes measures of silencing are not limited to
those whom directly committed the crimes
themselves. While it can be argued whether or not
Mancuso and Uribe were once allies - even though
such debates are becoming less and less difficult
to ascertain - the president has, in fact,
sanctioned allies within the political structure itself.
Earlier this year Colombias Supreme Court and
Uribe went head to head concerning amendments
made to the constitution which enabled the
president to run for a second term in 2006. After
a thorough investigation, Court officials ruled
that the initiative to amend the constitution
was flawed by criminal acts. The primary basis
of this claim was that various government
ministers, including Uribe, bribed former
congresswoman Yidis Medina to vote in favour of
legislation empowering the president to run for
re-election. As it increasingly appeared as
though a congressional tie may occur on whether
to allow Uribe to run for office a second time,
Medina was approached and was promised a series
of lucrative jobs and contracts for her vote. In
April, Medina turned herself in, confessed, and
provided evidence that of such a campaign and her
involvement therein. For accepting the bribe and
following through with the vote Medina was
sentenced to forty-seven months in prison. In
June, Uribe responded to the Supreme Courts
investigation and report on the illegalities
concerning the 2006 re-election. The president
announced that a referendum would be held in 2009
permitting Colombians to facilitate a repeat of
the 2006 election. While a referendum most
assuredly delegitimizes the credibility and
findings of the Supreme Court, it would
nevertheless provide Uribe with some image of
legitimacy. However, Uribistas soon calculated
that rather than supporting a referendum in 2009
a push could be made to negate the constitution
once more, allowing Uribe to seek a second
re-election. By July, the moral call for the
referendum was reneged thereby permitting Uribe
and the Partido de la U to dismiss the Supreme
Courts legitimacy, bypass a provisional
election, broaden formal challenges to Colombias
judiciary, and further modify elitist
protectionist measures within the constitution.
Uribes attack has not ceased. Apart from
physically silencing the AUCs leadership, Uribe
has proposed a series of amendments to the
Colombian constitution that would relinquish
various powers related to the countrys Supreme
Court and the capacity to investigate existing
congressional politicians and state officials
connected to the parapolitica. Essentially, the
Court would become powerless in directly
reviewing, hearing, or trying cases related to
the scandal. If accepted, the Supreme Court would
be restricted from any involvement in said cases
other than through an appeal process. This
clearly ensures political security for Uribistas
while the president marginalizes the judiciarys
authority (over the current administration).
Alongside such measures the president has
increased his rhetoric by accusing officials of
manipulating the judiciary and claiming it as a
medium that seeks to demonize his legitimacy.
Uribe and Senator Nancy Patricia Gutiérrez (under
investigation for alleged links with the AUC)
have tried to appropriate the Supreme Courts
operations related to the parapolitica by
flipping the scandal on its head. Both have
called on the Court to begin investigations
against various oppositional party members, such
as Senator Piedad Córdoba (PLC), Senator Gustavo
Petro (POLO), and other critics of the Colombian
Right, for allegedly pressuring persons involved
in the scandal. Supreme Court Judge Iván
Velásquez has too been slandered. Right-of-centre
politicos defamed the court justice by accusing
him of manoeuvring information and testimony
connected to the parapolitica through bribery.
Discussions of those involved in the prosecution
have been surreptitiously taped. Juan Carlos Díaz
Rayo, a former investigator for the Supreme
Court, was secretly recorded discussing how some
evidence related to certain officials connected
to the scandal could be stronger. The state has
also attempted to create a counter-scandal
entitled FARC-politica by the popular media.
Important proponents and activists within the
sphere of politics, labour, academics, and the
progressive media have been targeted as members
or associates of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia-Peoples Army (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de ColombiaEjército del Pueblo,
FARC-EP). This has greatly scarred and hampered
the important work of noted activists,
researchers, and internationally respected
critics of the Colombian state. Being associated
with the broadly-defined charge of rebellion
prevents support or actions of solidarity with
said colleagues for threat of being linked to or seen as a guerrilla.
Rather than seeking truth and facilitating
justice the Uribe administration and its
ideological cohorts have clearly become
preoccupied with silencing systemic corruption by
targeting those who have spoken out or raised a
spotlight on officials who have facilitated the
death and disappearances of the countrys
citizens. Uribe has shown his true colours as a
leader within a regime that seeks to dispel
democratic stability and integrity for the
continuity of power and dominance. While not the
only actor within the play of Colombian
authoritarianism, Uribe, if re-elected a second
time, will most assuredly take Colombia down a
road far from the rule of law but rather a tyranny secured by despotism.
James J. Brittain is an Assistant Professor of
Sociology at Acadia University, Nova Scotia,
Canada and the co-founder of the Atlantic
Canada-Colombia Research Group. He can be reached
at <mailto:james.brittain at acadiau.ca>james.brittain at acadiau.ca.
* Mauricio Archila (2007). Democratizing
democracy in Colombia in The State of
Resistance: Popular struggles in the global
south. François Polet (Ed.).London, UK: Zed Books. p.60.
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