[News] The Power of the Israel Lobby
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Fri Jun 16 13:36:28 EDT 2006
Weekend Edition
June 16/18, 2006
*** CounterPunch Special Report***
Its Origins and Growth
http://www.counterpunch.org/
The Power of the Israel Lobby
By KATHLEEN and BILL CHRISTISON
Former CIA analysts
Editors' Note: Ten, even five years ago, a fierce
public debate over the nature and activities of
the Israeli lobby would have been impossible. It
was as verboten as the use of the word Empire, to
describe the global reach of the United States.
Through its disdain for the usual proprieties
decorously observed by Republican and Democratic
administrations in the past , the Bush
administration has hauled many realities of our
political economy center stage. Open up the New
York Times or the Washington Post over the recent
past and there, like as not, is another opinion column about the Lobby.
CounterPunch has hosted some of the most vigorous
polemics on the Lobby. In May we asked two of our
most valued contributors, Kathy and Bill
Christison, to offer their evaluation of the
debate on the Lobby's role and power. As our
readers know, Bill and Kathy both had significant
careers as CIA analysts. Bill was a National
Intelligence Officer. In the aftermath of the
September, 2001, attacks we published here his
trenchant and influential essay on "the war on
terror". Kathy has written powerfully on our
website on the topic of Palestine. Specifically
on the Lobby they contributed an unsparing essay
on the topic of "dual loyalty" which can bed
found in our CounterPunch collection,
<http://www.easycarts.net/ecarts/CounterPunch/CP_Books.html>The
Politics of Anti-Semitism.
In mid May they sent us the detailed, measured
commentary, rich in historical detail, that we
are delighted to print below in its entirety.
Which is the tail? Which is the dog? asked Uri
Avnery in our newsletter, a few issues back,
apropos the respective roles of the Israel Lobby
and the US in the exercise of US policy in the
Middle East. Here's an answer that will be tough to challenge.
-- A.C./J.S.C.
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, the University
of Chicago and Harvard political scientists who
published in March of this years a lengthy, well
documented study on the pro-Israel lobby and its
influence on U.S. Middle East policy in March ,
have already accomplished what they intended.
They have successfully called attention to the
often pernicious influence of the lobby on
policymaking. But, unfortunately, the study has
aroused more criticism than debate not only the
kind of criticism one would anticipate from the
usual suspects among the very lobby groups
Mearsheimer and Walt described, but also from a
group on the left that might have been expected
to support the study's conclusions.
The criticism has been partly silly, often
malicious, and almost entirely off-point. The
silly, insubstantial criticisms such as former
presidential adviser David Gergen's earnest
comment that through four administrations he
never observed an Oval Office decision that
tilted policy in favor of Israel at the expense
of U.S. interests can easily be dismissed as
nonsensical . Most of the extensive malicious
criticism, coming largely from the hard core of
Israeli supporters who make up the very lobby
under discussion and led by a hysterical Alan
Dershowitz, has been so specious and sophomoric,
that it too could be dismissed were it not for
precisely the pervasive atmosphere of reflexive
support for Israel and silenced debate that Mearsheimer and Walt describe.
Most disturbing and harder to dismiss is the
criticism of the study from the left, coming
chiefly from Noam Chomsky and Norman Finkelstein,
and abetted less cogently by Stephen Zunes of
Foreign Policy in Focus and Joseph Massad of
Columbia University. These critics on the left
argue from a assumption that U.S. foreign policy
has been monolithic since World War II, a
coherent progression of decision-making directed
unerringly at the advancement of U.S. imperial
interests. All U.S. actions, these critics
contend, are part of a clearly laid-out strategy
that has rarely deviated no matter what the party
in power. They believe that Israel has served
throughout as a loyal agent of the U.S., carrying
out the U.S. design faithfully and serving as a
base from which the U.S. projects its power
around the Middle East. Zunes says it most
clearly, affirming that Israel "still is very
much the junior partner in the relationship."
These critics do not dispute the existence of a
lobby, but they minimize its importance, claiming
that rather than leading the U.S. into policies
and foreign adventures that stand against true
U.S. national interests, as Mearsheimer and Walt
assert, the U.S. is actually the controlling
power in the relationship with Israel and carries
out a consistent policy, using Israel as its agent where possible.
Finkelstein summarized the critics' position in a
recent CounterPunch article ("The Israel Lobby,"
May 1,
http://www.counterpunch.org/finkelstein05012006.html),
emphasizing that the issue is not whether U.S.
interests or those of the lobby take precedence
but rather that there has been such coincidence
of U.S. and Israeli interests over the decades
that for the most part basic U.S. Middle East
policy has not been affected by the lobby.
Chomsky maintains that Israel does the U.S.
bidding in the Middle East in pursuit of imperial
goals that Washington would pursue even without
Israel and that it has always pursued in areas
outside the Middle East without benefit of any
lobby. Those goals have always included
advancement of U.S. corporate-military interests
and political domination through the suppression
of radical nationalisms and the
<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0520217187/counterpunchmaga>
[]
maintenance of stability in resource-rich
countries, particularly oil producers,
everywhere. In the Middle East, this was
accomplished primarily through Israel's 1967
defeat of Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser and his
radical Arab nationalism, which had threatened
U.S. access to the region's oil resources. Both
Chomsky and Finkelstein trace the strong
U.S.-Israeli tie to the June 1967 war, which they
believe established the close alliance and marked
the point at which the U.S. began to regard
Israel as a strategic asset and a stable base
from which U.S. power could be projected throughout the Middle East.
Joseph Massad ("Blaming the Israel Lobby,"
CounterPunch, March 25/26,
http://www.counterpunch.org/massad03252006.html)
argues along similar lines, describing
developments in the Middle East and around the
world that he believes the U.S. engineered for
its own benefit and would have carried out even
without Israel's assistance. His point, like
Chomsky's, is that the U.S. has a long history of
overthrowing regimes in Central America, in
Chile, in Indonesia, in Africa, where the Israel
lobby was not involved and where Israel at most
assisted the U.S. but did not benefit directly
itself. He goes farther than Chomsky by claiming
that with respect to the Middle East Israel has
been such an essential tool that its very
usefulness is what accounts for the strength of
the lobby. "It is in fact the very centrality of
Israel to U.S. strategy in the Middle East,"
Massad contends with a kind of backward logic,
"that accounts, in part, for the strength of the
pro-Israel lobby and not the other way around."
(One wonders why, if this were the case, there
would be any need for a lobby at all. What would
be a lobby's function if the U.S. already
regarded Israel as central to its strategy?)
The principal problem with these arguments from
the left is that they assume a continuity in U.S.
strategy and policymaking over the decades that
has never in fact existed. The notion that there
is any defined strategy that links Eisenhower's
policy to Johnson's to Reagan's to Clinton's
gives far more credit than is deserved to the
extremely ad hoc, hit-or-miss nature of all U.S.
foreign policy. Obviously, some level of imperial
interest has dictated policy in every
administration since World War II and, obviously,
the need to guarantee access to vital natural
resources around the world, such as oil in the
Middle East and elsewhere, has played a critical
role in determining policy. But beyond these
evident, and not particularly significant,
truths, it can accurately be said, at least with
regard to the Middle East, that it has been a
rare administration that has itself ever had a
coherent, clearly defined, and consistent foreign
policy and that, except for a broadly defined
anti-communism during the Cold War, no
administration's strategy has ever carried over
in detail to succeeding administrations.
The ad hoc nature of virtually every
administration's policy planning process cannot
be overemphasized. Aside from the strong but
amorphous political need felt in both major U.S.
parties and nurtured by the Israel lobby that
"supporting Israel" was vital to each party's own
future, the inconsistent, even short-term
randomness in the detailed Middle East
policymaking of successive administrations has
been remarkable. This lack of clear strategic
thinking at the very top levels of several new
administrations before they entered office
enhanced the power of individuals and groups that
did have clear goals and plans already in hand
such as, for instance, the pro-Israeli Dennis
Ross in both the first Bush and the Clinton
administrations, and the strongly pro-Israeli
neo-cons in the current Bush administration.
The critics on the left argue that because the
U.S. has a history of opposing and frequently
undermining or actually overthrowing radical
nationalist governments throughout the world
without any involvement by Israel, any instance
in which Israel acts against radical nationalism
in the Arab world is, therefore, proof that
Israel is doing the United States' work for it .
The critics generally believe, for instance, that
Israel's political destruction of Egypt's Nasser
in 1967 was done for the U.S. Most if not all
believe that Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon
was undertaken at U.S.behest, to destroy the PLO.
This kind of argumentation assumes too much on a
presumption of policy coherence. Lyndon Johnson
most certainly did abhor Nasser and was not sorry
to see him and his pan-Arab ambitions defeated,
but there is absolutely no evidence that the
Johnson administration ever seriously planned to
unseat Nasser, formulated any other action plan
against Egypt, or pushed Israel in any way to
attack. Johnson did apparently give a green light
to Israel's attack plans after they had been
formulated, but this is quite different from
initiating the plans. Already mired in Vietnam,
Johnson was very much concerned not to be drawn
into a war initiated by Israel and was criticized
by some Israeli supporters for not acting
forcefully enough on Israel's behalf. In any
case, Israel needed no prompting for its
pre-emptive attack, which had long been in the works.
Indeed, far from Israel functioning as the junior
partner carrying out a U.S. plan, it is clear
that the weight of pressure in 1967 was on the
U.S. to go along with Israel's designs and that
this pressure came from Israel and its agents in
the U.S. The lobby in this instance as broadly
defined by Mearsheimer and Walt: "the loose
coalition of individuals and organizations who
actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a
pro-Israel direction" was in fact a part of
Johnson's intimate circle of friends and advisers.
These included the number-two man at the Israeli
embassy, a close personal friend; the strongly
pro-Israeli Rostow brothers, Walt and Eugene, who
were part of the national security bureaucracy in
the administration; Supreme Court Justice Abe
Fortas; U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg; and
numerous others who all spent time with Johnson
at the LBJ Ranch in Texas and had the personal
access and the leisure time in an informal
setting to talk with Johnson about their concern
for Israel and to influence him heavily in favor
of Israel. This circle had already begun to work
on Johnson long before Israel's pre-emptive
attack in 1967, so they were nicely placed to
persuade Johnson to go along with it despite
Johnson's fears of provoking the Soviet Union and
becoming involved in a military conflict the U.S. was not prepared for.
In other words, Israel was beyond question the
senior partner in this particular policy
initiative; Israel made the decision to go to
war, would have gone to war with or without the
U.S. green light, and used its lobbyists in the
U.S. to steer Johnson administration policy in a
pro-Israeli direction. Israel's attack on the
U.S. naval vessel, the USS Liberty, in the midst
of the war an attack conducted in broad
daylight that killed 34 American sailors was
not the act of a junior partner. Nor was the U.S.
cover-up of this atrocity the act of a government
that dictated the moves in this relationship.
The evidence is equally clear that Israel was the
prime mover in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and
led the U.S. into that morass, rather than the
other way around. Although Massad refers to the
U.S. as Israel's master, in this instance as in
many others including 1967, Israel has clearly
been its own master. Chomsky argues in support of
his case that Reagan ordered Israel to call off
the invasion in August, two months after it was
launched. This is true, but in fact Israel did
not pay any attention; the invasion continued,
and the U.S. got farther and farther embroiled.
When, as occurred in Lebanon, the U.S. has
blundered into misguided adventures to support
Israel or to rescue Israel or to further Israel's
interests, it is a clear denial of reality to say
that Israel and its lobby have no significant
influence on U.S. Middle East policy. Even were
there not an abundance of other examples, Lebanon
alone, with its long-term implications, proves
the truth of the Mearsheimer-Walt conclusion that
the U.S. "has set aside its own security in order
to advance the interests of another state" and
that "the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the
region is due almost entirely to U.S. domestic
politics, and especially to the activities of the 'Israel Lobby.'"
As a general proposition, the left critics'
argumentation is much too limiting. While there
is no question that modern history is replete, as
they argue, with examples of the U.S. acting in
corporate interests overthrowing nationalist
governments perceived to be threatening U.S.
business and economic interests, as in Iran in
1953, Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973, and
elsewhere this frequent convergence of
corporate with government interests does not mean
that the U.S. never acts in other than corporate
interests. The fact of a strong
government-corporate alliance does not in any way
preclude situations even in the Middle East,
where oil is obviously a vital corporate resource
in which the U.S. acts primarily to benefit
Israel rather than serve any corporate or
economic purpose. Because it has a deep emotional
aspect and involves political, economic, and
military ties unlike those with any other nation,
the U.S. relationship with Israel is unique, and
there is nothing in the history of U.S. foreign
policy, nothing in the government's entanglement
with the military-industrial complex, to prevent
the lobby from exerting heavy influence on
policy. Israel and its lobbyists make their own
"corporation" that, like the oil industry (or
Chiquita Banana or Anaconda Copper in other
areas), is clearly a major factor driving U.S. foreign policy.
There is no denying the intricate interweaving of
the U.S. military-industrial complex with Israeli
military-industrial interests. Chomsky
acknowledges that there is "plenty of conformity"
between the lobby's position and the U.S.
government-corporate linkage and that the two are
very difficult to disentangle. But, although he
tends to emphasize that the U.S. is always the
senior partner and suggests that the Israeli side
does little more than support whatever the U.S.
arms, energy, and financial industries define as
U.S. national interests, in actual fact the
entanglement is much more one between equals than
the raw strengths of the two parties would
suggest. "Conformity" hardly captures the
magnitude of the relationship. Particularly in
the defense arena, Israel and its lobby and the
U.S. arms industry work hand in glove to advance
their combined, very compatible interests. The
relatively few very powerful and wealthy families
that dominate the Israeli arms industry are just
as interested in pressing for aggressively
militaristic U.S. and Israeli foreign policies as
are the CEOs of U.S. arms corporations and, as
globalization has progressed, so have the ties of
joint ownership and close financial and
technological cooperation among the arms
corporations of the two nations grown ever
closer. In every way, the two nations' military
industries work together very easily and very
quietly, to a common end. The relationship is
symbiotic, and the lobby cooperates intimately to
keep it alive; lobbyists can go to many in the
U.S. Congress and tell them quite credibly that
if aid to Israel is cut off, thousands of
arms-industry jobs in their own districts will be
lost. That's power. The lobby is not simply
passively supporting whatever the U.S.
military-industrial complex wants. It is actively
twisting arms very successfully in both
Congress and the administration to perpetuate
acceptance of a definition of U.S. "national
interests" that many Americans believe is wrong, as does Chomsky himself.
Clearly, the advantages in the relationship go in
both directions: Israel serves U.S. corporate
interests by using, and often helping develop,
the arms that U.S. manufacturers produce, and the
U.S. serves Israeli interests by providing a
constant stream of high-tech equipment that
maintains Israel's vast military superiority in
the region. But simply because the U.S. benefits
from this relationship, it cannot be said that
the U.S. is Israel's master, or that Israel
always does the U.S. bidding, or that the lobby,
which helps keep this arms alliance alive, has no
significant power. It's in the nature of a
symbiosis that both sides benefit, and the lobby
has clearly played a huge role in maintaining the interdependence.
The left's arguments also tend to be much too
conspiratorial. Finkelstein, for instance,
describes a supposed strategy in which the U.S.
perpetually undermines Israeli-Arab
reconciliation because it does not want an Israel
at peace with its neighbors, since Israel would
then loosen its dependence on the U.S. and become
a less reliable proxy. "What use," he asks,
"would a Paul Wolfowitz have of an Israel living
peacefully with its Arab neighbors and less
willing to do the U.S.'s bidding?" Not only does
this give the U.S. far more credit than it has
ever deserved for long-term strategic scheming
and the ability to carry out such a conspiracy,
but it begs a very important question that
neither Finkelstein nor the other left critics,
in their dogged effort to mold all developments
to their thesis, never examine: just what U.S.'s
bidding is Israel doing nowadays?
Although the leftist critics speak of Israel as a
base from which U.S. power is projected
throughout the Middle East, they do not clearly
explain how this works. Any strategic value
Israel had for the U.S. diminished drastically
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. They may
believe that Israel keeps Saudi Arabia's oil
resources safe from Arab nationalists or Muslim
fundamentalists or Russia, but this is highly
questionable. Israel clearly did us no good in
Lebanon, but rather the U.S. did Israel's bidding
and fumbled badly, so this cannot be how the U.S.
uses Israeli to project its power. In Palestine,
Finkelstein himself acknowledges that the U.S.
gains nothing from the occupation and Israeli
settlements, so this can't be where Israel is
doing the U.S.'s bidding. (With this
acknowledgement, Finkelstein, perhaps
unconsciously, seriously undermines his case
against the importance of the lobby, unless he
somehow believes the occupation is only of
incidental significance, in which case he
undermines the thesis of much of his own body of writing.)
Owning the Policymakers
In the clamor over the Mearsheimer-Walt study,
critics on both the left and the right have
tended to ignore the slow evolutionary history of
U.S. Middle East policymaking and of the U.S.
relationship with Israel. The ties to Israel and
earlier to Zionism go back more than a century,
predating the formation of a lobby, and they have
remained firm even at periods when the lobby has
waned. But it is also true that the lobby has
sustained and formalized a relationship that
otherwise rests on emotions and moral commitment.
Because the bond with Israel has been a steadily
evolving continuum, dating back to well before
Israel's formal establishment, it is important to
emphasize that there is no single point at which
it is possible to say, this is when Israel won
the affections of America, or this is when Israel
came to be regarded as a strategic asset, or this
is when the lobby became an integral part of U.S. policymaking.
The left critics of the lobby study mark the
Johnson administration as the beginning of the
U.S.-Israeli alliance, but almost every
administration before Johnson's, going back to
Woodrow Wilson, ratcheted up the relationship in
some significant way and could justifiably claim
to have been the progenitor of the bond.
Significantly, in almost all cases, policymakers
acted as they did because of the influence of
pro-Zionist or pro-Israeli lobbyists: Wilson
would not have supported the Zionist enterprise
to the extent he did had it not been for the
influence of Zionist colleagues like Louis
Brandeis; nor would Roosevelt; Truman would
probably not have been as supportive of
establishing a Jewish state without the heavy
influence of his very pro-Zionist advisers.
After the Johnson administration as well, the
relationship has continued to grow in remarkable
leaps. The Nixon-Kissinger regime could claim
that they were the administration that cemented
the alliance by exponentially increasing military
aid from an annual average of under $50 million
in military credits to Israel in the late 1960s
to an average of almost $400 million and, in the
year following the 1973 war, to $2.2 billion. It
is not for nothing that Israelis have informally
dubbed almost every president since Johnson
with the notable exceptions of Jimmy Carter and
the senior George Bush as "the most pro-Israeli
president ever"; each one has achieved some
landmark in the effort to please Israel.
The U.S.-Israeli bond has always had its
grounding more in soft emotions than in the hard
realities of geopolitical strategy. Scholars have
always described the tie in almost spiritual
terms never applied to ties with other nations. A
Palestinian-French scholar has described the
United States' pro-Israeli tilt as a
"predisposition," a natural inclination that
precedes any consideration of interest or of
cost. Israel, he said, takes part in the very
"being" of American society and therefore
participates in its integrity and its defense.
This is not simply the biased perspective of a
Palestinian. Other scholars of varying political
inclinations have described a similar spiritual
and cultural identity: the U.S. identifies with
Israel's "national style"; Israel is essential to
the "ideological prospering" of the U.S.; each
country has "grafted" the heritage of the other
onto itself. This applies even to the worst
aspects of each nation's heritage. Consciously or
unconsciously, many Israelis even today see the
U.S. conquest of the American Indians as
something "good," something to emulate and, which
is worse, many Americans even today are happy to
accept the "compliment" inherent in Israel's effort to copy us.
This is no ordinary state-to-state relationship,
and the lobby does not function like any ordinary
lobby. It is not a great exaggeration to say that
the lobby could not thrive without a very willing
host that is, a series of U.S. policymaking
establishments that have always been locked in to
a mindset singularly focused on Israel and its
interests and, at the same time, that U.S.
policy in the Middle East would not possibly have
remained so singularly focused on and so tilted
toward Israel were it not for the lobby. One
thing is certain: with the possible exceptions of
the Carter and the first Bush administrations,
the relationship has grown noticeably closer and
more solid with each administration, in almost
exact correlation with the growth in size and
budget and political clout of the pro-Israel lobby.
All critics of the lobby study have failed to
note a critical point during the Reagan
administration, surrounding the debacle in
Lebanon, when it can reasonably be said that
policymaking tipped over from a situation in
which the U.S. was more often the controlling
agent in the relationship to one in which Israel
and its advocates in the U.S. have increasingly
determined the course and the pace of
developments. The organized lobby, meaning AIPAC
and the several formal Jewish American
organizations, truly came into its own during the
Reagan years with a massive expansion of
memberships, budgets, propaganda activities, and
contacts within Congress and government, and it
has been consolidating power and influence for
the last quarter century, so that today the
broadly defined lobby, including all those who
work for Israel, has become an integral part of
U.S. society and U.S. policymaking.
The situation during the Reagan administration
demonstrates very clearly the closeness of the
bond. The events of these years illustrate how an
already very Israel-centered mindset in the U.S.,
which had been developing for decades, was
transformed into a concrete, institutionalized
relationship with Israel via the offices of
Israeli supporters and agents in the U.S.
The seminal event in the growth of AIPAC and the
organized lobby was the battle over the
administration's proposed sale of AWACS aircraft
to Saudi Arabia in 1981, Reagan's first year in
office. Paradoxically, although AIPAC lost this
battle in a head-on struggle with Reagan and the
administration, and the sale to the Saudis went
forward, AIPAC and the lobby ultimately won the
war for influence. Reagan was determined that the
sale go through; he regarded the deal as an
important part of an ill-conceived attempt to
build an Arab-Israeli consensus in the Middle
East to oppose the Soviet Union and, perhaps even
more important, saw the battle in Congress as a
test of his own prestige. By winning the battle,
he demonstrated that any administration, at least
up to that point, could exert enough pressure to
push an issue opposed by Israel through Congress,
but the struggle also demonstrated just how
exhausting and politically costly such a battle
can be, and no one around Reagan was willing to
go to the mat in this way again. In a real sense,
despite AIPAC's loss, the fight showed just how
much the lobby limited policymaker freedom, even
more than 20 years ago, in any transaction that concerned Israel.
The AWACS imbroglio galvanized AIPAC into action,
at precisely the time the administration was
subsiding in exhaustion, and under an aggressive
and energetic leader, former congressional aide
Thomas Dine, AIPAC quadrupled its budget,
increased its grassroots support immensely, and
vastly expanded its propaganda effort. This last
and perhaps most significant accomplishment was
achieved when Dine established an analytical unit
inside AIPAC that published in-depth analyses and
position papers for congressmen and policymakers.
Dine believed that anyone who could provide
policymakers with books and papers focusing on
Israel's strategic value to the U.S. would effectively "own" the policymakers.
With the rising power and influence of the lobby,
and following the U.S. debacle in Lebanon which
began with Israel's 1982 invasion and ended for
the U.S. with the withdrawal of its Marine
contingent in early 1984, after the Marines had
become involved in fighting to protect Israel's
invasion force and 241 U.S. military had been
killed in a truck bombing the Reagan
administration effectively handed over the policy
initiative in the Middle East to Israel and its American advocates.
Israel and its agents began, with amazing
effrontery, to complain that the U.S. failure to
clean up in Lebanon was interfering with Israel's
own designs there from which arrogance Reagan
and company concluded, in an astounding twist of
logic, that the only way to restore stability was
through closer alliance with Israel. As a result,
in the fall of 1983 Reagan sent a delegation to
ask the Israelis for closer strategic ties, and
shortly thereafter forged a formal strategic
alliance with Israel with the signing of a
"memorandum of understanding on strategic
cooperation." In 1987, the U.S. designated Israel
a "major non-NATO ally," thus giving it access to
military technology not available otherwise. The
notion of demanding concessions from Israel in
return for this favored status such as, for
instance, some restraint in its
settlement-construction in the West Bank was
specifically rejected. The U.S. simply very
deliberately and abjectly retreated into policy
inaction, leaving Israel with a free hand to
proceed as it wished wherever it wished in the
Middle East and particularly in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Even Israel, by all accounts, was surprised by
this demonstration of the United States'
inability to see beyond Israel's interests. Prime
Minister Menachem Begin had attempted from early
in the Carter administration to push the notion
that Israel was a strategic Cold War asset to the
U.S. but, because Israel did not in fact perform
a significant strategic role for the U.S. and was
in many ways more a liability than an asset,
Carter never paid serious attention to the
Israeli overtures. Begin feared that the United
States' moral and emotional commitment to Israel
might ultimately not be enough to sustain the
relationship through possible hard times, and so
he attempted to put Israel forward as a
strategically indispensable ally and a good
investment for U.S. security, a move that would
essentially reverse the two nations' roles,
altering the relationship from one of Israeli
indebtedness to the U.S. to one in which the
United States was in Israel's debt for its vital strategic role.
Carter was having none of this, but the notion of
strategic cooperation germinated in Israel and
among its U.S. supporters until the moment became
ripe during the Reagan administration. By the end
of the Lebanon mess, the notion that the U.S.
needed Israel's friendship had so taken hold
among the Reaganites that, as one former national
security aide observed in a stunning upending of
logic, they began to view closer strategic ties
as a necessary means of "restor[ing] Israeli
confidence in American reliability." Secretary of
State George Shultz wrote in his memoirs years
later of the U.S. need "to lift the albatross of
Lebanon from Israel's neck." Recall, as Shultz
must not have been able to do, that the debt here
was rightly Israel's: Israel put the albatross
around its own neck, and the U.S. stumbled into
Lebanon after Israel, not the other way around.
AIPAC and the neo-conservatives who rose to
prominence during the Reagan years played a major
role in building the strategic alliance. AIPAC in
particular became in every sense of the word a
partner of the U.S. in forging Middle East policy
from the mid-1980s on. Thomas Dine's vision of
"owning" policymakers by providing them with
position papers geared to Israel's interests went
into full swing. In 1984, AIPAC spun off a think
tank, the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, that remains one of the pre-eminent think
tanks in Washington and that has sent its
analysts into policymaking jobs in several
administrations. Dennis Ross, the senior Middle
East policymaker in the administrations of George
H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, came from the
Washington Institute and returned there after
leaving government service. Martin Indyk, the
Institute's first director, entered a senior
policymaking position in the Clinton administration from there.
Today, John Hannah, who has served on Vice
President Cheney's national security staff since
2001 and succeeded Lewis Libby last year as
Cheney's leading national security adviser, comes
from the Institute. AIPAC also continues to do
its own analyses in addition to the Washington
Institute's. A recent Washington Post profile of
Steven Rosen, the former senior AIPAC foreign
policy analyst who is about to stand trial with a
colleague for receiving and passing on classified
information to Israel, noted that two decades ago
Rosen began a practice of lobbying the executive
branch, rather than simply concentrating on
Congress, as a way, in the words of the Post
article, "to alter American foreign policy" by
"influencing government from the inside." Over
the years, he "had a hand in writing several policies favored by Israel."
In the Reagan years, AIPAC's position papers were
particularly welcomed by an administration
already more or less convinced of Israel's
strategic value and obsessed with impeding Soviet
advances. Policymakers began negotiating with
AIPAC before presenting legislation in order to
help assure passage, and Congress consulted the
lobby on pending legislation. Congress eagerly
embraced almost every legislative initiative
proposed by the lobby and came to rely on AIPAC
for information on all issues related to the
Middle East. The close cooperation between the
administration and AIPAC soon began to stifle
discourse inside the bureaucracy. Middle East
experts in the State Department and other
agencies were almost completely cut out of
decision-making, and officials throughout
government became increasingly unwilling to
propose policies or put forth analysis likely to
arouse opposition from AIPAC or Congress. One
unnamed official complained that "a lot of real
analysis is not even getting off people's desks
for fear of what the lobby will do"; he was
speaking to a New York Times correspondent, but
otherwise his complaints fell on deaf ears.
This kind of pervasive influence, a chill on
discourse inside as well as outside policymaking
councils, does not require the sort of clear-cut,
concrete pro-Israeli decisions in the Oval Office
that David Gergen naively thought he should have
witnessed if the lobby had any real influence.
This kind of influence, which uses friendly
persuasion, along with just enough direct
pressure, on a broad range of policymakers,
legislators, media commentators, and grassroots
activists to make an impression across the
spectrum, cannot be defined in terms of narrow,
concrete policy commands, but becomes an
unchanging, unchallengeable mindset, a
sentimental environment that restricts debate,
restricts thinking, and determines actions and
policies as surely as any command from on high.
When Israel's advocates, its lobbyists, in the
U.S. become an integral part of the policymaking
apparatus, as they have particularly since the
Reagan years and as they clearly have been
during the current Bush administration there is
no way to separate the lobby's interests from
U.S. policies. Moreover, because Israel's
strategic goals in the region are more clearly
defined and more urgent than those of the United
States, Israel's interests most often dominate.
Chomsky himself acknowledges that the lobby plays
a significant part in shaping the political
environment in which support for Israel becomes
automatic and unquestioned. Even Chomsky believes
that what he calls the intellectual political
class is a critical, and perhaps the most
influential, component of the lobby because these
elites determine the shaping of news and
information in the media and academia. On the
other hand, he contends that, because the lobby
already includes most of this intellectual
political class, the thesis of lobby power "loses
much of its content". But, on the contrary, this
very fact would seem to prove the point, not
undermine it. The fact of the lobby's
pervasiveness, far from rendering it less
powerful, magnifies its importance tremendously.
Indeed, this is the crux of the entire debate. It
is the very power of the lobby to continue
shaping the public mindset, to mold thinking and,
perhaps most important, to instill fear of
deviation that brings this intellectual political
class together in an unswerving determination to
work for Israel. Is there not a heavy impact on
Middle East policymaking when, for instance, a
lobby has the power to force the electoral defeat
of long-serving congressmen, as occurred to
Representative Paul Findley in 1982 and Senator
Charles Percy in 1984 after both had deviated
from political correctness by speaking out in
favor of negotiating with the PLO? AIPAC openly
crowed about the defeat of both men both
Republicans serving during the Republican Reagan
administration, who had been in Congress for 22
and 18 years respectively. Similarly, does not
the media's silence on Israel's oppressive
measures in the occupied territories, as well as
the concerted, and openly acknowledged, efforts
of virtually every pro-Israeli organization in
the U.S. to suppress information and quash debate
on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, have an
immense impact on policy? Today, even the most
outspoken of leftist radio hosts and other
commentators, such as Randi Rhodes, Mike Malloy,
and now Cindy Sheehan, almost always avoid
talking and writing about this issue.
Does not the massive effort by AIPAC, the
Washington Institute, and myriad other similar
organizations to spoon-feed policymakers and
congressmen selective information and analysis
written only from Israel's perspective have a
huge impact on policy? In the end, even Chomsky
and Finkelstein acknowledge the power of the
lobby in suppressing discussion and debate about
Middle East policy. The mobilization of public
opinion, Finkelstein writes, "can have a real
impact on policy-making which is why the Lobby
invests so much energy in suppressing
discussion." It is difficult to read statement
except as a ringing acknowledgement of the
massive and very central power of the lobby to
control discourse and to control policymaking on
the most critical Middle East policy issue.
Interchangeable Interests
The principal problem with the left critics'
analysis is that it is too rigid. There is no
question that Israel has served the interests of
the U.S. government and the military-industrial
complex in many areas of the world by, for
instance, aiding some of the rightist regimes of
Central America, by skirting arms and trade
embargoes against apartheid South Africa and
China (until the neo-conservatives turned off the
tap to China and, in a rare disagreement with
Israel, forced it to halt), and during the Cold
War by helping, at least indirectly, to hold down
Arab radicalism. There is also no question that,
no matter which party has been in power, the U.S.
has over the decades advanced an essentially
conservative global political and pro-business
agenda in areas far afield of the Middle East,
without reference to Israel or the lobby. The
U.S. unseated Mossadegh in Iran and Arbenz in
Guatemala and Allende in Chile, along with many
others, for its own corporate and political
purposes, as the left critics note, and did not use Israel.
But these facts do not minimize the power the
lobby has exerted in countless instances over the
course of decades, and particularly in recent
years, to lead the U.S. into situations that
Israel initiated, that the U.S. did not plan, and
that have done harm, both singly and
cumulatively, to U.S. interests. One need only
ask whether particular policies would have been
adopted in the absence of pressure from some
influential persons and organizations working on
Israel's behalf in order to see just how often
Israel or its advocates in the U.S., rather than
the United States or even U.S. corporations, have
been the policy initiators. The answers give
clear evidence that a lobby, as broadly defined
by Mearsheimer and Walt, has played a critical
and, as the decades have gone on, increasingly
influential role in policymaking.
For instance, would Harry Truman have been as
supportive of establishing Israel as a Jewish
state if it had not been for heavy pressure from
what was then a very loose grouping of strong
Zionists with considerable influence in
policymaking circles? It can reasonably be argued
that he might not in fact have supported Jewish
statehood at all, and it is even more likely that
his own White House advisers all strong Zionist
proponents themselves would not have twisted
arms at the United Nations to secure the 1947
vote in favor of partitioning Palestine if these
lobbyists had not been a part of Truman's
policymaking circle. Truman himself did not
initially support the notion of founding a state
based on religion, and every national security
agency of government, civilian and military ,
strongly opposed the partition of Palestine out
of fear that this would lead to warfare in which
the U.S. might have to intervene, would enhance
the Soviet position in the Middle East, and would
endanger U.S. oil interests in the area. But even
in the face of this united opposition from within
his own government, Truman found the pressures of
the Zionists among his close advisers and among
influential friends of the administration and of
the Democratic Party too overwhelmingly strong to resist.
Questions like this arise for virtually every
presidential administration. Would Jimmy Carter,
for instance, have dropped his pursuit of a
resolution of the Palestinian problem if the
Israel lobby had not exerted intense pressure on
him? Carter was the first president to recognize
the Palestinian need for some kind of "homeland,"
as he termed it, and he made numerous efforts to
bring Palestinians into a negotiating process and
to stop Israeli settlement-building, but
opposition from Israel and pressures from the
lobby were so heavy that he was ultimately worn down and defeated.
It is also all but impossible to imagine the U.S.
supporting Israel's actions in the occupied
Palestinian territories without pressure from the
lobby. No conceivable U.S. national interest
served even in the United States' own myopic
view by its support for Israel's harshly
oppressive policy in the West Bank and Gaza, and
furthermore this support is a dangerous
liability. As Mearsheimer and Walt note, most
foreign elites view the U.S. tolerance of Israeli
repression as "morally obtuse and a handicap in
the war on terrorism," and this tolerance is a
major cause of terrorism against the U.S. and the
West. The impetus for oppressing the Palestinians
clearly comes and has always come from Israel,
not the United States, and the impetus for
supporting Israel and facilitating this
oppression has come, very clearly and directly,
from the lobby, which goes to great lengths to
justify the occupation and to advocate on behalf of Israeli policies.
It is tempting, and not at all out of the realm
of possibility, to imagine Bill Clinton having
forged a final Palestinian-Israeli peace
agreement were it not for the influence of his
notably pro-Israeli advisers. By the time Clinton
came to office, the lobby had become a part of
the policymaking apparatus, in the persons of
Israeli advocates Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk,
both of whom entered government service from
lobby organizations. Both also returned at the
end of the Clinton administration to
organizations that advocate for Israel: Ross to
the Washington Institute and Indyk to the
Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle
East Policy, which is financed by and named for a
notably pro-Israeli benefactor. The scope of the
lobby's infiltration of government policymaking
councils has been unprecedented during the
current Bush administration. Some of the left
critics dismiss the neo-cons as not having any
allegiance to Israel; Finkelstein thinks it is
naïve to credit them with any ideological
conviction, and Zunes claims they are
uninterested in benefiting Israel because they
are not religious Jews (as if only religious Jews
care about Israel). But it simply ignores reality
to deny the neo-cons' very close ties, both
ideological and pragmatic, to Israel's right wing.
Both Finkelstein and Zunes glaringly fail to
mention the strategy paper that several neo-cons
wrote in the mid-1990s for an Israeli prime
minister, laying out a plan for attacking Iraq
these same neo-cons later carried out upon
entering the Bush administration. The strategy
was designed both to assure Israel's regional
dominance in the Middle East and to enhance U.S.
global hegemony. One of these authors, David
Wurmser, remains in government as Cheney's Middle
East adviser one of several lobbyists inside
the henhouse. The openly trumpeted plan, crafted
by the neo-cons, is to "transform" the Middle
East by unseating Saddam Hussein, and the notion,
also openly touted, that the path to peace in
Palestine-Israel ran through Baghdad grew out of
the neo-cons' overriding concern for Israel. Both
Finkelstein and Zunes also fail to take note of
the long record of advocacy on behalf of Israel
that almost all the neo-cons (Paul Wolfowitz,
Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser,
Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, and their
cheerleaders on the sidelines such as William
Kristol, Robert Kagan, Norman Podhoretz, Jeane
Kirkpatrick, and numerous right-wing, pro-Israeli
think tanks in Washington) have compiled over the
years. The fact that these individuals and
organizations are all also advocates of U.S.
global hegemony does not diminish their
allegiance to Israel or their desire to assure
Israel's regional hegemony in alliance with the U.S.
The claimed interchangeability of U.S. and
Israeli interests and the fact that certain
individuals for whom a primary objective is to
advance Israel's interests now reside inside the
councils of government proves the truth of the
Mearsheimer-Walt's principal conclusion that the
lobby has been able to convince most Americans,
contrary to reality, that there is an essential
identity of U.S. and Israeli interests and that
the lobby has succeeded for this reason in
forging a relationship of unmatched intimacy. The
"overall thrust of policy" in the Middle East,
they observe quite accurately, is "almost
entirely" attributable to the lobby's activities.
The fact that the U.S. occasionally acts without
reference to Israel in areas outside the Middle
East, and that Israel does occasionally serve
U.S. interests rather than the other way around,
takes nothing away from the significance of this conclusion.
The tragedy of the present situation is that it
has become impossible to separate Israeli from
alleged U.S. interests that is, not what should
be real U.S. national interests, but the selfish
and self-defined "national interests" of the
political-corporate-military complex that
dominates the Bush administration, Congress, and
both major political parties. The specific groups
that now dominate the U.S. government are the
globalized arms, energy, and financial
industries, and the entire military
establishments, of the U.S. and of Israel
groups that have quite literally hijacked the
government and stripped it of most vestiges of democracy.
This convergence of manipulated "interests" has a
profound effect on U.S. policy choices in the
Middle East. When a government is unable to
distinguish its own real needs from those of
another state, it can no longer be said that it
always acts in its own interests or that it does
not frequently do grave damage to those
interests. Until the system of sovereign
nation-states no longer exists and that day may
never come no nation's choices should ever be
defined according to the demands of another
nation. Accepting a convergence of U.S. and
Israeli interests means that the U.S. can never
act entirely as its own agent, will never examine
its policies and actions entirely from the
vantage point of its own long-term self interest,
and can, therefore, never know why it is devising
and implementing a particular policy. The failure
to recognize this reality is where the left
critics' belittling of the lobby's power and
their acceptance of U.S. Middle East policy as
simply an unchangeable part of a longstanding
strategy is particularly dangerous.
Kathleen Christison is a former CIA political
analyst and has worked on Middle East issues for
30 years. She is the author of
<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0520217187/counterpunchmaga>Perceptions
of Palestine and
<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/097125480X/counterpunchmaga>The
Wound of Dispossession.
Bill Christison was a senior official of the CIA.
He served as a National Intelligence Officer and
as Director of the CIA's Office of Regional and
Political Analysis. He is a contributor to
Imperial Crusades, CounterPunch's history of the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan.
They can be reached at
<mailto:kathy.bill at christison-santafe.com>kathy.bill at christison-santafe.com.
The Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
(415) 863-9977
www.freedomarchives.org
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