[News] HERSH: How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib.
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News at freedomarchives.org
Mon May 17 08:55:25 EDT 2004
THE GRAY ZONE
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040524fa_fact
How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib.
Issue of 2004-05-24
Posted 2004-05-15
The roots of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal lie not in the criminal
inclinations of a few Army reservists but in a decision, approved last year
by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to expand a highly secret
operation, which had been focussed on the hunt for Al Qaeda, to the
interrogation of prisoners in Iraq. Rumsfelds decision embittered the
American intelligence community, damaged the effectiveness of élite combat
units, and hurt Americas prospects in the war on terror.
According to interviews with several past and present American intelligence
officials, the Pentagons operation, known inside the intelligence
community by several code words, including Copper Green, encouraged
physical coercion and sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners in an effort to
generate more intelligence about the growing insurgency in Iraq. A senior
C.I.A. official, in confirming the details of this account last week, said
that the operation stemmed from Rumsfelds long-standing desire to wrest
control of Americas clandestine and paramilitary operations from the C.I.A.
Rumsfeld, during appearances last week before Congress to testify about Abu
Ghraib, was precluded by law from explicitly mentioning highly secret
matters in an unclassified session. But he conveyed the message that he was
telling the public all that he knew about the story. He said, Any
suggestion that there is not a full, deep awareness of what has happened,
and the damage it has done, I think, would be a misunderstanding. The
senior C.I.A. official, asked about Rumsfelds testimony and that of
Stephen Cambone, his Under-Secretary for Intelligence, said, Some people
think you can bullshit anyone.
The Abu Ghraib story began, in a sense, just weeks after the September 11,
2001, attacks, with the American bombing of Afghanistan. Almost from the
start, the Administrations search for Al Qaeda members in the war zone,
and its worldwide search for terrorists, came up against major
command-and-control problems. For example, combat forces that had Al Qaeda
targets in sight had to obtain legal clearance before firing on them. On
October 7th, the night the bombing began, an unmanned Predator aircraft
tracked an automobile convoy that, American intelligence believed,
contained Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban leader. A lawyer on duty at the
United States Central Command headquarters, in Tampa, Florida, refused to
authorize a strike. By the time an attack was approved, the target was out
of reach. Rumsfeld was apoplectic over what he saw as a self-defeating
hesitation to attack that was due to political correctness. One officer
described him to me that fall as kicking a lot of glass and breaking
doors. In November, the Washington Post reported that, as many as ten
times since early October, Air Force pilots believed theyd had senior Al
Qaeda and Taliban members in their sights but had been unable to act in
time because of legalistic hurdles. There were similar problems throughout
the world, as American Special Forces units seeking to move quickly against
suspected terrorist cells were compelled to get prior approval from local
American ambassadors and brief their superiors in the chain of command.
Rumsfeld reacted in his usual direct fashion: he authorized the
establishment of a highly secret program that was given blanket advance
approval to kill or capture and, if possible, interrogate high value
targets in the Bush Administrations war on terror. A special-access
program, or sapsubject to the Defense Departments most stringent level of
securitywas set up, with an office in a secure area of the Pentagon. The
program would recruit operatives and acquire the necessary equipment,
including aircraft, and would keep its activities under wraps. Americas
most successful intelligence operations during the Cold War had been saps,
including the Navys submarine penetration of underwater cables used by the
Soviet high command and construction of the Air Forces stealth bomber. All
the so-called black programs had one element in common: the Secretary of
Defense, or his deputy, had to conclude that the normal military
classification restraints did not provide enough security.
Rumsfelds goal was to get a capability in place to take on a high-value
targeta standup group to hit quickly, a former high-level intelligence
official told me. He got all the agencies togetherthe C.I.A. and the
N.S.A.to get pre-approval in place. Just say the code word and go. The
operation had across-the-board approval from Rumsfeld and from Condoleezza
Rice, the national-security adviser. President Bush was informed of the
existence of the program, the former intelligence official said.
[]
The people assigned to the program worked by the book, the former
intelligence official told me. They created code words, and recruited,
after careful screening, highly trained commandos and operatives from
Americas élite forcesNavy seals, the Armys Delta Force, and the C.I.A.s
paramilitary experts. They also asked some basic questions: Do the people
working the problem have to use aliases? Yes. Do we need dead drops for the
mail? Yes. No traceability and no budget. And some special-access programs
are never fully briefed to Congress.
In theory, the operation enabled the Bush Administration to respond
immediately to time-sensitive intelligence: commandos crossed borders
without visas and could interrogate terrorism suspects deemed too important
for transfer to the militarys facilities at Guantánamo, Cuba. They carried
out instant interrogationsusing force if necessaryat secret C.I.A.
detention centers scattered around the world. The intelligence would be
relayed to the sap command center in the Pentagon in real time, and sifted
for those pieces of information critical to the white, or overt, world.
Fewer than two hundred operatives and officials, including Rumsfeld and
General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were
completely read into the program, the former intelligence official said.
The goal was to keep the operation protected. Were not going to read more
people than necessary into our heart of darkness, he said. The rules are
Grab whom you must. Do what you want.
One Pentagon official who was deeply involved in the program was Stephen
Cambone, who was named Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in
March, 2003. The office was new; it was created as part of Rumsfelds
reorganization of the Pentagon. Cambone was unpopular among military and
civilian intelligence bureaucrats in the Pentagon, essentially because he
had little experience in running intelligence programs, though in 1998 he
had served as staff director for a committee, headed by Rumsfeld, that
warned of an emerging ballistic-missile threat to the United States. He was
known instead for his closeness to Rumsfeld. Remember Henry IIWho will
rid me of this meddlesome priest? the senior C.I.A. official said to me,
with a laugh, last week. Whatever Rumsfeld whimsically says, Cambone will
do ten times that much.
Cambone was a strong advocate for war against Iraq. He shared Rumsfelds
disdain for the analysis and assessments proffered by the C.I.A., viewing
them as too cautious, and chafed, as did Rumsfeld, at the C.I.A.s
inability, before the Iraq war, to state conclusively that Saddam Hussein
harbored weapons of mass destruction. Cambones military assistant, Army
Lieutenant General William G. (Jerry) Boykin, was also controversial. Last
fall, he generated unwanted headlines after it was reported that, in a
speech at an Oregon church, he equated the Muslim world with Satan.
Early in his tenure, Cambone provoked a bureaucratic battle within the
Pentagon by insisting that he be given control of all special-access
programs that were relevant to the war on terror. Those programs, which had
been viewed by many in the Pentagon as sacrosanct, were monitored by
Kenneth deGraffenreid, who had experience in counter-intelligence programs.
Cambone got control, and deGraffenreid subsequently left the Pentagon.
Asked for comment on this story, a Pentagon spokesman said, I will not
discuss any covert programs; however, Dr. Cambone did not assume his
position as the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence until March 7,
2003, and had no involvement in the decision-making process regarding
interrogation procedures in Iraq or anywhere else.
In mid-2003, the special-access program was regarded in the Pentagon as one
of the success stories of the war on terror. It was an active program,
the former intelligence official told me. Its been the most important
capability we have for dealing with an imminent threat. If we discover
where Osama bin Laden is, we can get him. And we can remove an existing
threat with a real capability to hit the United Statesand do so without
visibility. Some of its methods were troubling and could not bear close
scrutiny, however.
By then, the war in Iraq had begun. The sap was involved in some
assignments in Iraq, the former official said. C.I.A. and other American
Special Forces operatives secretly teamed up to hunt for Saddam Hussein
andwithout successfor Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. But they werent
able to stop the evolving insurgency.
[]
In the first months after the fall of Baghdad, Rumsfeld and his aides still
had a limited view of the insurgency, seeing it as little more than the
work of Baathist dead-enders, criminal gangs, and foreign terrorists who
were Al Qaeda followers. The Administration measured its success in the war
by how many of those on its list of the fifty-five most wanted members of
the old regimereproduced on playing cardshad been captured. Then, in
August, 2003, terror bombings in Baghdad hit the Jordanian Embassy, killing
nineteen people, and the United Nations headquarters, killing twenty-three
people, including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the head of the U.N. mission. On
August 25th, less than a week after the U.N. bombing, Rumsfeld
acknowledged, in a talk before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, that the
dead-enders are still with us. He went on, There are some today who are
surprised that there are still pockets of resistance in Iraq, and they
suggest that this represents some sort of failure on the part of the
Coalition. But this is not the case. Rumsfeld compared the insurgents with
those true believers who fought on during and after the defeat of the Nazi
regime in Germany. A few weeks laterand five months after the fall of
Baghdadthe Defense Secretary declared,It is, in my view, better to be
dealing with terrorists in Iraq than in the United States.
Inside the Pentagon, there was a growing realization that the war was going
badly. The increasingly beleaguered and baffled Army leadership was telling
reporters that the insurgents consisted of five thousand Baathists loyal to
Saddam Hussein. When you understand that theyre organized in a cellular
structure, General John Abizaid, the head of the Central Command,
declared, that . . . they have access to a lot of money and a lot of
ammunition, youll understand how dangerous they are.
The American military and intelligence communities were having little
success in penetrating the insurgency. One internal report prepared for the
U.S. military, made available to me, concluded that the
insurgentsstrategic and operational intelligence has proven to be quite
good. According to the study:
Their ability to attack convoys, other vulnerable targets and particular
individuals has been the result of painstaking surveillance and
reconnaissance. Inside information has been passed on to insurgent cells
about convoy/troop movements and daily habits of Iraqis working with
coalition from within the Iraqi security services, primarily the Iraqi
Police force which is rife with sympathy for the insurgents, Iraqi
ministries and from within pro-insurgent individuals working with the CPAs
so-called Green Zone.
The study concluded, Politically, the U.S. has failed to date.
Insurgencies can be fixed or ameliorated by dealing with what caused them
in the first place. The disaster that is the reconstruction of Iraq has
been the key cause of the insurgency. There is no legitimate government,
and it behooves the Coalition Provisional Authority to absorb the sad but
unvarnished fact that most Iraqis do not see the Governing Councilthe
Iraqi body appointed by the C.P.A.as the legitimate authority. Indeed,
they know that the true power is the CPA.
By the fall, a military analyst told me, the extent of the Pentagons
political and military misjudgments was clear. Donald Rumsfelds
dead-enders now included not only Baathists but many marginal figures as
wellthugs and criminals who were among the tens of thousands of prisoners
freed the previous fall by Saddam as part of a prewar general amnesty.
Their desperation was not driving the insurgency; it simply made them easy
recruits for those who were. The analyst said, Wed killed and captured
guys who had been given two or three hundred dollars to pray and
spraythat is, shoot randomly and hope for the best. They werent really
insurgents but down-and-outers who were paid by wealthy individuals
sympathetic to the insurgency. In many cases, the paymasters were Sunnis
who had been members of the Baath Party. The analyst said that the
insurgents spent three or four months figuring out how we operated and
developing their own countermeasures. If that meant putting up a hapless
guy to go and attack a convoy and see how the American troops responded,
theyd do it. Then, the analyst said, the clever ones began to get in on
the action.
By contrast, according to the military report, the American and Coalition
forces knew little about the insurgency: Human intelligence is poor or
lacking . . . due to the dearth of competence and expertise. . . . The
intelligence effort is not coördinated since either too many groups are
involved in gathering intelligence or the final product does not get to the
troops in the field in a timely manner. The success of the war was at
risk; something had to be done to change the dynamic.
[]
The solution, endorsed by Rumsfeld and carried out by Stephen Cambone, was
to get tough with those Iraqis in the Army prison system who were suspected
of being insurgents. A key player was Major General Geoffrey Miller, the
commander of the detention and interrogation center at Guantánamo, who had
been summoned to Baghdad in late August to review prison interrogation
procedures. The internal Army report on the abuse charges, written by Major
General Antonio Taguba in February, revealed that Miller urged that the
commanders in Baghdad change policy and place military intelligence in
charge of the prison. The report quoted Miller as recommending that
detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation.
Millers concept, as it emerged in recent Senate hearings, was to
Gitmoize the prison system in Iraqto make it more focussed on
interrogation. He also briefed military commanders in Iraq on the
interrogation methods used in Cubamethods that could, with special
approval, include sleep deprivation, exposure to extremes of cold and heat,
and placing prisoners in stress positions for agonizing lengths of time.
(The Bush Administration had unilaterally declared Al Qaeda and other
captured members of international terrorist networks to be illegal
combatants, and not eligible for the protection of the Geneva Conventions.)
Rumsfeld and Cambone went a step further, however: they expanded the scope
of the sap, bringing its unconventional methods to Abu Ghraib. The
commandos were to operate in Iraq as they had in Afghanistan. The male
prisoners could be treated roughly, and exposed to sexual humiliation.
They werent getting anything substantive from the detainees in Iraq, the
former intelligence official told me. No names. Nothing that they could
hang their hat on. Cambone says, Ive got to crack this thing and Im tired
of working through the normal chain of command. Ive got this apparatus set
upthe black special-access programand Im going in hot. So he pulls the
switch, and the electricity begins flowing last summer. And its working.
Were getting a picture of the insurgency in Iraq and the intelligence is
flowing into the white world. Were getting good stuff. But weve got more
targetsprisoners in Iraqi jailsthan people who can handle them.
Cambone then made another crucial decision, the former intelligence
official told me: not only would he bring the saps rules into the prisons;
he would bring some of the Army military-intelligence officers working
inside the Iraqi prisons under the sapsauspices. So here are
fundamentally good soldiersmilitary-intelligence guysbeing told that no
rules apply, the former official, who has extensive knowledge of the
special-access programs, added. And, as far as theyre concerned, this is
a covert operation, and its to be kept within Defense Department channels.
The military-police prison guards, the former official said, included
recycled hillbillies from Cumberland, Maryland. He was referring to
members of the 372nd Military Police Company. Seven members of the company
are now facing charges for their role in the abuse at Abu Ghraib. How are
these guys from Cumberland going to know anything? The Army Reserve doesnt
know what its doing.
Who was in charge of Abu Ghraibwhether military police or military
intelligencewas no longer the only question that mattered. Hard-core
special operatives, some of them with aliases, were working in the prison.
The military police assigned to guard the prisoners wore uniforms, but many
othersmilitary intelligence officers, contract interpreters, C.I.A.
officers, and the men from the special-access programwore civilian
clothes. It was not clear who was who, even to Brigadier General Janis
Karpinski, then the commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade, and the
officer ostensibly in charge. I thought most of the civilians there were
interpreters, but there were some civilians that I didnt know, Karpinski
told me. I called them the disappearing ghosts. Id seen them once in a
while at Abu Ghraib and then Id see them months later. They were
nicetheyd always call out to me and say, Hey, remember me? How are you
doing? The mysterious civilians, she said, were always bringing in
somebody for interrogation or waiting to collect somebody going out.
Karpinski added that she had no idea who was operating in her prison
system. (General Taguba found that Karpinskis leadership failures
contributed to the abuses.)
By fall, according to the former intelligence official, the senior
leadership of the C.I.A. had had enough. They said, No way. We signed up
for the core program in Afghanistanpre-approved for operations against
high-value terrorist targetsand now you want to use it for cabdrivers,
brothers-in-law, and people pulled off the streetsthe sort of prisoners
who populate the Iraqi jails. The C.I.A.s legal people objected, and the
agency ended its sap involvement in Abu Ghraib, the former official said.
The C.I.A.s complaints were echoed throughout the intelligence community.
There was fear that the situation at Abu Ghraib would lead to the exposure
of the secret sap, and thereby bring an end to what had been, before Iraq,
a valuable cover operation. This was stupidity, a government consultant
told me. Youre taking a program that was operating in the chaos of
Afghanistan against Al Qaeda, a stateless terror group, and bringing it
into a structured, traditional war zone. Sooner or later, the commandos
would bump into the legal and moral procedures of a conventional war with
an Army of a hundred and thirty-five thousand soldiers.
The former senior intelligence official blamed hubris for the Abu Ghraib
disaster. Theres nothing more exhilarating for a pissant Pentagon
civilian than dealing with an important national security issue without
dealing with military planners, who are always worried about risk, he told
me. What could be more boring than needing the coöperation of logistical
planners? The only difficulty, the former official added, is that, as
soon as you enlarge the secret program beyond the oversight capability of
experienced people, you lose control. Weve never had a case where a
special-access program went sourand this goes back to the Cold War.
In a separate interview, a Pentagon consultant, who spent much of his
career directly involved with special-access programs, spread the blame.
The White House subcontracted this to the Pentagon, and the Pentagon
subcontracted it to Cambone, he said. This is Cambones deal, but
Rumsfeld and Myers approved the program. When it came to the interrogation
operation at Abu Ghraib, he said, Rumsfeld left the details to Cambone.
Rumsfeld may not be personally culpable, the consultant added, but hes
responsible for the checks and balances. The issue is that, since 9/11,
weve changed the rules on how we deal with terrorism, and created
conditions where the ends justify the means.
[]
Last week, statements made by one of the seven accused M.P.s, Specialist
Jeremy Sivits, who is expected to plead guilty, were released. In them, he
claimed that senior commanders in his unit would have stopped the abuse had
they witnessed it. One of the questions that will be explored at any trial,
however, is why a group of Army Reserve military policemen, most of them
from small towns, tormented their prisoners as they did, in a manner that
was especially humiliating for Iraqi men.
The notion that Arabs are particularly vulnerable to sexual humiliation
became a talking point among pro-war Washington conservatives in the months
before the March, 2003, invasion of Iraq. One book that was frequently
cited was The Arab Mind, a study of Arab culture and psychology, first
published in 1973, by Raphael Patai, a cultural anthropologist who taught
at, among other universities, Columbia and Princeton, and who died in 1996.
The book includes a twenty-five-page chapter on Arabs and sex, depicting
sex as a taboo vested with shame and repression. The segregation of the
sexes, the veiling of the women . . . and all the other minute rules that
govern and restrict contact between men and women, have the effect of
making sex a prime mental preoccupation in the Arab world, Patai wrote.
Homosexual activity, or any indication of homosexual leanings, as with all
other expressions of sexuality, is never given any publicity. These are
private affairs and remain in private. The Patai book, an academic told
me, was the bible of the neocons on Arab behavior. In their discussions,
he said, two themes emergedone, that Arabs only understand force and,
two, that the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation.
The government consultant said that there may have been a serious goal, in
the beginning, behind the sexual humiliation and the posed photographs. It
was thought that some prisoners would do anythingincluding spying on their
associatesto avoid dissemination of the shameful photos to family and
friends. The government consultant said, I was told that the purpose of
the photographs was to create an army of informants, people you could
insert back in the population. The idea was that they would be motivated
by fear of exposure, and gather information about pending insurgency
action, the consultant said. If so, it wasnt effective; the insurgency
continued to grow.
This shit has been brewing for months, the Pentagon consultant who has
dealt with saps told me. You dont keep prisoners naked in their cell and
then let them get bitten by dogs. This is sick. The consultant explained
that he and his colleagues, all of whom had served for years on active duty
in the military, had been appalled by the misuse of Army guard dogs inside
Abu Ghraib. We dont raise kids to do things like that. When you go after
Mullah Omar, thats one thing. But when you give the authority to kids who
dont know the rules, thats another.
In 2003, Rumsfelds apparent disregard for the requirements of the Geneva
Conventions while carrying out the war on terror had led a group of senior
military legal officers from the Judge Advocate Generals (jag) Corps to
pay two surprise visits within five months to Scott Horton, who was then
chairman of the New York City Bar Associations Committee on International
Human Rights. They wanted us to challenge the Bush Administration about
its standards for detentions and interrogation, Horton told me. They were
urging us to get involved and speak in a very loud voice. It came pretty
much out of the blue. The message was that conditions are ripe for abuse,
and its going to occur. The military officials were most alarmed about
the growing use of civilian contractors in the interrogation process,
Horton recalled. They said there was an atmosphere of legal ambiguity
being created as a result of a policy decision at the highest levels in the
Pentagon. The jag officers were being cut out of the policy formulation
process. They told him that, with the war on terror, a fifty-year history
of exemplary application of the Geneva Conventions had come to an end.
[]
The abuses at Abu Ghraib were exposed on January 13th, when Joseph Darby, a
young military policeman assigned to Abu Ghraib, reported the wrongdoing to
the Armys Criminal Investigations Division. He also turned over a CD full
of photographs. Within three days, a report made its way to Donald
Rumsfeld, who informed President Bush.
The inquiry presented a dilemma for the Pentagon. The C.I.D. had to be
allowed to continue, the former intelligence official said. You cant
cover it up. You have to prosecute these guys for being off the
reservation. But how do you prosecute them when they were covered by the
special-access program? So you hope that maybe itll go away. The
Pentagons attitude last January, he said, was Somebody got caught with
some photos. Whats the big deal? Take care of it. Rumsfelds explanation
to the White House, the official added, was reassuring: Weve got a
glitch in the program. Well prosecute it. The cover story was that some
kids got out of control.
In their testimony before Congress last week, Rumsfeld and Cambone
struggled to convince the legislators that Millers visit to Baghdad in
late August had nothing to do with the subsequent abuse. Cambone sought to
assure the Senate Armed Services Committee that the interplay between
Miller and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the top U.S. commander in
Iraq, had only a casual connection to his office. Millers recommendations,
Cambone said, were made to Sanchez. His own role, he said, was mainly to
insure that the flow of intelligence back to the commands was efficient
and effective. He added that Millers goal was to provide a safe, secure
and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of
intelligence.
It was a hard sell. Senator Hillary Clinton, Democrat of New York, posed
the essential question facing the senators:
If, indeed, General Miller was sent from Guantánamo to Iraq for the purpose
of acquiring more actionable intelligence from detainees, then it is fair
to conclude that the actions that are at point here in your report [on
abuses at Abu Ghraib] are in some way connected to General Millers arrival
and his specific orders, however they were interpreted, by those MPs and
the military intelligence that were involved.. . .Therefore, I for one
dont believe I yet have adequate information from Mr. Cambone and the
Defense Department as to exactly what General Millers orders were . . .
how he carried out those orders, and the connection between his arrival in
the fall of 03 and the intensity of the abuses that occurred afterward.
Sometime before the Abu Ghraib abuses became public, the former
intelligence official told me, Miller was read inthat is, briefedon the
special-access operation. In April, Miller returned to Baghdad to assume
control of the Iraqi prisons; once the scandal hit, with its glaring
headlines, General Sanchez presented him to the American and international
media as the general who would clean up the Iraqi prison system and instill
respect for the Geneva Conventions. His job is to save what he can, the
former official said. Hes there to protect the program while limiting any
loss of core capability. As for Antonio Taguba, the former intelligence
official added, He goes into it not knowing shit. And then: Holy cow!
Whats going on?
If General Miller had been summoned by Congress to testify, he, like
Rumsfeld and Cambone, would not have been able to mention the
special-access program. If you give away the fact that a special-access
program exists,the former intelligence official told me, you blow the
whole quick-reaction program.
One puzzling aspect of Rumsfelds account of his initial reaction to news
of the Abu Ghraib investigation was his lack of alarm and lack of
curiosity. One factor may have been recent history: there had been many
previous complaints of prisoner abuse from organization like Human Rights
Watch and the International Red Cross, and the Pentagon had weathered them
with ease. Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he had
not been provided with details of alleged abuses until late March, when he
read the specific charges. You read it, as I say, its one thing. You see
these photographs and its just unbelievable. . . . It wasnt
three-dimensional. It wasnt video. It wasnt color. It was quite a
different thing. The former intelligence official said that, in his view,
Rumsfeld and other senior Pentagon officials had not studied the
photographs because they thought what was in there was permitted under the
rules of engagement, as applied to the sap. The photos, he added,
turned out to be the result of the program run amok.
The former intelligence official made it clear that he was not alleging
that Rumsfeld or General Myers knew that atrocities were committed. But, he
said, it was their permission granted to do the sap, generically, and
there was enough ambiguity, which permitted the abuses.
This official went on, The black guysthose in the Pentagons secret
programsay weve got to accept the prosecution. Theyre vaccinated from
the reality. The sap is still active, and the United States is picking up
guys for interrogation. The question is, how do they protect the
quick-reaction force without blowing its cover? The program was protected
by the fact that no one on the outside was allowed to know of its
existence. If you even give a hint that youre aware of a black program
that youre not read into, you lose your clearances, the former official
said. Nobody will talk. So the only people left to prosecute are those who
are undefendedthe poor kids at the end of the food chain.
The most vulnerable senior official is Cambone. The Pentagon is trying now
to protect Cambone, and doesnt know how to do it, the former intelligence
official said.
[]
Last week, the government consultant, who has close ties to many
conservatives, defended the Administrations continued secrecy about the
special-access program in Abu Ghraib. Why keep it black? the consultant
asked. Because the process is unpleasant. Its like making sausageyou
like the result but you dont want to know how it was made. Also, you dont
want the Iraqi public, and the Arab world, to know. Remember, we went to
Iraq to democratize the Middle East. The last thing you want to do is let
the Arab world know how you treat Arab males in prison.
The former intelligence official told me he feared that one of the
disastrous effects of the prison-abuse scandal would be the undermining of
legitimate operations in the war on terror, which had already suffered from
the draining of resources into Iraq. He portrayed Abu Ghraib as a tumor
on the war on terror. He said, As long as its benign and contained, the
Pentagon can deal with the photo crisis without jeopardizing the secret
program. As soon as it begins to grow, with nobody to diagnose itit
becomes a malignant tumor.
The Pentagon consultant made a similar point. Cambone and his superiors,
the consultant said, created the conditions that allowed transgressions to
take place. And now were going to end up with another Church
Commissionthe 1975 Senate committee on intelligence, headed by Senator
Frank Church, of Idaho, which investigated C.I.A. abuses during the
previous two decades. Abu Ghraib had sent the message that the Pentagon
leadership was unable to handle its discretionary power. When the shit
hits the fan, as it did on 9/11, how do you push the pedal? the consultant
asked. You do it selectively and with intelligence.
Congress is going to get to the bottom of this, the Pentagon consultant
said. You have to demonstrate that there are checks and balances in the
system. He added, When you live in a world of gray zones, you have to
have very clear red lines.
Senator John McCain, of Arizona, said, If this is true, it certainly
increases the dimension of this issue and deserves significant scrutiny. I
will do all possible to get to the bottom of this, and all other allegations.
In an odd way, Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights
Watch, said, the sexual abuses at Abu Ghraib have become a diversion for
the prisoner abuse and the violation of the Geneva Conventions that is
authorized. Since September 11th, Roth added, the military has
systematically used third-degree techniques around the world on detainees.
Some jags hate this and are horrified that the tolerance of mistreatment
will come back and haunt us in the next war, Roth told me. Were giving
the world a ready-made excuse to ignore the Geneva Conventions. Rumsfeld
has lowered the bar.
[]
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