

REPRESSION

Documents from the
F.B.I., Think Tanks, and
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Documents from the
national liberation strug-
gles and their allies.

RESISTANCE



RESISTANCE:

DOCUMENTS FROM NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLES AND THEIR ALLIES

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DEBATE ON REPRESSION

Liga Socialista Puertorriqueña (LSP)

Introduction

The political repression that yankee imperialism implements against independentism and the sectors of the people in struggle has increased in the last few years. This campaign has included political assassination, incarceration of patriots by the Federal Grand Jury, violent repression of the people's struggles, an increase in repressive forces, the assignment of large amounts of money by the colonial legislature (PPD-PNP) to the police, the new FBI guidelines, the projected construction of garrisons for the National Guard, etc. All this is part of the new imperialist strategy that contemplates as much a new economic profile (putting a priority on mineral exploitation) as the crushing of the patriotic revolutionary movement with the intention of preventing it from becoming the alternative for the people at the point in which the colonial structure breaks down.

The left in Puerto Rico has responded to this offensive in many ways. The politics, of course, have been justified by different theoretical approaches to the problem. Thus we find that some try to make revolutionary and militant politics concrete, by denouncing the repression through marches, meetings, trying to mobilize the people, etc., while other sectors confine themselves to one or another declaration of condemnation, once in a while sending representatives to demonstrations, engaging in theoretical polemics as a justification for inertia, proposing divisionist politics - or in the worst of cases, as has happened with the PIP, not saying anything about the problem.

The article which we present here is from our point of view. We base the discussion as a discussion among socialists about repression and the modern State, so that in this light we can analyze our national reality and the current strategy of imperialism, concluding with criticisms of other analyses and politics and a special part dedicated to the polemics surrounding the independentist position in the face of the Grand Jury. We are sure that these brief words, a product of collective discussion, will positively contribute to clarifying the debate about repression and will stimulate independentism to redouble our efforts in the struggle against the enemy of our people, yankee imperialism.

I. THE MARXIST POLEMIC ABOUT THE STATE AND REPRESSION

It is a very common idea amongst people unin-

formed about the theoretical debates in the left to think that Marxism represents a compact theoretical body that all the socialist currents resort to without differences; that there is (they say) only one Marxism and that the problem of many existing groups is simply that they can't agree. Nothing could be further from the truth. This is instead the idea that the bourgeoisie tries to sell through its medium of "social disinformation." The reality is that these divisions in the left (as much in the past as in the present) are based on different conceptions of Marxism and are expressed in different political and theoretical projects. The theme of the State and repression (which today is asserted as the most distinctive characteristic of bourgeois society) is an old theme which has come back to life under the clamor of theoretical debate and the advances of the revolutionary movement on a world scale. Who can doubt that how we understand the State and its repressive character becomes fundamental at the moment the left is designing its politics and strategy? At this moment of capitalist crisis aren't these debates very productive?

For us in the LSP to participate in the theoretical discussion of both elements (State and repression) is interesting, but we think that what is really important is to link all this discussion to the problem of political praxis (practice), to look towards contributing to the implementation of a politics for the left, nationally, that serves to confront the escalation of repression that yankee imperialism imposes on our Nation; repression that has already cost our organization one death and three in prison in these last few years. At the same time, to work in a revolutionary direction that helps push forward the liberation of our people. In both respects we are obliged to contribute as a revolutionary organization. We think it is most appropriate to begin by identifying the theoretical problems of both concepts, State and repression (foreseeing that it will be useful to the discussion later on about repression in Puerto Rico). The best way to do this is by going back to the Marxist classics. For Marx, as well as for Engels and Lenin, the phenomenon of repression is closely linked to the problem of political power in all societies divided into classes, in which repression is planned (and put into practice) through the organisms of domination, the State.

According to the founders of historical materialism, from the beginning of the history of humanity, of society divided into classes, the need of

the dominant classes for a coercive apparatus has been established. From that point on, repression has been used, as class violence, as a mechanism or measure destined to guarantee domination over the exploited classes. This coercive apparatus, which appears to us as "a whole made up of institutions and objective structures" that centralizes in its hands all power, is what we call the State. The origin of both phenomena are intimately related.

In Marxist literature this is a position that is constantly repeated. For example, Victor Serge, in his extraordinary work, *What Every Revolutionary Should Know About Repression*, points out that: "Repression is one of the essential functions of all political power." Lenin (to cite only two authors) in his work *State and Revolution*, says: "The State is the special organization of force, the organization of violence for the repression of any class. . ." This is how "classical Marxism" understands the phenomenon of repression, as a product of power politics (of class violence) that the dominant classes practice over the rest of the society that it suppresses. It is the State which introduces it in this political reality and that defines it according to the course of the class struggle. Repression is a constant factor and its character corresponds to the power relations of the period.

But Marxist theory also recognizes that in spite of the fact that coercion (or repression) is a principal element that class repression depends on, it is not the only mechanism the dominant classes have resorted to in order to produce a base of support for their domination. Throughout history, under different social systems (slave, feudal or bourgeois) there has been an ideology that attempts to legitimize the existing order, its acceptance and internalization by those dominated. Marx calls the product of the first, ideological domination, and the second alienation.

The root of the problem is, according to Marx, that it has muddled the very necessity for man to live in society. Agreeing with Aristotle that this "necessity" is what transforms the social subject into a "political animal", it goes much deeper by questioning whether the individual's behavior corresponds to what this necessity demands as a solution. The conclusion is that it does not. Instead of looking to protect oneself and fulfill oneself according to individual and collective interests (of one's class), the imposition of ideology of the dominant class repeatedly drives one to separate oneself from the struggle towards these objectives, to alienate oneself from one's true interests. For example, in bourgeois society, the alienation of the dominated sectors is a product of a dialectical combination on three levels: the alienation of the subject from production, the product and the political arena. This is a result of finding oneself under the baton of the bourgeoisie and at the same time in a social order that in no way favors one. This is where repression

begins. It is the impediment to the development of one's capacities, of one's conscious will. This is why one of the priority tasks of socialists is, precisely, to carry and spread true class ideology to the proletariat and the rest of the workers exploited by capitalism.

But this way of understanding the State—repression phenomenon, as a problem of coercion cloaked by (and legitimized by) consensus, is one of the substantive points of debate between Marxists. For some tendencies, like social democracy and eurocommunism, the conclusions made about the reflections of Marx and Lenin are wrong, and on more than one occasion question the Marxist theory of the State. In the first place, those ideas already alluded to do not seem to be those appropriate to understand the modern State — the reality is that in these times (they say), capitalism (mainly in the developed countries) depends on consensus for power, through ideological domination, than on repression. For this reason, the struggle for socialism (they believe) should be centered on the ideological aspect. Therefore, every victory in this camp should become a real loss for bourgeois power. And what worse can bourgeois democracy offer than more favorable terrain for this kind of struggle? Sometimes they go even further and openly propose that socialism will be arrived at as a product of the expansion of bourgeois democracy (freedoms); they ask, aren't there socialist characteristics in modern democracy (free education, health, etc.)? So then, let's develop them! The euphemism begins to consider democracy as subversive.

But are these correct statements? For us in the *Liga Socialista Puertorriquena*, we are convinced that they are not. The point of departure that these people have — whether or not a Marxist theory of the State exists or not — is false. So the problem that they talk about in reality is that after rejecting the Marxist doctrine of the State (the same as with the doctrine of social classes) they have found themselves lacking (because they still haven't established a doctrine) a theory that synthesizes their political interests. The communist theory of the State is found on other horizons. It suffices to point out that one of its pillars is the interest in demystifying the bourgeois State of its supposed democratic character and in indicating the true reality of the exploitation of the worker under this system.

We tread this road with force. It is through the analysis of the development of capitalism and its exploitation that one can come to understand and theorize about the state and "modern democracy." Is the modern state a neutral apparatus that any class can come to dominate? Autonomous from the economic structure? Don't even dream it. History demonstrates that as soon as the dominated classes try to seize power, the state apparatus, in the

hands of the bourgeoisie, answers with the most shamefaced violence. The example of Chile is instructive. Democracy today is merely a way of legitimizing capitalist exploitation. Autonomy has not existed, and will not exist, as long as the system is commanded by the bourgeoisie for its own exclusive benefit. There will only be illusions and manipulation of exploited classes so that they accept the order of things. As Marx affirms in his Critique of the Gotha Program, "As long as capitalism exists, freedom does not exist."

Who can speak of democracy, consensus, the participation of the masses in the politics of power, without taking into account the necessities of capital? What does the Trilateral Commission mean, if not the submission of national politics to the political-economic plan of transnational capital? For example, in the case of so-called "American democracy", who is really behind the economic policy of the state, with its emphasis on the military and the repression — the people, or big yanqui capital? Until what point can one continue speaking of the freedom of these bourgeois democracies? If what we observe is precisely that the modern state has become an instrument of the bourgeoisie that specialises in the control and prevention of political activities by the masses, of their struggles; always prone to provocation, intervention and repression.

Seeing things this way, it seems to us that the politics being proposed by these sectors are useless to us if what we are thinking about is pushing forward the struggle for socialism. We are in agreement about the existence of a need to raise the consciousness of the working class and other exploited sectors, but the struggle for political power is not limited to this. To wait for all exploited people to acquire class consciousness, and only then to address ourselves to the conquest of power and the building of socialism, is quite simply to wait for something that we will never see, as long as the ideological apparatus of the bourgeoisie continues to function. We know that many of these sectors are moved more by opportunism than by anything else, but we have to be clear that there exists no precedent in history for this idea materializing. In fact it has been the opposite — only after having resolved the problem of power has it been possible to develop, deeply and extensively, the ideological domination of the proletariat. The case of Nicaragua is a good example.

The matter of consensus has been put forward as follows. When the proletariat and other exploited sectors are in a position of political weakness (ideological and organizational), or, as we say, "one down," in the face of the power of the bourgeoisie, then capitalist violence is reduced, and thus it would appear that the exploited sectors consent to the order and the bourgeoisie and its followers take advantage of this to boast about their "democratic" system — in which, according to them,

the workers can give up their struggle. Then they speak about the neutrality of the state, to which it is supposed that all have access, about democracy, about bourgeois liberties, etc., when in reality what they are proposing is to fix the legal parameters, the terrain, in which they want the political struggle of the exploited to stay boxed up. One needs only observe to realize that as soon as struggles arise that question this "legality" the bourgeoisie's only response has been repression. It therefore seems to us that the problem at hand — if the democratic order as it has been described is favorable for the development of a socialist politic (about which we are all in agreement) — properly should revolve around the question of establishing to what extent the bourgeoisie will permit us to put a socialist politic into practice "peacefully" and if, within these constraints, the dictatorship of the proletariat can be built.

It is in light of these considerations that we conclude that one of the essential tasks of the revolutionary left, irregardless of the shadings that repression assumes in their countries, is the demystification of the bourgeois state, especially its false "democracy". Within the working class, the repressive essence of the state should be dwelt upon — that it will utilize the means and resources it deems necessary to obstruct, impede and destroy any class struggle that places its political power in question. Thus, the strategy should prioritize other battlefronts, outside institutional channels. The proletariat and its allies, guided by their vanguard, should discover that there exists no possibility of a reformist solution to their problems. The creation of a movement that does not rely upon the power we have in parliament (which reinforces illusions of the democratic apparatus), but rather upon the independent and conscious action of the exploited masses, based on their experiences, sacrifices, and the organizational forms that they assume in the process and that are essential for making revolution and building workers' power — these should be promoted. As Lenin indicates, "(The) masses learn in practice, they attempt their first steps in view of all, they sketch out the route, they set objectives, they put to the test their own forces and the theories of all their ideologues. They carry out heroic efforts to raise themselves up to the high level of the gigantic tasks, of universal scope, which history imposes upon them, and as great as the isolated defeats may be, and much as we may be moved by the rivers of blood and thousands of victims, nothing can be of comparable importance to the direct education of the masses and of classes in the course of direct revolutionary struggle...." And it will suffice to indicate that the revolution will be as strong, and go as far, as the political development and class consciousness of the exploited masses are able to carry it.

Taking these brief critical notes about the phenomenon of repression as a basis, let us go on to the theme that concerns us, the problem of the increased imperialist repression against our people in the last few years. And the first thing that comes into focus is our particular case, its colonial character, which allows repression to acquire different contours here than those it assumes in what we could call "model cases," such as the developed capitalist societies. Here repression extends to every nook and cranny of our nationality (from the ideological field to simple daily social activity), and it presents itself as the pillar of domination, as the constant policy that —sometimes in a clear form, other times not — domination manages to maintain.

It does not matter how docile a colonized person may appear, how friendly (s)he may be, how much a Puerto Rican colonial may feel part of the great yanqui imperialist power, a Martiniquean part of the great French democracy, or a British colonial may quake in the face of English nobility; imperialist condescension has its limits, and it will never reduce its repressive policy beyond a preventive strategy. When there is no strong opposition, one must be on guard lest it arise. The colonizer is never trusting, since he knows the contradictions of the system. Repression will be constant, although it may vary according to the course of the political struggle. This must be our point of departure.

a. Repression, basis of colonialism

Colonialism is first and foremost a system that relies upon force; it is the product of military conquest by an imperialist power that uses its power to impose an economic-political-social order upon an oppressed nation, which corresponds solely to the interests of their bourgeoisies. And therefore, it is a negation of the historical exigencies of the subjugated people. It is therefore also a situation that brings to light in the political sphere the confrontation between two antagonistic and necessarily violent forces, the forces of the foreign dominator with its army and police, and those which the national liberation movement develops as an answer to this, composed of patriotic militants. The political-military character of the domination and its repressive aspect impose a strategy that takes into consideration the political-military aspects of the liberation forces in terms of the final outcome of the conflict. In the end, will imperialism renounce its domination voluntarily? Completely eradicate colonialism? So far it has not happened.

Fanon, one of the great students of colonialism, explains it this way: "Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reason, it is violence in its natural state. And it will not give way except in the face of a greater violence...." So the problem of violence encompasses two aspects.

On the one hand there is violence on the part of the colonizer, when he converts his domination into national and class oppression, and when he is willing to, and does, use repressive force for reasons of political prudence, provocation, control, or for the physical liquidation of struggles developed by the colonized people, irregardless of the shadings they assume; the bottom line is that they are expressions of their liberation struggle.

As the same time there is violence on the part of the colonized. In the first place this is the product of his/her situation in the colony, confronting a reality that denies him/her, that rejects him/her, that is hostile to him/her, that projects an alien reality (according to the colonizer) where no matter how much (s)he may seek to, (s)he will never stop being a foreigner. Fanon indicates in this regard: "Faced with the colonial situation, the colonizer finds himself in a state of permanent tension. The world of the colonial is a hostile world, which rejects, but at the same time it is a world that stirs up envy...."

It is a situation that also impels the aggressivity of the colonized, first and foremost against themselves; thus the high indices of criminality in the colonial countries. And once the ideological pretense in which the colonized is enveloped begins to crumble, (s)he discovers what history presents through the path of violence, the conquest of liberation. As Lenin said: "National wars undertaken by the colonial and semicolonial countries are not only possible but inevitable in the era of imperialism...."

b. Repression, foundation of the colonial domination of Puerto Rico

Are the realities of colonialism which we are mentioning here compatible with what we observe in Puerto Rico? Definitely so. With its particularities and specificities, Puerto Rico is today an industrial-military-type colony of yanqui imperialism, oppressed in both its national and class character. For 85 years, it is a domination that has rested on two intimately related factors: a harsh military repressive presence and the ideological domination of the people in general. The elections, the legislature, the courts and the rest of the colonial institutions serve as a cover for the prime aspect of the domination, its repressive-military form, which reflects the decisive power of imperialist politics to guarantee domination. History has proven it — repression with variations but always present, in a potential or brutal form, but with a sole objective: to impede the development of the patriotic forces.

As we put forward at the United Nations last year, referring to this aspect: "The so-called acts of the Congress of the United States with which the foreign, sovereign power has governed Puerto Rico (Foraker Act and Jones Act, amended in 1952), are covers for the military regime that has been im-

posed on Puerto Rico since 1898...(in the first place): from 1898 to 1900 the army governed directly. In 1900 the garrison regime is organized. Characteristically, the army governs through the civilian regime, for better or for worse, based on the principle that the garrison is maintained insofar as it is provisioned, supplied with munitions and replenished...During the garrison regime there is absolute disregard for public opinion, and the opposition toughens. Thus the repression suffered by the working class during its great strikes at the beginning of the century and the beginning of the annihilation of the Nationalist Party (Rio Piedras massacre, October 24, 1935; jailing and exile of three leadership bodies of the Nationalist Party between 1936 and 1941; Utuado massacre and Ponce massacre, March 21, 1937)." Later, in 1939-52, there is a change to a base-of-operation regime, based principally on the annihilation of the Nationalist Party and a relatively stable "social peace". In the present period there is a process entailing the combination of both forms, in accord with the imperialist politic of the moment.

It has been a colonial domination in which violence has not been absent. Referring to the violence imperialism toward our people, Corretjer indicates the following in his work *The Struggle for Independence*: "Certainly when the yanqui war fleet bombarded our capital without warning in May, 1898, Puerto Ricans had committed no violence against the yanqui government. When they entered at Guanica, Puerto Rico, Puerto Ricans had committed no violence that could justify their violence. Keeping our country in their hands by force of arms, the kidnapping of our sovereignty, the highway robbery of changing our currency, the destruction of our economy, the attempt to destroy our language and our culture — these are acts of violence committed by imperialism...it is imperialism that resorts to violence, murder and massacre, prison and exile, each time Puerto Ricans begin a new stage of struggle in defense of the country...."

Neither has violence been absent from the life of the colonized Puerto Rican. Colonial order and ideological domination serve here as the basis for

the conversion of violence into one of the characteristic features of our society. Colonial ideological domination plays the same alienating role here as bourgeois ideology; it serves as an obstacle to Puerto Ricans understanding their reality and the necessity for change; instead of this happening, it projects itself through a foreign world-view, which the Puerto Rican rejects, where the Puerto Rican participates only in a mystified way. This crisis of identification represents one of the foundations of the violence our people suffers from, which it channels in different ways: family disputes, violence in the public housing projects, murders, robbery, suicides, alcoholism, drugs, religious fanaticism,

etc. Another foundation is the capitalist order that is based on a system of private property and wage exploitation.

This violence has made itself felt in the course of the liberation struggle to an impressive degree. We have the example of the Jayuya insurrection. In 1950 the town is taken by assault in the face of colonial resistance. Fighting also took place in Utuado, Ponce, Penuelas, Naranjito, Mayaguez, San Juan, Santurce, Arecibo. An attempt was made to take the Government Palace in San Juan by assault and the liberation war was taken to Washington, as had never before been put forward by Latin American anti-imperialism. More recently, new political-military organizations utilize revolutionary violence to answer colonial violence and to push forward by this means, in a revolutionary manner, national liberation.

c. Why the repressive escalation now?

In the last few years, the repressive imperialist policy toward our people in the struggle has been sharpened. Various and diverse interpretations have been made about this phenomenon, by the government as well as by the left; at this point we would like to offer our position about this.

The structural crisis of the colonial system has brought about a climate in which there can be an increase in social struggles. The '70's and this decade so far have seen a rise in the struggles of our people for their demands (strikes of workers and students, Vieques, Villa Sin Miedo, the resistance to compulsory military service, etc.). The period of relative "social peace" imperialism obtained, based on various factors — the annihilation of revolutionary independentism (Nationalist Party), a period of economic and social growth, emigration encompassing a third of the population, a legalization of the colonial order by an independentist sector, among others — is replaced by another reality, where — apart from the calamities of the system and the growing social malaise — a patriotic and revolutionary socialist movement, and the emergence of new political-military organizations, assert themselves.

The imperialist offensive is directed precisely toward confrontation with the new revolutionary patriotic currents, trying to throw up obstacles, every way they can, to the possibility of these being able to channel the discontent of the masses and concretize a revolutionary process with possibilities of victory. This is the reason for the repressive escalation as the strategy of the imperialist power. A strategy that, because of the forms it has taken, can synthesize into a "preventive war", focused on what imperialism considers to be the key sectors within the ranks of independentism, working on the subjective factor, very important for ideological domination.

It is a repressive scheme more concerned with political forecasting and provocation than responding to levels of struggle that the liberation movement has not yet reached. Simply put, the repressive policy is one that corresponds more to yanqui experience with their counterinsurgency policy as applied in the Third World and to the policy it imposes within its territory (against the nationalities and minorities imprisoned within yanqui borders, for example American Indians, Chicano-Mexicano, Blacks, Latins, etc.) than to any particularity of our case. More the particularity is the form the repressive escalation takes — its objective. An attempt to destroy the revolutionary patriotic movement in its embryonic phase, seeking to avoid any possibility of an independence process.

In practical terms this policy can be summed up as: first, isolating the public revolutionary leadership (e.g., the **PUERTO RICAN SOCIALIST LEAGUE**) from the discontented masses and the rest of the left and of independentism (thus the selectivity of the repression, a good example being the jailings by means of the grand jury); second, exerting pressure upon the reformist sectors to assume lame positions that place them at the tail of the colonial parties; third, to strike brutally where the popular masses confront the bourgeois order (Villa Sin Miedo, the university strike, the firemen's strike, the strike at the Water and Aqueducts Authority, etc.). While it permits or promotes the accession of groups or institutions of a pacifist, religious or paralegal nature to the leadership of the struggles.

Under this policy, repression becomes translated into the jailing of independentists through the grand jury, workers' strikes (UTIER) and student strikes (November 11) are repressed, political assassination (Angel Rodriguez Cristobal, Cerro Maravilla, etc.), repression against squatters (e.g., Villa Sin Miedo), campaigns of lies against the patriots subpoenaed to the grand jury, beatings and threats to journalists, etc. At the same time there is an increase in the funding, specialization and "professionalization" of the colonial police, the establishment of INTERPOL, the FBI grows in numbers, with more powers and in a certain sense less disreputable than the corrupt colonial police; and to this must be added the return to a garrison regime, as a project to fortify the military presence in the country, planning to use it against the sectors of the people that are in struggle (e.g., Jayuya, the firemen's strike, etc.). And thus the proliferation of National Guard garrisons in the mining zone, where they are waiting for an answer from the people to their plans for the physical destruction of the zone. The idea is that the police and intelligence agencies will assume responsibility for the guerrilla struggle while the National Guard is reserved

for the mass struggles of the people.

Once the revolutionary movement is destroyed, imperialism proposes, as part of its strategy, to develop ("In peace and harmony") the economic plan (2020 Plan), and places a priority on the exploitation of our mineral resources—whose implementation would mean the physical destruction of the country.

d. Other interpretations and positions regarding repression

The colonial sectors have tried to justify the repressive escalation of imperialism by claiming that this is merely a part of "democracy"'s obligatory answer to the high indices of criminality that have been noted. This is a position that the bourgeoisie itself, and its bureaucrats, know to be false, since their own sociologists have reiterated that the problem of criminality is fundamentally intertwined with the crisis of the colonial system. And in the face of this problem, they have no other answer than the use of violence against the people. They repress the people. they maintain the people in a police state; while the colonial administration dedicates itself at every level to corruption, to pillage — in short, to the very criminality that they speak about. The government's campaigns continue to justify the other repression, the strategy of "preventive war", placing emphasis on the tactic of criminalizing the struggle for independence. Where the struggle takes on the process of liberation (they say) it is a case of common crime, that should be punished by their justice (as they call their class violence). In all, it is an attempt to cover over the forms that the class struggle takes today and present it to the people as a matter of justice against crime.

Other interpretations of the problem of repression can be found among sectors of the left. As we indicated at the beginning, there exist important theoretical differences among socialists that lead us to different political positions, as is the case with regard to the problem of repression. For some sectors, the phenomenon flows first and foremost from the break with the colonial regime's legality by some groups, who implement a line that is willing to consider tactics and activities that go beyond the margins of colonial legality and thus endanger the "democratic order" that they demand as necessary for implementing their political policy. In a certain sense this position can be considered as a variant of the official position (justice vs. delinquency, democracy vs. violence).

For these forces, the problem lies in an incor-

rect interpretation by the revolutionary organizations of imperialist domination, which leads them to assume incorrect politics. In the words of Roberto Alejandro, leader of the Union of Socialist Youth, the problem is posed thus: "The situation in Puerto Rico is different (from that of Latin America). Here democratic order and with this a corresponding form of government, is the fundamental political feature. To adhere obstinately to the belief that the state is only an instrument of repression, forgetting the mechanisms of consensus that have been developed, is to insist on a political blindness that results in greater isolation of the left... Even more importantly, the people, the workers, believe in the legitimacy of that order and thus the ratio of electoral participation may be one of the highest." (El Nuevo Dia, p. 37, March 9, 1983). Carlos Gallisa, Secretary General of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, expresses a similar sentiment: "In Puerto Rico ... repression ... is not the principal form through which the yanquis exercise their domination over our people. Here the North American government, through the different mechanisms of ideological penetration ... has achieved a kind of consensus among the masses in order to legitimize imperialist intervention. It is this reality that determines that our national liberation struggle in this stage be carried out principally on the political and ideological level... in order to have the most space possible for our actions on every level it is of vital importance to avoid the framework of legal existence being closed off to us ..." (Claridad, p. 11, March 11-17, 1983).

The first question that is raised by these lines of argument is that of their point of departure: What kind of colonial domination in fact exists in our country? Is it of a political-military nature, that moves to retain colonial control by any and every means, or is it a case of colonial exception, where the domination relies principally upon the acceptance (consensus) of the masses of domination? They are without a doubt thinking about the second, in which the character of the ideological domination is what is fundamental, but the matter cannot be taken care of so easily.

It is not a problem of denying the repressive character of the colonial system. Gallisa himself recognizes the importance that the use of repression as an instrument of domination has had for imperialism. In his words: "In the 85 years of North American domination in Puerto Rico repression has always been present, although it has been expressed in different forms and in different ways in line with the political situation of the moment ... its objective is to immobilize and eventually liquidate the forces that promote political change..." So then what has

happened? If we understand how much of a priority it is for the policy of yanqui power to impede—by any means, through repression—any possible development of independentism; that their policy is continuous but varies in its shadings; then, isn't the consensus they are talking about based on the imperialist violence that they system imposes and maintains (and with it, its ideology)? The historical experience of the '50s and '60s, when the consensus they are talking about was tangible, was based upon a series of factors, such as important economic growth, continuous emigration, a social mobility that created among the people the idea that things were going well, but above all, the annihilation of revolutionary independentism.

Thus it was that imperialism became complacent and the people lacked a movement that could lead it to independence, became repressed and bought off, and retreated with the Puerto Rican Independence Party to a position of legalization of the colonial order. There was a confluence of all factors into support for the regime. Nice consensus, this colonial consensus! They had to murder patriots and then put a pistol to the head of those who remained to get them to accept "voluntarily" the rules of the game and forget their struggle for independence. Then they were surprised when the people told us: "the ideal is very nice, but it's not feasible."

The danger that we see in this type of argument is that it could lead to the justification — out of fear of the blows that imperialism could unleash against us — of the abandonment of important tasks (such as support for the armed revolutionary struggle, the struggle against repression, etc.) and fall into their own political game, where imperialism has everything to gain, with their consensus and all. This is what concerns us with their statement: "in order to have the most space possible for our actions on every level it is of vital importance to avoid the framework of legal existence being closed off to us." And what other conceivable use could this have for us, if not to be used for revolutionary political agitation?

This does not recollect the words of Regis Debray: "Thus the classic inversion, so often repeated: A revolutionary organization appears on the scene. It aspires to legal existence and thus to participate in "normal" life for a certain period of time, in order to consolidate itself and make a name for itself, in order to prepare the conditions for the armed struggle. But bit by bit it becomes absorbed, pulled by the routine of public political life, so that THAT becomes the horizons of its habitual action. It recruits some cadres, some militants; celebrates its first congress; mimeographs

a newspaper and some bulletins. Then comes the hundred annual assemblies, the thousand meetings, the "first international contacts," the sending of delegates abroad, since a multiplicity of congresses must be attended; permanent representation is established in some other organisms, to maintain public relations. The balance is positive: the functionaries function, the presses print, the delegates travel, the international friendships grow, the leaders are overwhelmed with work.

In sum, the machine works ... The perspective of insurrectionary struggle recedes, for a few months and then for a few years. Time passes with its ups and downs. The eruption of hostilities is considered increasingly sacrilegious, adventurist, eternally "premature" ... The moment has not yet arrived; unforeseen circumstances are never lacking. The militants must understand that to take up armed struggle right away would be to break the unity of the organization, which is sacred; to sabotage its legality; to provoke repression against its leaders. In sum, the political organization becomes its own end. It will never take up the armed struggle because it must first wait to constitute itself as a solid vanguard party, when in reality it cannot hope to be recognized in its status as vanguard except through armed struggle." (Taken from *Revolution in the Revolution*)

We question how useful it can be for independentism to continue with the defense of colonial "democratic" legality and to place this interest over and above other obligatory tasks if we are to get imperialism out of here. In the first part we spoke of the "fetishism of legality" that some socialist sectors have upheld. What is wrong in their thesis is the suggestion of transforming the capitalist order without any conflict with the ruling classes (with capital), a tactic that continually falls into class conciliation and thus, into failure after failure. There cannot be any conciliation with imperialism under any pretext. Not for fear of repression, nor for any type of political opportunism. As the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP) put forward: "Those who think that by dealing within the channels permitted by the regime they will not provoke repression and gain time to prepare themselves are completely wrong" And those who think that not supporting the campaigns against repression of other independentist sectors will free them from the same, are also wrong.

It is necessary to struggle for the demystification of colonial pseudo-democracy, and even more so in these times when it is coming out with all its corruption and shamelessness. Independentists will not be the ones who come running to save it. We should combat the hackneyed idea

about the necessity of using the legislature and other colonial institutions to push forward the independence movement, for the great propaganda access these offer us. The Puerto Rican Independence Party roundly demonstrated the falsity of this slogan. From being the country's second party, which was possible thanks to the revolutionary focus generated by the revolutionary struggle of the Nationalists, once this movement was annihilated, they fell into the situation of having to gather signatures, because not even in their eternal chain of defeats did they manage to remain inscribed. And the years of propaganda in the legislature and in the electoral campaigns, what were they good for? Did they help to raise consciousness? Not at all.

As Corretjer indicates: "The group of Puerto Ricans that proposes to make Puerto Rico independent by "peaceful (read: electoral) means" is very mistaken. Because in the long run or in the short run, they will become another brigade of imperialist lackeys, or they will be beset with the violent repression of imperialism, which will force them to disband, since the spirit of their followers, entranced with a "peaceful" conquest of independence, will not be prepared to confront the enemy, nor will they have any material preparation for the contingency; or, plucking up their courage, they will come down seriously and correctly in the revolutionary camp, which will mean ending up somewhat rashly where they prudently should have begun. (From *The Struggle for Independence*.)

And so that our people can be prepared for the tasks that history imposes upon them, they must be made conscious, the subjective aspect must be worked on, from a radical revolutionary perspective. Having this in mind, we have maintained our anti-electoral position, as a question of education (consciousness-raising) and of political tactics. In elections, the colonial mentality that holds sway over our people is reinforced - inactivity; laziness; the leadership of eloquent speeches and the masses assume a passive role, secondarily, leaving their leaders to do the work for them. This idea must be combated - "nothing, absolutely nothing, can take the place, in terms of (liberating) education for the masses of people, of the experience of revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people" (Corretjer). The way they assume an independent and revolutionary position is by not voting.

That is why we tell our people that "not voting in the colonial elections is, on the contrary, an honest act, a patriotic and democratic act. It is the conscious way to negate the right of a government that is not Puerto Rican, that is American,

that is the government of the United States, to use a collective expression of the will of the Puerto Rican people to select some functionaries obliged by law to defend the interests of the United States, whether or not these coincide with the well-being of the Puerto Rican people. If you do not vote in the colonial elections there will come the time when so many non-voters will follow your example and the farse, the joke, the trickery of colonial elections will come to an end. . . In that moment the government of the United States will understand that it cannot govern Puerto Rico. In that moment the solution to the so-called political status of Puerto Rico will be found with the inevitable recognition of the independence of Puerto Rico. Because preventing the Puerto Rican people from achieving their independence and their sovereignty is the sole motive of the colonial elections." (CORREO DE LA QUINCENA, October 1980). It is necessary to work on the subjective factor of our people from the revolutionary perspective.

Comrade Roberto Alejandro says that our problem is that we confront a working class that "believes in the legitimization of that order" and that "they will not abandon their color televisions, nor the unemployed their "subsidies" for a "vague," "imprecise" proposal of the left." But is this a valid interpretation? Aren't the programs and the strategy of the left based on the national reality, or is it that we find ourselves at a point so close to revolutionary victory that we have to offer our people a detailed plan for the transition to socialism? On the other hand, aren't the Haitian workers, lacking food and color televisions and under a very repressive regime, as submissive as workers here?

First, we never had the idea of reforming for a capitalist alternative as the PIP proposes through its self-sustaining development program in response to the colonial crisis. Second, the measure of need ~~doesn't~~ say much, economic-social demands are important, in the course of the class struggle but are not the measure of it, nor the foundation of political consciousness. This is nourished in other ways. Isn't there an autonomy of politics with respect to the economic? Instead of having this defeatist view of our working class, let's see it in the picket lines, in marches, strikes, in struggle against capital and the repressive apparatus. This is where the worker discovers the true reality of the colony and can be in a more favorable position to accept the political message of the revolutionary organizations. It's wrong to see ourselves in front of the worker's struggle, advancing the same pseudodemocratic order that will be repressed as soon as imperialism believes that too much is being demanded. What an extraordinary way to push for the conscientization of our working class.

We've already talked about the existence of a Marxist theory of the State and the failed attempts by the reformist sectors to develop a new conception of the problem that will be nothing more than

a variation of the institutionalized thesis of the bourgeois state. Is there a new socialist theory of the state in Puerto Rico? No. What has happened is that sectors of the left see -- through colonized eyes, the analysis and politics that are applied in other countries -- and sometimes the poorest, a recipe for us, going outside of our concrete national situation. What we see in sectors of the left is, then, the search for a theoretical justification for fear of repression. We cannot explain in any other way that after a period of brutal repression like that used against the university strike (1981-82) that this student leader still insists that democratic order is the principal form of discrimination.

In this struggle the student masses improvised diverse forms of struggle in order to confront the offensive by the colonial university administration (illegal demonstrations, barricades, confrontations, etc.). These propelled forward the development of the movement, giving it organizing experience, political consciousness, contributing to the correct idea that it is possible to conduct an independent and progressive movement outside of the channels imposed by colonial legality. Then the violent repression of imperialism. The myth of the democratic regime collapses. What did the leadership do? They retreated -- not to the indigent masses that demanded an effective political response to the repression -- but they went to the legislature, to the trenches of colonial legality. Where little by little the struggle is diluted and the possible victory becomes a failure.

We in the LSP think that the future of the Puerto Rican revolution is in the struggles that our people are developing outside of the colonial channels. Here is where their future is guided by the revolutionary organizations. Here is where they experiment, get consciousness of their situation, the repressive character of the regime, as well as the organizational forms in which the struggle for liberation and the construction of structures of proletarian power will be found and will be developed into socialism. These are the struggles that should give rise to a combative movement, independent of any colonizing or bourgeois influence. To this we contribute revolutionary organizations. We must demystify the colonial democracy and show it to the worker as repressive as it is so that she/he can confront it with certainty. We must contribute to subjective development and awaken our people's combativeness against the foreign power. We are bound to our comrades repressed by imperialism, for the simple fact of being independentistas, bound to offer our support and solidarity and make out of this a movement transformed into counterattack, that stimulates the independence struggle to continue advancing. It is not a time for stalling (vacillating) or fearful positions. We have to take up our responsibilities with Marxist-Leninist consciousness. Only with a people in struggle and a revolutionary politics will we win independence and socialism.

COLLABORATION AND NON-COLLABORATION: THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL REPRESSION

Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN)

I. THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY:

Technically, the Federal Grand Jury is a legal body in law organized as part of the North American legal system by an act of Congress following Constitutional guidelines created at the time the Constitution was written. It is a special jury composed of between 16 and 23 persons taken from the lists of available jurors on any given day when a Grand Jury is constituted. Because the lists of jurors are generally drawn in great part from government employees, the Grand Juries generally tend to be made up principally of government workers whose views are supportive of law-enforcement agencies.

Under the guidance of an U.S. attorney, grand juries are supposed to impartially hear evidence about a crime and determine whether "probable cause" exists to indict someone. Through the Grand Jury, the U.S. attorney may subpoenae any person to testify, provide hair, handwriting, fingerprints and any other evidence requested. The U.S. attorney may grant immunity from prosecution for the evidence given for anyone called before the Grand Jury.

Although this is in essence what the Grand Jury is supposed to be, in practice it is something else altogether.

Although guarantees against self-incrimination may be made for what cooperation is offered before a Grand Jury, the subsequent investigation of what one has given may provide new information which can be used against the person who collaborated, as well as against members of their family, friends or associates.

Collaboration without protection against self-incrimination can be equally bad. It may result in providing information innocently which can be used to broaden an investigation into areas not available before, touching on individuals, groups, and institutions, who become involved

and targeted through your testimony. Offering physical evidence, likewise can be used against you, or to draw a conclusion about someone else.

In two recent instances of collaboration, one person who did was subsequently indicted as a means of pressuring him to become an informer, and in the second case, a woman was called to give a record of testimony before a Grand Jury in Puerto Rico after having talked to the FBI, provided fingerprint and hair samples, and the names of many persons who innocently visited her home and who have now become targets of the investigation.

II. THE POLITICAL USES OF THE GRAND JURY:

The Grand Jury has always had a political use in American history. In 1798, when the questions of federalism and confederation were being hotly debated and fought over in all the former colonies, both sides used grand juries to investigate and indict each other. Thereafter, grand juries were impanelled to investigate anti-slavery movements, unionists and confederates, labor movements—and in the 20th Century, feminist, labor, communist, and other dissident forces. Since 1975, Federal Grand Juries have been used against anti-imperialist and national liberation movements in the U.S. and Puerto Rico, with the Puerto Rican independence movement as its principal target.

In 1975, following the emergence of the F.A.L.N. (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional) in the United States, several members of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party were threatened with subpoenas, and one—Lureida Torres was actually imprisoned for six months.

In 1977-78, eleven persons—some associated with the National Commission on Hispanic Affairs of the Episcopal Church—were subpoenaed in New York and Chicago, and nine were imprisoned

for periods ranging from three months to eleven months, for refusing to collaborate.

Between 1978 and 1980, in Puerto Rico, three advocates of independence were imprisoned for their refusal to collaborate. Three Puerto Ricans are currently in prison in New York after having been subpoenaed in Puerto Rico and refusing to collaborate. Four other Puerto Ricans, three Mexicans, and a North American woman currently face prison sentences of up to ten years for refusing to collaborate under criminal contempt charges.

There are eight others, New Afrikan and anti-imperialist North-Americans, in prison for their refusal to collaborate.

III' WHY THIS FORM OF REPRESSION?

The imprisonment of people who refuse to talk, and thus provide information to the government against themselves and others, is enshrined in U.S. law. It therefore provides a perfect cover to the intelligence agencies and the Justice Department for imprisoning those who oppose U.S. government policies.

In the particular case of the Puerto Rican independence movement, the U.S. legal system has served for the past 83 years of colonial domination by the U.S. in Puerto Rico, to repress all attempts of the Puerto Rican people to attain their national independence. The U.S. legal system has served to deny Puerto Rican advocates of independence such basic rights as employment, citizenship (Puerto Rican), access to their own media and communications, free trade, education and housing. Many Puerto Ricans have come to understand that U.S. laws are a foreign imposition. From this experience, a position of non-cooperation with the U.S. legal system has emerged which is expressed in electoral boycotts, refusal to testify in courts on political issues, and non-collaboration on the investigation of what the U.S. government labels terrorist activities and matters of political violence. This position was concretized by the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico beginning in 1936 when the Grand Jury was first used in Puerto Rico to criminalize the party.

Under U.S. criminal law, independence advocates have been prosecuted for seditious conspiracy, for simply advocating independence, for resistance to the military draft by the U.S. armed forces, and for taking public lands not in use to overcome the housing and poverty crisis in their own country.

The uses of the Federal Grand Juries today

seek to intimidate the Puerto Rican independence movement at a time when it is becoming more militant and decisive in its actions. The U.S. government seeks to destroy that militance by imprisoning the leadership, while forcing more conservative sectors of the movement for national liberation into a political corral where a policy of self-policing will deny it any capacity to act. This would serve to assure the U.S. a continuing domination of Puerto Rico and would destroy the current national and international campaign for independence at a time when it is becoming more effective.

The effectiveness of this campaign is directly related to the political and economic crisis within which the U.S. finds itself today, and to the war-like right-wing administration headed by Reagan, and representing the most racist and reactionary elements of U.S. industry.

IV. THE POLITICAL BASIS FOR REPRESSION:

"Puerto Rico is neither a domestic matter nor an international matter. It is a geopolitical bastion of the United States." So says Jeannie Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and a right-wing ideologue for the industrial sector of U.S. capital.

This proposition is the basic element in the view of those now in power. It is part of the analysis for the Caribbean Basin Initiative strategy of the Reagan administration which seeks to establish a political and economic hegemony over the Central America-Caribbean zone--which takes in the totality of the islands, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Panama as a means of isolating Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua, and ultimately to destroy them.

In this strategy, Puerto Rico plays the central role as a military center for aggressive operations. Under a component plan (the 2020 Plan, discussed elsewhere), the U.S. would transform Puerto Rico into a center for the assembling of industrial goods, foodstuffs, and other consumer items; as well as processing plants for deep sea mining and oil and strategic minerals refining from the open-pit mining in central Puerto Rico.

The Puerto Rican independence movement is the key to the success or failure of the plan.

The U.S. strategy against the independence movement is to crush it or render it impotent. To this end it is moving against the revolutionary forces and encircling the reformists.

The presence of an independence sector within the Puerto Rican population in the United States

is part of the threat felt by the U.S. government. The capacity of this sector to influence the direction of the anti-imperialist movement, provide a guiding ideological framework for a coherent strategy of anti-imperialism and national liberation, makes it an extremely important target for repression.

At the same time that the U.S. government represses, it seeks to maintain an illusion that a "democratic process" is being followed—and so the Grand Jury.

In the political implementation of its repressive campaign, the U.S. government sees as its principal threat the active armed clandestine movement. Indeed, intelligence officials have declared this branch of the Puerto Rican independence movement as its "number one priority." Through the Grand Jury, the intelligence agencies seek to develop informants and to destroy the political-military formations. Their methods, amply demonstrated in the past and present—to identify, locate, and destroy insurgent forces—require as a prerequisite the destruction of politically active sectors which could save the lives of revolutionaries, hamper the investigations through non-collaboration campaigns, and mobilize mass support for the insurgents.

It is in the stage of intelligence gathering and suppression of the open political organizations that the U.S. government, through the use of the Grand Juries, finds itself at present.

The rationale expressed by U.S. attorneys is that lengthy imprisonment of open, legal organizations and members which seek to mobilize public opinion in support of the insurgents and the objective of independence is both legal in law and a valid way of pursuing the campaign against the independence movement. To justify this they link the open organizations with the political-military movement; they accuse individual members of complicity in bombings, they force some into clandestinity to facilitate their argument, and they seek to frame the persecution and oppression within a "criminal" acts label so as to obscure the political nature of their actions.

V. COLLABORATION AND NON-COLLABORATION:

In the struggle against the uses of the grand jury for political repression contradictory stands have been taken at different times by the different forces facing the problem. These stands usually reflect the political ideology of the forces in question. Reformists usually take a reformist view involving compromising on some aspects of

resistance. They advance the notion that while providing information which could incriminate oneself or others is an act of collaboration and should be opposed, when the question is simply one of handwriting, finger-print, hair and voice samples and such exemplars, cooperation with Grand Juries "is not an act of collaboration."

Even revolutionary organizations sometimes go astray and fall into this degenerate form of collaborationism.

Recently, the heroic Puerto Rican political-military organization MACHETEROS argued the reformist line based on a total misconception of the Grand Jury and the politics governing the line of non-collaboration. They argued in their analysis that the argument for non-collaboration was based on a refusal to appear before the Grand Jury and denounce U.S. government actions. Further, they establish categories to determine who may cooperate and who may not—leaving it to individuals to decide on the "merit of each case."

Despite their sophisticated argument, they fail to take into account the fundamental premises about the Grand Jury system: It is a political instrument for repression; it is a blueprint for the destruction of the revolutionary independence movement and those called before it either collaborate, or do not collaborate. Collaboration encourages its use and non-collaboration liquidates it as an effective instrument of repression.

Collaboration also validates the criminalization label the U.S. government wishes to impose on the independence movement. By transforming the political and internationally legitimate struggle of the Puerto Rican people for their national independence into "a criminal enterprise," as has been repeatedly stated by U.S. attorneys and the U.S. Justice Department, the U.S. government seeks to decertify the political status we have won through great struggles and sacrifice at the cost of the lives of thousands of Puerto Rican patriots.

Non-collaboration reaffirms our political legitimacy and encourages the trust of our masses in their leadership and their organizations.

The contribution made to the struggle for the liberation of Puerto Rico by Puerto Ricans born and raised in the United States through the resistance to the Grand Jury as well as through the organization of a political-military formation is great.

The fourteen independence advocates subpoenaed by Grand Juries since 1975 have lifted a great wall of silence which has kept grand juries

from disrupting the work of the movement and helped it develop. The Mexicans and North American anti-imperialists subpoenaed before this attack on the national liberation movement of the Puerto Rican people have demonstrated the highest example to their own struggles on moral and political leadership which will help transform the very nature of the struggle against imperialism and for the self-determination of the oppressed nations inside the imposed imperial borders.

Non-collaboration is of the sharpest political quality and sets the example to follow by generations to come. It is a leading political line against which no resistance is possible, and which exposes and defeats weak and compromising positions. Even in imprisonment, a political defeat of fascism and imperialism is woven and new forces join the fight for the liquidation of the colonial system.

IN THE FACE OF REPRESSION, THERE
WILL BE NO COLLABORATION!

REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISTS' VIGILANCE AGAINST TRAITORS AND TREASON:

THE LESSONS OF SAMUEL (SOLOMON) BROWN, YVONNE THOMAS, PETER MIDDLETON AND TYRON RISON

Taken from the *New African Freedom Fighter*

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In New Afrikans' revolutionary struggle one of the most sensitive and devastating problems that has caused irreparable damage to the movement is the informer. Recent events have made it crucial to examine the psychology and role of the informer. Recent events have made it crucial to examine the psychology and role of the informer in destabilizing clandestine and mass public infrastructures and to put forth the tactic revolutionary organizations should take in dealing with this major contradiction.

The subject is often made supersensitive by the element of surprise in finding that a trusted comrade has turned state or federal informer.

Collaboration by a comrade with the fascist state can be very distressing, politically embarrassing and sometimes compromising to the cell leader who recruited the revolutionary turned traitor. This is the subjective factor. Objectively, the damage to the organization, the infrastructure and the movement is much more serious. This problem demands resolute denunciation, purging and liquidation of all traitors and weak-willed individuals.

We will analyze the role of two types of informers - stool pigeons and turncoats. Stool pigeons are individuals who are paid by the F.B.I., C.I.A., Joint Terrorist Task Force or local police to join organizations specifically for the purpose of obtaining intelligence. The other type, turncoats,

are revolutionaries who are captured and for their own selfish ends collaborate with the enemy against his or her people. Politically, both of these types of informers are major contradictions and enemies to the movement and must be resolutely dealt with according to their characteristics.

The Black Nation is at war with the imperialist, racist, fascist state. The imperialist fully understands fully what war means and how it must be fought. War for the enemy means death and destruction without mercy, guilt or vacillation. This mentality is manifested in the behavior that they act out when dealing with captured revolutionaries and organizations they infiltrate and gather intelligence in an attempt to crush. Revolutionaries in Amerika have failed to comprehend and respond to the fact that in war their enemy, the u.s. imperialists are veterans in killing, destruction and genocide against their adversaries. Vacillation on principles has resulted in some comrades being indecisive in dealing with the informers in our ranks.

When the first Black slave was taken off the slave ship, chained and shackled, the white slave-masters implemented the tactic of overkill and dehumanization against rebellion in the captive colonial Black Nation. When the first insurrection was organized by the same captive Afrikan slaves the enemy clearly understood the value of the informer. Without informers, the enemy was unable to ob-

tain intelligence on the guerrilla's identities, organizational structure and maneuvers. The role of the informer then and now was counterrevolutionary and treacherous to the liberation of colonial captive New Afrikans. Revolutionaries cannot have any mercy when dealing with those who inform and collaborate with the intelligence arm, courts and Grand Juries of the u.s. government. Accountability must be demanded to continue to hold high the virtues and honor of revolutionary struggle.

To date, the enemy's primary source of intelligence on revolutionaries and their work has been electronic surveillance, including wiretaps on telephones and human intelligence. The most reliable source of intelligence is human beings in the form of stool pigeons and traitors. Their function is to supply the enemy with invaluable information that is used to sabotage revolutionary movements, destroy revolutionary infrastructures, capture more comrades on the streets and psychologically propagate an atmosphere of hopelessness and impotence among revolutionaries and the masses. This is a critical aspect of the enemy's psychological warfare. The objective is to neutralize and suppress our peoples' will to win.

This is the context and perspective from which stool pigeons and turncoats must be viewed. As long as there is a revolutionary struggle against the racist, imperialist, capitalist state, there will be a concerted effort by the enemy to destabilize revolutionary organizations.

The cases of traitors Solomon Brown and Tyron Rison, who were captured after the attempted Nyack expropriation on Oct. 20, 1981, and that of Peter Middleton, who was summoned to the RICO Grand Jury, are critical lessons that the movement must learn and grow from. The most significant factor is that all of them were functionaries whose politics were philosophically lumpen-oriented. From day one of their capture they began to play into the enemy's trap by talking with them. Because of backward and corrupt politics, there were no principles that provided the strength to make them steadfast like Sekou Odinga and Kuwasi Balagoon. They immediately became vulnerable to the pressure tactics of the FBI and Prison Guards. Lacking firm conviction in political principles, they chose to juggle and bargain with the enemy. There is sufficient evidence to confirm that these traitors collaborated with the FBI with critical intelligence on comrades and their whereabouts and linked them to the Nyack expropriation.

Revolutionaries must attack the problem of informers from a dialectical and scientific analysis of what the objective and subjective conditions are that give rise to informers. Self-criticism and political education are mandatory to purge bourgeois bandit mentality. The enemy will use everything at his disposal to exploit the psychological

weaknesses of turncoats and stool pigeons in the New Afrikan revolution for land and independence. Once a revolutionary is captured, objective reality is manipulated by the enemy's subjective view of the revolutionaries. They are the number one threat to the imperialist empire and must be destroyed. The enemy attempts to mesmerize the captured soldier with the illusion that control over life and death is in the hands and guns of the enemy. A two-edged sword of pain and pleasure is used as a psychological weapon to control the behavioral responses of the captured soldier. The offering of bribes, shorter prison sentences and glamorous vacations to hook the fish are common traps. For the stronger willed, intimidation, threats to the family and physical torture, drugs in food, electric shock, lobotomies and punitive isolation are used. The enemy's objective is to break the captured soldier's will to fight and escape. Committed revolutionaries understand these realities and their behavior is qualitatively different.

People are not born informers; material conditions produce them. Informers are often psychological misfits who slip or sneak into the movement or are unconsciously recruited into revolutionary infrastructures. They join or are drafted due to subjective factors into the ranks with basic weaknesses in their personalities that make them acutely vulnerable to captivity, isolation and intimidation by what they perceive as a superior force. Such is the case of Yvonne Thomas. Her relationship to a revolutionary structure was due to her being the wife of Mtayari Shabaka Sundiata, which allowed her access to information she should have never been privy to, given her unstable mental condition. This is a clear reflection of politics not being in command.

Revolutionary organizations have a responsibility to investigate the particular circumstances of traitors, engage in self-criticism and hold fast to the line. They must immediately educate the masses and the movement of all the concrete facts and of the identity of the traitors to put in check the state's effort to destroy the movement. This principle must not be compromised to save face politically or to protect the identity of former comrades whose commitment to revolutionary struggle has been compromised by greed, leniency, jail or dope. This is essential to reinforce the correct position of total non-collaboration with the enemy and to keep the ranks and the line pure.

Revolution is a professional business and revolutionaries must take seriously every threat that potentially or overtly attacks their work. All informers are enemies to the revolution and each one must be dealt with resolutely according to the specific circumstances involved. There can be

no exception or wavering on this principle.

An analysis of these contradictions must begin with the history of how these traitors were recruited into the movement. Revolutionary infrastructures make subjective decisions of who will be recruited and how. In New Afrikans' advanced struggle for land and independence a common error is to recruit on the strict basis of ability to rumble or fight, or loyalty to a personality. Political theory and politics are subordinated because they are considered intellectual tools and not essential to winning armed struggle. This view has been a fundamental characteristic of revolutionary nationalists' struggle for the last ten years.

Returning to the point of origin of the contradiction is fundamental to taking the initiative from the enemy and his use of informers. Revolutionaries should not expect punitive and fascist conditions inside prisons of the bourgeois democratic police state to change. Revolutionaries' most effective weapon against police terror, violence and psychological warfare is to be armed with a correct and clear grasp of their political line, a decentralized intelligence system and staunch internal discipline to struggle, organize, resist and fight back against seemingly insurmountable odds.

After a soldier is captured, it's too late to begin to build and develop these tools. Training and constant self-criticism continuously developing vigilance, discipline and a revolutionary world outlook must become the program of revolutionaries. Through constant training in revolu-

tionary theory and practice, fighting skills are grounded in political principle. These principles must be internalized by all comrades and never compromised.

This is what is meant by politics in command. There must be constant struggle for the correct political and military line to turn revolutionary mistakes and setbacks into victories for the people and the movement. This is the politics that guides how informers should be dealt with. Only from this practice can clandestine infrastructures purge weaknesses in the character of comrades. Making exceptions for particular situations will only put the individuals above the principles that all comrades are struggling for. Mistakes must be admitted and struggled with in order that revolutionaries see their errors and advance the movement a qualitative leap forward.

The New Afrikan struggle for land, independence and socialism is a protracted people's struggle. Revolutionaries must view this dynamic from the context of opposing internal and subjective contradictions that will manifest themselves in different forms. Struggling for revolutionary change, people's war and people's victory, revolutionaries must be armed with a scientific analysis and a revolutionary theory for armed struggle, land, independence and socialism.

FIRM IN NON - COLLABORATION

Position of the Komite Unitario Contra la Represion (CUCRE)

Lately arguments have been made against the politics of non-collaboration that, we have to say with total frankness, twist facts, history and positions, but even worse, hit the struggle of our people with more force than the blows dealt by the enemy with the grand jury. The suggestions raised by the article by the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Puertorriqueños (PRTP) and seconded by the Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño (PSP) are deadly traps for the independence movement. Their effect is not in terms of prison or no prison as it gives the impression, but political damage to the formation and development of the people. Let's look at some aspects.

1. The article twists the terms "to appear" and "collaborate" in order to give the impression that the political line in effect now (of non-collaboration) proposes not to appear before grand juries. This is untrue.

2. It gives the impression that the only objective of the grand jury is to "disarticulate" the revolutionary movement through the jailing of active cadres.

3. History is falsified in order to make it seem that Don Pedro Albizu Campos assumed the position of participating and encouraging others to testify before the grand jury. Later on we will make clear this historical lie and the damage it does to our greatest patriotic figure of this century.

4. It says that the subpoena can be for physical evidence that the FBI already has from previous arrests "and that in those cases it is alright to give those items in order to avoid jail."

5. It gives the impression that you can play a legal game a la Perry Mason and avoid jail; everything is in the hands of brilliant lawyers that develop "inspired" answers.

6. It gives the impression that the U.S. government only subpoenas people who are suspects that they want to imprison, or worse yet, who have something to hide.

7. It says that from the 1930s to the 1950s "many patriots" were persecuted and jailed through the grand jury. How many? Who?

8. The magazine says that those of us who

preach non-collaboration have as the only argument that "collaboration violates human and patriotic dignity." Although this is not true, "poor are a people who have lost the capacity to become indignant."

9. It tries to rest with a general politics that states: "the particular reality of each person has to be the determining factor." What reality? How many children they have? Whether they are a leader or in the base? Whether they are afraid when they are subpoenaed? Whether they think that the struggle is a bed of roses and that jail and death were adornments in the biographies of Albizu, Betances, Marti, Che and other great men who knew and lived "courage and dignity and sacrifice"? The general interest is what should dictate the conduct of individuals.

THE POLITICS OF NON- COLLABORATION

When the federal grand jury begins to function as an instrument of political persecution, the U.S. government has certain objectives that are framed by the proposition of detaining or destroying the struggle of a people. Some of the objectives are: to terrorize possible activists and sympathizers by making it dramatically clear that to struggle implies jail; to get certain effective cadres off the streets for a period of time and debilitate the movement; to disparage and create doubts about the "real" work done by certain militants and/or organizations; to divide the movement by sowing doubt and lack of confidence in their leaders; to frighten sectors, by being selective in the action they can facilitate a political line that would be less damaging to their interests and could dominate over the other.

Also the use of the grand jury has a real investigative end that touches on several aspects. As Albizu said: it attempts to get the person to give the incriminating evidence that the FBI hasn't found because it doesn't exist; it attempts to find snitches through the threat of imprisonment; it looks for information beyond the facts that contribute to the complete picture of a political cadre, psychologically, the attitudes and character of other persons and other organizations; it constitutes

a fishing expedition, that is to say, throwing a bone to see who follows it, looking to clean up their lists of "suspects" by excluding those who submit to exculpatory tests (which can be testimony or physical evidence like hair, handwriting, fingerprints, etc.), and in this way to close the circle around those they want to permanently destroy.

Every time they subpoena a person, one or another of these considerations can be present. In some cases the concrete objective is very clear but in others only the appearance of general political persecution. We already know that the grand jury, from a juridical point of view, is an inquisitorial institution where all the rights which protect one from the government's abuses are annulled. For example, the presumption of innocence, non-self-incrimination, due process of law, right to defend oneself, right to discovery and to legal representation, right to know the reasons for the investigation, and others.

To plan out a politics to follow, including legal aspects, is not only difficult but must be based in politics and confidence in the people. On more than one occasion it has been pointed out not only by us -- but by lawyers as well -- that the only way to stop the use of the grand jury or avoid the imprisonment of comrades is through political mobilization. The only arguments -- including legal ones -- that have weight are of a political nature. Unfortunately here in Puerto Rico, cases like that of Farinacci and vacillating positions about what should be the politics to follow, like those expressed by the PRTP and Gallisá, have weakened those arguments before the court.

The legal and political reality is that you have one option: collaborate or don't collaborate. The difference between the two is not jail. Both could result in jail. The example of Farinacci* is very instructive: he gave the grand jury what was asked for and then they developed charges. The big difference between one position and the other, going to prison or not, is that in collaborating (that is, submitting to the requirements of the subpoena, be they for testimony or physical exemplars), you do so with a loss of dignity and prestige, and open the door to agents, lose confidence, do not serve as an example for the people and facilitate the work of the enemy.

But if you do not collaborate, and go to jail or not, you do so with dignity, serving to create consciousness about repression and pointing out the path of struggle to the people, strengthening the resistance to the grand jury and the argument before the court, and winning the confidence of your comrades and of the people.

The case of Farinacci is also demonstrative of our argument. When they called comrade Norberto Cintrón for the second time, his defense used two principal arguments to sustain the firmness of the comrade's non-collaboration position: the time

he was already in jail and the political ideology which dictated his actions. The answer, straight from the mouth of the judge, was that if Farinacci had changed his position and collaborated, why couldn't another of the same ideology do it as well?

Before continuing we want to be clear on the meaning of the terms they use because they have twisted what "to appear", "to collaborate" and "non-collaboration" means. Up to now we know of no organization or public or clandestine article that proposes not appearing before the grand jury as a general politics which should be followed.

Surely, not appearing implies a politics of non-collaboration that can be manifested by forcing them to arrest you and waiting for it; by presenting a motion before the court saying that you will not collaborate and forcing the contempt charges immediately; or by evading it entirely with the aim of hiding or joining the clandestine struggle.

Although we do not proclaim that this is the political line that should be followed, we recognize in it a politics of non-collaboration that we also support. Leave it to the discretion of the person subpoenaed and/or to the organization involved to determine their line of action within "non-collaboration". Ultimately it is their political analysis that will determine whether this is the action that they should take. Those who decide to do this should be able to count on the solidarity of the whole independence movement.

To appear before the grand jury, that is to say, to present oneself before it in order to make a political declaration or to simply say that you won't testify, won't hand over documents or give physical exemplars or submit yourself to the lineup solicited, that is to say, that you will not comply with the requirements of the FBI through the grand jury -- this is to act within the line of non-collaboration.

In the cases of Carlos Rosario Pantojas, Carlos Noya Muratti, Norberto Cintrón Fiallo, Ricarte Montes García, Raymond Soto Dávila and Alberto de Jesus Berríos, all appeared before the grand jury, but not one collaborated. Only one, Ricarte Montes García, presented no legal defense. These six were imprisoned for civil contempt.

But there have been other cases. Another 12 persons have been subpoenaed, have appeared, have refused to collaborate and have not been jailed. But in the case of Farinacci, he appeared and collaborated by giving in to the FBI's requirements and they still formulated charges.

Before the FBI's offensive initiated in 1979, there were other cases in the U.S. and in Puerto Rico. We have the case of Edgard Maury who appeared, did not collaborate and was incarcerated for what remained of the life of the grand jury - one day; the cases of comrade Lureida Torres and those comrades related to the Hispanic Commission of the Episcopal Church

who appeared, refused to collaborate, defended themselves in court and were jailed, and recently the comrade Ivette Alfonso in the U.S. who appeared, did not collaborate and was not jailed. Others subpoenaed at the same time were jailed and others, like the five comrades that went to trial in Brooklyn (Julio and Andres Rosado, María Cueto, Steven Guerra and Ricardo Romero), have been charged with criminal contempt.

The difference in how the U.S. government has proceeded in each case is determined politically by them. From the legal point of view they could have proceeded against all in the same way including re-subpoenaing those they have jailed as well as those they have not. How they proceed is a political determination made in Washington by the Task Force created to fight against the revolutionary independence movement. Neither the prosecutor nor the judge makes the decision although pro forma they put it into practice.

Non-collaboration is the political line that the immense majority of Puerto Rican and Mexican comrades, Blacks and white North Americans have followed and that in Puerto Rico was initiated by the Nationalist Party. Its foundation nevertheless, is not only based on tradition, although this is a factor of great value in the struggle of a colonized people against imperialism. The basis for non-collaboration emanates as much from the inquisitorial character of the grand jury system as from a political necessity for the struggle of our people at this moment.

We do not collaborate because the powers granted through the grand jury to the FBI/prosecutor/Federal Dept. of Justice/U.S. Government (pick a name) arbitrarily violate all the rights that are consecrated in the constitutions of the U.S. and Puerto Rico which protect individuals and political organizations from abuse on the part of the executive branch. All the power is given to the government to capriciously and summarily incarcerate whoever it fancies.

If you are a suspect, it is presumed that your guilt must be proven and that you have the right to the protection of the Fifth Amendment of the yankee constitution (no self-incrimination). In the case of physical exemplars, the Fifth Amendment does not apply and in the case of testimony (answering questions) they can offer you "use immunity". This immunity means that your answer cannot be used against you but can be used against another person, and what another person answers can be used to formulate charges against you. What a game!

It is recommended in the article that if they ask for fingerprints or other physical exemplars that have already been obtained, for example through previous arrests, you should give over the evidence and remain free from jail. Untrue. The enemy is not so idiotic. The grand jury does not ask for things it has already officially obtained. Their case would fall apart. The case of Farinacci again appears on the scene. Originally they asked for Farinacci's fingerprints, photograph, hair sample, submitting to a lineup, and we don't

remember what else. But at the time of his arrest they took his photograph and fingerprints. From that point on they stopped asking for fingerprints and photos, and asking only for the lineup and hair sample.

We don't know of a single case where the prosecutor asked for or insisted on asking for exemplars that they already had.

When they subpoena you they don't tell you the reason; doing so is at the discretion of the prosecutor, or the court can demand it of the prosecutor. In any case it is enough that the prosecutor state what case the subpoenas relate to. But let's imagine for a moment that the judge went further and "demanded" that it be clarified whether you are a subject or only a witness, and made it even more difficult by "demanding" that the relationship between you and the investigation be clearly shown. What happens then is that all this information can be submitted to the judge in private; you never see it; you do not have the opportunity to contest it; the judge decides if it relates to the case and orders you to answer the questions. Then, according to the position proposed by the PRTP, you would be answering questions without knowing what is behind them. If you are then ready to answer by saying "I don't know", the prosecutor might be able to demonstrate that in fact you do know. Maybe they won't charge you with planting a bomb or with contempt of the grand jury, but in reality if they want to jail you they can charge you with perjury; this also means jail. If you don't swear or affirm (the term used for those who do not believe in God) in order to avoid the charge of perjury, all the prosecutor has to do is get an order from the judge and then consider this refusal as non-collaboration.

If we continue with this theatre of clever lawyers, it is good to know that the right of non-self-incrimination can be annulled if you answer some questions and not others.

But the problem is not a juridical one, it's not only whether one is incriminated or not, but rather when one begins to slip and when it is going to be stopped.

Whether you have or haven't done so, take also into consideration the following: the enemy is looking for some revolutionary comrades and needs information to charge them as well as to identify them; if you present testimony or material evidence in order to exclude yourself, you are helping to close the investigation in on others.

If you continue to insist on playing the game and they are interested in imprisoning you, they will continue to ask questions and solicit material evidence until you say no and they put you in jail; up until you collaborate, giving them what they want most, or until they achieve through your collaboration enough information to charge you with a crime. The limit is only imposed when you refuse to participate.

But not all of those subpoenaed are suspects. The

reality is that the majority of those subpoenaed (around 20) are not suspects or the government has no interest in imprisoning them.

They can subpoena you to ask you for information about totally legal activities of people and/or organizations. This information, however, contributes to the enemy having a better picture of who they are really interested in looking for so as to attack better. Don't forget that the grand jury is also an investigative body to solve cases in which the FBI has failed.

Also, don't forget that the FBI doesn't subpoena by chance. If you are subpoenaed, it is because you are an activist, a suspect, a parent, a friend, neighbor, workmate, co-disciple, or possess, have access to, or are in custody of someone or something the FBI is interested in. If they are interested in jailing you they will carry it to contempt, perjury or another charge. If they're not interested in you, when you refuse to collaborate they will let you go free. Or they might act in a different way depending on how you interest them.

We have insisted, as much in court as publicly, that if the U.S. government has demonstrative proof of the links of the suspect with the supposed "crime" under investigation, as they say they have in some cases, they should proceed with charges in court. The accused has the right to defend him/herself, to cross-examine, to know the testimonies or evidence against him/her and "that a jury (so-called 'petit jury' that hears the cases in court) which has received the versions of the prosecution and defense, determines (guilt or innocence)"; **but a subpoenaed person has none of these rights.**

The subpoenae (subpoenaed person) has no right to be accompanied into the grand jury room by a lawyer. The lawyer has to stay outside and a consultation can only be given on petition of the subpoena and for a limited time.

It is good to point out and to insist that the basic problem with the grand jury is its character, its repressive essence that in practice gives unlimited powers to the government to act against opposing groups. We cannot be so "metaphysical" as to "transcend", as they maintain in the article, "the fact that we are dealing with an instrument of repression and investigation". We work with realities and that is the reality. In Puerto Rico, as in the U.S., all the arguments and known legal defenses have been tried. The reality that we cannot transcend at which is that there only exists the alternative to collaborate or not collaborate, and to not collaborate leaves it to the government's discretion whether or not to imprison.

We do not collaborate because we start with the right of our people to fight for their social well-being and their national independence and we are not ready to offer the enemy any type of information about ourselves or about our comrades, friends, neighbors, brothers and sisters or organizations that exercise their right to struggle.

As militants in this struggle, we have a function to fulfill that goes beyond protest, denunciation, presenting a program, organizing pickets and marches and -- why not say it? -- participating in the armed struggle; and that is to educate in order that correct attitudes can be assumed, attitudes that isolate the enemy and strengthen the people. We have to educate about solidarity, loyalty, courage, sacrifice, self-denial, personal disinterest, total commitment to the struggle and the interests of the people. Only cadres formed at this height are capable of acting without vacillation, without being worried about jail or death. To put in the forefront the necessity to avoid jail, instead of acting in accordance with what one preaches, contributes to the demoralization with which imperialism wants to drown our people. This was the great error of Farinacci: not to act in accordance with what he preached. An error which was deepened by not being able to recognize it and make a self-criticism, but instead looking for tactical justifications.

We don't collaborate because we have an obligation to our people to struggle until the final consequences. To the workers, to the land squatters, to the students, to all those who struggle, it is constantly said that in order to achieve your objectives, protests, strikes or pickets are not enough, that this struggle has to be escalated to the point that the enemy feels our action. Men and women of the people understand that and become involved in actions categorized by the government as criminal. They know well the risks they take and participate confiding in their leaders and their comrades. But how much can you confide in a person who is not ready to be imprisoned or who prefers to play the game of "where do you collaborate and where do you not collaborate?"

TO NOT COLLABORATE AND TO EDUCATE IS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE.

In this moment of profound crisis that the system is living (and that is both political and moral), we must act at the highest level required so that the people distinguish between the petty opportunist politicians and the revolutionaries that are committed to the people until the final consequences.

Non-collaboration is as valid a politics for all of the left as it is for the settler of Villa Sin Miedo, the worker or the student who exposes him/herself to danger in their struggle. When people support you in your struggle, nobody asks you if you are or aren't prepared to go to jail or lose your life. Because what the people need to understand is the necessity to struggle to achieve their objectives and that they are a great people who need to understand the path, so they don't underestimate it or make it a question of "ay bendito."

The only way to stop the U.S. government in its use of the grand jury is to present a monolithic front of resistance that unmasks its repressive intentions and makes it fail completely in its application because it doesn't obtain any information - so that the only alternative left for them is to imprison hundreds of Puerto Ricans or stop its use.

Lamentably, the answer, not of the people who are mobilized spontaneously or in a disorganized way, but of the independence movement, has not been at the height demanded by the times. Sectarianism and party cannibalism have denied the necessary support to those subpoenaed. To limit oneself to declarations, to cover the news in one's newspapers and send a symbolic representative to one or another picket is paltry and only contributes to the enemy becoming bolder and continuing its selective attack against independentist sectors.

It's easy to argue against non-collaboration based on "moments when the popular masses have not developed sufficient consciousness to mobilize themselves against this instrument of repression"; what is difficult is to do work conducive to the development of this consciousness. If since the beginnings of the grand jury, the independence movement had reacted as one in support of the first subpoenae and had assigned resources to the campaign although it was outside of their own parties, the capacity for mobilization would be greater today.

With the scarcity of resources that the Unitary Committee Against Repression (CUCRE) has had, we have tried to expose the repressive situation, to alert all sectors of the importance with which work should be recognized, and what is more important, the duty they have to be in solidarity with those subpoenaed. We still believe that the time has come to abandon this suicidal sectarianism and, with a truly self-critical attitude, to correct the damage done.

ALBIZU AND THE GRAND JURY.

In the article by the PRTP, history is falsified with respect to how Albizu acted in front of the grand jury in 1936. It is unpardonable to attempt to argue a position using incorrect data that, giving them the benefit of the doubt, at least reflects irresponsible intellectual laziness that doesn't verify the data obtained. If on the contrary, they knew the correct data, not mentioning and not making the pertinent clarifications, that demonstrates more reproachable conduct. It is outrageous to treat a patriotic figure with such lack of respect, as if we didn't have enough with the constant imperialist campaign to depreciate our national values. Let's look at the facts.

In 1919 the institution of the grand jury was created at the **insular** level. It was established in

"the first section of the law of June 18, 1919, amended by law 58 in 1925." - "Any felony that is attributed to a public functionary because of actions taken in the exercise of his functions must be prosecuted through charges by the grand jury, presented before the court that has jurisdiction in the case. All other crimes will be prosecuted in the form prescribed by the Code of Criminal Justice."

On March 6, 1936, this grand jury - which is **not federal** - was constituted, convoked by the District (so-called insular) Court of San Juan, upon demand by the local prosecutors, Marcelino Romani and Domingo Massari, to investigate "the deaths of the young Nationalists Elias Beauchamp and Hiram Rosado."

Before this Puerto Rican grand jury, loyal to his politics of distinguishing the treatment of the Puerto Rican from the Yankee, Albizu appeared to give the Nationalist Party's evidence against the police, which was being investigated for the assassination of Beauchamp and Rosado.

This insular grand jury found probable cause against the assassins. This insular grand jury was dissolved shortly afterwards. **The first quotation from Albizu in the PRTP article refers to the insular grand jury.**

The situation was very different in Federal court. On March 6, charges of sedition were formulated against Albizu and other Nationalist leaders; meanwhile there was the case against the Nationalist, Pearson, survivor of the Rio Piedras Massacre. On March 31, a federal grand jury was convoked by the prosecutor of the federal court, Snyder, in order to hear the cases of sedition and determine probable cause. The alternative for the prosecutor was to bring the cases before federal commissioner Julia. If it was presented to the commissioner it would have implied a hearing where the accused would have a right to a defense. Through the grand jury there would be no hearing, no defense and the "evidence" could be expanded by asking for more from the accused themselves.

Immediately more than 100 subpoenas were issued. Practically all of the Nationalist leadership was included, from the national and local juntas. The first three called - Pedro Albizu Campos, Juan Juarbe Juarbe and Juan Antonio Corretjer - entered the room and did not collaborate. Like the second quote from Albizu said, in the room he denounced political persecution, made a fool of the prosecutor, answered nothing and gave nothing they required of him. As a tactic it was established that Corretjer, the Secretary-General of the Party, was the custodian of the records and he refused to hand them over.

As soon as Corretjer refused, the summonses were withdrawn and the prosecutor proceeded to find him guilty of contempt of court. Two facts stand out in the process: 1) Corretjer was sentenced to one year in jail, but in the face of the

position of non-cooperation, the more than 100 subpoenas were left without effect and no one else went to jail for contempt; 2) When the defense alleged in court (in the contempt hearing) that the requested records had already been seized by the police and prosecutors when they carried out break-ins related to the sedition charges, Judge Cooper answered by asking for the records from the period since the break-ins. Of course they were denied and then Correjerter was sentenced.

To say "respond like Albizu", politically denouncing the persecution, is not to discover the Mediterranean. This very thing is what Carlos Noya, Norberto Cintrón, Ricarte Montes, Raymond Soto and Alberto de Jesus have done. They have read political declarations to the grand jury as a response to the demands of the prosecutors - but they have **not** answered any question or handed over anything asked for.

These political declarations are very important. They clearly establish the position of principles upon which the subpoenae's non-cooperation is based, and in some cases have had a great effect on the members of the jury. In the case of Julio Rosado there were jurors who began to cry. In the case of the second subpoena of Norberto, the grand jury did not want to prosecute him for contempt on the second occasion. But more important is to hold fast to these experiences in order to understand up to what point the government has power and how unjust and oppressive the grand jury system is. In the face of this (in Norberto's case), the government proceeded to substitute various members of the jury to advance their goal. Later, in the case of Raymond, the foreman of the grand jury was a North American

Much to the contrary of what is proposed by the PRTP and Gallisá, the politics of non-cooperation have demonstrated great effectiveness. In the three, almost four, years that the grand jury "investigation" has been going on, the U.S. government has been unable to proceed with charges, they have been unable to make massive arrests, they have completely failed to resolve the cases of armed actions and have only been able to imprison six comrades for contempt of the grand jury.

The fact that five more North American prosecutors, specially brought from the U.S., have been assigned, that the investigation is directly led from Washington, that all of it is under the control of the Task Force assigned in Washington for the so-called "fight against terrorism", and that the FBI is engaged in a campaign between right and left in order to clean up its face (thus the "investigations" of corruption, the article of Juan Manuel García Passalacqua (**San Juan Star**) 3/14/83) and some visits to leaders of political parties) - all this shows us that the

FBI/grand jury is failing in the confrontation with the politics of non-collaboration.

The escalation in the repressive use of the grand jury is very significant. The subpoenas of Federico Cintrón and Carlos Noya to appear in Brooklyn and the charges of criminal contempt constitute an increase in pressure in the face of the failure obtained through incarceration for 18 months. They threaten jail for Noya for the second time and attack the organization that fights the grand jury/FBI and repression.

Judge Sifton recognized the failure of the use of the grand jury and the success of the campaign of non-collaboration when he decided on March 17, in the case of two North American comrades, Michelle Miller and Silvia Baraldini, that there was no case to imprison them for civil contempt because it was clear that they would follow the standard of the five (Julio Rosado and the others) and would not collaborate; if they wanted to punish them, they had to proceed with criminal contempt.

We are completely convinced of the success of the campaign of non-collaboration and believe that it would be harmful for the U.S. government to proceed with criminal contempt for "many, many more."

Lamentably, we recognize the great damage these articles have done in dividing the resistance to the grand jury. With these articles they have invited Washington to increase the activities of the grand jury/FBI in Puerto Rico. Once again it is from the independence movement itself that the blow emanates. Why?

Rectify, comrade! It is revolutionary to rectify!

The CUCRE reaffirms its politics of non-collaboration and will continue its support of all political prisoners and its denunciation of all those who assume a position which gives ground to the enemy.

"What makes a person or an organization great is not in the action it carries out, but in maintaining itself at the level or height at which it carries out the action."

By the Comité Unitario Contra la Represión

Federico Cintrón
Spokesperson

March 16, 1983

POLEMIC THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN

Liga Socialista Puertorriqueña (LSP)

Our position on how to confront the federal grand jury must be stated -- this time made necessary in regard to a document of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Puertorriqueños (Macheteros). We see the responsibility to do this because of the importance that any political-military organization which struggles for independence and socialism exercises over the development of the struggle (whether the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional, the Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Popular, the Comandos Revolucionarios del Pueblo, the Organización de Voluntarios por la Revolución Puertorriqueña or the Ejército Popular Boricua-Macheteros), and because of the immediate acceptance and projection of this position by the Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño. It is our responsibility to argue our position because essentially, the position we're referring to is not merely mistaken and erroneous but also extremely destructive and dangerous to the interests of our people, particularly our working class. Paradoxically, the PRTP position itself, in some parts of the document, gives the impression that they take no position, that what there is really is the absence of a position.

There are many secondary points to the fundamental analysis; we will discuss the basis of the position, or the lack of a position.

The first obvious point is the contradiction seen in the use of the term "to appear."

Before anything else we want to make clear that "to appear" means to make an appearance and nothing else.

In the PRTP document, in the part called "Puerto Rico and the Federal Grand Jury" ("The position that in the most generalized form that has been adopted by Puerto Ricans, as a response to the grand jury, has been to refuse to answer questions or give over anything demanded. There have also been appearances, but the questions have been answered corresponding to the interests of the struggle for national liberation and in open defiance of the imposition of the Grand Jury as an instrument of yankee repression in Puerto Rico."); and in the part called "To appear is not to collaborate" the term "to appear" is used as if it meant "answering questions".

On the other hand, in the end, as in the part titled "The Current Reality and the Grand Jury," ("We respect the position taken by several comrades to not answer questions or turn over anything required. We also respect the position of not appearing adopted by others and accept the decision of comrades to respond in denouncing terms to the requirements or in terms of more absolute nonrecognition of the grand jury.") It seems to us that the term is used correctly when the act of making a presence is not identified as answering questions.

Also it should be clear that to make a presence "to appear" or not has never been a debate. What has been raised is the point of giving in or not to the requirements of the grand jury. In the second place, let's analyze the "position" of answering questions "in a defiant or denouncing form". To sustain this position the PRTP uses two quotes from the greatest Puerto Rican nationalist leader of the 20th century, Pedro Albizu Campos. The first of these quotes (both included in the part "To appear is not to collaborate") refers to an Insular and not a Federal Grand Jury. This Insular Grand Jury was similar in essence to what the origins of the Grand Jury were. The second quote does not support the comrades' position because in fact Albizu did not answer questions but instead made a fool out of the prosecutor.

As this "position" falls apart -- the position of answering questions in a defiant or denouncing form -- the true position comes out and that appears only implicitly: that you can answer certain questions - a position that can be summed up in considering "the particular reality of each person."

In terms of this position there are two aspects which we need to avoid. First, persons choosing to answer some questions and not others, and second, that some comrades answer questions and others don't.

We want to interject here a proven truth; that the incarceration of people subpoenaed to the grand jury is a reality imposed by the enemy.

In the first of these cases, the most "innocent" questions that are answered give information to the enemy that could help them complete profiles

of militants or organizations. Even more, and as serious as the first, is that even by not answering questions, information is provided.

When the first of these cases is projected beyond its own immediate reality and is analyzed as regards the second case, the case of some that answer and some that don't, we can see the real content of the phrase "the particular reality of each person." This is transformed into informing on the individual level, because it collaborates with imperialism in projecting the false idea that the reason one doesn't submit to questioning is because one can't, not because one doesn't want to. The same situation happens in the case of physical evidence.

The third point we need to comment on is with respect to how you confront the Federal Grand Jury - since in the last point we explained how not to do it.

Resistance to the grand jury, in itself, is a victory. To demonstrate this we have two forceful examples. In 1936, when more than 150 leaders of the Nationalist Party were subpoenaed to the Grand Jury to turn over their records, lists of members and financial books, the position taken by the Secretary General of that Party - the Secretary General of our organization, Juan Antonio Corretjer - was that as the custodian of these required documents, he refused to hand them over and thereby saved more than 150 nationalist leaders from imprisonment by his own imprisonment. Thus, more than being "tradition" (important in and of itself for colonized peoples), this act gives substance to the analysis of the accumulated experiences working towards the development of positions today.

The second example that sustains this thesis can be seen in the resistance from 1977 up until today. The generalized resistance to the Grand Jury, based in non-collaboration and complemented by big mass mobilizations in the U.S. and Mexico in support of those subpoenaed, has forced imperialism to uncover the punitive character of the Grand Jury by escalating the repression with jailing for criminal contempt. Non-collaboration has triumphed - including over collaboration.

The PRTP article ignores all of this.

In addition, the position taken by the PRTP and the PSP helps the government in its intention to criminalize the struggle for our national liberation and gives legitimacy to the repressive institution of the Grand Jury and to a stage which has already been defeated through the struggle against

it, the stage when this institution has a "coercive" character.

To answer questions before this body, or give evidence such as documents, fingerprints, handwriting, voice or hair samples, to have your picture taken or go before a line-up, or to do the same with the FBI in order to avoid a subpoena, gives "validity" and "moral strength" to both repressive institutions and "legalizes" the attempts of imperialism to destroy our struggle through the use of the Grand Jury. It reduces our struggle to a simple criminal investigation, just like they carry out against corrupt elements or organized crime.

Another point we feel obligated to make is the period of time in which the article appears, indicating a low level of camaraderie. First, as if we have nothing to learn from past experiences.

Arrested just before the second subpoena to the Grand Jury of comrade Norberto Cintrón Fiallo, at that time a prisoner and exiled, the lawyer Farinacci collaborated with the Grand Jury by giving physical evidence. In the court hearing of comrade Norberto, the judge responded to the allegation by the defense that comrade Norberto would not submit to the demands of the Grand Jury as a matter of principle, by saying that another person with the same ideology had not refused and had obeyed the order of the Grand Jury. This speaks for itself.

Second, as we already pointed out, the position taken by the PRTP undermines the surpassing of a stage - that of the Grand Jury being "coercive."

We don't think more argument is needed to prove the point that the movement for the independence and socialism of Puerto Rico needs a united front of non-collaboration in order to defeat the Grand Jury and that non-collaboration cannot be anything other than not answering and giving over nothing. Any deviation from this position helps to undermine the resistance to the Grand Jury and goes against movement unity.

Let's now draw some general conclusions.

The relaxation of the principles of struggle proposed by the PRTP is tantamount to sponsoring the decline of independentism. In fact, with liberalism, accusations develop and the doors are opened.

It's strange to see how the PRTP also struggles hard to defend the "right" of "persons who do not have a high level of political consciousness" to not be in contempt of the Grand Jury. Isn't it true

that one of the things that a political-military organization should cultivate is the lack of information given to the enemy by the people?

THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE PRTP GIVES CONSIDERABLE SUBSTANCE TO A STRATEGIC RETREAT OF INDEPENDENTISM WHICH HAS AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE PSP AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN 1978 WHEN THEY OFFERED AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INDEPENDENCE THE SO-CALLED FREE ASSOCIATED STATE, AND PLACES THE PRTP, IN FACT, IN THE VANGUARD OF REFORMISM. THE DYNAMICS OF THESE POLITICS WILL CAUSE THEM TO BECOME THE TAIL.

This position goes against the development of unity on both the clandestine and general levels and threatens to transform the armed struggle of the Macheteros from content to form, from revolutionary to reformist, into armed struggle as pressure tactics, and to function from and for reformist objectives.

The faith of the PRTP is thus oriented towards the "strength" of the reformists and the "indecisive"

vacillators (who will definitely come forward to support this position) and moves away, de facto, from faith in the revolution - which is the same as saying faith in the masses.

We would point something out. For us in the Liga Socialista Puertorriqueña the masses are not the instrument of the revolution. The revolution is the instrument of the masses and it is in accord with this that we should take our positions.

Reformism has always used the masses and the revolution to protect itself (another variation on the theory of survival) or to push forward its opportunist, limping positions.

The PRTP will do enormous good for the revolution when it corrects its deviation, distances itself from its relenting positions that foster decline and reorient itself towards the healthy road of the revolution, that is to say, towards prolonged popular war that allows for no deviations.

THERE WILL BE NO STRATEGIC RETREAT.

The revolution will continue.

NOTES ON THE REPRESSION PRACTICED BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN PUERTO RICO

By Carmen Gautier-Mayoral

"Puerto Rico is neither a domestic matter nor an international matter. It is a geographical bastion of the United States." J. Kirkpatrick

Repression in Puerto Rico is far more pervasive than I can possibly cover in a short paper. It is also institutionalized and somewhat taken for granted, unfortunately, by the majority of the population, for it is not in vain that it is the oldest colony in the world today - four hundred and seventy five years a colony in 1983 - and the second most populated after Hong Kong.

The Island's geographic location between the two main navigation routes from the Atlantic Ocean into the Caribbean Sea - the Channels of Mona and Anegada - has been its damnation: it has given it the role of military bastion both under Spain and the United States. Accordingly, the Reagan admi-

nistration calls it their bastion of anticommunism in the Caribbean. Puerto Rico's Latin American nationality, indigenous culture, and, in the end, unassimilable people, have been the great causes of persecution under so called programs of internal security by the U.S. Intelligence Agencies, to insure the permanence of U.S. military use of its territory.

The information presented here is a very small part of the study of the following documents: *Staff Report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, vol. III (see note 7); 75 volumes of documents in the file of the F.B.I. on Juan Mari Bras from 1944 to 1977, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC, Sec. 552; 699 documents in the file of Miguel Angel Cabrera, a pro independence labor organizer who was falsely accused in 1977 of the murder of U.S. lawyer Alan Randall

(the file begins in 1965 when Cabrera entered U.P.R. as a freshman, and goes on until 1979); documents sent to Nelson Canals, president of *Comité Unitario contra la Represión* by unknown means, and which are the only uncensored ones; documents sent by the U.S. Navy under the F.O.I.A. relating to Carlos Zenon president of the Vieques Fishermen's Association; interviews with Juan Mari Brás, Juan Antonio Corretjer, and other people who prefer to remain anonymous; articles published in the Puerto Rican press about the F.B.I.; articles from the *New York Times* on the F.B.I.; and other pertinent materials.

But whose internal security is in fact being protected? Not even that of the United States. I aim to prove here that - notwithstanding sanctimonious yearly statements by U.S. diplomats at the U.N. that Puerto Rico's status is an internal matter between Puerto Rico and the United States - the United States government, and even more its intelligence agencies, deal with Puerto Rico as a part of the Caribbean, of Latin America and of the world.

The programs to be carried out, or very often to be tested in, Puerto Rico are many times decided for non Puerto Rican reasons, reasons all having to do with U.S. foreign and defense policy.

REPRESSION BEFORE 1960

Repression under the U.S. flag certainly did not begin in 1960. As far back as 1898 a letter from the War Department to General Miles called Puerto Rico a very peaceful territory apt for the future transfer of Northamerican blacks from the South. A few of the outstanding repressive acts of the first three fifths of this century are:

1. **The repeated denial of a plebiscite to the Puerto Rican people**, under President McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and even Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. Wilson - the great defender of the self determination of the peoples on the other side of the Atlantic - went so far as to postpone the general election to be held in Puerto Rico in November 1916, in order to evade what would have amounted to a referendum on the imposition of U.S. citizenship and the military draft on Puerto Ricans. The election was held in July, 1917, after the Jones Act had imposed American citizenship and after the draft laws had been applied to the Island. It is interesting to note that the British at no time imposed this "blood tax" on their colonial subjects.

2. **The Río Piedras and the Ponce massacres** (October 1935 and March 1937) both ordered by Governor Blanton Winship and carried out by the police of Puerto Rico against unarmed Nationalist Party marchers.

3. The use of Grand Jury proceedings, first used to harass, intimidate and disorganize a national liberation movement in 1936, organized to sentence poet Juan Antonio Corretjer to one year in jail for not handing over to the U.S. District Court the minutes of Nationalist Party meetings and the lists of its members.

4. The imprisonment of Dr. Pedro Albizu Campos and the whole governing board of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in 1936, after a second jury, chosen specifically to convict them, met and heard their case when the first jury could not agree on their guilt. The American Civil Liberties Union warned Dr. Gruening, Director of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the Department of the Interior, that accusing them under the sedition laws of the U.S. rather than for a criminal activity of which there was no proof, made them political prisoners and not common criminals. The same can be said for the 1981 F.A.L.N. convicts.

5. The jailing of the next three governing boards of the Nationalist Party in 1937, 1941 and 1942.

6. The constant trailing of known Nationalists in the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's, documented in the FBI's own reports.

7. A visit by the Unamerican Activities Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives to San Juan in 1959, ten months after the Cuban revolution.

8. The continued imprisonment - until 1979 - of the longest held political prisoners in the Western Hemisphere - Andrés Figueroa Cordero, Lolita Lebrón, Irvin Flores, Oscar Collazo and Rafael Cancel Miranda - while those persons who really put the survival of the American republic in danger - the Watergate convicts - were all pardoned or paroled in a matter of at most thirty months.

Few of these activities responded to problems of Puerto Rican or even Northamerican internal security. Instead they were the result of U.S. foreign and defense policies. A plebiscite could not be granted to Puerto Rico while the U.S. intervened in the Caribbean creating receiverships and protectorates ranging from Cuba, Santo Domingo and Haiti, to Panama and Nicaragua. War clouds were gathering in Europe by 1936 and the U.S. government wanted to promote Interamerican Solidarity as part of its future defense. Albizu Campos had been very persuasive in carrying the message of Puerto Rican independence to Latin America.

Nevertheless, this is perhaps the most outstanding occasion when persecution of Puerto Rican **independentistas** was totally due to a fear of losing Puerto Rico. In May of 1936 when news of the Tydings Bill for independence reached the island, the majority of town governments took down the U.S. flag and flew the Puerto Rican flag. The Republican (pro-statehood) president of the Senate in the "Coalition" legislature, Rafael Martinez Na-

dal, announced that he would ask his followers to vote "yes" in a referendum for independence. Albizu Campos called for the convening of a Constitutional Convention in June, and University students elected their delegates to that convention. By August of 1936 the Tydings bill, intended as a punishment which the Puerto Ricans would vote against, had died in committee and Albizu and the whole governing board of the Nationalist Party had been jailed. A year later they were banished to Atlanta. International law under the League of Nations recognized no rights to colonial peoples or national liberation movements like the United Nations does today. Thus, although there were a series of Latin American protests, the operation against the Nationalists was performed to "clean up the house" before appearing to grant economic and eventually political rights to Puerto Ricans in the forties.

A Secret Memo from Lt. Col. Dubois of the Operation Division of the Department of the Army, dated March 9, 1945, and written in answer to the third Tydings bill for independence of that year, reveals the real reason behind the persecution of independence advocates in Puerto Rico. It says:

If independence were to be granted to Puerto Rico, the duration of the war and for an indeterminate period thereafter, to be determined by the President of the United States:

- a. Sovereignty of the island shall be retained by the U.S..
- b. The U.S. government shall exercise exclusive military jurisdiction over the Island of Puerto Rico and of water area, air and communication routes, thereto as follows:
 1. Exclusive jurisdiction over all existing military posts, camps, airbases, landing fields and separate stations, and lines of communication connecting them or leading thereto.
 2. The right to acquire such additional land and water as should be necessary for additional bases and defense.
 3. Exclusive rights to conduct surveys, reconnaissance, etcetera, for military purposes.
 4. Exclusive privileges on a preferential and unrestricted basis for the use of all land, sea, and air transportation facilities, public utilities, and all radio, cable, postal and other communications facilities, the latter being subject to United States control and censorship.
 5. Exclusive rights for military and other agencies of the U.S. government to station observers in Puerto Rican territory, and to conduct investigations for purposes of military intelligence. The Government of Puerto Rico shall furnish

such assistance as is required for these investigations.

6. The Federal Bureau of Investigation to be authorized to continue to operate in Puerto Rico.
7. The security of U.S. installations (espionage and sabotage acts) to remain under the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
8. The U.S. Public Health Service to continue.
9. The right to retain the civil population, if necessary.
10. The right to retain in the Army of the U.S. for a period to be determined by the President of the U.S. such Puerto Ricans as are now serving in, or may be subsequently called into, the Army of the U.S. and as may be acceptable for subsequent service.

(Secret)

Even the puppet republic of Cuba at the time of the Platt Amendment appears as the pinnacle of freedom and self-government in comparison to what Colonel Dubois had in mind for an independent Puerto Rico.

The persecution of independentistas in the 1940's, 1950's and early 1960's and the humiliation of the Unamerican Activities Committee in San Juan have already been documented in this section.

ACCELERATION OF REPRESSION SINCE 1960

On 16 August, 1960 J. Edgar Hoover wrote a MEMO to the Special Agent in Charge in San Juan, opening a new program of disruption and curtailment of the activities of Puerto Rican nationalists. The memo says:

The Bureau appreciates that the situation in Puerto Rico is unique because of conditions in Cuba, its accessibility to Puerto Rico, and the seemingly unrestrained travel of some of your subjects to Cuba . . . In line with the instructions in Bulet 8 - 4 - 60, you should seriously consider highly placed Puerto Rican subjects who have access to Cuba for development as security informants . . .

Puerto Rican subjects who have frequently traveled to Cuba are primarily concerned with seeking independence for Puerto Rico. Bulet August 4, 1960 advised that the more positive effort must be made not on effort must be made **not only to curtail but to disrupt the activities of the Puerto Rican nationalists.** San Juan and New York were requested to furnish their observations, suggestions and recommendations concerning this. (emphasis added)

A photocopy of this memorandum appears below (Document I).

This was the beginning of the Counterintelli-

gence Program (COINTELPRO) of the FBI against its second target: The Puerto Rican independence movements, four years after the initiation of the program against the Communist Party of the U.S.A. (CPUSA) in 1956, and over a year before the Socialist Worker's Party (SWP) was targeted in the U.S. Later the Black Panthers, the Black Muslims, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., university activists and other groups were persecuted.

I need not go into details about the Counterintelligence Program to a Northamerican audience. Suffice it to say it consisted of a series of covert action programs adopting wartime counterespionage techniques of the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) and the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.), and directing them against domestic groups and the Puerto Rican independence groups.

Why was COINTELPRO directed against Puerto Ricans in 1960? Was there an ongoing "communist conspiracy," political unrest, threat of revolution, or radical effervescence in the island? Far from it, 1960 was the year of the fourth election of Luis Muñoz Marin as governor of Puerto Rico, of the celebration of what was then called the Puerto Rican economic miracle, and of the height of Puerto Rican belief in Commonwealth, as a truly dynamic solution meant to give ever more powers to the island government.

But despite all of these auspicious appearances, Puerto Rico could not escape its destiny as a U.S. bastion in the Caribbean. There were two causes for the FBI to apply COINTELPRO to the Island, neither one of Puerto Rican origin: (1) the Cuban revolution had triumphed on January 1, 1959; and (2) the U.S. had decided by August of 1960 on a dual action in Latin America to counteract that revolution: the Alliance for Progress - the carrot - and the counterinsurgency program - the stick. Puerto Rico was to be part of both sides of that dual action.

By August of 1960 Cuba had made it very clear that it was not willing to allow itself to be manipulated by the U.S. companies established there. The U.S. Congress had already eliminated the Cuban sugar quota in July and on August 6, the Cuban Government had nationalized the electric and telephone companies, the oil refineries and the sugar centrals. But the break off of relations would not occur until October.

The dual action planned by the U.S. for Latin America included the invasion of *Bahía Girón* (Bay of Pigs) in April, 1961 and plans for Mafia killers to assassinate Fidel Castro. Puerto Rico was included on the carrot side of the dual action as part of what was then called the Democratic Left, and as a full participant in the Alliance for Progress both as a showcase of development in alliance with capitalism; and as a contributor of top personnel to the Washington foreign policy establishment.

It was also included in the "stick" side: the transformation of the Interamerican Defense programs - the Rio Treaty, the Military Aid Programs, the Interamerican Defense Board, the Interamerican War College, the periodic meetings of the hemispheric Chiefs of Staff and the Public Security Program for police training of the Agency for International Development - from a joint defense against extra hemispheric attacks (1945 - 60) to a program of counterinsurgency. The onset of COINTELPRO in Puerto Rico, together with riot training for police and National Guard was the beginning of the counterinsurgency program in Latin America.

That Puerto Rico was considered part of Latin America is shown in a letter of June 1, 1961, from the Director of the FBI to the Special Agent in Charge, San Juan, in the last paragraph of the second page:

The Internal security situation in Puerto Rico is unique because of its strategic location away from the continental United States and its historical relationship with Latin America . . .

And again on the second paragraph of the first page:

The conditions which exist in places in Latin America contribute to the dangerousness of communism and nationalism. We have seen during the past two years a small hard core of nationalists advocating Puerto Rican independence grow into a movement of considerable magnitude wherein communism has a greater part than ever in the past. . .

The first two pages of this letter are reproduced below (Document 2). Three months later, on October 31, 1961, SAC San Juan wrote:

...Further, in Latin American countries, even more so than in the United States, university faculty members and students are considered "a breed apart" and freedoms of academic thought and expression are highly prized and closely guarded. It is therefore felt the implementing of such a program in Puerto Rico could possibly open the Bureau to criticism for attempting to stifle academic freedom.

(This was a program which was proposed to trail Professor Boris Stanfield, retired from Colombia University and a teacher at U.P.R. because he received PRAVDA in Puerto Rico; and to trail other professors for being pro independence or even pro greater freedom for Latin Americans.) This fourth page of the memorandum to Director Hoover is also reproduced below (Document 3). Further, the headings of at least two FBI memoranda in 1969 - June 10 and November 6 - from Director Hoover to SAC San Juan, on Groups Seeking Independence for Puerto Rico bear the subheading "COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM. (LATIN AMERICAN SECTION)" (Emphasis added).

Harassment and persecution of independence advocates by the FBI in Puerto Rico includes: anonymous letters to the wives of independence

leaders accusing their husbands of pretended infidelities; press releases and "misinformation" sent to "friendly" columnists in the main newspapers on the island; distribution of flyers with false information in University campuses; the persecution of professors for the crime of being "progressive;" the recruitment of informants and their infiltration into all of the organizations of the left; and the use of government agencies to harass independence followers. For example, in a sample taken within a small sector of University professors in 1975 it was found that thirty three per cent of that sector were *independentistas* and sixty six were not. All of the *independentistas* had had their income tax returns investigated from a minimum of two to a maximum of four times in the previous twenty years.

Other activities include: visits to relatives - parents - or preferably to the parent's employers, to intimidate them with the possibility of losing their jobs if they cannot "correct" their politically active relatives; having workers, union leaders and student leaders arrested on false charges especially in election years. The Puerto Rican radio and television stations have been under the Federal Communications Commission's regulation since the 1930's. The intolerance of the FBI would not permit the owners of three small radio stations in Yauco, San German and Ponce to broadcast a half hour program called *Bandera Roja* of the Unitary Patriotic Action Group. The owners were threatened with loss of FCC authorization to broadcast.

Many foreign - federal - and national - Puerto Rican - government agencies collaborate with the FBI, for example: the University of Puerto Rico (supplies student records); the bureau of Vital Statistics; the Bureau of Motor Vehicles of the Department of Public Works and Transportation (supplies photographs); the Electric Power Authority; the U.S. Post Office in Puerto Rico; the Telephone Company; the Communications Authority; and the Police of Puerto Rico (persecute individuals at the request of the FBI). Equifax, Inc., a private provider of credit cards, also supplies confidential information to the bureau.

We can appreciate the scope of surveillance of Puerto Rico by the intelligence community of the United States in the distribution which the FBI makes of its memoranda. They have been sent to the following agencies: the Selective Service Office requesting a reclassification to 1-A for pro independence youth leaders; the office of U.S. marshalls in Puerto Rico; the Bureau of Research of the Department of State; the Secret Service of the Department of the Treasury; the Department of Transportation; the Federal Aviation Administration; the intelligence branches of the Air Force, the Army and the Navy; the Coast Guard; and the command center at the White House.

Another frequent form of harassment to Puer-

to Rican independence advocates is the mysterious and continuous loss of baggage at airports, when that baggage contains documents exposing the colonial case of Puerto Rico. Attorneys Juan Mari Brás, Noel Colón Martínez, Graciany Miranda Marchand and Nilita Vientós Gastón have been some of the best known victims of this persecution. The main document prepared for the first Conference in Solidarity with the Independence of Puerto Rico held in Havana in September of 1975, never left the airport in San Juan. The boxes containing it were said to be "lost" between San Juan and Kingston.

Even non Puerto Ricans have been subjected to harassment. Dr. Alonso Aguilar Monteverde, a distinguished Mexican economist, was arrested upon arrival in San Juan to deliver various lectures invited by the University of Puerto Rico. He had a visa issued by the U.S. embassy in Mexico, but was not allowed to enter Puerto Rico and was returned to his country the next day. This abuse occurred in early 1979 a few days after Mexico announced that it would attend the Second Conference in Solidarity with the Independence of Puerto Rico.

The documents show at least five types of intervention carried on by the FBI in Puerto Rico:

1. Intervention in elections and plebiscites, twenty per cent of the first five hundred documents handed to the Puerto Rican Socialist Party in November of 1977 dealt with this subject. If the Puerto Rican Independence Party were to request their documents under FOIA I feel sure that the numbers dealing with this subject would grow substantially.

2. Intervention in the information media.

3. Attempts at factionalization and disruption of the independence movements.

4. Intervention in the student movements, especially the Federation of University Students pro Independence (FUPI).

5. Attempts at preventing any possible connection between the Puerto Rican independence movements and socialist countries, as that would endanger the U.S. position in Puerto Rico.

Although the intervention in elections and plebiscites is one of the activities of a metropolitan intelligence agency most indicative of the colonial condition of a territory, I unfortunately do not have space to cover this or any of the other interventions in detail. I refer you to "COINTEL-PRO on Puerto Rico," a report mentioned in note 22 below.

RECENT ACCELERATION OF REPRESSION IN PUERTO RICO

The international situation for a United States whose 1950's hegemony is irretrievably lost is indeed complex in today's Caribbean. The Soviet Navy, that spectre which always "appears" in the Caribbean at the time of Congressional appropriations for new ships and airplanes, and the Cuban

"devil" can no longer carry the full blame for the loss of American power and prestige in the Antilles and Central America. Indeed, Alan Riding tells us that "throughout the Caribbean basin, Washington is now competing for influence (and one could add for trade) not only with Cuba, but also with Mexico, Venezuela and the European Social Democratic and Christian Democratic movements." This is good old capitalist competition, of the kind one would expect the Reagan administration — if it were consistent with what it preaches — to appreciate. It does mean that the price of the loss of American economic hegemony is certainly dear.

One is surprised then to read in Professor (now Ambassador) Jeanne Kirkpatrick's paper in December 1980 that:

...other new participants (in Central America) include the Socialist International into which are gathered a number of Democratic Socialists (Willy Brandt, Olaf Palme, Francois Mitterrand, Michael Manley) who unable to win popular support for peaceful revolution in their own countries, have grown progressively more enthusiastic about supporting revolution elsewhere and less fastidious about the company they keep or the methods utilized. (Emphasis added).

All that is really happening is that prosperous West Germany and others are pushing the U.S. out of the Caribbean for their own trading purposes, in the same manner in which the U.S. pushed Britain out of its colonies all during the Second World War. One hundred and twenty years earlier Britain had helped Latin America obtain its independence from Spain and for the same reasons.

But the Reagan administration does not choose to see it this way. Instead there must be a Communist-Social Democrat-Christian Democrat-Catholic Left conspiracy to overthrow what the Santa Fe group of the Interamerican Security Council calls:

...republics which have to a greater or lesser degree adopted the principles of representative and democratic government limited in its authority.

What does all this bode for Puerto Rico? A new dual role in the new carrot and stick approach to the Caribbean and hemispheric problems of the United States. On the carrot side, the Interamerican Security Council's report proposes that:

...The U.S. must launch a new policy for the Greater Caribbean, including Central America... providing multifaceted aid for all friendly countries under attack by armed minorities receiving assistance from hostile forces. The program will wed the most successful elements of the Truman Doctrine and the Alliance for Progress.

Along the same lines, Reagan proposes for Latin America "a growing support of A B C countries — Argentina, Brazil and Chile —, the cleansing of the

'red Caribbean Sea' and the 'Puertoricanization' of the whole region...

The Caribbean Basin Initiative announced in February, 1982, includes a special role for Puerto Rico: "With its strong traditions of democracy and free enterprise it can play a leading role in the development of the area." All major political parties presented economic programs to the Reagan administration to compensate CBI harm to the Puerto Rican economy. On March 21, 1982 the Legislature of Puerto Rico passed a concurrent resolution expressing its opinion on the CBI thus:

In summary, the Caribbean Initiative will represent a setback in the development of Puerto Rico's economy which will increase unemployment, paralyze industrial development, destroy agricultural production, weaken the Puerto Rican labor movement, and provoke frustration and unrest among unemployed youths in Puerto Rico. The clearly predictable result will be the chaos and social and political instability that inevitably accompany extreme poverty, and the resulting inability of the poor to provide for their needs and those of their families.

In the middle of a crisis where two thirds of the Island's population receive food stamps, and where income is so low that the government claims that even under the new guidelines proposed by President Reagan ninety per cent of this sixty six per cent still qualify, Puerto Rico is again to be a "model for development and growth in partnership with capitalism." That is going to be a pretty tall order, and will be interesting to watch. Perchance Congress is going to grant special favors to Puerto Rico at the same time as it cuts off programs for their own constituents?

On the stick side, although President Reagan's policy for Latin America as a whole is still being prepared, there is evidence "that he assigned the region a new strategic importance...he would like to tie the Americas together in a bastion of freedom." In this approach, which will be very difficult to carry out, Puerto Rico has already been assigned three roles: (a) it must shine as what Reaganites call a bastion of anti Communism in the Caribbean; (b) it must, if asked to, send its boys to fight in American intervention in El Salvador or Nicaragua and elsewhere; (c) it must, establish an interagency group with the U.S. government to deal with terrorism. This is entirely in keeping with the interdepartmental group on terrorism formed under Secretary of State Haig in February of 1981, and which includes representatives from the Justice Department, the State Department, the C.I.A., the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council and the Treasury and Energy Departments.

The problem with such priorities in Puerto Rico is that they are again established for non Puerto Rican reasons. As Journalist Harold Lidin wrote in

the daily *San Juan Star*, "Cuban terrorists in Puerto Rico operate as if they had a license from the Commonwealth police." The *New York Times* pointed out in late 1979 that "Puerto Rico has the highest rate per capita of Cuban terrorism in the United States: forty acts — mostly bomb explosions — attributed by the FBI to rightwing Cubans in Puerto Rico since 1970." I have documented this rightwing terrorism elsewhere. In spite of this, says Ladin, "with the new administration in Washington it is questionable whether the FBI would even venture...a blow at the right wing here."

As to the pro independence armed groups operating from time to time in Puerto Rico, it is now usual in the United States to call "terrorists" those people who are in fact freedom fighters, and thus delegitimize their struggle. And yet this happens in the very same decade when the United Nations had continuously recognized the rights of national liberation movements to fight for the independence of their country. It is a case of international law, represented by United Nations resolutions, against the domestic law of a foreign power.

Nevertheless, and in accordance with the renewed U.S. fear of revolution in the Caribbean and the New Cold War being waged from Washington within the context of the foreign policy called "Resurgent America," there is a current acceleration of repression in Puerto Rico. On the one hand, various organizations ranging from Judge Webster's FBI to the Rand Corporation are trying very hard to convince your country in 1981 and 1982 that Puerto Rico produces the most dangerous "terrorists" for the U.S. government on American soil. It is interesting to note, for example, that the Rand Note ascribes to Puerto Rico so called "terrorists" every bomb exploded in American cities with assailant unknown.

On the other hand, the use of the U.S. Federal Grand Jury against Puerto Ricans, both as an information gathering device and to imprison people for the unbelievable crime of refusing to talk, has also been accelerated. Since 1976 Lureida Torres, Jose Lopez, Roberto Caldero, and the brothers Julio, Luis and Andres Rosado were imprisoned for periods of up to eighteen months in the United States. In Puerto Rico a Grand Jury purporting to investigate the attack on Sabana Seca in December, 1979, sent Norberto Cintron Fiallo (a labor leader) and Ricarte Montes Garcia (a school teacher and member of the Puerto Rican Socialist League) to prison and expatriation in a New York jail. Cintron had recently been found not guilty of an accusation of bank robbery when he was jailed by the Grand Jury for refusing to talk. Carlos Rosario Pantojas was also jailed for the same reason, but he served his term on the Island.

In late 1982, a new strategy to scare Puerto Ricans was devised by President Reagan's Department of Justice: the Rosado brothers were sent again be-

fore a federal judge in Brooklyn, now charged by the U.S. attorney with criminal contempt for refusing to talk to a Grand Jury. This new charge could have caused an indeterminate sentence of up to fifteen to twenty years as opposed to the maximum of eighteen months for civil contempt applied in all previous cases. However, and in the interest of justice, the federal judge in Brooklyn threw this case out of court.

But what is really troubling Puerto Rico at this time? Certainly it is neither "terrorism" nor freedom fighters in spite of the blow up of eight National Guard airplanes at the Muñiz, Air Force Base in January of 1981. Neither is it communism nor conspiracies, nor what is happening in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala or the *Islas Malvinas* (Falkland Islands).

What is really troubling Puerto Rico is the breakdown of its economic model in the late 1960's which led to the breakdown of its corresponding political model in the 70's. This has already produced a widespread questioning of the "legitimacy" of American rule in Puerto Rico. The food stamps and other handouts have undoubtedly helped to quell this dissatisfaction with foreign rule for a while. But none of the political parties support the *status quo* today. All are agreed that Puerto Rico is a colony or has colonial vestiges, and that certain remedies must be sought. After the disastrous election of 1980, it is hardly surprising that the people have lost faith in the institutions of the Island. No new rabbits have been pulled out of the hat for the economy either.

The ownership and profit from the exploitation of our natural resources is still being questioned. In 1980, the U.S. Congress "kindly" granted us nine miles of territorial sea, thus giving the United States 191 miles of our economic zone to the North and South of the Island, where there are great probabilities of hydrocarbon deposits and ferromanganese nodules. These resources could be a source of wealth to start our island on a more rational economic development, and provide jobs in satellite industries. But they are no longer ours. Another source of wealth could be the renting of Puerto Rico's bases to the United States, such as is done in Spain and other places. Our Mexican, Venezuelan and other Social Democrat friends, both Latin American and European, seem to agree that we could be helped along the lines which I have outlined above.

But instead of addressing these concrete problems, once again the Caribbean and Latin American policy of the United States dictates the policy for the Intelligence Agencies of the foreign power — the United States — operating in its colony — Puerto Rico. And obviously, the Governor of the Colony must announce this policy as his own. A vicious association has once again been created — from outside Puerto Rico — between the idea of being a nationalist and that of being a communist, in the

same manner as Albizu Campos was accused of being a fascist in the 1930's;

Rephrasing Marx and Engels in the opening words of the Communist Manifesto, one could say, a little facetiously, "A spectre is haunting the Caribbean — the spectre of Communism." This spectre is ascribed to every legitimate aspiration of a people to self determination. Very difficult times await the island while its people are being persecuted, and its problems remain unsolved. However, the very role of repression which the United States has assigned to Puerto Rico in its Caribbean policy pro-

duces both internal and international contradictions. On the one hand, the deepening economic crisis accompanied by the Reagan cuts in welfare funds and the disastrous effects of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (if it should be approved by Congress) will accelerate the loss of faith not only in the institutions of government, but also in the very relationship to the United States. On the other, progressive Caribbean consciousness of the repressive role assigned to Puerto Rico will strengthen the growing international support for the independence of the Island.

THE LUMPENPROLETARIAT & REPRESSION: A CASE STUDY By Edward A. Lee

A central confusion within the Movement ten years ago was the question of class. Who are the revolutionary forces? Who are the reactionary forces? Typical of that chaotic time of trying on different ideologies as one tries on clothes of different styles, was the confusion over the lumpenproletariat and the "street people."

The lumpenproletariat, long viewed by Marxists as an unstable and "dangerous" class, were suddenly praised by many revolutionaries. In 1969, when the Black Panther Party was explaining the forcible ouster of disruptive white leftists from their Oakland "United Front Against Fascism Conference, the BPP defined the ouster as "lumpenproletarian discipline."¹ Eldridge Cleaver, acting as one of the chief ideologists of the Panther Party, acclaimed the "Black urban lumpenproletariat" to be "the vanguard of the proletariat."² This confused trend of hailing "the Lumpen" as the most revolutionary strata in U.S. society was widespread in various third world movements and the "New Left" Students for a Democratic Society.

In this study we show how the capitalist state, in the form of a reform "poverty program", reached down into the very mass of the oppressed in one community in Chicago to recruit a force to keep a repressive order for it. It was the leadership role played by lumpen-proletarian elements within

that organization of oppressed that gave the government its leverage. Further, the situation was both masked and confused by a split within the state, with certain police elements savagely turning on their newly-bought "lumpen" allies. During this time the Movement was able neither to successfully intervene nor even to expose this deadly maneuver, because of our confused ideas about the "lumpen." This resulted in a situation where the De Facto public emphasis of the Movement towards this development was to support the repression. As startling as this may seem, it underlines the practical necessity of class analysis in guiding our immediate work.

When radicals in the '60s spoke of "the lumpen" they were usually talking about what they also called "street people" as a whole. So that a high-school-age gang member, an unemployed veteran just back from Vietnam, and an aspiring pimp or heroin pusher might be classed together as "lumpen." Often, a personal involvement with violence and crime was regarded as immediate proof of high potential for revolutionary work. This confusion about class had tragic results. Lack of a precise understanding about the lumpenproletariat is still so dangerous because it blinds us to a key factor in the development of repression against the oppressed.

Marxists have traditionally made a sharp distinction between the poorest, most oppressed layers of the working class — who are propertyless and often jobless — and the lumpenproletariat. The latter, existing on the bottom edge of society, no longer have any relation to the means of production and distribution. They owe no loyalty save to their own personal interests, and, far from having solidarity with any class they are all too-willing to live as parasites preying on their own people. At times this point is obscured since the “lumpen” are traditional victims of police activity.

In a famous passage in the *Manifesto*, Marx and Engels wrote: “The ‘Dangerous class,’ the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.”³ That analysis is still accurate, and helps us understand how organizations of “street people” are successfully used by the ruling class.

A CASE STUDY IN CHICAGO

In 1965-70, national attention was focused on the explosive political growth of Black youth gangs in Chicago, Illinois. Two southside gangs in particular, the Black P. Stone Nation and their rivals, The Disciples rapidly became empires; thousands of youth could be mobilized wearing either the red berets of the “Stones” or the blue berets of the “Ds”. Immediately, both the Civil Rights Movement and the white liberal community saw these gangs as ready-made organizations to advance the interests of social reform. Both believed that police harassment of ghetto youth and the poverty of gang members opened the door to recruiting these gang structures en masse into the Movement.

The Black P. Stone Nation, the largest of the two youth gangs, was perhaps the most successfully publicized organization of its kind in the U.S. From its origins as a grammar school marching group for the Annual Bud Billiken Day (a traditional celebration sponsored by the *Chicago Defender* and participated in by tens of thousands of Chicago Blacks), the “Stones” soon grew into a local Woodlawn gang. In the early sixties that gang, the Blackstone Rangers, became the “General Motors” of southside Chicago gangs. It found the key to growth by becoming a “conglomerate” of gangs by convincing local gangs to affiliate into the Blackstone structure. The local gang leaders were represented on the “Main 21”, the leadership council of what later became known as the Black P. Stone Nation. At their peak the “Stones” had most of the gang youth on the southside from 23rd Street to the City’s southern edge, with additional

affiliates in the Black suburbs, the Westside and Northside, and claimed membership was between 5,000 - 7,000.

The Disciples (“Ds”) were generally conceded to be fewer in number, more of a “fighting gang” and less political than the “Stones”. They were dominant in the Englewood area, west of Woodlawn. Their membership was generally put at around 1,000.

In the spring of 1966, Rev. Martin Luther King, James Bevel, Al Sampson and other S.C.L.C. staff started holding meetings with over thirty Chicago youth gangs. In May, Rev. Bevel addressed 400 “Stones” in the First Presbyterian Church of Woodlawn, stressing that a campaign by all the thousands of gang youth against the white establishment could “immobilize” the city.⁴ The alluring prospect of real power was repeatedly held up for gang leaders. That June 11th, S.C.L.C., and the A.C.L.U., the street ministers of the Urban Training Center, the Y.M.C.A. and other social agencies held an all-day conference for the leaders of eight major gangs in the swank Sheraton-Blackstone Hotel. Comically named, the “Turf-masters First Annual Convention”, this meeting once again tried to enlist the gangs into the liberal movement.*⁵

Although the Blackstone Rangers and the Disciples soon lost interest in the rhetoric of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, interest in them was far from over. Liberals and church progressives continued to view the gangs as important levers for social reform in Chicago. Rev. John Fry and the First Presbyterian Church encouraged the “Stones” to use the church as a center, and Fry himself became a controversial public defender of the gangs. Police harassment was countered by a well-financed defense program. Right-wing insurance man Clement Stone, Charles Merrill, Jr. (of the founding family of Merrill, Lynch, etc.), Charles F. Kettering II, (who gave \$260,000 out of GM profits and other capitalists built up a sizeable fund for bail and legal expenses.⁶

The Illinois Black Panther Party was also trying hard to enlist the gangs, temporarily achieving a well-publicized alliance with the Disciples. The “Stones” and “Ds” were widely viewed as latent revolutionary organizations. This trend achieved its purest expression in the realm of literature, in Sam Greenlee’s *The Spook Who Sat by the Door*. [7] In this best-selling novel, a southside Chicago youth gang is secretly reorganized by a Black rebel who learned guerrilla warfare within the C.I.A. The novel ends in a powerful, but doomed, all-out armed assault by the gang against the U.S. Army.

In a recent interview, Greenlee confirms that his novel was a fictional vehicle for a “serious study to the revolutionary potential in the Black community.” He says the gangs had “. . . the greatest revolutionary potential. All they lacked

was orientation and leadership. I think they had more revolutionary potential than the Panthers, for instance." [8] Greenlee is only expressive of what many people believed a few years ago — and perhaps many still believe.

GANG LEADERSHIP NOT REVOLUTIONARY

III. Contrary to the myth so often projected, the Blackstone Rangers and the Disciples were never "revolutionary," or even usually militant. The youth gang leadership openly and honestly looked to their own interest, bargaining and maneuvering with all sides to get the best "deal." Andrew Barret, Youth Director of the National Conference of Christians and Jews (and a former street worker with a "Stone" affiliate), summed it up very concisely:

"The Rangers are becoming highly politically oriented. They are interested in getting a piece of the action, not tearing down the system." [9]

As Greenlee himself points out:

"Most of street gang activity is antisocial, and it is and was a serious problem to the community. They weren't robinhoods; they weren't robbing from the rich to feed the poor. Their rip-offs weren't taking place in Highland Park, they were taking place in Woodlawn and Lawndale. They were ripping off their friends, neighbors, mothers, fathers and daughters." [10]

While the Black liberation organizations have always had to fight the repressive police structures, to publicize their racist crimes and organize against them, the "Stones" and "Ds" leadership had a policy of submission to the police. Time and again they hoped that cooperation with the police might earn them favors, particularly personal protection from arrests.

What was the exact nature of that cooperation with the Chicago Police Department? The gang leadership, particularly elements of the "Main 21" of the Blackstone, served the police as informers and enforcers, suppressing sparks of Black unrest. In 1966, 1967, and 1968 all saw massive Black "riots," rebellions in the Chicago Ghetto. All three years the "Stones" leadership worked with the police to keep the Woodlawn community "quiet." In a grant application to the O.E.O., the Woodlawn Organization gave an example of this activity:

"... Ranger activity during the widely publicized westside riots in Chicago during the summer of 1966. At the time the riots were underway, the Rangers were under considerable pressure to join the rioters because of their alliances with Westside groups.

"The Ranger leadership met and decided not to participate in the riots but, more importantly, decided to make an organized effort

to prevent similar violence in Woodlawn. The following plan was developed and carried out by the Rangers in conjunction with the Chicago Police Department, the Woodlawn Organization, and the First Presbyterian Church.

"First, the Ranger leadership manned a twenty-four hour phone service at the Church during the time the riots were taking place in the Westside. T.W.O. workers and police officers were called into service every time there was any possibility of gang youth becoming involved in a disturbance. The Ranger leadership, in response to calls, went to the site of possible disturbances and dispersed the youth involved. There were over 30 such calls concerned with possible unilateral action by a member handled by the Rangers. "Secondly, Ranger members were instructed to call if approached by anyone inciting them to riot. There was one such incident in which the person inciting to riot was identified and his name turned over to the Police. . . . The Rangers' action was one of the most relevant reasons that the on-going riots were prevented from taking place in Woodlawn." [11]

Many Black organizations in various cities, fearing the destruction of these rebellions and viewing them as a futile direction, worked to "cool" their communities (the B.P.P. itself did so in Oakland, California, for example). But to these particular gang leaders this "riot prevention" took the form of close cooperation with the police, and was only the most visible tip of their submission to the state apparatus.

FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF THE GANGS

IV. On May 30, 1967, Theodore Berry of the Community Action Program, Office of Economic Opportunity (O.E.O.) formally approved a \$927,341 Federal Grant to the Woodlawn Organization. [12] This decision funded an experimental project to give basic literacy and job-skill training to 800 Black gang members.* The real point of this experiment, however, was that the leadership of the Blackstone Nation and the Disciples were in reality full partners in the grant, sharing in the money and the staff positions. Within a year this project was a national scandal, the subject of intense police repression and on the verge of closing down. The political coup de grace was delivered by Senator McClellan, who in July, 1968, held a Senate inquisition designed to stir up headlines and racist stereotypes. [13] This federal grant was the high-water mark of the influence of the Blackstone Nation and its best-known leader, Jeff Fort.

It is quite easy to evaluate the effectiveness of the grant. As of June, 1968 only 105 youth had been placed in jobs during the previous year, of

whom 65 were still employed. [14] Microscopic results for a million-dollar project. The reason, of course, is that there is a shortage of jobs in the U.S. for Black youth. This is particularly true for youth with police records and a gang history. An internal O.E.O. memorandum, dated April 2, 1968, admitted that the lack of jobs was "the most glaring problem." [15]

The only area where the grant showed practical results was in the reduction of gang violence between "Stones" and "Ds". Youth gang murders dropped 44% in the 3rd Police District between the summers of 1966 and 1967, as gang leadership restrained fighting lest it endanger the flow of O.E.O. dollars.

It is important to understand that for the government, the success or failure of this project had little to do with how many Black youth found jobs, or didn't kill each other. This O.E.O. grant was a disguised Vietnam-style counterinsurgency program, an experiment in enlisting lumpenproletarian gang elements to help police the ghetto.

In the early spring of 1967, a quiet meeting was held at the Woodlawn Organization offices on East 63rd Street in Chicago. Six men, representing T.W.O., Chicago Urban League and the Office of Economic Opportunity, took part in this meeting. The Chicagoans wanted to make certain there were no misunderstandings about the proposed gang project. In particular, they wanted it understood in advance that the "Main 21" and the "Ds" leadership would use their power to "rip-off" funds from the project. There was no other way the project could work.

The senior O.E.O. representative replied that he understood quite well and that it posed no problems for Washington. He then went ahead to sketch out, "off the record", the dynamics of the project. The real goal of the project was to help create a "Black Mafia". O.E.O. knew that the Blackstone "Main 21" had fantasies of becoming another syndicate, taking over control of drugs, numbers, prostitution and protection in the southside ghetto. O.E.O., by giving them hundreds of thousands of dollars, job patronage for their members, Federal "legitimazation" and helping arrange police connections, would give them at least a chance at their goal. Since white ethnic groups had advanced themselves through organized crime, O.E.O. was willing to help Blacks do the same. All the participants agreed that the "Main 21" had poor odds for success, but that they owed it to the Black community to try and help them.

Many believe that promoting Black control of organized crime is an important step upwards for the Black community, but it's hard to imagine the government acting from that motive. It would

make much more sense to assume that a large, stable criminal organization would be created by the government because they saw it as an important tool for social control. All the evidence bears this out.

In his prepared testimony before the McClellan Subcommittee in 1968, Jerome S. Bernstein, O.E.O. Project Manager for the Woodlawn grant, proudly cited the political fruits of funding the Rangers and Disciples:

"These two youth gangs were responsible for preventing a Black Panther meeting on August 1, 1967 which was to be held on the Westside of Chicago for the express purpose of forging a coalition of youth gangs to collectively "take on the City" during the summer of 1967. These two gangs proclaimed that there would be no riots and that there would be no Black Panther meeting. There were no riots and there was no Black Panther meeting. On more than one occasion these youth took over the streets of Woodlawn and prevented bloodshed and property destruction when police control over the situation had seriously deteriorated." [16]

What could be more clear? As one Disciple leader told a Black newspaper: "We can control and police our people better than the police and the Army." [17] Even more pointed was the private memorandum Bernstein wrote on his return to Washington from Chicago in July, 1967. Bernstein had oriented the "Main 21" to their new role by bringing in as teachers three "Black Power Militants" from Watts who were working in O.E.O. Poverty Programs. These "Black Power Militants" were, of course very friendly to the government and "vehemently opposed to Black Nationalist movements." [18]

Bernstein soon got a report from Rev. Arthur Brazier, President of T.W.O., that their new pupils had learned their lessons quickly:

"Rev. Brazier informed us that the meeting of the Rangers with the Watts group had a profound effect on both gangs. He stated that, whereas, on Tuesday; the day before, the gangs were ready to shoot it out in the street, the first thing Wednesday morning, the two leaders of each gang came into T.W.O. "arm in arm". They informed Rev. Brazier that they were opposed to any rioting in Chicago and that they would not permit any riots to take place in their "hood". They stated that they would not tolerate outside agitators coming into their community to

provoke riots and that they would run them out of Woodlawn, and, if necessary, shoot them...

"Rev. Brazier informed me that he had received a call from Commander Griffin who was concerned about a rumor that an agitator from Detroit had arrived in Chicago to foment riots and that he was operating in South Chicago. Commander Griffin stated that his men could not identify who this individual was nor could his men locate him. Rev. Brazier transmitted this information to the Rangers who later that day identified the individual and informed the police of his name and whereabouts, and he was subsequently apprehended and, I believe, sent out of the City (I do not know if this information was transmitted to Commander Griffin through T.W.O. or not)."[19]

This is what the government was paying for, and even at a million dollars a year it was a bargain. In Vietnam, the U.S. was paying much more for native counterinsurgency troops and not getting half the service. It should be clear that in return for government favors it was expected that the gangs would use the threat of violence to keep Blacks in their place. The defense of white business property—capital, in other words—was a top priority. This project was so important to O.E.O.'s own procedures it became the only project in Chicago funded directly from O.E.O. to the community, by passing City Hall.

A letter from Rev. Brazier to Jerome Bernstein on August 3, 1967, gives us a good example of this.[20] According to the letter and supporting newspaper accounts, the new Woodlawn grant passed a practical test of its effectiveness. The previous Tuesday, August 1st, Nicholas J. Nickolaou, owner of Big Jim's Cut-Rate Liquors at 67th Street and Cottage Grove, shot a Black man and killed him. The white merchant had accused a Black child of breaking his store window and had confiscated the child's bike. The child's father angrily came and confronted Nickolaou, who then shot him twice as he was leaving, claiming self-defense.

Since the killing was witnessed, community anger quickly rose as the news spread. Within 45 minutes of the killing, Leon Finney of T.W.O. received an urgent telephone call from George Collar, President of The Woodlawn Businessmen's Association. Finney went out to the scene to help police pacify the crowd of angry residents. Parents from the area refused to be dispersed and were talking about burning the white-owned liquor store out. Finally, Finney got Nick Lorenzo, a

leader of the Disciples, to take action with 50 of his members. To quote Finney: "The Disciples walked up to the corner in a body and demanded to have the corner clean. In a few seconds, all the adults quietly dispersed and went home."

Lorenzo boasted to the Chicago Daily News: "The people in the neighborhood know our strength. They moved. Yesterday it was quiet and today it's quiet." [21] Brazier, whose organization was complemented by the police and the daily newspapers, was quite pleased over the incident. As he wrote to O.E.O.: "I think that without a doubt the constructive activity of the group in this situation can be traced directly to the O.E.O. Youth Grant." [22]

Instead of organizing protests against the white merchants or taking action against racists themselves or even just standing aside and letting some rough justice be attempted, T.W.O. and the gangs had to act as police auxiliaries and protect white business property. In both Brazier's letter to O.E.O. and Finney's statements to the press the spotlight is on how the T.W.O.-gang combination prevented the liquor store from being destroyed; in both accounts one is struck by how unimportant the murder of a Black father seems. In the congratulatory newspaper editorials, statements by liberal politicians, memos to Washington, etc. the use of the threat of violence by a gang against community residents—clearly illegal by existing laws—is warmly applauded. This reveals the essence of capitalist "Law and order".

Such cooperation with the police against the people was condition of the grant, and built into the program. Every day project staff met with Sgt. Wilson, 3rd District Chicago Police Department to exchange information. Twice a month, Commander Griffin of the 3rd District met with Rev. Brazier and other project officials at a "monitoring meeting" at Regional O.E.O. offices. [23] T.W.O. was trusted sufficiently by the police to be given copies of the reports turned in by police informers inside the gangs themselves. [24]

THE POLITICS OF THE GANG LEADERSHIP

V. It would be wrong to view the lumpenproletarian gang leadership as politically passive, a *tabula rasa*, willing to go in whatever direction the momentary advantage directed. On the surface that seems true, with the Rangers and Disciples flirting with both sides. They went to the Poor Peoples Campaign in Washington, they swelled the ranks of Rev. Jesse Jackson's campaign about job discrimination, they joined any temporary liberal cause or event that promised publicity and/or money. In a deeper sense, however, these gang leaders had several important points of political unity with

the government.

First, the gang leaders had a strong natural orientation towards protecting white business in Woodlawn. They viewed the community—people and commerce and real estate—as a resource to be mined for its profitability. Every white businessman who left the area simply meant a source of potential income lost. When the liquor store incident happened the Rangers and Disciples met and assessed the situation. According to Nick Lorenzo, “We agreed that this community is ours and we’re going to keep it.”[25]

An interesting example of this attitude was the Red Rooster Super Markets, which had a large store at 62nd Street and Dorchester, in the center of Woodlawn. Red Rooster was infamous for its unrestrained consumer fraud tactics, and over the years gathered many slap-on-the-wrist violations for rigged scales, etc. A favorite Red Rooster fraud was soaking packaged meat in water, then freezing the whole mess. Result: with each package of meat the Black shopper also paid for as much as one-half pound of ice.

In March, 1969, Rev. Jesse Jackson’s Operation Breadbasket started picketing Red Rooster over these abuses. The protest was soon settled by the Red Rooster chain hiring twenty-two “Stones”, including Jeff Fort, Mickey Cogwell and other “Main 21.” The jobs appear to have been mostly a pay-off to let Red Rooster go on exploiting the Black community.[26]

In the same way, every time a major rebellion broke out in Chicago’s ghetto, the “Main 21” would move to protect Woodlawn’s white businesses with “do not touch” signs. Black homeowners were also important to the “Stones”, since they could be encouraged to buy “window insurance”. Small wonder that when the police accused the Blackstone Rangers of extorting protection money, both the Woodlawn Businessmen’s Association and the Jackson Park Businessmen’s Association held a press conference to defend and praise the “Stones”. At that meeting, Father Tracy O’Sullivan of St. Cyril Church said: “The youths really delivered, and this attack by the police was the thanks they got.”[27]

While movements of the oppressed usually clash with exploitative business interests, this was not true with the gangs. We could say that white business interests and the gang leadership got along so well because they both viewed the Black community in the same way.

Secondly, the gang leadership shared with the government an opposition to grass-roots Black organization. After all, a successful mass Black

organization in Woodlawn would have crowded the “Stones”, even recruited people away from them. So that as their troubles increased, as police arrests and court cases piled up, as Fort and others were indicted on federal charges of embezzeling O.E.O. funds, the gang leadership was paralyzed. By 1968, the police repression was so heavy against the “Stones” as to be crushing. Fort himself was arrested one hundred fifty times in six months—almost once a day!

All the “Main 21” could do was to keep cooperating with the police, begging for favors. We know that members of the “Main 21” secretly kept the police informed about Black Panther Party activity, pointing out as they did so how useful they could be to the police if the police let them survive. It was only pathetic in January 1969, when Leonard Sengali of the Black P. Stones announced that the gang was starting a whole new program of protecting Blacks from crime. Sengali said that “Stones” would don green uniforms (the same color as the official Community Police Aides paid for by Model Cities Poverty Funds) and patrol the community, reporting all suspicious activity to the police.[28]

The Chicago Police Department was inexorably putting the “Stones” out of business, literally. Even then, the leadership was so submissive that the police could repress them and use them at the same time. In August, 1968, when Mayor Daley and his Machine were girding to put down the expected mass demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention, the police arranged to have bail suddenly lowered for a number of the “Main 21” who were in jail. The secret condition was that the “Stones” would forcibly stop Dick Gregory from leading an announced march thru “Stones” territory. The Machine was frightened that Gregory’s protest march might touch off mass demonstration or “rioting” by Blacks. Once released, the “Main 21” threatened Gregory with death if his march entered their areas, and indeed, the march plans were hastily changed. Of course, once their usefulness was over, these gang leaders soon found themselves back in jail.

In April, 1969, Illinois National Guard were once again called out as the Chicago ghetto verged on open rebellion and once again, the “Stones” and the Disciples patrolled Woodlawn to help the police keep the lid on. By this time Commander Griffin of the 3rd District knew he could rely completely on the gangs. Each gang patrol had official 3rd District Police shoulder patches to wear on their jackets so that cops on the beat could identify them.[29] Naive people still wonder at how the Nazis could recruit Jewish police to control the ghetto for them.

THE SPLIT OVER REPRESSIVE STRATEGY

VI. The open police harassment of the gangs and their O.E.O. project was so obviously illegal that it became itself a major political issue. Church offices sympathetic to the gang youth were repeatedly raided, to the background music of breaking doors and ripped-apart furniture. Youth Action, "a streetwork project funded by the four most prestigious social agencies in Chicago," was raided three times. During the raid on their Auburn Highland Center, two staff members were "roughed up" and \$2,500 property damage was done--although the police found no weapons or drugs and made no arrests. Gang members themselves were often arrested and rearrested on any pretext. Fighting and retaliation raids between the "Stones" and "Ds" were carefully promoted and touched off by the police Gang Intelligence Unit (GUI). [30]

This open display of police power aroused many sectors of Chicago's liberal and Black communities. Youth Action, T.W.O., the Urban League, Chicago Theological Seminary, the A.C.-L.U., the Better Boys Foundation, 5th Ward Alderman Leon Depres and 6th Ward Alderman "Sammy" Rayner (both anti-Daley independents) and many other liberal institutions and personalities protested these police activities. Many genuinely were infuriated at the police persecution of these Black youth from "poverty back-grounds". Out of this clash came a mythology

which has been widely accepted: the picture is of poverty-stricken gang youth trying to move away from "Anti-social behavior" towards constructive community concerns, being crushed by the racist machine of Mayor Richard J. Daley because the city couldn't tolerate any threat of independent organization. This familiar all-American scenario is incomplete and misleading. The full story of this living interplay between federal government, the local city machine, the police and the gangs is far richer in lessons, although more complex, than the mythology of good guys vs. bad guys.

It is widely assumed that Mayor Richard Daley viewed the O.E.O. grant and the gangs as a threat to his Machine and that he therefore used repression to crush them. On the contrary, Mayor Daley always appreciated how useful the gangs could be. In 1966, Jeff Fort was given a job at the City's Woodlawn Urban Progress Center. At that time, Denton Brooks, head of the City's "Anti-Poverty" program (Chicago Committee on Urban Opportunity) took Fort and other "Main 21" to lunch and suggested that the "Stones" submit a proposal for an "anti-poverty" grant. [31] Black youth gangs had previously been used by the

Chicago Police Dept. in order to harass and drive out Black community organizers. In 1965, Chicago SNCC's attempt to do "grass-roots" organizing came under heavy attack from local gangs, with vandalization of the SNCC office, intimidation of children at the SNCC "Freedom School" and beatings of SNCC workers contributing to the death of the project. It was alleged that this conflict was caused by the police, who gave the gangs a "license" to commit crimes in return for attacking SNCC.

To be sure, Mayor Daley was enraged about the gang leaders floating their O.E.O. grant with T.W.O., rather than with the City's agency, C.C.-U.O. (which would have poured part of those funds into patronage channels). But Daley never opposed that grant, despite what the liberals said. He was, among other things under heavy pressure from Washington to "OK" the grant.

As Jerome Bernstein pointed out to the McClellan Subcommittee (a point that went studiously unreported in the Chicago media):

"For the record, the Mayor did, in fact, concur in the funding of the program and did so in the form of a telephone call which he, Mayor Daley, initiated to Sargent Shriver, then Director of O.E.O. To be more explicit, the T.W.O. program would not have been funded at all without the support of Mayor Daley. Sargent Shriver stated so on several occasions and held up funding of the program for two weeks pending communication of the Mayor's support for the program. The T.W.O. program in the sense was in reality as much the result of actions of Mayor Daley as those of T.W.O. and O.E.O. The Mayor's support for funding of the program is a matter of written record which is both known to the Subcommittee and the Acting Director of O.E.O." [32]

Washington Post columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak made the same point a full year earlier, as they revealed "The deep split among the authorities over how to deal with the deepening riot problem."

"Highly respected Police Superintendent Orlando Wilson (who has just retired) led the anti-gang faction in opposing the grant. He was joined by local Poverty Program officials, who view The Woodlawn Organization as far too radical.

"Although anathema to Negro radicals, Daley happens to be a pragmatic politician...fearing a bloody summer, he was willing to give the liberals a chance at doing business with the

gangs.”[33]

Further, it turns out that the Chicago police themselves were split exactly as Evans and Novak discussed. Commander Griffin of the 3rd District warmly supported the grant. He communicated this support to O.E.O. and agreed that his men would take part in it. The 3rd District after all, had practical experience at how useful the gangs were in controlling the Black community.

Griffin was at odds with Lt. Buckney of the new Gang Intelligence Unit, who from the start was out to destroy the gangs. Buckney was so fanatical that his men twice took Jerome Bernstein of O.E.O. into custody. During a meeting with O.E.O., this disagreement within the Chicago Police came out:

“At the mention of Buckney’s name, Griffin threw up his hands and stated that Buckney did not understand his job, he did not know what he was doing, and that something had to be done about him.”[34]

On August 9, 1967, Rev. Brazier and Leon Finney of T.W.O. met with Superintendent Conlisk and seven other Chicago police brass. According to Rev. Brazier, Commander Griffin argued that the police should take advantage of “the beneficial effects of the youth project on the gang youth in Woodlawn.” Lt. Buckney, Gang Intelligence Unit, disagreed and pointed to Jeff Fort as a problem (Fort had been arrested by G.I.U. for probation violation), Commander Griffin defended Fort, and then pointed out that “At the time of Jeff’s arrest, Commander Griffin was waiting to meet with Jeff in his office to discuss with Jeff and some of his associates ways and means of preventing riot agitators from circulating in the Woodlawn community.” Superintendent Conlisk then promised that the police Dept. wouldn’t oppose Fort’s defense when they testified at his parole rehearing, and that the gang project would receive police “cooperation and support.”[35]

It was Captain Edward N. Buckney (promoted a year after that meeting) and his Gang Intelligence Unit which initiated and led the campaign to repress the “Stones” and Disciples. This was the unit that led the raids, made the constant arrests, maintained informers inside the gangs and tried to get them to war on each other. Buckney did so not to carry out orders from Mayor Daley, but despite his orders. Again, it was Robert Novak who revealed that the entire Senate inquisition into the O.E.O. project by Senator McClellan had been initiated by Gang Intelligence Unit “without authorization by the Mayor.” And by helping Congressional reactionaries create a national scandal, Buckney and G.I.U. forced the Mayor into a

position of open opposition to the gangs and the O.E.O. project.[36]

As late as May, 1968, Rev. Brazier and Mayor Daley were still trying to work out a deal over the O.E.O. project. At an April 22, 1968 meeting, Rev. Brazier was asked by Mayor Daley to keep the project going until at least next September, as Brazier was threatening to close it before the summer. Daley asked Rev. Brazier if T.W.O. could “come under the C.C.U.O. umbrella”. Brazier offered Mayor Daley the right to “pick the Project Director”, but said that working under Deton Brooks and C.C.U.O. was unacceptable. Brazier then “reminded the Mayor that T.W.O. had never directly attacked the Mayor publically.” Mayor Daley ended the meeting by urging Brazier and Brooks to work something out.[37] All this maneuvering was, of course, torpedoed by the Senate investigation and its publicity.

The question of why Lt. Buckney and his G.I.U. played such a role is an interesting one. It was true that the Black satraps of the Democratic Party Machine viewed the Black gangs as potential rivals too close to home, so as to speak.

Having more weight is the influence of the syndicate. Some who worked within the O.E.O. project believe that it was precisely the Ranger’s dream of a ghetto organized crime empire that led to their downfall. They believe that the Syndicate, seeing a powerfully organized rival, demanded that the police “deliver” some repression for all the protection money they were being paid. A reader who believes this is an exaggeratedly cynical view of police-syndicate relations has not factually studied this subject. To take just one publically documented fact out of many: Commissioner Orlando Wilson’s Chief Assistant, Paul Quinn, was demoted when it was revealed that he was one of the syndicate pay-off coordinators within the C.P.D. There were clear channels of possible syndicate influence on the policy of the G.I.U.

It is important to see that there was a sharp split in the white government over how to pacify the ghetto. The gang project, an advanced counter-insurgency program with certain real similarities to U.S. programs in Vietnam and the Philippines, brought this split out in the open. In Vietnam, we saw this split between the “civic action” programs of the U.S. Special Forces, which sought to use bribes/reforms to recruit ethnic minority native forces to fight the communist insurgency, vs. the conventional warfare of annihilation using massive levels of U.S. regular troops and firepower so clumsily wielded by General Westmoreland and his clan. The analogy lends insight to Chicago. The liberals wanted to use reforms to recruit “native” forces to pacify the ghetto, while the conservatives wanted

to turn the police loose to repress anything Black that lifted its head. Some wanted to do both, which is what happened both in Vietnam and Chicago.

Evans and Novak commented in 1967:

"The Negro slums of America today comprise a secret arsenal of firearms, zip-guns and knives ready for use at a moments notice. Besides, police officers who practice diplomacy in making an arrest in the Negro slums are just as apt to trigger a riot as their heavy-handed brethen.

"In fact, those who know the Negro slums best are pessimistic. . . They are sure only that the sole force of discipline in those slums are the anonymous gang leaders (our emphasis). Thus, the split of the white establishment over how to deal with these gang, as seen in Chicago, is still further cause for pessimism."

This split in the capitalist government made for not a few ironies. Jerome Bernstein, the "Godfather" of the very successful gang project, was fired from O.E.O. by Sargent Shriver for having become too politically controversial. Bernstein was frustrated at, as he repeatedly explained, being fired for producing the only successful federal "anti-riot" program for the ghetto. He futilely pointed out how Woodlawn was kept from exploding, unlike Watts, Detroit, Newark, Harlem. . . and Chicago's Westside.

Botner liberals and conservatives (inadequate categories in this case) got to try their strategies for repression. This produces the irony of gang leaders having "delivered the goods" for the government, now serving time in a federal prison for "conspiracy to commit fraud" in handling O.E.O. funds. Of course, the government officials and Black community leaders who got the gangs involved in this project, who gave them informal approval to "rip-off" funds, who virtually set them up, walked away clean after the project collapsed.

The final irony came with President Richard Nixon's inauguration in January, 1969. During this triumphant celebration of Republican victory, the gangs weren't forgotten. Jeff Fort, already under Federal Investigation, received a formal invitation to Nixon's Inaugural Ball! Fort sent Mickey Cogwell and Bobby Jennings, complete with "white ties and tails", as Ranger representatives to the Inaugural Ball. The white public in Chicago was astonished. Veteran Black journalist Lou Palmer saw it as the Nixon Administration's recognition of the potential vote power: "Nixon squeaked into the Presidency with few Black votes. The Black P. Stones had campaigned to persuade Blacks to boycott the polls." Naturally, vote boycotts of predominantly Democratic Black voters could only help Nixon and the Republicans, and Nixon had encouraged such campaigns.

CONCLUSION

VII. We should now be able to see clearly what Marx and Engels meant when they said that the lumpenproletariat ". . . May, here and there be swept into the Movement . . . Its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue."

Groupings of the oppressed must be understood in terms of class. Black gangs are composed primarily of working class youth, many of whose families are in what Marx referred to as the "Reserve Army" of the unemployed. These youths, because of their colonial and class oppression, are logically pulled towards rebellion. We know that some members of the Black P. Stones and Disciples participated enthusiastically in the defense of the literally besieged Black community of Cairo, Illinois. Some joined the Black Panther Party and other organizations. At least part of the leadership was at one time strongly motivated to drive heroin pushers out of the "turf". The gang structure effectively "locked up" this pull towards rebellion. The gang leadership not only used the power of their own organizations to "police" the ghetto, but, most importantly of all, neutralized within their organizations the critical strata of the most oppressed working class youth.

There is, of course, no precise dividing line "on the streets" between the lumpenproletariat and the lower working class. Further, elements of the "lumpen" - angry, desperate - have always been drawn into the struggle, usually during its most militant or violent stages. All previous Marxist experience, internationally, has taught us to use these elements but not build primarily on them. Many organizers here in the U.S. have long since come to similar conclusion. The B.L.A., to take one example, has seriously taken up the discussion of this question:

"It is clear to us that the so-called lumpen class cannot carry our liberation struggle forward on its own. This is because of their class nature: undisciplined, dogmatic, and easily prone to diversion. This class however will supply some of the most dedicated comrades to the struggle. But we must clarify our view of the lumpen class as a whole. The traditional concept of lumpen as a category of the lowest social strata in an industrialized society, unemployed, etc., is a description that fits not only brothers and sisters that hang out in the street all day long and survive in that fashion, but it also fits a great segment of black people who are marginally employed and who for various socio-economical reasons think essentially the same as the classical "lumpen". Therefore, we must make a clear distinction between the economic definition of lumpen (the relationship of that class to the means of production) and the atti-

tudinal, behavioral definition which can readily apply to a larger proportion of our people. When we use the term lumpen we are using a broad definition."

It is interesting to notice that the B.L.A., like much of the white "New Left", mistakenly defines the "lumpen" to equate to the unemployed and marginally employed. This blurs our class analysis, since it uses the word "lumpenproletariat" to include both that class and the lowest stratas of the working class "reserve army". Thus a teen-age "Stone" who joined out of group loyalty or friendship or survival protection would be placed in the same class as Mickey Cogwell on the "Main 21". Cogwell "joined" by bringing the gangs in the Robert Taylor-Washington Park Projects into the Blackstone Rangers - in return for \$5,000. After the gang hustle collapsed he then went to work for the syndicate's Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union. In 1973, Cogwell got an

exclusive franchise for all Black areas in Chicago, and worked at extorting "dues" money out of Blacks to be split between him and the white syndicate. This is a classic lumpenproletarian career of preying on the working class. Clearly, the need for this class analysis is as acute today as a decade ago, and applies sharply to the prison struggle and proliferation of "militant" community organizations.

The other point that emerges is how liberals and conservatives, for all their antagonisms, remain united in the common defense of capitalism by repression against the oppressed. It was, after all, the activist liberals - Black as well as white - who promoted the use of youth gangs to strong-arm the ghetto into "peace". This is the bitter fruit of liberal social pacification. Only with a class understanding of the concrete situation can we effectively grasp who are the revolutionary forces, who are the reactionary forces.

FOOTNOTES

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3. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," SW, International Publishers, 1972, P. 44.
4. John Fry, **Fire and Blackstone**, J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1969, p. 5.
5. **Daily Defender**, June 13, 1966
Chicago Sun-Times, June 12, 1966
6. **Chicago Tribune**, August 23, 1970
Chicago Tribune, September 24, 1970
7. Sam Greenlee, **The Spook Who Sat by the Door**, Bantam, 1970
8. **Reader**, November 21, 1975
9. **Chicago Tribune**, June 16, 1969
10. **Reader**, November 21, 1975
11. Untitled grant proposal from T.W.O. to Community Action Program, O.E.O., but clearly 1967, p. 10
12. "Two-Track Manpower Demonstration for 800 Unemployed Disadvantaged Young Adults", C.A.P. Project No. (G8734/A/O)
13. Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, Part 9-17, Hearings held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
14. "TWO MAJOR ISSUES (CHARGES AND ANSWERS)", p. 5
(This is an O.E.O. background paper, written in anticipation of the McClelland Hearings and given to Senators Muskie, Javits and Harris)
15. C.A.P. Memorandum from Dennis Porter to Donald K. Hess, April 2, 1968, p. 10

16. STATEMENT OF JEROME S. BERNSTEIN, p. 12
17. Daily Defender, April 9, 1968
18. Jerome S. Bernstein, "MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD, T.W.O. Field Trip of July 25-27, 1967", August 12, 1967, p. 3
19. Ibid, p. 25
20. Letter to Jerome S. Bernstein from Rev. Arthur Brazier, August 3, 1967
21. Chicago Sun-Times, August 2, 1967
Chicago Daily News, August 4, 1967
22. Letter to Jerome S. Bernstein from Rev. Arthur Brazier, August 3, 1967
23. "TWO MAJOR ISSUES (CHARGES AND ANSWERS)", p. 5.
Monthly reports from Rev. Brazier to O.E.O. confirm these frequent meetings with the Chicago Police Department
24. Chicago Sun-Times, March 15, 1972
25. Chicago Daily News, August 4, 1967
26. Chicago Tribune, March 8, 1970
27. Daily Defender, April 17, 1968;
28. Chicago American, January 25, 1969;
29. Henry De Zutter, "The Press: Loyal Troops in the City's War on Gangs", Chicago Journalism Review, June, 1969
30. For a good liberal account of this police harrassment, SEE Chicago Journalism Review, January, 1969 and June, 1969
31. Chicago Journalism Review, November-December, 1968
32. BERNSTEIN TESTIMONY, p. 19
33. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Inside Report", Washington Post, July 5, 1967
34. MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD, August 12, 1967, p. 24
35. Letter to Jerome Bernstein from Rev. Arthur Brazier, August 15, 1967
36. Robert Novak, "The Story Behind the Rangers Probe" Chicago Sun-Times, July 12, 1968
37. "Memo to the Acting Director, O.E.O., From Community Action Program", April 29
38. Washington Post, July 5, 1967
39. Chicago Tribune, March 30, 1972
40. Chicago Daily News January 21, 1969, L.F. Palmer, Jr., "Behind the Inaugural Invitation"
41. Coordinating Committee of the Black Liberation Army, Message to the Black Movement, 1975, p. 10
42. Chicago Tribune, November 3, 1974

ANATOMY OF A TRAITOR

Taken from Resistance (Vol. 2 No. 1)

Samuel Brown has cemented his collaboration with u.s. imperialism by volunteering to testify to the RICO grand jury. He is a traitor to the New Afrikan Independence Movement and must be treated as such. His turning traitor results from a process that must be understood and analyzed.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze and draw lessons from the way the state moved against Samuel Brown, his response to that, the practice of the movement, and to do self-criticism related to this process. The analysis of Sol opened up discussion about the entire situation: why have there been numerous traitors, what were the political errors and weaknesses which have resulted in the political and military defeat itself and which are seen in various political difficulties of the past year.

THE FACTS AS WE KNOW THEM

Samuel Brown (SB) was captured after the attempted expropriation of a Brinks truck on October 20, 1981 by the Revolutionary Armed Task Force. As soon as he was captured, he was separated from and given different treatment than the white combatants. He was systematically beaten by police and by guards at Rockland County Jail, which resulted in a broken neck.

His response to the beatings according to SB himself (in moments of lucidity) was to become overcome with fear and terror, pleading with the pigs to stop beating him and proclaiming his innocence. This, of course, had the effect of encouraging the state to continue to beat and attack him, because he revealed his vulnerabilities. He responded to their threats. For example, he allowed the guards to intimidate him from coming to his first legal meeting.

From October 21, it was clear that he was incoherent and terrorized. When lawyers raised his conditions in court on October 23, the pig judge refused to acknowledge that he was injured, thus putting the stamp of approval on the torture. The court has played a central part in the state's political/military counter-insurgency attacks against revolutionary forces and then supported it — justifying and covering up the use of torture, blocking access to lawyers and medical care — while trying to hide behind the veneer of bourgeois legality. Given the formidable obstacles posed by the enemy, movement forces did not move aggressively enough to intervene to stop the beatings and secure him. An immediate political campaign was needed.

By the time he was at FCI (Federal Correctional Institution at Otisville) he was in continuous pain, heavily drugged and physically isolated, with access to lawyers and others purposely hampered by the pigs and court. But more than his body was broken; his consciousness, spirit and will were broken. Thus, from the time the FBI Terrorist Task Force questioned him he was willing to talk. He gave information and signed statements. Though he may not have wanted to hurt others, he was unwilling to defy the pigs and he agreed to cooperate. He thought he could "get over," answer their questions harmlessly. His overriding concern was for his own survival. He was terrified and thoroughly demoralized. He was cynical and alienated from his comrades, blaming others for his predicament and believing the pigs when they told him that he was alone and abandoned. The FBI understood his weaknesses and played on them, using a combination of physical threats, promises, lies and psychological warfare. They interviewed him something like nine different times and there is overwhelming evidence that he gave information that led to others being captured and arrested, as well as stating lies that the pigs could use against others. What they got included a 13-page signed confession that named numerous other people. SB told lawyers that the FBI had talked to him and warned that the pigs were after several other people. But it was months before he told anyone about his signed statements. He would never admit that he gave information, thus making it impossible to sort out what information — true or false — the enemy was going on.

It must be said that, during this period, outside forces failed to move decisively. Why? The state created obstacles, refusing to allow his lawyer, Chokwe Lumumba, to represent SB and stopping others from seeing him. But it was an error to not struggle harder to overcome these obstacles. It was 11 weeks before the needed political campaign was launched. A proposed federal suit was never pursued (while another was filed solely on behalf of Kathy Boudin).

There are several reasons why the urgent need to move to protect a captured combatant was not made top priority. Primarily, there was serious misestimation of SB's strengths and ability to withstand physical and psychological pressure. This had to stem from an evaluation that was not based on correct politics, and that did not take

into account SB's low level of political consolidation. When those with direct contact with SB warned that he was psychologically unbalanced, and that he was blaming comrades for his bust, outside people who knew him argued that his craziness was just an act. Not only was this response inaccurate, but it revealed a contempt for politics. How could "acting crazy" be seen as appropriate behavior for a captured freedom fighter?

At the same time, competition and individualism among legal support people meant that some of these forces put their own control above protecting SB. This meant that legal moves that could have made a difference got delayed and stymied.

On January 6, SB's painkillers were taken away for a night. The next day David Gilbert was moved out from FCI, leaving SB more isolated. Then he gets another visit from the FBI. SB's collaboration includes calling BAAANA while with the FBI, and making provocative and incriminating statements that aid the enemy's larger plans of attack. Finally, SB slashes his wrists. What finally breaks through the impasse and wins his needed surgery is a political campaign, including a hunger strike by some freedom fighters, demanding medical care and an end to isolation.

When he comes to Woodbourne he is a physical wreck, weak and emaciated and raving out of his mind. He talks out loud for hours about how strong and wonderful Amerikkka is and condemns Black nationalist resistance. He is terrorized and submissive, bowing and scraping to every guard and prison official. He identifies more with the enemy than the movement. He is angry and alienated from all comrades. Though there are valid criticisms of others, his anger is built on self-justification and lies that cover over his collaboration and portray himself as an innocent victim who got roped into a situation and was left to face the consequences. His dishonesty and knowledge of his collaboration made him fear the movement. The FBI comes again and he spends three hours with them. He comes back up, tells us the visit happened and maintains that he said nothing. When we confront the prison officials concerning this illegal interrogation, he goes off against us. He would rather collaborate than face the possible wrath of the enemy. He would rather attack us than join the struggle against the state.

In March, the FBI Terrorist Task Force raids BAAANA in search of Dr. M. Shakur, arrests Chui (Cecil Ferguson) and Jamal, and names SB as prime informant. They move him to protective custody and bring him to the grand jury to openly testify against people. SB refuses to do so, contacts his lawyers and fights to come back to Woodbourne prison. SB has a sense of history and does not want to be seen as a traitor and a dirty snitch. He writes a short repudiation of any written statements as lies and the product of torture. But he remains dishonest, still adamantly refusing to admit that he gave information to the pigs or even that he said anything they could use in their investigation.

Our stand toward him at Woodbourne is overwhelmingly supportive, with emphasis on helping him rebuild physically and mentally. A liberal line predominated about confronting him to be honest about his interrogations. His response to what little struggle there was with him was to attack us and threaten to call the FBI to be put into protective custody. A proposed article by New Afrikan forces on the outside that would have publicly said SB had collaborated was stopped from being printed by imprisoned New Afrikans because people feared it would push SB to "go over to the enemy." Yet the question must be asked; "Was he not already there?"

He is lying about everything now. He spends hours talking about himself, claiming he was a Lt. in the 101st Airborne in Vietnam, the past head of the Fruit of Islam for all of N.Y.C., a licensed school teacher, the first Black man to introduce solar heating into construction, and on and on. All his lies and fantasies are geared to building up his own image.

When we are moved to Rockland County and he is finally with other New Afrikans, his lies and antagonism in the face of constructive criticism only heighten until he finally secretly asks to be isolated from us in the very jail where the pigs broke his neck!

ANALYSIS OF SAM BROWN

Throughout the year there have been differences and questions over analyzing the situation with SB. Is he a freedom fighter? Did he collaborate or was he just a victim of torture? Who is to blame? Should people confront him or just placate him?

Our position: while physical and psychological torture were the conditions under which SB broke, his lack of political development and consolidation, his commitment to individual and selfish goals, and his lack of revolutionary character were the basis for the state's success in turning him into a traitor. He showed that he really wasn't politically committed to the struggle for Black (New Afrikan) independence. It is a failure of the forces that he worked with that they did not recognize this before allowing him to participate in such a high level of military action. The leadership of his unit in particular and the unit in general must accept major responsibility for allowing SB, with his weaknesses, to be in such a sensitive political/military position. This error was not just an incorrect assessment of SB, but came from not having a correct overall standard for recruiting people and for political education and revolutionary character for the collective as a whole.

As for SB in particular, we like others were sympathetic, even knowing he gave information, because of the abuse and pain he had suffered. We

did not attack him, but attempted to rebuild him. However, SB's collaboration with the pigs continued long after the torture had stopped and after his isolation was broken. What is most important is he never would provide comrades with a full and honest account of what he said to the pigs. This stand disarmed the movement from being able to deal with the damage from his talking. That stand made him a collaborator long before his final move into federal protective custody because he was perpetuating the harm done by his talking. To SB, it was more important to protect himself than to protect the movement from attack.

Moreover, SB's dishonesty left him vulnerable for future manipulation and use by the pigs. Inside, SB knew the extent of his collaboration and his dishonesty. To build a justification for his errors he further alienates himself from and attacks his former comrades. He actively opposes struggle with comrades while he's willing to isolate himself in the hands of the pigs. (Now it is clear that he was, as he threatened us at Woodbourne, always maneuvering to keep his options open to make a deal with the state.)

We can now identify specific political and character weaknesses that made SB vulnerable to the state as soon as he was in the enemy's hands. They are important to identify because they are common weaknesses and errors in all of us that become deadly when the contradictions heighten.

***Reformism and Opportunism** SB did not have a correct understanding of the state, both over- and underestimating it. He thought he could "get over" and fool them by saying "just a little bit." But that only led to their squeezing him more and more. This is a common error of people in the movement — talking to the FBI in the hope that they will leave you alone, or speaking to a grand jury because you "don't know enough to hurt anyone." This approach always leads to disaster. The only way to not collaborate is to not collaborate. Noncollaboration is a principle that can not be compromised. SB believed the state's lies that he was abandoned and that they knew everything already. He began to identify with them and look to them for compassion, to let up on him. In his eyes, they became all-powerful and impossible to resist. Though SB was pro-armed struggle, he was not a revolutionary. Systematic political education and struggle would have either challenged his reformist politics or exposed this essential weakness. He responded to the injustice of the system, but is in awe of its omnipotence and thinks you must ultimately work through the system to change it. For instance, he never gave up hope of winning in the courts and while refusing to read political literature, would spend hours reading and quoting from law books. This

is an example of how reformism and militarism go hand in hand.

***Individualism and Dishonesty:** When faced with the challenge he put his individual needs above the needs of his struggle and his people. He not only gave information but he then lied to comrades to try to protect himself and his reputation. He is more interested in protecting his reputation than protecting the lives of others. He arrogantly rejects efforts to have constructive criticisms and struggle with him. This trait was visible before October 20, but only geared to aggrandise his self-image, also to leave an opening for possible deals with the state.

***Cynicism** His lack of faith in the struggle and his comrades meant he believed the FBI's lie that he had been abandoned and had only them to look to. He used his anger and alienation against the movement as a justification for giving information and lies that could hurt others. While he would frequently portray himself as the most daring soldier of all time, at other times he portrayed himself as having been tricked into something, blindly and unprepared. His treachery in the face of the nurturing and struggle by comrades is the ultimate in the politics of cynicism.

While political and legal structures made serious errors, SB is fully responsible for his conduct and choices.

LESSONS

It was a serious and deadly error of the RATF that he was involved in clandestine armed action. More than an incorrect specific assessment of SB, this error came from a wrong position on the nature of armed clandestine organization and the character of those who build it. Such work requires the highest level of ideological clarity, political commitment and revolutionary moral integrity. The strength of a guerrilla unit comes from its political principles and cohesion, its strategic line and the quality of its cadre. Specifically, with SB, people substituted his willingness to "rumble" (fueled in part by arrogance and macho) for political depth. Serious political education and struggle would have brought to the surface his weaknesses to either be transformed or to keep him out of the armed work. At an earlier time, when SB's conduct clearly violated revolutionary morality, he disappeared for a year to avoid discipline. After that he was allowed to drift back into the grouping without any accounting for what had happened. The example of SB starkly shows the results of denying the critical importance of ideological, political development and of high standards of revolutionary morality in building political-military struggle.

Revolutionaries fighting inside the monster cannot underestimate the state's counter-insurgency

strategy. Torture is a serious fact of life, systematically and increasingly utilized. Fighters must be prepared for the possibility and be accountable to a code of conduct. We must be materialist in our approach to combatting torture. While some people do break, we can strengthen ourselves to combat it successfully. The enemy's torture is not simply a matter of physical pain, but depends on combining this with psychological torture, lies and tricks to intensify our own internal weaknesses. Thus our greatest weapon is not some super-human physical stamina but rather our political line, ideological clarity and commitment, our love for the people and for our comrades, our hatred and understanding of the nature of the enemy, and our willingness to sacrifice. These qualities must be built through ongoing collective struggle.

When comrades do break under torture there is still a code of conduct to which they are responsible. This includes ceasing all collaboration as soon as the torture is over, providing comrades with an honest and full accounting as soon as possible and struggling to help analyze the pigs' methods and how they can be resisted.

There was a serious absence of decisive attack to stop the torture and get medical care for SB. The failure to see protecting him as the priority was bad politics on the need to defend captured freedom fighters and to protect those still in the field.

Once it became known that SB had been involved in extensive discussion with the FBI, some people inside argued to placate and uncritically support him as a victim of torture, rather than confronting and struggling with him about why he cooperated and what he said. This liberal position is based on a narrow, legalistic view of the state. The emphasis was to prop SB up so that he would not take the stand against others. But it didn't deal with the fact that the state has many uses for his information - i.e. to capture others, to break down other people, to frame other people and to politically use his example to attack the movement - and that we were unarmed to combat their strategy, lacking knowledge of what he'd done with them. Furthermore, SB could never rectify his errors as long as he continued living a lie. Fundamentally, he belongs to the enemy.

SELF-CRITICISM

We are self-critical that it has taken us this long to put forward a clear position, to arm others with the lessons. This came from incorrect and divided

opinions within ourselves. We still have some unresolved differences: given the circumstances, how long and in what ways we should have worked with SB; and the timing and content of a public position. What is clear is that liberalism prevailed in our dealings with SB and that this practice was damaging to political principles and to the movement.

Last spring New Afrikan forces on the outside wanted to publish an article that named SB as a traitor. They were stopped from doing so by political prisoners and captive Freedom Fighters. If it was not yet right to label him a traitor, we at least had an obligation to let the movement know the extent of his collaboration and to struggle with him more decisively to change his practice. By not confronting SB sooner and in a more determined way despite all his resistance - and we could neither make a breakthrough (if that was at all possible), nor define the situation sharply and quickly for appropriate action. As soon as the extent of his collaboration became known last spring, we had an obligation to put out an analysis to the movement. Our failing to do so disarmed the movement from dealing with the political impact of his collaboration. Our practice served to perpetuate the false image of him as a freedom fighter. This compromised the political integrity and meaning of "freedom fighter": and weakened the struggle for non-collaboration. We ended up with a man who turned traitor living in our midst without taking an appropriate form of struggle and thus set a bad example for the movement.

One source of our ongoing liberalism was feeling pressure - which SB himself skillfully played on - that if we "pushed" him too hard he would go over to the pigs and turn state's witness. In the absence of our taking a defined, principled stand, a position held sway that took a narrow, legalistic view of the state, emphasizing the ephemeral tactical/legal gains of the individuals facing trial above the struggle as a whole. In reality of course, as long as he continued to live a lie that protected and justified his collaboration, he fundamentally belonged to the enemy. Our liberalism was a continuation of the basic errors behind the setbacks of October 20th and after: we failed to make the highest level of political principles and struggle the guide for our practice; we failed to set and insist on the highest standards of revolutionary morality and character.

ERRATA

—Editors

The article "A Reply to 'To Appeal is Not to Collaborate'" by Oscar Lopez-Rivera, Prisoner of War, contains a factual error which we would like to correct. It points to the case of Eve Rosahn as an example of selective non-collaboration with the Grand Jury. This is incorrect. Rosahn did not collaborate with the Grand Jury. Her error was providing handwriting exemplars to the Rockland County, New York District Attorney, in pre-trial proceedings, in order to clear herself of frame-up criminal charges lodged after the October 20, 1981 attempted Brink's expropriation.

This action ignored the fact that the Grand Jury and the criminal proceedings were 2 arms of the same investigation, with the same direction and the same goal. Through ideological struggle and criticism self-criticism, Rosahn understood her actions in Rockland County to have been collaborative; this error was rectified in principle and practice when Rosahn refused to collaborate with the Federal Grand Jury, and spent fifteen (15) months in jail as a Grand Jury resister.

answered her

of the political grand jury.

According to the document, the PRTP's intentions are to present their position with the purpose of generating a "healthy debate" around the grand jury. The first thing about the article that attracts our attention is its title - Comparecer no es Colaborar. There is a distorting and deviating ambiguity in its title. Among other things, the title could imply that the position of Non-Collaboration excludes the opportunity to appear before a judge or the grand jury. It could also imply that Puerto Rican people are obligated to collaborate with the grand jury and subject to yankee imperialist laws.

In the United States, to date, (where more people have been imprisoned for their refusal to collaborate with the grand jury that is attacking the independence movement), no one has advanced the absurd position inferred by the title of the PRTP document. Beginning with Lureida Torres and continuing with the five compañeros who were found guilty of criminal contempt, all have **appeared** before the courts and the grand jury. However, what they have all refused to do is **collaborate**. But if the document's title appears deviated, its content is even more so. Being true to our revolutionary principles and to the PRTP document, we must affirm here that the article does not constitute an analysis of the grand jury. Instead, it is the justification of an old position advanced principally by the attorneys from the "Center for Constitutional Rights" in New York.

In 1975, a group (primarily composed of attorneys) put forth the position that turning over to the grand jury physical evidence and things that the FBI and police already had in their files was not synonymous with collaboration. According to them it could be used as a tactic to prevent the imprisonment of the subpoenae. This tactic has already been put into practice, with the most recent case being that of the North American compañera Eve Rosahn. She assumed this position and turned over all the required physical evidence. After obtaining the evi-

If the idea behind the tactic was to prevent imprisonment, as the PRTP proposes, this was not the case. Eve Rosahn was imprisoned for 13 months. If the tactic was intended to raise consciousness, its results were confusion and mistrust. Neither she nor the North American leftist movement gained anything. The yankee government and the political grand jury were the winners. So if this is one of the alternatives recommended by the PRTP, then we suggest that they analyze the cost of utilizing such a tactic. We are sure that they will realize that the movement has more to lose than gain. We must also point out that it is better to learn from another's mistakes than your own.

We must make clear that this is an exclusively legalistic position. It requires people to recognize the jurisdiction of the courts and submit to the empire's prejudicial laws. It views the yankee judicial system, not as antagonistic to the interests of the revolutionary movement and the Puerto Rican people, but as an impartial system in which to seek refuge. Maybe an attorney who is an expert in the field of interrogation and who understands the nature of the grand jury can utilize this tactic without incriminating himself or the movement. But the vast majority of us are not attorneys; and when we submit ourselves to the grand jury's demands, we are not permitted to have an attorney at our side to counsel us. You can not go before the grand jury and tell them "this is all the information I am willing to give, take it or leave it!" The prosecutor and the grand jury will demand very specific and detailed information. In addition, one can not forget that any testimony or physical evidence can be used against them or anyone else in the movement.

In 1975, no one stated that assuming this position constituted treason. What was said, more or less, was the following: 1. that assuming this position was helping to perpetuate the grand jury; 2. that at no point was this a guarantee that the yankee government would stop the harassment or cease requiring the subpoenae's future appearance before this or any other grand jury; 3. that it was possible

A REPLY TO "TO APPEAR IS NOT TO COLLABORATE"

statement by Oscar López-Rivera, P.O.W.

An article entitled "Comparecer no es Colaborar" (To appear does not mean to collaborate) appeared in the March 18-24 1983 edition of **Claridad**. According to **Claridad**, the article is a document circulated by the PRTP and presented as an "analysis" of the political grand jury.

According to the document, the PRTP's intentions are to present their position with the purpose of generating a "healthy debate" around the grand jury. The first thing about the article that attracts our attention is its title - Comparecer no es Colaborar. There is a distorting and deviating ambiguity in its title. Among other things, the title could imply that the position of Non-Collaboration excludes the opportunity to appear before a judge or the grand jury. It could also imply that Puerto Rican people are obligated to collaborate with the grand jury and subject to yankee imperialist laws.

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dence the grand jury then wanted her to answer questions. When she refused, they imprisoned her on contempt charges.

If the idea behind the tactic was to prevent imprisonment, as the PRTP proposes, this was not the case. Eve Rosahn was imprisoned for 13 months. If the tactic was intended to raise consciousness, its results were confusion and mistrust. Neither she nor the North American leftist movement gained anything. The yankee government and the political grand jury were the winners. So if this is one of the alternatives recommended by the PRTP, then we suggest that they analyze the cost of utilizing such a tactic. We are sure that they will realize that the movement has more to lose than gain. We must also point out that it is better to learn from another's mistakes than your own.

We must make clear that this is an exclusively legalistic position. It requires people to recognize the jurisdiction of the courts and submit to the empire's prejudicial laws. It views the yankee judicial system, not as antagonistic to the interests of the revolutionary movement and the Puerto Rican people, but as an impartial system in which to seek refuge. Maybe an attorney who is an expert in the field of interrogation and who understands the nature of the grand jury can utilize this tactic without incriminating himself or the movement. But the vast majority of us are not attorneys; and when we submit ourselves to the grand jury's demands, we are not permitted to have an attorney at our side to counsel us. You can not go before the grand jury and tell them "this is all the information I am willing to give, take it or leave it!" The prosecutor and the grand jury will demand very specific and detailed information. In addition, one can not forget that any testimony or physical evidence can be used against them or anyone else in the movement.

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that the subpoenae might confirm information that before had been only conjecture; 4. that the subpoenae might unwittingly help establish connections that the enemy was unaware of; 5. it would give new impetus to traitors, since they would more readily use this tactic than the position of Non-Collaboration; and finally, 6. the subpoenae would be declaring himself as just another person who is ready to cooperate and not offer any RESISTANCE!

Why doesn't the document comprise an analysis of the grand jury? In reading and understanding the document's content, we can see that the method that the compañeros use in their "analysis" of the grand jury can only lead them to assume an incorrect position. They establish two premises, (both of which are only partially correct) that can only lead them to an erroneous conclusion. The first premise that they establish is that the grand jury is being utilized by yankee imperialism in order to imprison revolutionary political cadres. Their second premise is that since the enemy already knows that a subpoenae might refuse to **appear** (a key word for the PRTP compañeros) that this tactic only does the work of the enemy. The conclusion they arrive at is that any cadres subpoenaed before the grand jury will automatically be imprisoned. This line of reasoning is purely one dimensional. It fails to take into consideration that every action creates a reaction. This is an incomprehensible dilemma. They try to limit the alternatives that the subpoenae has at his disposal. Let's look at how the PRTP utilizes this method of analysis in a more specific manner: their first premise - if we refuse to appear, answer questions or turn over any required evidence, second premise - if "they consolidate the advantageous position of the grand jury's tactical use" and their conclusion "in this way whenever it is convenient for the government to eliminate one or several revolutionary cadres, they will subpoena them before grand jury" (an open and shut case!) They end their conclusion with "as expected, our automatic refusal to **collaborate** will authorize the enemy to imprison us." The PRTP compañeros use key words such as "appear," "consolidate the advantageous position," "eliminate" and "collaborate," in order to justify the position they intend to assume, or better stated, the position they have already assumed. For us and many other compañeros in the movement, this is not an analysis, but merely a semantic/rhetorical game that can only lead to deception.

The compañeros have arrived at an erroneous conclusion utilizing this line of reasoning. Why is it incorrect? First, because history has taught us that whenever yankee imperialism has wanted to eliminate revolutionary cadres, they have not needed the grand jury to do so. They have massacred them as in Cerro Maravilla and Ponce or imprisoned and tortured them as with Pedro Albizu Campos and the Nationalist heroes. They have framed them with

their nefarious Counter Intelligence Program (Cointelpro) or cowardly assassinated them as in the case of comrade Angel Rodríguez Cristóbal. If they want to imprison any independentist, all they have to do is charge them with "seditious conspiracy" and they can lock them up for a minimum of 20 years.

These are only a few methods that yankee imperialism has utilized to eliminate revolutionary cadres. Compañeros, the grand jury is much more than an imperialist tactic through which to imprison us. According to the very same yankee Justice Department, the grand jury is an "agency geared to achieve forceful compliance of the law" that will be used in the battlefield against the Puerto Rican revolutionary movement. Incarceration has not taken out of circulation those compañeros/as that have been imprisoned for their refusal to collaborate with the grand jury. Nor has their imprisonment resulted in the disarticulation of the movement. On the contrary, what has happened is that it has generated more agitation and support in Puerto Rico, the U.S. and on an international level. Opposition to the grand jury as represented by the position of non-collaboration, has captured the minds and consciousness of thousands and thousands of Puerto Rican people.

Lureida Torres received broad support when she was imprisoned for refusing to collaborate with the grand jury. When María Cueto and Raisa Nemiken assumed the same position and were imprisoned, the support and agitation was greater. But when Pedro Archuleta, Ricardo Romero (both leaders of the Mexican Commission of the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, MLN) José López, Julio Rosado (Coordinators of the MLN's Puerto Rican Commission) Luis Rosado, Andrés Rosado and Roberto Caldero were imprisoned for assuming that very position, the support and agitation in the Puerto Rican and Mexican communities was immense! Following the logic of the PRTP, if four of the compañeros who assumed the position of Non-Collaboration were coordinators of the MLN, then the MLN should have ceased to exist. However the facts prove that the movement did not suffer any disarticulation while the compañeros remained imprisoned. In fact the movement gained strength.

The support given by our people (in Puerto Rico, the U.S. and on an international level) to Carlos Pantojas, Carlos Noya, Norberto and Federico Fiallo, Ramón Soto and Ricarte Montes García totally negates the value and logic of the position advanced by the PRTP. **THE POSITION OF NON-COLLABORATION HAS PRODUCED RESISTANCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS!** When the compañeros Federico Cintron-Fiallo and Carlos Noya Muratti appeared before a federal court in Brooklyn, New York, before the very same judge who heard the criminal contempt trial of Julio and Andrés Rosado, Ricardo Romero, María Cueto and Steven Guerra, the court

clerk declared that he had never seen such vast support in a case of that nature. The courtroom was packed with demonstrators and the judge had received more than 12,000 telegrams and letters of support for the compañeros. Since this occurred after the PRTP circulated their document, we ask that the compañeros analyze these results. The position of Non-Collaboration is not synonymous with political masochism. The compañeros that have taken this position have done so with a clear conscience because they understand that it is the most correct position. History has proven this to be true. This position has not been touted as a political remedy or the only alternative. However, we are certain of one thing. Non-Collaboration has received the support of the masses. It has even created an impact in the highest spheres of the Episcopal Church. Two Episcopalian bishops have testified in open court that if they were subpoenaed before the grand jury, they too would refuse to collaborate. These statements carry a lot of weight. But we are not stating that this will guarantee our victory, that will only happen when the Puerto Rican people render all the imperialist laws useless.

There is another segment in the document that should also concern us. The document states that "the particular reality of each individual should be the determining factor." This implies that the particular reality of an individual is more important than that of the movement.

In order to understand how incorrect this position is and exactly what it implies, we will recount what happened when one person decided to testify because she believed that her "particular reality" lent itself to answer questions and turn over the physical evidence required by the grand jury. All these things, according to the person's line of reasoning, were things that the FBI already knew or had in their possession. After turning over her fingerprint samples, they showed her photographs and asked seemingly innocent questions. In one photograph there appeared a person who looked almost identically like the person giving testimony. The FBI believed that they were one and the same person. When they asked if it was she, the woman examined the photograph carefully and noticed that the woman pictured was holding a cigarette in her hand. She then stated that it could not be her because she did not smoke. The woman thought that her response could not have incriminated or harmed any-

one. The truth was just the opposite. The next day, the FBI subpoenaed the person who appeared in the photograph. They had not been sure which of the two women was the one in the photograph. But now they knew. The FBI had no way of confirming which one had been at that place that day. But they knew now, thanks to the testimony of a person who believed that her "particular reality" lent itself to give the grand jury information that the FBI already had.

This person was not an informant. You need not be an informant in order to inform on someone. We know that the majority of the information compiled by the FBI and other repressive agencies is obtained through interrogating our neighbors, friends, relatives and even our employers. These people divulge information not out of malice, but rather out of naïveté.

In addition, we know that prosecutors and FBI agents are experts in the field of interrogation. The majority of us are not attorneys and we are quite apt to put our foot in our mouth.

We should also be concerned because yankee imperialism is not utilizing the grand jury to attack individuals, but as part of a war plan against a movement and a people. It does not involve the isolated persecution of a few individuals or revolutionary cadres.

Based on the history of the political grand jury, focusing principally on the last 9 years, (it is during this period that the grand jury has most intensively and extensively been used) we reach certain conclusions which we consider to be correct. We can conclude that turning over physical evidence or giving testimony because we believe that the FBI already has this information, is a tactic more advantageous to the enemy than to the movement. We can also rule out the incorrect premise that the use of the grand jury is merely a campaign to imprison and eliminate a few revolutionary cadres. We can conclude that the political grand jury is a legal repressive agency that will be utilized by yankee imperialism in their war against the Puerto Rican revolutionary movement. Above all, we can conclude that the position of Non-Collaboration, despite the fact that it carries the possibility of imprisonment, is a tactic that can be utilized by our people not only in the struggle against the grand jury, but also in their principal struggle to render yankee imperialism useless.

THIS IS A CONSISTENT TACTIC—IT IS NEITHER DOGMATIC NOR INTRANSIGENT!

REPRESSION: PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION OF THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND THE PUERTO RICAN PEOPLE

U.S. imperialism, as we have stated, exercises absolute control over the principal aspects of the political, economic and cultural life of the Puerto Ricans. In the face of this aggression, many thousands of patriots have struggled for generations to free their homeland. To suppress this struggle and to terrorize the Puerto Rican people, the repressive forces of the U.S. and the colonial regime have applied a campaign of naked repression, murdering hundreds of patriots and imprisoning and persecuting thousands. This has been paralleled by brutal attacks by the police on Puerto Rican communities in the U.S. as well as on the island, in an effort to crush resistance and to prevent the development of a radical independentist base among the Puerto Rican people.

The record of repression of the independence movement has been written in blood, beginning with the invasion and two years of military government needed to suppress guerrilla struggle against the invaders. The list includes the massacres of Rio Piedras in 1935 and of Ponce in 1937, when 20 independentistas were killed and 200 wounded by police. The rally was demanding freedom for Albizu Campos, Juan Antonio Corretjer and other Nationalist Party leaders imprisoned in the U.S. on charges of seditious conspiracy. The repression continues through the years, with the summary execution at police headquarters in San Juan of independentistas Elias Beauchamp and Hiram Rosado; the disappearance of the corpse of patriot Angel Esteban Antongiorgi; in the torture and psychological attacks against Puerto Ricans imprisoned in the U.S. for refusing obligatory U.S. military service in WWII and Korea; the enactment in 1948 of the "Law of the Muzzle," which made any advocacy of independence a crime against the U.S.; the mass arrests of Nationalist Party cadres and other independentistas in the wake of the Jayuya Rebellion of 1950, in which many patriots were killed or wounded by police and National Guard forces, and in which the civilian population of Puerto Rican towns was strafed and bombed by the U.S. Air Force; in the medical executions by their yanki jailers of Albizu Campos and later of Andres Figueroa Cordero, one of the Five Puerto Rican Nationalists imprisoned for a combined total of over 125 years for their defense of their homeland in the 1950's, on charges which again included sedition against the U.S. government.

In the current period of growth of the independence struggle in the 1960's and 70's, the bloody list includes murder of activists in U.S. jails, like Young Lords Party member Julio Roldan and Tito Perez in New York and Manuel Ramos in Chicago; the frame-up incarcerations of Carlos Feliciano and Eduardo Cruz for pro-independence bombings in the U.S.; the murder of student Antonia Martinez in Rio Piedras by police attacking anti-ROTC protests; the killing of Angel Charbonier and Eddie Ramos in Mayaguez by a bombing carried out by right-wing terrorists organized by the FBI and CIA; the lengthy imprisonment of Martin Sostre for his activities in support of Black and Puerto Rican liberation in New York State; the disappearance of Lcdo. Julio Pinto Gandia; the frame-up and exile of Humberto Pagan, a leader of the 1971 student strike at the University of Puerto Rico; the arrest of Juan Antonio Corretjer, Consuelo Lee Corretjer and the entire Central Committee of the Puerto Rican Socialist League in 1971 on weapons charges, which dragged on for nearly a decade before the last proceedings were dropped against Dona Consuelo Lee de Corretjer; the assassination of Santiago Mari Pesquera, son of PSP leader Juan Mari Bras; the kidnapping, torture and murder of Teamster organizer and independence activist Juan Rafael Caballero by a death squad within the colonial police; the sequestering of 14 Puerto Rican and Chicano/Mexicano activists and other Latin Americans by federal Grand Juries "investigating" the FALN and the entire independence movement in the U.S. in 1977. Today U.S. Grand Juries operating in Puerto Rico are part of a further wave of repression, incarcerating two independentistas, Carlos Rosario Pantojas, and Carlos Noya of the Puerto Rican Socialist League for refusing to collaborate with their witch hunt.

The Grand Jury is only one aspect of the current wave of repression, which is directed expressly at isolating and destroying the revolutionary independentist forces who stand in the way of U.S. efforts to further "rationalize" the status of Puerto Rico in order to deal with the current political and economic crisis of the Commonwealth. This period was initiated immediately on the heels of a United Nations' condemnation of U.S. repression of the independence movement. On July 25, 1978 colonial police entrapped and executed at Cerro Maravilla two young independentistas, Carlos Soto Arrivi and Arnaldo Dario Rosado, through the efforts of a police agent, informer and provocateur named Gonzalez Malave.

Testimony by a taxi driver at the scene, and also by Lieutenant Julio Andrades, one of the police officers involved in the shooting has made it clear that this was a cold-blooded murder carried out under the direct instructions of the pro-statehood governor Carlos Romero Barcelo and subsequently covered up by a white-wash investigation by President Carter's Administration. Gonzales Malave was also involved in this same period with the arrest of eight other independentistas whom he accused of participation in an armed clandestine formation. Two of these, Guillermo Sagara and Ramon Rosado, are still in jail, facing weapons charges.

At the same time, Nydia Esther Cuevas and Pablo Marcano were arrested and tried for their takeover of the Chilean Consulate in San Juan and sentenced to long terms in U.S. prisons. Another captured independence fighter, William Guillermo Morales, who had taken a stance as a Prisoner of War for the national liberation of Puerto Rico, escaped from captivity in the U.S., despite medical mistreatment and the loss of fingers of both hands in the unexplained explosion in a Queens, New York apartment which led to his capture.

In May, 1979, 21 independentistas were arrested by U.S. Navy Military Police for protesting the genocidal U.S. Navy presence in Vieques, an inhabited island 75% of whose land is occupied by naval bases and whose waters are used for bombing practice and maneuvers. One of these 21, Angel Rodriguez Cristobal, was singled out for brutality from the first. This leader of the Puerto Rican Socialist League, who had taken a stance as Prisoner of War, was found hanged to death in his isolation cell in Tallahassee Federal Prison in Florida on November 11, 1979. Physical evidence of blood in his cell and a gash over his eye, as well as the statements of other prisoners, make it clear that he was executed after a struggle. But Angel's decisive stance of refusing to recognize the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and of declaring himself a Prisoner of War, the position which brought down the government's murderous attacks, has also immortalized him. Subsequently, many of the other Vieques defendants took a similar position and served prison terms in exile in the U.S. The Vieques struggle continues and remains an arena of U.S. colonial repression. The current Grand Jury in Puerto Rico is investigating the attack on the Navy at Sabana Seca by three armed clandestine organizations, the Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Popular (FARP), the Ejercito Popular Boricua (EPB-also known as Macheteros), and the Organizacion de Voluntarios Para la Revolucion Puertorriquena (OVRP). At least two people on an FBI hit list of 25 "suspects" in this attack have been found murdered execution-style, Jose Adorno Maldonado and Jorge Zayas Candal. Over 400 people have been interrogated and persecuted in the FBI dragnet in Puerto Rico, and the repression continues.

The fundamental challenge to this repression has been made by the Eleven Puerto Rican Prisoners of War, accused of being members of the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN), combatants for Puerto Rican independence who were captured in Evanston, Illinois on April 4, 1980, and who have refused to recognize U.S. jurisdiction over them. Instead they have demanded their right under international law, as anti-colonial freedom fighters, to be tried by an international tribunal or released. (See PETITION TO THE U.N. ON PRISONER OF WAR STATUS)

Police repression in Puerto Rico and in Puerto Rican communities in the U.S. is not restricted to independentistas but has steadily increased against the people in general, in a parallel attempt to terrorize the population. The attacks on Puerto Rican and other Third World communities have been part of a strategy outlined by the Trilateral Commission of U.S., Western European and Japanese imperialist policy-makers, who outlined in the book CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY, the basis of developing a fascist order in the U.S. directed against the Third World peoples within U.S. borders, whose human rights struggles are judged to represent an "excess of democracy" and a threat to imperialist stability. Police terror against these communities is part of an attempt to effectuate the bantustanization of a population deemed marginal, transferring them out of the central cities, where they pose a challenge to the security of the power structures of industry and finance, into suburban camps in the manner of cities in Europe and the Third World. The cases of Rafael Cruz and Julio Osorio in Chicago, murdered by police in an attack on the Puerto Rican Day festivities in 1977; of Luis Baez, shot 25 times by New York police; and of the two Puerto Rican men shot by an off-duty policeman in New York because he "thought they were in the FALN," are only the tip of the iceberg. Similarly in Puerto Rico, cases like that of Dona Adolfina Villanueva, who was killed, and her husband, Don Augustin Carrasquillo, gravely wounded by police carrying out an eviction, are only too common.

This repression to which our movement has been repeatedly subjected to is today most clearly manifested in the incarceration of Carlos Rosario Pantojas, and Carlos Noya, a leader of the Liga Socialista Puertorriquena (L.S.P.). This attack by the Grand Jury in Puerto Rico has no pretense of criminal investigation, but rather seeks to intimidate the radical base of the independence movement and thus effectuate the isolation and destruction of the patriotic vanguard formations - the armed clandestine movement.

In the specific case of Carlos Noya, one of the last persons to see Prisoner of War Angel Rodriguez Cristobal alive, he has been subjected to extreme psychological terror. Almost precisely one year after the assassination of Angel, he was called before a federal grand jury in Puerto Rico and transferred to New York. This is in direct violation of a constitutional principle which states that a person cannot be transferred out of his district, in the

event that he should decide to co-operate. Carlos was immediately imprisoned for refusing to co-operate. He was then visited by a prison psychiatrist who in a 15 minute "evaluation" determined that he was a threat to security and should be placed in isolation.

Public outrage at this blatant abuse of our imprisoned comrade ensued in the form of a massive telegram campaign to prison officials and federal authorities. Only through massive public pressure were the prison officials forced to return Carlos to general population where he remains today.

CONCLUSION

MASACRE DEL CAPITOLIO (1933)

Manuel Rafael Suarez Diaz
several injured

MASACRE DE RIO PIEDRAS (1935)

Ramon S. Pagan, Secretary of the Nationalist Party
Jose Santiago Barea
Pepito Santiago
Pedro Quinones
Eduardo Rodriguez
Dionisio Pearson

MASACRE DEL CUARTEL (1935)

Elias Beauchamp
Hiram Rosado

MASACRE DE PONCE (1937)

Georgina Velez (7 years old) and 20 other
children, women and men killed, while
150 were injured.

KILLED IN COMBAT AGAINST U.S. COLONIALISM, 1950

Heriberto Castro
Carlos Irizarry
Raimundo Diaz Pacheco
Julio Colon Feliciano
Antonio Gonzalez
Antonio Ramos
Agustin Quinones
Griselio Torresola
Gregorio Hernandez
Domingo Hiraldo
Roberto Acevedo
Manuel Torres Medina
Arturo Ortiz
Jose Ramos
Guillermo Gonzalez Ubides
Hipolito Miranda Diaz
and others

Korean War

Luis Manuel O'Neill
Alejandro Cartillo Cruz Alicea
Reinaldo Trillas
Luis Medina Maisonve
Rafael Cancel Miranda
Antonio Filardi Guzman
Gabriel Parrilla
and others

MASACRE DE CERRO MARAVILLA (1978)

Carlos Soto Arrivi (18 years old)
Arnaldo Dario Rosado (23 years old)

ASSASSINATED

1970 Antonia Martinez (21 years old)
1975 Angel Charbonier
1975 Eddie Ramon
1976 Santiago Mari Pesquera
1977 Juan Rafael Caballero
1979 Carlos Muniz Varela
1979 Angel Rodriguez Cristobal
1980 Jose Adorno Maldonado
1980 Jorge Zayas Candal

EXILED

Dominga Cruz Beceril
Reinaldo Trillas
Laura Meneses
Humberto Pagan
Juan Juarbe y Juarbe

MEDICAL ASSASSINATION

Pedro Albizu Campos
Andres Figueroa Cordero

IMPRISONED FOR REFUSAL TO SERVE IN U.S. ARMED FORCES

World War I
Florencio Romero
World War II
Ramon Medina Ramirez
Rafael Lopez Rosa
Julio de Santiago
Paulino E. Castro
Roberto Acevedo
Cesar Torres
Amauri Ruiz
Jesus Siaca Pacheco
Ernesto Concepcion de Gracia
and others

Vietnam War

Sixto Alberto
Raul Grillasca
Anselmo Rosa
Gabriel Mesquida
Antonio Anibal Rivera
Rafael Rivera Rosa
and others

JAILED FOR 25 YEARS OR MORE

Lolita Lebron
Rafael Cancel Miranda
Irving Flores
Andres Figueroa Cordero
Oscar Collazo (29 years)

PRESENTLY INCARCERATED

Prisoners of War (P.O.W.)

Carmen Valentin
Alicia Rodriguez
Haydee Torres
Lucy Rodriguez
Dylcia Pagan
Dick Jimenez
Luis Rosa

Carlos Torres
Adolfo Matos
Elizam Escobar
Oscar López Rivera
Political Prisoners

Nydia Cuevas
Pablo Marcano
Raymond Soto
Alberto De Jesus
Ricarte Montes
Julio Antonio Veras-Delgadillo
Felix Rosa

GRAND JURY RESISTERS

Julio Rosado
Maria Cueto
Ricardo Romero
Steven Guerra
Andres Rosado
Carlos Noya
Federico Cintron-Fiallo

ASSASSINATED IN VIETNAM BY U.S. ARMY

Aramis Gonzalez Perez

DISAPPEARED

Luis Colon Osorio

PERSECUTED AND HARASSED

The following is a partial list of 23 independentistas who are suspected of the attack, at Sabana Seca in December, 1979:

*The entire membership of the Liga Socialista Puertorriquena (L.S.P.)

*Juan Antonio Corretjer, Secretary-General of the L.S.P.

*The clandestine Revolutionary Workers Committee

*Luis Angel Torres, Secretary-General of the Movimiento Popular Socialista

*Carlos Noya, member L.S.P.

*Ricarte Montes García, member L.S.P.

The record of U.S. imperialism in regard to Puerto Rico is clear. The facts which we have cited, such as the forced emigration of 2/5 of the population, the sterilization of 40% of Puerto Rican women and 1/4 of the men, the jailing and murders of hundreds of independentistas and police terror against the community at large, show that the U.S.—not only in the juridical definition, but in fact—is waging a genocidal war against the Puerto Rican people to enforce its illegal colonial domination of our homeland. We call upon the international community to render judgement on our claim.

REPRESSION:

DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI, THINK TANKS,
AND OTHER REPRESSIVE AGENCIES

SECRET COUNTER-INSURGENCY CONFERENCE IN PUERTO RICO

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTER-
PRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS

RAND REPORT

TARGETTING OF AMERICA - A Special Report on Terrorism

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With the following article, we begin the enemy section. Although it is written from a revolutionary perspective, we have chosen to include it here because it deals specifically with the enemy's plans, rather than with the revolutionary movement's response.

We have learned that on August 28-September 1, 1978, a secret conference of top imperialist security experts from different nations met to instruct puppet Puerto Rican officials and police commanders in San Juan. While our knowledge of this "Special Seminar on Terrorism in Puerto Rico" is very incomplete, what we do know throws some light on our enemy's plans. This applies to both Puerto Rico in specific and to the entire U.S. Empire in general.

While the ostensible purpose was to plan police security at the then-forthcoming Pan-American Games, this secret gathering largely discussed new and increased repressive measures against the entire Puerto Rican nation. The major theme of the meeting was to apply the counter-insurgency methods tested and found useful in other countries to Puerto Rico.

We should expect everywhere in the U.S. Empire that as the struggle deepens in coming years, that revolutionaries will face the specific tactics and strategies already tested elsewhere. These will not, of course, be necessarily applied wholesale. The internationalization of experience, of learning from the most advanced situations abroad, applies to the enemy as well as ourselves, and should push us to further our own knowledge as a basic necessity in anticipating our enemy's moves.

The counter-insurgency experts who gathered at the invitation of the P.R. Attorney General's Office were certainly very experienced, in some cases ranking figures in organizing repressive campaigns:

* U.S. Ambassador Anthony Quinton, at that time Director of the U.S. Office on Combatting Terrorism, U.S. State Dept. (this body is supposed to coordinate all U.S. military & civil efforts in this field), and now U.S. Ambassador in charge of destabilizing Nicaragua.

* British General Richard Clutterbuck, author of textbooks on counter-insurgency, now at Exeter College.

* General Querrolo of the Uruguyan Army, who helped lead the military campaign that defeated the Tupamaro movement.

* Dr. Richard Mulder, the Dutch government negotiator for South Moluccan hostage incidents.

* Reinhard Rupprecht, then Vice President of the Bundeskriminalamt in West Germany, active in campaigns against the Red Army Faction fighters.

* Robin Bourne, Canadian Deputy Solicitor General for Police and Security, the actual coordinator of repression against the Quebec Liberation movement.

* Inspector Ronald McIntyre, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

* Jay Mallin, at that time "Terrorism/Latin America Editor" for Soldier of Fortune magazine. This is the main mercenary recruitment propaganda journal for the armed right white and the C.I.A.

* Dr. Aaron Katz, Center for the Study of Human Behavior (a RAND-type counter-insurgency "think tank"). Katz was the actual organizer of this conference for the P.R. Attorney General and the U.S. Dept. of Justice. He had earlier organized a conference on "terrorism" in San Juan for Federal Judges that had been attacked by the Puerto Rican liberation movement as C.I.A. instigated.

* Colonel Louis O. Giuffrida, at that time Director of the California Specialized Training Institute. This is one of the leading "SWAT-team" and political repression training centers for police. He is now U.S. Director of Emergency Management.

In addition, F.B.I. agents took an active role in the conference. Consultation was also obtained from Bryan Jenkins of the RAND Corp., Israeli Ambassador Dov Schmorak, and Guiseppe di Genaro, Director of Research for the Italian Ministry of Justice and Chairman of the U.N. Crime Commission. On the Puerto Rican side some 48 "key Puerto Rican officials at the highest levels of government and law enforcement" were there to be educated.

The material they discussed seems to hold few surprises for us; it is useful, however, in that it further confirms the pattern of imperialist planning. Two main elements that were covered were: changes in the legal codes to further restrict civil liberties and to accommodate anti-guerrilla campaigns; systematic "denial" campaigns to isolate guerrillas from their mass base.

1. The puppet P.R. officials made it clear that they hoped to learn more about revising their legal code, both to cover for more intensive and brutal anti-guerrilla campaigns and to ensure that captured suspects have no chance of exercising any "legal" rights. In their initial discussion with their masters in Washington, the P.R. Attorney General's Office said that a main goal of the secret conference would be:

"Preparation for the enactment of substantive laws making new offenses, defining more clearly certain aspects of terrorist conduct...possible revision of laws that restrict response on the part of authorities relating to arrest, search, detention and intelligence gathering...Analysis and study of various anti-terrorist laws in effect in other communities, i.e. State of Internal War Act in Uruguay, the Canadian War Measures Act, the United Kingdom's Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1975, the Spanish Decreto-Ley of 1975, and the Mexican Federal Penal Code, with a view to...benefiting from aspects and applications appropriate to the socio-political context of Puerto Rico."

The laws that the puppet P.R. government found so important as successful models all share the characteristic of being fascistic martial law measures, completely negating individual human rights and authorizing the security forces to act as they see fit. The Canadian anti-FLQ laws, for example, expressly overrides the Canadian Bill of Rights. Under all these laws, permanent roadblocks, identity checks, personal movement restrictions, compulsory body searches at mass checkpoints, "search and destroy" sweeps of cordoned-off urban areas, etc. are all legalized. While these laws do not openly legalize torture of suspects and assassination, in the political environment of a fascistic military campaign the restraining factors of exposure and opposition by democratic elements is difficult to organize.

The process of prosecution and trial — involving bail, admissibility of evidence, rights of defense, sentences, etc. — was viewed as equally important. In the crude round-ups of the imperialist security forces, it is common that many of the arrested have no evidence against them. It is important to the imperialists that when the situation warrants, they can "flexibly" revise their laws so that no legal defense is possible. The Uruguayan, Canadian and U.K. laws, for example, all provide for detention without trial. The German "Lex BaaderMeinhoff" laws prevented guerrillas from

having adequate legal representation — and even imprisoned defense lawyers who were too energetic as co-conspirators with the accused. These are the models for a future Puerto Rico.

As we know, the enemy intends to alter bourgeois democratic legality however it suits them. The printed "Background Materials" handed out to each of the Puerto Rican puppets emphasize this:

"There is no question that the breach of commonly accepted civil liberties has made it easier for the authorities to make arrests, acquire evidence, try defendants, and impose sentences of the state."

The full import of this becomes very clear when they discuss, under the staging of a "fair trial" (by which they mean a trial in which the accused is certain of being convicted), all the possible ways that the defense can be hindered. This carefully planned harassment begins with placing the defense lawyer under a "gag order" and ending up with keeping the defendant "in solitary" so as to create "psychic consequences of such isolation...prisoners have lost their minds; their nerves have been shattered forever; they have been driven to suicide." This is just assassination by subtle means.

2. The conference pushed the importance of the government constructing a "Denial System". This is the systematic effort to "deprive the terrorist of resources needed for survival". Under this is included leadership, weapons, safe houses, etc.. Much of this discussion was very routine: "If open guerrilla warfare escalates, it may become imperative that known leaders of extremist groups be immobilized and kept out of circulation...Denial of funding opportunities open to the terrorists, i.e., legitimate channels of acquiring funds. ('Defense Funds')..."

Incidentally, General Querrolo of the Uruguayan Army helped lead the discussions on "Denial System". No wonder the imperialists wanted to keep this conference secret from Puerto Rican people. It isn't hard to envision the popular anger at having a bloody torturer from the Uruguayan Junta instructing Puerto Rican police on how to take care of the pro-independence movement.

It is the "resource" of political contact with the masses that the "Background Materials" emphasize most strongly, over and over. It is evidence that they recognize that the political consciousness of the masses is of primary importance. They repeatedly underline how the populace must receive only the government's propaganda, and must be prevented from sympathizing with the armed struggle ("A wedge must be driven between the terrorist and society", etc. etc.).

*Control of the media (press, radio and TV) was covered as a necessity: "To speak of idealism and truth in journalism or the public's right to know, is less than realistic and only pandering to slogans. In the matter of terrorism...it is of vital importance that the media take a conservative line..."

And later: "The media, which has the power to aid as well as hinder the terrorists, should never be permitted to demonstrate the terrorist as an ordinary human." This takes on great significance when we review how the media pictured Carlos and Maria Torres, as well as other FALN prisoners of war.

Also examined were the internal rules adopted by the leading U.S. media corporations. These are as we might expect, and should cause counter-insurgency experts little lost sleep. CBS-TV News, for example, has a secret rule that only the President of CBS can approve "live" TV interviewing of a guerrilla — since their hard policy is that no revolutionary statements can be broadcast "unedited".

*Using terror to discourage public demonstrations of support for the guerrillas — or even normal "labor strikes" that might arouse anti-government feeling is recommended: "The level of force and hurt employed by the security forces should also take into effect the symbolism and potential value of intimidation..."

*"Overreaction" or excessive violence is labelled as "dangerous" because it angers the masses, creating support for the armed struggle: "It is important that the security forces not be perceived as guilty of meaningless overkill in weapons utilization or conduct." This truth contradicts what the experts have just said about using "Intimidation" of the masses.

The experts urge that the ideal is to choose the exact level of repressive violence needed in each specific situation: "Overresponse, on the other hand, although it may accomplish a given tactical objective such as the neutralization of a specific individual, group of individuals, or 'target', may do so at the expense of more people becoming disaffected from the government and its aims and more closely allied with the dissident forces or causes."

This is even seen to be true for sentencing of captured revolutionaries: "The policy of the Prosecutor's office concerning sentences must be to press for sentences that will remove the terrorist from society, but will not result in the creation of a symbol of 'popular resistance' or a martyr." We can recall the comrade from the Puerto Rican Socialist League who was given a relatively light sentence, moved far away to a prison in Florida — where he allegedly committed "suicide".

It is this consideration of limiting security force violence that most obviously betrays the con-

traditions within imperialist counter—insurgency policy. No imperialist army or police force yet seen on this earth has proven capable of limiting their brutality. In every case, without exception, the enemy has viciously and indiscriminately persecuted not only the ranks of revolutionary supporters, but those of democratic-minded people and the communities of the oppressed.

And against revolutionary fighters the security forces cannot stop from lurching into the most trigger-happy excesses. The "Background Materials" themselves admit that armed struggle is followed by "the stimulation of possible vigilante or 'death squad' attitudes" among the police. Further, these experts themselves are visibly straining at their leashes in their desire to kill all revolutionaries.

On one page the words "Do not overreact" are followed on the very next line by: "Only one side can truly survive. If the terrorist cannot be neutralized, nothing less than the death of a terrorist will keep him from repeating his act. Terrorists cannot be rehabilitated." In other words, the puppet Puerto Rican police are being told to kill and kill and kill. Just like in Uruguay.

Our Puerto Rican comrades are very familiar with this and other such conferences secretly convened by the imperialists. They are well aware that U.S. rule over their nation is not only food stamps but also terroristic conspiracy. The importance that imperialism places on suppressing their independence movement is, however, often underestimated by others. The stubborn national sentiments of many Puerto Ricans (as exemplified by the growing ties between the labor movement and the armed struggle) is taken quite seriously by U. S. imperialism. Even within the walls of the Empire national liberation is inexorably coming.

The struggle over Puerto Rico is a strategic encounter in terms of the entire U.S. Empire. This is why preparations for the most drastic counter-insurgency campaigns are quietly underway at the same time as the neo-colonial Statehood strategy is being noisily advanced. U.S. Ambassador Quainton told the puppet police and officials that the U.S. government considers Puerto Rico as "the front line of battle." And this secret gathering demonstrates how those imperialist officers whose profession is combating communism view the Puerto Rican revolution as a matter of international concern.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/ TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS

(From the Department of Justice)
Monday, March 7, 1983
Re: The FBI Guidelines

Attorney General William French Smith today announced new guidelines to clarify the scope of domestic security and terrorism investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The revised guidelines, which will become effective on March 21, will succeed the 1976 Domestic Security Guidelines, which were the first of their kind.

The new guidelines are needed to ensure protection of the public from the greater sophistication and changing nature of domestic groups that are prone to violence, the Attorney General said.

At the same time, the guidelines will adequately protect lawful and peaceful political dissent, he said.

The new guidelines are the product of more than eight months of review involving numerous components in the Department of Justice, including FBI Headquarters and FBI field personnel.

"We have carefully evaluated our seven years of experience with the original guidelines in light of the operational concerns of FBI field personnel and the comments of interested persons in the Congress and elsewhere," Smith said.

"This review has shown that investigative guidelines do serve important functions. They provide our agents with the direction and certainty they need to perform their critical responsibilities effectively. At the same time, guidelines create a structure of review and accountability to reassure the public that our agents are acting properly under the law."

"It is equally clear," Smith said, "that our citizens are no less threatened by groups which engage in criminal violence for political or racist purposes than by those which operate lawlessly for financial gain. Thus, we must ensure that the criminal intelligence resources which have been brought to bear so effectively in organized crime and racketeering investigations are effectively employed in domestic security/terrorism cases."

During the past seven years, the Attorney General said, the character of domestic groups prone to violence has changed and the structures of these groups have become more fluid and sophisticated. "Moreover, the agents of the FBI have clearly demonstrated their professional competence, integrity and ability to adhere to requirements of law," he said. "The time has therefore come to eliminate separate regulations for domestic security/terrorism investigations and treat these matters as an integral part of FBI's general law enforcement responsibilities."

"These new guidelines will clarify the standards governing these investigations and reaffirm the importance of gathering criminal intelligence about violence-prone groups, while retaining adequate protections for lawful and peaceful political dissent."

FBI Director William H. Webster observed, "This revision is responsive to concerns expressed by our field personnel and is in our view an extremely balanced and positive enforcement initiative."

For example, Webster said that as a response to field agents' need for clear and consistent standards, the new guidelines will be integrated with the existing "General Crimes and Organized Crime Guidelines" that have governed many FBI investigations for several years.

These omnibus guidelines will thus include in a single document, with parallel terminology, rules the FBI will follow for cases involving (1) general crimes, (2) racketeering enterprises, and (3) domestic security and terrorism. Only the latter category has been redrafted; the guidelines for the other two types of investigation are essentially unchanged.

The domestic security/terrorism portion of these combined guidelines recognize that there can be

special First Amendment concerns in these investigations. However, Attorney General Smith said, "when persons advocate crime, particularly violent crime -- such as blowing up a building or killing a public official -- those persons cannot expect law enforcement agencies to refrain from making reasonable further inquiry to ensure protection of the public."

"Of course, Smith said, statements advocating criminal activity must be viewed in context before further inquiry will be authorized. Furthermore, the Guidelines make clear, both in the Statement of Principles and in the review and accountability provisions, that constitutionally-protected advocacy of unpopular ideas or political dissent alone cannot serve as the basis for an investigation."

Other significant features of the new guidelines include:

1. The new guidelines employ the "criminal enterprise" concept successfully used in organized crime investigations. This will allow the FBI to cross organizational lines in a domestic security/terrorism investigation without regard to what a particular group or element of an organization might call itself. Thus, the FBI will be able to deal more effectively with groups which knowingly support the criminal activities of an enterprise.

If, for example, members of a group are providing safehouses, money, or weapons supporting the criminal activities of a terrorist group, they would be investigated as part of the same criminal enterprise. This avoids the necessity of opening a separate investigation of such groups, with a separate justification.

The enterprise concept will also permit the FBI to focus investigation upon violent factions of a larger group, without investigating the entire group. The new approach recognizes that terrorist groups today have a fluid membership and often lack organizational structure, yet function as a single enterprise directed toward a common goal.

2. The multi-level approach of the old guidelines, with different standards for "preliminary", "limited" and "full" investigations, is eliminated. There is to be only one form of domestic security/terrorism investigation.

The FBI will be authorized to undertake such investigations when the facts or circumstances "reasonably indicate" the existence of a domestic security/terrorism enterprise -- the standard now followed in organized crime investigations.

The Attorney General observed that having consistent investigative standards for racketeering and domestic security/terrorism investigations should help to eliminate any perception that actual or imminent commission of a violent crime is a prerequisite to investigation. This will help agents to discover terrorist activity before anyone is hurt, he said. At the same time, Smith observed, this standard requires a valid factual basis and law enforcement purpose, and thus precludes fishing expeditions.

If information falls short of the "reasonable indication" standard, yet still calls for further checking, agents can proceed under the existing "preliminary inquiry" rules of the General Crimes portion of the combined guidelines.

3. A major criticism of the old guidelines has been the tendency to close investigations and terminate informant coverage when there is a lull in violent criminal activity -- perhaps only temporary -- or the group has simply gone dormant.

"A helpful change made by the new guidelines, Director Webster said, "would permit the FBI to monitor organizations which may be temporarily inactive but whose prior record or stated objectives indicate a need for continued federal interest, so long as the minimum standard for investigation is satisfied."

4. Other provisions of the new Guidelines make clear FBI's authority to provide investigative assistance to the Secret Service in support of that agency's protective responsibilities. The Guidelines also confirm the authority of FBI agents to collect publicly-available information, such as periodicals, as long as that activity is consistent with the provisions of the Privacy Act.

In a memorandum transmitting the new guidelines to Webster, the Attorney General thanked the FBI for its invaluable assistance in preparing the revisions and stated:

"It is important that the FBI devote its criminal intelligence expertise to domestic security/terrorism cases as it has, with increasing success, in organized crime cases. In the past, operating under distinct guidelines setting different standards and procedures has hampered this effort. The new approach, combining both organized crime and domestic security investigations in a single set of guidelines should make it easier for your agents to focus their intelligence efforts on those criminal enterprises which threaten our people to attain ideological goals."

The Attorney General said that he and Director Webster would be observing carefully how these revisions worked in practice and continue to welcome the views of interested members of Congress and the public. Smith expressed confidence that established Department of Justice review procedures and the

professionalism and adherence to the rule of law that is fundamental in the training of FBI agents will assure compliance with the protections enumerated in the guidelines.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS

As the primary criminal investigative agency in the federal government, the FBI has the authority and responsibility to investigate all criminal violations of federal law not exclusively assigned to another federal agency. The FBI thus plays a central role in national law enforcement and in the proper administration of justice in the United States.

Investigations by the FBI are premised upon the important duty of government to protect the public against organized criminal activity, and against those who would engage in political or racial terrorism or would destroy our constitutional system through criminal violence. At the same time, that duty must be performed with care to protect individual rights and to insure that investigations are confined to matters of legitimate law enforcement interest. The purpose of these Guidelines, therefore, is to establish a consistent policy in such matters. The Guidelines should encourage Agents of the FBI to perform their duties with greater certainty, confidence and effectiveness. They should also give the public a firm assurance that the FBI is acting properly under the law.

These Guidelines provide guidance for all investigations by the FBI of crimes and crime-related activities. Investigations involving foreign intelligence, foreign counterintelligence and international terrorism matters are the subject of separate guidelines. The standards and requirements set forth herein govern the circumstances under which an investigation may be begun, and the permissible scope, duration, subject-matters, and objectives of an investigation.

All investigations of crime or crime-related activities shall be undertaken in accordance with one or more of these Guidelines. Part I sets forth general principles that apply to all investigations conducted under these Guidelines. Part II governs investigations undertaken to detect, prevent and prosecute specific violations of federal law. Part IIIA governs criminal intelligence investigations undertaken to obtain information concerning enterprises which are engaged in racketeering activities involving violence, extortion or public corruption. Part IIIB governs criminal intelligence investigations undertaken to obtain information concerning enterprises which seek to achieve political or social change through violence.

These Guidelines are issued under the authority of the Attorney General as provided in 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 533.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Preliminary inquiries and investigations governed by these Guidelines are conducted for the purpose of preventing, detecting, or prosecuting violations of federal law. They shall be conducted with as little intrusion into the privacy of individuals as the needs of the situation permit.

All preliminary inquiries shall be conducted pursuant to the General Crimes Guidelines. There is no separate provision for a preliminary inquiry under the Criminal Intelligence Guidelines. A preliminary inquiry shall be promptly terminated when it becomes apparent that a full investigation is not warranted. If, on the basis of information discovered in the course of a preliminary inquiry, an investigation is warranted, it may be conducted as a general crimes investigation, or a criminal intelligence investigation, or both. All such investigations, however, shall be based on a reasonable factual predicate and shall have a valid law enforcement purpose.

In its efforts to anticipate or prevent crime, the FBI must at times initiate investigations in advance of criminal conduct. It is important that such investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. When, however, statements advocate criminal activity or indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of violence, an investigation under these Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent, from the circumstances or the context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm.

General crimes investigations and criminal intelligence investigations shall be terminated when all logical leads have been exhausted and no legitimate law enforcement interests justifies their continuance.

Nothing in these Guidelines is intended to prohibit the FBI from collecting and maintaining publicly available information consistent with the Privacy Act.

Nothing in these Guidelines prohibits the FBI from ascertaining the general scope and nature of criminal activity in a particular location or sector of the economy.

II. GENERAL CRIMES INVESTIGATIONS

A. Definitions

(1) "Exigent circumstances" are circumstances requiring action before authorization otherwise necessary under these guidelines can reasonably be obtained, in order to protect life or substantial property interests; to apprehend or identify a fleeing offender; to prevent the hiding, destruction or alteration of evidence; or to avoid other serious impairment or hindrance of an investigation.

(2) "Sensitive criminal matter" is any alleged criminal conduct involving corrupt action by a public official or political candidate, the activities of a foreign government, the activities of a religious organization or a primarily political organization or the related activities of any individual prominent in such an organization, or the activities of the news media; and any other matter which in the judgment of a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) should be brought to the attention of the United States Attorney or other appropriate official in the Department of Justice, as well as FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ).

B. Preliminary Inquiries

(1) On some occasions the FBI may receive information or an allegation not warranting a full investigation-- because there is not yet a "reasonable indication" of criminal activities -- but whose responsible handling requires some further scrutiny beyond the prompt and extremely limited checking out of initial leads. In such circumstances, though the factual predicate for an investigation has not been met, the FBI may initiate an "inquiry" involving some measured review, contact, or observation activities in response to the allegation or information indicating the possibility of criminal activity.

This authority to conduct inquiries short of a full investigation allows the government to respond in a measured way to ambiguous or incomplete information and to do so with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation permit. This is especially important in such areas as white-collar crime where no complainant is involved or when an allegation or information is received from a source of unknown reliability. It is contemplated that such inquiries would be of short duration and be confined solely to obtaining the information necessary to make an informed judgment as to whether a full investigation is warranted.

A preliminary inquiry is not a required step when facts or circumstances reasonably indicating criminal activity are already available; in such cases, a full investigation can be immediately opened.

(2) The FBI supervisor authorizing an inquiry shall assure that the allegation or other information which warranted the inquiry has been recorded in writing. In sensitive criminal matters, the United States Attorney or an appropriate Department of Justice official shall be notified of the basis for an inquiry as soon as practicable after the opening of the inquiry, and the fact of notification shall be recorded in writing.

(3) Inquiries shall be completed within 90 days after initiation of the first investigative step. The date of the first investigative step is not necessarily the same date on which the first incoming information or allegation was received. An extension of time in an inquiry for succeeding 30-day periods may be granted by FBI Headquarters upon receipt of a written request and statement of reasons why further investigative steps are warranted when there is no "reasonable indication" of criminal activity.

(4) Before employing an investigative technique in an inquiry, the FBI should consider whether the information could be obtained in a timely and effective way by less intrusive means. Some of the factors to be considered in judging intrusiveness are adverse consequences to an individual's privacy interests and avoidable damage to his reputation. Whether an intrusive technique should be used in an inquiry depends on the seriousness of the possible crime and the strength of the information indicating the possible existence of the crime. However, the techniques used in an inquiry should generally be less intrusive than those employed in a full investigation. It is recognized that choice of technique is a matter of judgment.

(5) The following investigative techniques shall not be used during an inquiry:

- (a) Mail covers;
- (b) Mail openings;
- (c) Nonconsensual electronic surveillance or any other investigative technique covered by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2520.

(6) The following investigative techniques may be used in an inquiry without any prior authorization from a supervisory agent:

- (a) Examination of FBI indices and files;
- (b) Examination of records available to the public and other public sources of information;
- (c) Examination of available federal, state and local government records;
- (d) Interview of the complainant, previously established informants, and confidential sources;
- (e) Interview of the potential subject;
- (f) Interview of persons who should readily be able to corroborate or deny the truth of the allegation, except this does not include pretext interviews or interviews of a potential subject's employer or co-workers unless the interviewee was the complainant;
- (g) Physical or photographic surveillance of any person.

The use of any other lawful investigative technique in an inquiry shall require prior approval by a supervisory agent, except in exigent circumstances. Where a technique is highly intrusive, a supervisory agent shall approve its use in the inquiry stage only in compelling circumstances and when other investigative means are not likely to be successful.

(7) Where a preliminary inquiry fails to disclose sufficient information to justify an investigation, the FBI shall terminate the inquiry and make a record of the closing. In a sensitive criminal matter, the FBI shall notify the United States Attorney of the closing and record the fact of notification in writing. Information on an inquiry which has been closed shall be available on request to a United States Attorney or his designee or an appropriate Department of Justice official.

(8) All requirements regarding inquiries shall apply to reopened inquiries. In sensitive criminal matters, the United States Attorney or the appropriate Department of Justice official shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reopening of an inquiry.

C. Investigations

(1) A general crimes investigation may be initiated by the FBI when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is being, or will be committed. The investigation may be conducted to prevent, solve, and prosecute such criminal activity.

The standard of "reasonable indication" is substantially lower than probable cause. In determining whether there is reasonable indication of a federal criminal violation, a Special Agent may take into account any facts or circumstances that a prudent investigator would consider. However, the standard does require specific facts or circumstances indicating a past, current, or impending violation. There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a mere hunch is insufficient.

(2) Where a criminal act may be committed in the future, preparation for that act can, of course, amount to a current criminal violation under the conspiracy or attempt provisions of federal criminal law, if there are present the requisite agreement and overt act, or substantial step toward completion of the criminal act and intention to complete the act. With respect to criminal activity that may occur in the future but does not yet involve a current criminal conspiracy or attempt, particular care is necessary to assure that there exist facts and circumstances amounting to a reasonable indication that a crime will occur.

(3) The FBI supervisor authorizing an investigation shall assure that the facts or circumstances meeting the standard of reasonable indication have been recorded in writing.

In sensitive criminal matters, as defined in paragraph A(2), the United States Attorney or an appropriate Department of Justice official and FBIHQ shall be notified in writing of the basis for an investigation as soon as practicable after commencement of the investigation.

(4) The Special Agent conducting an investigation shall maintain periodic written or oral contact with the appropriate federal prosecutor, as circumstances require and as requested by the prosecutor.

When, during an investigation, a matter appears to arguably warrant prosecution, the Special Agent shall present the relevant facts to the appropriate federal prosecutor of the termination of an investigation within 30 days of such termination. Information on investigations which have been closed shall be available on request to a United States Attorney or his designee or an appropriate Department of Justice official.

(5) When a serious matter investigated by the FBI is referred to state or local authorities for prosecution, the FBI, insofar as resources permit, shall promptly advise the federal prosecutor in writing if the state or local authorities decline prosecution or fail to commence prosecutive action within 120 days. Where an FBI field office cannot provide this follow-up the SAC shall so advise the federal prosecutor.

(6) When credible information is received concerning serious criminal activity not within the FBI investigative jurisdiction, the FBI field office shall promptly transmit the information or refer the complainant to the law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction, except where disclosure would jeopardize an ongoing investigation, endanger the safety of an individual, disclose the identity of an informant, interfere with an informant's cooperation, or reveal legally privileged information. If full disclosure is not made for the reasons indicated, then whenever feasible the FBI field office shall make at least limited disclosure to the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction, and full disclosure is not made to the appropriate law enforcement agencies within 180 days, the FBI field office shall promptly notify FBI Headquarters in writing of the facts and circumstances concerning the criminal activity. The FBI shall make a periodic report to the Deputy Attorney General on such nondisclosure and incomplete disclosures, in a form suitable to protect the identify of informants and confidential sources.

(7) All requirements regarding investigations shall apply to reopened investigations. In sensitive criminal matters, the United States Attorney or the appropriate Department of Justice official shall be notified in writing as soon as practicable after the reopening of an investigation.

III. CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

This section authorizes the FBI to conduct criminal intelligence investigations of certain enterprises who seek either to obtain monetary or commercial gains or profits through racketeering activities or to further political or social goals through activities that involve criminal violence. These investigations differ

from general crimes investigations, authorized by Section II, in several important respects. As a general rule, an investigation of a completed criminal act is normally confined to determining who committed that act and with securing evidence to establish the elements of the particular offense. It is, in this respect, self-defining. An intelligence investigation of an ongoing criminal enterprise must determine the size and composition of the group involved, its geographic dimensions, its past acts and intended criminal goals, and its capacity for harm. While a standard criminal investigation terminates with the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, the investigation of a criminal enterprise does not necessarily end, even though one or more of the participants may have been prosecuted.

In addition, the organization provides a life and continuity of operation that are not normally found in a regular criminal activity. As a consequence, these investigations may continue for several years. Furthermore, as Justice Powell noted, the focus of such investigations "May be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime." *United States v. United States District Court*, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972). Unlike the usual criminal case, there may be no completed offense to provide a framework for the investigation. It often requires the fitting together of bits and pieces of information many meaningless by themselves to determine whether a pattern of criminal activity exists. For this reason, the investigation is broader and less discriminate than usual, involving "the interrelation of various sources and types of information." *Id.*

Members of groups or organizations acting in concert to violate the law present a grave threat to society. An investigation of organizational activity, however, may present special problems particularly where it deals with politically motivated acts. "There is often a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values," in such matters that is "not found in cases of 'ordinary crime'." *Id.* Thus special care must be exercised in sorting out protected activities from those which may lead to violence or serious disruption of society. As a consequence, the guidelines establish safeguards for group investigations of special sensitivity, including tighter management controls and higher levels of review.

A. Racketeering Enterprises Investigations

This section focuses on investigations of organized crime. It is concerned with investigation of entire enterprises, rather than individual participants in specific criminal acts, and authorizes investigations to determine the structure and scope of the enterprise as well as the relationship of the members. Except as specified below, this authority may be exercised only when the activity engaged in by the racketeering enterprise involves violence, extortion, narcotics, or systematic public corruption.

(1) Definitions

Racketeering activity is any offense, including the violation of state law, encompassed by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1961 (1).

(2) General Authority

- a) The FBI has authority to conduct investigation of racketeering enterprises whose activities involve violence, extortion, narcotics, or systematic public corruption. A racketeering enterprise not engaged in such activities may be investigated under this authority only upon a written determination by the Director, concurred in by the Attorney General, that such investigation is justified by exceptional circumstances.
- b) A racketeering enterprise investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in a continuing course of conduct for the purpose of obtaining monetary or commercial gains or profits wholly or in part through racketeering activity. The standard of "reasonable indication" is identical to that governing the initiation of a general crimes investigation under Part II.
- c) Authority to conduct racketeering enterprise investigations is separate from and in addition to general crimes investigative authority under Part II and domestic security/terrorism investigations under Part III. Information warranting initiation of a racketeering enterprise investigation may yield information warranting a general crimes inquiry or investigation or a domestic security/terrorism investigation.

(3) Purpose

The immediate purpose of a racketeering enterprise investigation is to obtain information concerning the nature and structure of the enterprise, as specifically delineated in paragraph II D below, with a view to the longer range objective of detection, prevention, and prosecution of the criminal activities of the enterprise.

(4) Scope

- a) A racketeering enterprise investigation properly initiated under these guidelines may collect such information as:
 - (i) The members of the enterprise and other persons likely to be knowingly acting in the furtherance of racketeering activity, provided that the information concerns such persons' activities on behalf of or in furtherance of the enterprise;

- (ii) the finances of the enterprise;
 - (iii) the geographical dimensions of the enterprise; and
 - (iv) the past and future activities and goals of the enterprise.
- b) In obtaining the foregoing information, any lawful investigative technique may be used, in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs C 4 and 5 of Part I.
- (5) Authorization and Renewal
- a) A racketeering enterprise investigation may be authorized by the Director or designated Assistant Director upon a written recommendation setting forth the facts and circumstances reasonably indicating the existence of a racketeering enterprise whose activities involve violence, extortion, narcotics, or systematic public corruption. In such cases the FBI shall notify the Attorney General or his designee of the opening of the investigation. An investigation of a racketeering enterprise not involved in these activities may be authorized only by the Director upon his written determination, concurred in by the Attorney General, that such investigation is warranted by exceptional circumstances. In all investigations, the Attorney General may, as he deems necessary, request the FBI to provide a report on the status of the investigation.
 - b) A racketeering enterprise investigation may be initially authorized for a period of up to 180 days. An investigation may be continued upon renewed authorization for additional periods each not to exceed 180 days. Renewal authorization shall be obtained from the Director or designated Assistant Director. The concurrence of the Attorney General must also be obtained if his concurrence was initially required to authorize the investigation.
 - c) Investigations shall be reviewed by the Director or designated senior Headquarters official on or before the expiration of the period for which the investigation and each renewal thereof is authorized.
 - d) An investigation which has been terminated may be reopened upon a showing of the same standard and pursuant to the same procedures as required for initiation of an investigation.

B. Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations

This section focuses on investigations of enterprises, other than those involved in international terrorism, whose goals are to achieve political or social change through activities that involve force or violence. Like racketeering enterprise investigations, it is concerned with the investigation of entire enterprises, rather than individual participants and specific criminal acts, and authorizes investigations to determine the structure and scope of the enterprise as well as the relationship of the members.

(1) General Authority

- a) A domestic security/terrorism investigation may be initiated when the facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States. The standard of "reasonable indication" is identical to that governing the initiation of a general crimes investigation under Part II. In determining whether an investigation should be conducted, the FBI shall consider all of the circumstances including: 1. the magnitude of the threatened harm; 2. the likelihood it will occur; 3. the immediacy of the threat; and 4. the danger to privacy and free expression posed by an investigation.
- b) Authority to conduct domestic security/terrorism investigations is separate from and in addition to general crimes investigations under Part III A and international terrorism investigations under the Attorney General's Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations. Information warranting initiation of an investigation under this section may be obtained through the course of a general crime inquiry or investigation, a racketeering enterprise investigation, or an investigation of international terrorism. Conversely, a domestic security/terrorism investigation may yield information warranting a general crimes inquiry or investigation, a racketeering enterprise investigation, or an investigation of international terrorism.
- c) In the absence of any information indicating planned violence by a group or enterprise, mere speculation that force or violence might occur during the course of an otherwise peaceable demonstration is not sufficient grounds for initiation of an investigation under this section. For alternative authorities see Part II relating to General Crimes Investigations and the Attorney General's Guidelines on "Reporting on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest." This does not preclude the collection of information about public demonstrations by enterprises that are under active investigation pursuant to paragraph B 1(a) above.

(2) Purpose

The immediate purpose of a domestic security/terrorism investigation is to obtain information concerning the nature and structure of the enterprise as specifically delineated in paragraph (3) below, with a view to the longer range objectives of detection, prevention, and prosecution of the criminal activities of the enterprises.

(3) Scope

- a) A domestic security/terrorism investigation initiated under these guidelines may collect such information as:
 - (i) the members of the enterprise and other persons likely to be knowingly acting in furtherance of its criminal objectives, provided that the information concerns such persons' activities on behalf or in furtherance of the enterprise;
 - (ii) the finances of the enterprise;
 - (iii) the geographical dimensions of the enterprise; and
 - (iv) past and future activities and goals of the enterprise.
- b) In obtaining the foregoing information, any lawful investigative technique may be used in accordance with requirements of Part IV.

(4) Authorization and Renewal

- a) A domestic security/terrorism investigation may be authorized by the Director or designated Assistant Director upon a written recommendation setting forth the facts or circumstances reasonably indicating the existence of an enterprise as described in this subsection. In such cases, the FBI shall notify the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review of the opening of the investigation. In all investigations the Attorney General may, as he deems necessary, request the FBI to provide a report on the status of the investigation.
- b) A domestic security/terrorism investigation may be initially authorized for a period of up to 180 days. An investigation may be continued upon renewed authorization for additional periods each not to exceed 180 days. Renewal authorization shall be obtained from the Director or designated Assistant Director.
- c) Investigations shall be reviewed by the Director or designated Senior Headquarters official on or before the expiration period for which the investigation and each renewal thereof is authorized.
- d) Each investigation should be reviewed at least annually to insure that the threshold standard is satisfied and that continued allocation of investigative resources is warranted. In some cases, the enterprise may meet the threshold standard but be temporarily inactive in the sense that it has not engaged in recent acts of violence, nor is there any immediate threat of harm – yet the composition, goals and prior history of the group suggests the need for continuing federal interest. Under those circumstances, the investigation may be continued but reasonable efforts should be made to limit the coverage to information which might indicate a change in the status or criminal objectives of the enterprise.
- e) An investigation which has been terminated may be reopened upon a showing of the same standard and pursuant to the same procedures as required for initiation of an investigation.
- f) The FBI shall report the process of a domestic security/terrorism investigation to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review not later than 180 days after the initiation thereof, and the results at the end of each year the investigation continues. The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review shall review the results of each investigation at least annually.

IV. Investigative Techniques

A. When conducting investigations under these guidelines the FBI may use any lawful technique. Before employing a technique, the FBI should consider whether the information could be obtained in a timely and effective way by less intrusive means. Some of the factors to be considered in judging intrusiveness are adverse consequences to an individual's privacy interests and avoidable damage to his reputation. Whether a highly intrusive technique should be used depends on the seriousness of the crime and the strength of the information indicating the existence of the crime. It is recognized that choice of technique is a matter of judgement.

B. All requirements for use of a technique set by statute, Department regulations and policies, and Attorney General Guidelines must be complied with. The investigative techniques listed below are subject to the noted restrictions:

- (1) Informants and confidential sources must be used in compliance with the Attorney General's Guidelines on the Use of Informants and Confidential Sources;
- (2) Undercover operations must be conducted in compliance with the Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations;

(3) Undisclosed participation in the activities of an organization by an undercover employee or cooperating private individual in a manner that may influence the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment must be approved by FBIHQ, with notification to Department of Justice;

(4) Nonconsensual electronic surveillance must be conducted pursuant to the warrant procedures and requirements of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2520;

(5) Pen registers must be authorized pursuant to Department policy. This requires an order from a federal district court and an extension every 30 days, under the December 18, 1979, memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division to all United States Attorneys;

(6) Consensual electronic monitoring must be authorized pursuant to Department policy. For consensual monitoring of conversations other than telephone conversations, advance authorization must be obtained in accordance with established guidelines. This applies both to devices carried by the cooperating participant and to devices installed on premises under the control of the participant. See USAM 9-7.013. For consensual monitoring of telephone conversations, advance authorization must be obtained from the SAC and the appropriate U.S. Attorney, except in exigent circumstances;

(7) Searches and seizures must be conducted under the authority of a valid warrant unless the search or seizure comes within a judicially recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See also, Attorney General's Guidelines on Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third Parties;

(8) Whenever an individual is known to be represented by counsel in a particular matter, FBI shall follow applicable law and Department procedure concerning contact with represented individuals in the absence of prior notice to their counsel. The SAC or his designee and the United States Attorney shall consult periodically on applicable law and Department procedure.

V. Dissemination of Information

The FBI may disseminate information during investigations conducted pursuant to these guidelines to another Federal agency or to a State or local criminal justice agency when such information:

- A. falls within the investigative or protective jurisdiction or litigative responsibility of the agency;
 - B. may assist in preventing a crime or the use of violence or any other conduct dangerous to human life;
 - C. is required to be furnished to another Federal agency by Executive Order 10450, as amended, dated April 27, 1953, or a successor Order;
 - D. is required to be disseminated by statute, interagency agreement approved by the Attorney General, or Presidential Directive;
- and to other persons and agencies as permitted by Sections 552 and 552a of Title V, U.S.C.

VI. Cooperation with Secret Service

The FBI is authorized to provide investigative assistance in support of the protective responsibilities of the Secret Service, provided that all preliminary inquiries or investigations are conducted in accordance with the provisions of these guidelines.

VII. Reservation

A. Nothing in these guidelines shall limit the general reviews or audits of papers, files, contracts, or other records in the government's possession, or the performance of similar services at the specific request of a Department or agency of the United States. Such reviews, audits or similar services must be for the purpose of detecting or preventing violations of federal law which are within the investigative responsibility of the FBI.

B. Nothing in these guidelines is intended to limit the FBI's responsibilities to investigate certain applicants and employees under the federal personnel security program.

C. These guidelines are set forth solely for the purpose of internal Department of Justice guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any manner, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitation on otherwise lawful investigative and litigative prerogative of the Department of Justice.

March 7, 1983

William French Smith
Attorney General

A RAND NOTE



Prepared For

PUERTO RICAN TERRORISTS: A POSSIBLE
THREAT TO U.S. ENERGY INSTALLATIONS?

William Sater

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PREFACE

This Note is one in a series of publications produced by The Rand Corporation as part of a broad study of potential threats to U.S. nuclear programs. The research is sponsored by Sandia Laboratories.

Previous publications in the series include Kinrad Kellen, **Terrorists-What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions**, N-1300-SL, November 1979, and David Ronfeldt and William Sater, **The Mindsets of High-Technology Terrorists: Future Implications from an Historical Analog**, N-1610-SL, March 1981.

SUMMARY

The United States has had its fair share of terrorist incidents, but surprisingly few have been grave, compared to incidents in other parts of the world. The exceptions have been attacks by Puerto Rican terrorists who have been active in this country for more than three decades. These terrorists attained nationwide--and worldwide--notoriety in 1950, when they attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman. Four years later, in 1954, they followed with an armed assault on the U.S. House of Representatives, wounding five congressmen. Since then, Puerto Rican terrorists have gone through various phases of activity.

Who are these Puerto Rican terrorists? What are their political or other aims? What are their targets? This Note attempts to answer these questions, using information from the available open literature (primarily newspaper and journal articles) and interviews with law-enforcement officials.

By far the best known of the Puerto Rican terrorist groups is the FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional). As the name indicates, the overall declared aim of the group is Puerto Rican independence or separate nationhood, an aim that, curiously enough, is shared by less than 10 percent of the Puerto Rican population; that population, according to recent elections, favors either the status quo or the incorporation of their island into the United States as the fifty-first state. The FALN itself is the result of the 1974 merger of two movements, the **Comandos Armados de Liberación** (Armed Commandos of Liberation) and the **Movimiento de Independencia Revolucionario en Armas** (Armed Independence Revolutionary Movement).

Seven other Puerto Rican terrorist groups have also been identified. These groups and the FALN have carried out attacks in the United States and in Puerto Rico on various targets such as banks, FBI offices, and military installations. Their most deadly attack to date occurred in 1975, when they bombed the Fraunces Tavern in New York, killing four people and injuring sixty--three others. The Fraunces Tavern is located in New York's financial district, and the attack may thus have had additional symbolic significance.

The FALN and other Puerto Rican terrorist organizations are of particular interest, especially to the energy industry, for two reasons: First, Puerto Rican terrorist groups have struck energy facilities on their own island. Second, and more ominously, the FALN made a threat against nuclear targets in the United States during the seizure of the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogota, Colombia, in March 1980. The FALN and two Latin American terrorist groups issued a joint communique warning the United States that "you must remember...that you have never experienced war in your vitals and that you have many nuclear reactors." (1)

This particular statement provided the primary impetus for the initiation of the research described in this Note. The major findings are summarized as follows:

- o Attacks in Puerto Rico have generally been directed at U.S. military installations and personnel, whereas most attacks in the United States have been against buildings, banks, and other commercial establishments.
- o The number of attacks on the U.S. mainland has been declining, while in Puerto Rico, incidents have increased. It may be that the terrorists consider an attack on U.S. military installations in Puerto Rico to be equivalent to an attack on and in the United States.
- o Puerto Rican terrorists, although verbally committed to Marxist-Leninist lines, seem more devoted to Puerto Rican separatism than to socialism.
- o The political situation in Puerto Rico is such that no democratically determined political solution seems likely to bring about total independence in the foreseeable future, and nothing less will placate the terrorists. Thus, terrorism is likely to continue to be a threat.
- o Although the tactics and weapons of Puerto Rican terrorists have been rather primitive and no evidence exists as yet to indicate that they have the capability of successfully attacking a nuclear installation, their threats against the nuclear industry must be taken seriously.

Puerto Rican terrorists, like other terrorist groups, are bent on attaining publicity. Thus, an attack on a nuclear installation, even if not particularly destructive, would be potentially very profitable for them. The selection of nuclear installations as the target for the threat in their Bogota communique therefore cannot be underestimated.

I. INTRODUCTION

For over two decades, Puerto Rican terrorists—all of whom are separatists, favoring Puerto Rican independence—have waged a sporadic, but persistent campaign of terror against U.S. domination of their island. They have conducted this war of “national liberation” both on the U.S. mainland and, to a lesser degree, in Puerto Rico itself. The attacks in the continental United States obtained publicity for their cause that they could not have hoped to achieve had they confined their terrorist operations to Puerto Rico. The most notorious attacks were an assassination attempt on President Truman in 1950 and an attack in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1954, in which five congressmen were wounded.

The most prominent Puerto Rican terrorist group operating in the United States in recent years is the FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, or Armed Forces for National Liberation). The FALN emerged as a distinct entity in 1974, after about twenty years of relative inaction on the part of Puerto Rican separatists, following the 1954 assault on the U.S. Congress. Most FALN actions have consisted of bombings of banks and corporate headquarters in New York and Chicago, but in 1980 the organization threatened to attack a different sort of target: During the seizure of the Dominican Republic’s embassy in Bogota, the FALN and two Latin American terrorist groups issued a joint communique warning the United States that “you must remember . . . that you have never experienced war in your vitals and that you have many nuclear reactors.” [1] This threat against U.S. nuclear reactors attracted the attention of those charged with the security of U.S. nuclear programs. Earlier, in 1975, a Puerto Rican separatist group—presumed to be the FALN—had threatened to detonate 100 bombs, 25 of which were to have contained radioactive material. This threat was assessed to be a hoax. [2] Four years later, a person or persons claiming to be members of the FALN warned that they would blow up New York’s Indian Point nuclear plant. Again, nothing happened. [3]

There is no indication at present that the FALN or any other Puerto Rican terrorists have either the capability to mount a successful attack on a nuclear facility or the knowledge and means to assemble their own nuclear device. But given their demonstrated ability to operate in the United States and their continued striving for publicity, such threats may have to be taken seriously. The terrorists certainly have the conventional weapons to attack a nuclear installation, though they may not be able to actually seize or destroy one.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Puerto Rico became a U.S. possession in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War. The new colony submitted to U.S. rule and accepted a series of governors appointed by Washington. Although some sentiments for independence always existed among a minority of the islanders, there has never been a strong, popular separatist movement in Puerto Rico.

With the founding of the Nationalist Party in the 1920s and the assumption of its leadership by Pedro Albizu Campos, nationalist sentiments began to acquire some focus and direction. Albizu believed that Puerto Rico should not be dominated by the United States or “polluted” by its alien culture. He attacked U.S. imperialism and the “exploitation of the island by U.S. business interests.” Even so, in the 1932 general election, his Nationalist Party won only 2 percent of the vote. Its failure to attract widespread support was partly the result of successful efforts by insular officials to curb the separatists, but it also reflected the belief held by influential Puerto Ricans that independence would destroy the island’s fragile economy. Various measures which proposed granting the island freedom were introduced in the U.S. Senate both before and during World War II, but they were opposed by these influential Puerto Ricans.

The economic ascent that began during the New Deal and continued throughout World War II further deprived the separatists of popular support. Nevertheless, in 1950 they launched a small uprising. The uprising was quickly suppressed, but separatist sentiment was not eliminated. Later that same year, two Puerto Rican separatists attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman, and in 1954 four armed Puerto Ricans sprayed the U.S. House of Representatives with gunfire. A plot to murder the governor of Puerto Rico was subsequently uncovered. Albizu was implicated in these plans and was sentenced to prison, leaving the nationalist movement without its charismatic leader. An intensive police crackdown was launched on the independentistas and separatist violence abated.

Meanwhile, Puerto Ricans had voted in 1952 to become a commonwealth. Under this new arrangement, the island retained its ties with the United States, and thereby continued to enjoy the economic benefits produced by the relationship while acquiring increased control over some aspects of its political and economic life. A combination of economic programs, including Operation Bootstrap, and extensive emigration of Puerto Ricans to the mainland helped the island’s economy during the 1960s and 1970s, but by the mid-1970s, the economic boom had slowed. Construction started to taper off, tourism decreased, and as the U.S. economy weakened, many Puerto Ricans returned home. The world crisis of 1974 and 1975 further hurt the island’s economy, which was heavily dependent on imported oil.

Puerto Rico is beset by high inflation and suffers from the unemployment that began a decade ago. The precarious state of its economy had continued to cloud its political scene. Parties advocating independence habitually receive no more than 6 percent of the total vote cast. The remainder is almost evenly

divided between those favoring statehood in the United States and those preferring retention and expansion of Puerto Rico's commonwealth status. Therefore, many of those who demand independence seem to think that their goal can be obtained only by violence.

III. THE TERRORISTS

The most active Puerto Rican terrorist organization in the United States, the FALN, was formed in 1974 through the merger of the Comandos Armados de Liberacion (Armed Commandos of Liberation) and the Movimiento de Independencia Revolucionario en Armas (Armed Independence Revolutionary Movement). Both of these groups had been active between 1969 and 1971, primarily attacking American businesses based in Puerto Rico. Their members believed that independence was attainable only by armed struggle. Their purpose was to undermine "the imperialist power base on the island [and] to hasten a crisis which would shake the foundation of the Puerto Rican colonial world and enable the struggle to move on to the offensive and toward victory." [1] Concerted police efforts eventually destroyed both groups, but the surviving members formed a successor group called the Fuerza Unida Revolucionaria Pro Independencia Armada (United Force for Armed Independence), which later became the FALN.

The FALN's first operation was the fire-bombing of five New York City banks on October 26, 1974. Subsequent symbolic bombings--operations that caused no loss of life but were designed to cause extensive damage and thus attract attention--were directed against entities that the terrorists perceived as representing U.S. capitalism and imperialism. The violence of the attacks then increased, as a New York City policeman was lured into a booby-trapped apartment in East Harlem and was severely injured by a bomb explosion.

The FALN struck next in Puerto Rico, bombing two branches of the Chase Manhattan Bank and a power station transformer.

Back on the U.S. mainland, the FALN mounted an operation in early 1975 that was designed to kill and injure as well as to destroy. On January 25, they bombed the Fraunces Tavern, near Wall Street in downtown Manhattan. The bomb exploded during the lunch hour, killing four persons and injuring sixty-three others. This operation was ostensibly mounted in retaliation for an alleged CIA attack on an independentista meeting. However, the quest for publicity was undoubtedly an equally strong motive.

Attacks were subsequently resumed on symbolic targets, but they now spread to Chicago, and the targets included department stores, hotels, government offices, and military installations as well as banks and businesses. In all, 120 bombings have been attributed to the FALN since 1974. [2]

Prior to 1981, the only other Puerto Rican terrorist organization that had attacked targets on the U.S. mainland was CRIA (Comandos Revolucionarios Independientes Armados, or Independent Armed Revolutionary Commandos). CRIA is believed to have been responsible for 20 bombing attacks between 1977 and 1978. Their targets included the FBI's offices in New York City and Newark, New Jersey, and a number of Puerto Rican banks and economic aid offices based in New York. These attacks caused no loss of life but did considerable damage. There is no ready explanation for CRIA's sudden emergence and disappearance; it may simply have been a faction of the FALN operating under an assumed name.

Several other terrorist groups dedicated to Puerto Rico's independence are presently active on the island. To date, they have not turned their attention to targets on the U.S. mainland. These groups include FARP (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Popular, or Armed Forces of Popular Resistance); CRP (Comando Revolucionario del Pueblo, or People's Revolutionary Commandos); COPAAN (Comite Patriotic Anti-Anexionista, or Patriotic Anti-Annexation Committee); MAP (Movimiento de Accion Revolucionario, or Armed Revolutionary Movement); OVRP (Organizacion de Voluntarios de la Revolucion Puertorriquena, or Organization of Volunteers of the Revolution of Puerto Rico); and the Macheteros.

The Macheteros are the most active and dangerous of these groups. They surfaced in August 1978, claiming responsibility for the shooting of a policeman on an isolated Puerto Rican beach. In October 1979, they joined with several other pro-independence terrorist groups in the bombing of six government office buildings and military installations in Chicago and Puerto Rico. Two months later, the Macheteros combined forces with the OVRP and FARP to ambush a U.S. Navy bus near the Sabana Seca naval base in Puerto Rico, in retaliation for the death of a jailed Puerto Rican terrorist who hanged himself. Two American sailors were killed in the ambush and ten were wounded. In March 1980, the Macheteros again attacked military personnel, attempting to assassinate two American Army officers and an American sergeant attached to the University of Puerto Rico's ROTC program. In January 1981, the Macheteros scored their biggest coup, destroying nine jet fighter planes at Puerto Rico's Muniz Air National Guard Base. Using simple pipe bombs, the terrorists caused damage estimated at between \$30 million and \$40 million in just 9 minutes. They explained their action as a protest against U.S. military intervention in Latin America and affirmed their solidarity with other revolutionary groups in that region.

[1] Latin, Buenos Aires, March 21, 1980.

[2] Information obtained May 18, 1978, from the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security, through the Freedom of Information Act.

[3] "Puerto Rico, The Flame of Resistance," New York Times, September 12, 1979.

[4] Juan Angel Silen, "We, the Puerto Rican People," The Monthly Press Review, New York, 1971, p. 127.

[5] Risks International, Inc., Executive Risk Assessment, February 1981, p. 1.

MINDSETS AND IDEOLOGY

The Puerto Rican separatist movement is not monolithic but consists of a variety of factions which will, if necessary, cooperate with each other. The only common thread is the demand for independence. In this sense, the terrorists are isolated from the mainstream of Puerto Rican politics, but the lack of popular support does not seem to diminish their zeal.

Clearly, Puerto Rican terrorism attracts attention to the separatist movement. The more the independentistas can destroy or disrupt, the more they can demonstrate the power of their cause. Other groups which also began as terrorists and eventually led their nations to independence, such as the FLN in Algeria, have set examples for them to follow. The independentistas may believe that prolonged resistance to the status quo will increase the chance of international support for their cause and will convince the United States that granting independence is preferable to continued acts of destruction. The separatists may also believe that violence creates the setting essential to the process of nation-building. The Puerto Rican terrorists are similar to the Palestinians in this regard; they seem convinced that the actual process of the struggle they are waging creates a national identity for them. Thus, they may believe that acts of destruction enhance their movement's visibility, demonstrate their effectiveness, and create a climate of local and international support for their cause.

MODUS OPERANDI

Puerto Rican terrorists have generally attacked undefended or lightly defended targets. Although fanatical and seemingly unrealistic in their campaign to secure Puerto Rico's independence, the terrorists are not careless about their own safety. They generally prefer stealth and escape to armed confrontation and possible death or capture. Their preferred weapon has been the pipe bomb, which enables them to attack without warning and to use timers so that they can withdraw long before an actual explosion. When surrounded by superior numbers of police, as eleven FALN members were in 1980, they will surrender rather than initiate a gun battle.

Their most sophisticated bombs consist of dynamite packed in an ordinary lead pipe and attached to a fuse and timer, sometimes attached to a tank of propane gas. Such devices are easy to construct, simple to detonate, and very destructive. Thus simplicity by no means inhibits effectiveness.

Puerto Rican terrorists' assassination operations have been similarly uncomplicated. Although U.S. military personnel have recently become the focus of their attacks, they have traditionally sought unarmed targets who could be ambushed without difficulty and taken with minimal resistance. The combined Macheteros, OVRP, and FARP attack on unarmed sailors in an isolated part of the Sabana Seca naval base is an example, as were the plots to assassinate three ROTC personnel at the University of Puerto Rico and the attempted assassination of an Army recruiter in Waukegan, Illinois. In none of these incidents did the terrorists use anything more sophisticated than light automatic or semi-automatic weapons. To date, they have not employed RPGs, heat-seeking missiles, or other advanced weaponry.

The simplicity of the terrorists' weapons is undoubtedly one of their greatest strengths. They do not have to rely on external patrons for sophisticated arms and training, and they are able to obtain maximum effect with limited resources because of their mobility and the advantage of surprise.

TARGETING

Puerto Rican terrorists have attacked three types of targets: private property, government facilities, and individuals. While attacks in all three categories have increased since 1974 (see Figs. 1 and 2), violence against persons almost doubled. Historically, the independentistas have tended not to strike at individuals. Indeed, given the number of bombings, very few people have died. The deaths that have occurred have been deliberate, not the accidental consequences of bombings; most have been carried out in retaliation for what the terrorists believe is violence against jailed separatists. As more independentistas are incarcerated, there is an increasing risk that they may suffer injuries which, in turn, could precipitate the assassination of government officials or military personnel. This possibility would be particularly strong if jailed FALN members were to initiate hunger strikes like those undertaken by IRA members in Northern Ireland.

Puerto Rican independentistas have recently attacked energy facilities both in the United States and in Puerto Rico. These facilities have primarily been buildings belonging to large oil companies. While costly and sometimes deadly, the incidents have not been intended to disrupt energy production. A bomb did, however, disrupt the oil refining operations of one facility in Puerto Rico in 1974.

The island's electrical company has suffered extensive damage, particularly in 1977 and 1978, during a labor dispute when transmission lines and the grid system were attacked. Officials also discovered an explosive device at a Consolidated Edison facility in Larchmont, New York, which was apparently placed there as an act of solidarity with the striking electrical workers of Puerto Rico.

Actions against nuclear power or research facilities in the United States would not appear improbable. Such actions might take the form of mere threats, but they would still increase public awareness of the existence of the Puerto Rican separatist cause. The publicity potential of such an operation could be sufficiently tempting to cause Puerto Rican terrorists to launch something like a standoff attack on a nuclear installation in the United States.

TIES WITH CHICANO EXTREMISTS

The Puerto Rican independence movement has tried to establish connections with other dissident groups within the United States. The independentistas have courted the Chicano movement, as both share a common culture and language and also a history of "exploitation at the hands of the American imperialists." Some Puerto Rican activists even favor creating a united front of Chicanos, blacks, and native Americans. Such a movement, they seem to think, would be a powerful economic force which would support the independence movement and could paralyze the American economy.

A limited coalition of Puerto Ricans and Chicanos already exists. In June 1977, Puerto Rican activists and Chicanos combined to create the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN), an umbrella organization stressing the shared interests and shared history and intended to direct revolutionary activities. The MLN compares the American Southwest to Puerto Rico, and both are considered as having been incorporated into the United States not by choice but by imperialism. Speeches by MLN leaders deal with solidarity and honor the heroes of both areas, supporting the goals of both groups.[3]

An example of possible cooperation between Puerto Rican and Chicano extremists was the undercover presence of alleged FALN members in the Episcopal Church's National Commission on Hispanic Affairs. The federal government investigated various individuals belonging to the Commission, claiming that they had ties to the FALN. These investigations did not always result in indictments, partly because some of those subpoenaed preferred to go to jail for contempt rather than respond to the Grand Jury inquiries. Attorneys for two women associated with the Commission who served jail terms for contempt argued that the women were acting as lay ministers and could not violate confidentiality. They were questioned about the bombing of the Fraunces Tavern and the whereabouts of a FALN leader sought in the investigation. A judge who released the women after a 10-month silence stated that "all that has been shown is that the [fugitive being sought] was a one-time member of the Commission" and that the two women "may have had some knowledge of his whereabouts." [4]

However, one fact clearly emerges: The elements favoring a violent road to Puerto Rican independence have expanded beyond the ethnic enclaves of New York and Chicago. Authorities stated that dynamite discovered in the Chicago apartment of a suspected FALN member had been traced to a Colorado construction site. And explosives used in FALN bombings in New York and Chicago appear to have been stolen from a dam site near Tierra Amarilla, New Mexico, a center of Chicano political activity.

Radical groups that are not tied to one specific ethnic or radical element are also supporting the cause of the independentistas. The Prairie Fire Organizaing Committee, a Marxist-Leninist group affiliated with the Weather Underground, for example, recently stated its support of eleven FALN members arrested in Evanston, Illinois, in April 1980 and "the strategy of the people's war they represent." [5]

Thus, the Puerto Rican movement may now be able to draw upon the resources and skills of other elements. The independentistas have a nationwide network which should permit them to follow their plans more easily, particularly in the Southwest, where their targets could include nuclear facilities.

[4] "Three Year Inquiry Threads Together Evidence of F.A.L.N. Terror," New York Times, April 17, 1977; "Dud Bombs Discovered in Midtown in Building Targeted by F.A.L.N.," New York Times, August 9, 1977; "Release of 2 Women Held in F.A.L.N. Inquiry Urged," New York Times, December 6, 1977; "2 Women Freed After 10-Month Silence in Bomb Case," New York Times, January 25, 1978.

[5] "Solidarity with the Eleven Puerto Rican Prisoners of War," Breakthrough, The Political Journal of the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee, Vol. V, No.1, Spring 1981.

IV. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST ACTIVITY

During the past decade, Puerto Rican terrorists have demonstrated the ability to bring their "war of national liberation" to the continental United States. Since nearly 40 percent of all Puerto Ricans live on the U.S. mainland, the terrorists have ample means of concealment, support, and escape. Moreover, the connections established between the Puerto Rican extremists and various Chicano and radical left groups have further extended the terrorists' operational capacity. Therefore, we must expect continued attacks on U.S. commercial businesses, banks, department stores, hotels, government buildings, military installations, business and political elites, military personnel, and perhaps even nuclear installations. Campaigns may be waged to apply greater pressure on the United States to accord imprisoned Puerto Rican terrorists prisoner-of-war status. In addition, hunger strikes like those staged by IRA prisoners in Northern Ireland might be initiated. Apparently, the FALN has also contemplated kidnapping President Reagan's son Ronald or some high-ranking government official, intending to use a hostage as a bargaining chip for the release of the eleven jailed FALN members. Kidnapping and hostage-bartering may emerge as a mode of operation in the near future.

Puerto Rican terrorists have recently begun to attack U.S. military personnel and installations in both the continental United States and Puerto Rico. The military has become a favorite symbolic target of the terrorists because it is the most obvious manifestation of the U.S. occupation of the island. As Juan Antonio Corretjer, a socialist and advocate of independence, explained to the New York Times:

People call them terrorists ... But terrorists want to terrify a society. These groups have not directed themselves to terrifying the people, but to striking blows against the armed forces of the U.S.

There is an evident intensification to show the international community that Puerto Rico is a country occupied militarily by the U.S. [1]

The February 1981 issue of Executive Risk Assessment reported that "the U.S. Army is gravely concerned about increasing FALN threats against Puerto Rican members of the armed forces." During that month, a series of bomb threats were telephoned to Army recruiting stations in New York, New Haven, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Canton, Ohio, by a group purporting to be the FALN. A number of death threats were also made against Army recruiters. One recruiter, a Puerto Rican, barely escaped assassination in Waukegan, Illinois, by persons presumed to belong to the FALN. [2]

The FALN has recently begun to issue threats against business and political leaders. On April 8, 1980, police discovered a list of the names of some 100 American business executives in a vacant Jersey City apartment believed to have been a safehouse for one of the FALN members arrested in Evanston, Illinois, on April 4, 1980. Kidnappings of such men may well be planned for the future. Indeed, terrorist assaults in the United States are likely to continue, and they may increase, as a response to perceived American intervention in Central America, the continued military presence in Puerto Rico, and the unfulfilled demand for prisoner-of-war status for jailed Puerto Rican terrorists.

Violence has increased dramatically since 1974 and has shifted increasingly from the U.S. mainland to the island (see Apps. A through D). But the decline in activity in the United States appears to be a temporary phenomenon due, perhaps, to the capture of the eleven FALN members in April 1980. As new cadres appear, we should see a resurgence of FALN terrorism in the United States. The first wave of these new cadres may already be active. In May 1981, a group calling itself the Puerto Rican Armed Resistance claimed credit for placing five bombs at various locations in New York City during a four-day period. One of these bombs killed a man at Kennedy Airport. Some officials believe that the group is an offshoot of the FALN. [3]

[1] "Armed Puerto Rican Groups Focus Attacks on Military," New York Times, January 15, 1981.

[2] Risks International, Inc., Executive Risk Assessment, February 1981, p. 2.

[3] These New York bombings are not included in the statistics presented in the appendixes.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Puerto Rican terrorists have been active in the United States and Puerto Rico for more than two decades. Because of the island's political status, it is likely that separatist violence will continue. The only solution that would satisfy the terrorists is independence, a condition that is not likely to be attained, if only because less than 10 percent of Puerto Ricans seem to favor it. Despite the lack of popular support, the terrorists apparently remain committed to their campaign. As their frustration grows, their determination to secure independence by violent means, or at least to gain publicity, may well increase--and be translated into more frequent operations against more spectacular targets.

The Puerto Rican terrorists' techniques and methods of assault thus far are not particularly sophisticated, but they are effective and sometimes deadly. If the terrorists were to turn to attacks on nuclear facilities, their determination and modus operandi could make them a serious threat.

Appendix A

INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST PRIVATE PROPERTY
BY PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
1.	9 Feb. 1970	NY	MIRA	Attempted bombing of GE Building
2.	16 Mar. 1970	PR	UK	Bomb explosion outside of Kresge Store
3.	20 Mar. 1971	NY	MIRA (?)	Bomb Altman's Dept. Store
4.	20 May 1972	PR	CAL	Bombing of a hotel housing a political delegation
5.	26 Dec. 1972	NY	UK	Bombing of Bonwit Tellers
6.	26 Dec. 1972	NY	UK	Bombing of Gimbels
7.	26 Dec. 1972	NY	UK	Bombing of Bergdorf Goodman
8.	16 Feb. 1973	NY	MIRA (?)	Discovery of an incendiary device at Alexander's Department Store
9.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Bombs explode at: Marine Midland Bank
10.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Offices of Exxon and Chemical Bank
11.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Rockefeller Plaza, home of Banco de Ponce
12.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Lever Brothers House
13.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Union Carbide
14.	11 Dec. 1974	NY	FALN	Bombing of an apartment house
15.	1 Dec. 1974	PR		Bombing of Burger King (may be strike involved)
16.	1 Dec. 1974	PR		Bombing of ITT Building
17.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Bombing of Chase Manhattan Bank Branch
18.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Bombing of Chase Manhattan Bank Branch
19.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Bomb Power Transformer
20.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Bomb found unexploded
21.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Bomb found unexploded

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
22.	24 Jan. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of Fraunces Tavern four killed
23.	2 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of: N.Y. Life Insurance Bldg
24.	2 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	Metropolitan Life Insurance Building
25.	2 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	Bankers Trust
26.	2 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	American Bank and Trust
27.	2 Apr. 1975	NY	FALN	Blimpies Sandwich Shop
28.	23 May 1975	PR		Bombing of bank,
29.	23 May 1975	PR		Bombing of bank
30.	23 May 1975	PR		Bombing of McDonald's Hamburger Stand
				Bombing of:
31.	14 Jun. 1975	CHI	FALN	United American Bank
32.	14 Jun. 1975	CHI	FALN	First National Bank
33.	16 Jun. 1975	PR		Bomb 4 trucks belonging to PR Tel. Co. (may be strike related)
34.	27 Oct. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of National West- minister Bank
35.	27 Oct. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of First National City Bank
36.	27 Oct. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of First National ? Bank
37.	27 Oct. 1975	NY	FALN	Bombing of Chase Manhattan Bank
38.	27 Oct. 1975	CHI	FALN	Bombing of Continental National Bank
39.	27 Oct. 1975	CHI	FALN	Bombing of IBM Plaza
40.	27 Oct. 1975	CHI	FALN	Bombing of Sears Tower
41.	27 Oct. 1975	CHI	FALN	Bombing of Standard Oil Bldg. (attempted bombings)
42.	9 Nov. 1975	NY	FALN ?	Bomb First National City Bank
43.	7 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bombing of John Hancock Bldg.
44.	7 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bombing of Bank Leumi Le Israel
45.	7 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bombing of First National City Bank Plaza
46.	19 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN ?	Bomb Marshall Fields
47.	21 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN ?	Bomb Marshall Fields
48.	25 Jun. 1976	NY	FALN	Bomb Pan Am Building
49.	25 Jun. 1976	NY	FALN	Bomb 1st National City Bank
50.	25 Jun. 1976	NY	FALN	Bomb Chase Manhattan Bank
51.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Macy's
52.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Gimbels
53.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Lord & Taylor
54.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Lord & Taylor
55.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Altman's

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
56.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Altman's
57.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Korvettes
58.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Ohrbachs
59.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Bombing of Ohrbachs
60.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of Macy's
61.	12 Jul. 1976	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of Korvettes
62.	10 Sep. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bomb Holiday Inn (DND)
63.	19 Sep. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bomb Marshall Fields
64.	21 Sep. 1976	NY	FALN	Bomb Hilton Hotel (DND)
65.	18 Feb. 1977	CHI	FALN	Bombing of Merchandise Mart
66.	18 Feb. 1977	CHI	FALN	Bombing of U.S. Gypsum Building
67.	18 Feb. 1977	NY	FALN	Bombing of Chrysler Bldg.,-- Texaco Touring Center
68.	18 Feb. 1977	NY	FALN	Bombing of Gulf and Western Building
69.	24 Feb. 1977	NY	UK	Letter bombs mailed to Puerto Rican banks operating in New York City
70.	20 Mar. 1977	NY	FALN	Bombing of Whelan Drug Store
71.	20 Mar. 1977	NY	FALN	Bombing of American Bank Note Company
72.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Bombings of: Macy's
73.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Macy's
74.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Bloomingdales
75.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Bloomingdales
76.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Bloomingdales
77.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Bloomingdales
78.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Gimbels
79.	9 Apr. 1977	NY	FALN	Gimbels
80.	3 Aug. 1977	NY	FALN	Mobil Oil Building
81.	4 Aug. 1977	NY	FALN	N.Y. Commodity Exchange
82.	8 Aug. 1977	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of American Metal Climax Building
83.	14 Aug. 1977	PR	UK	Bombing of PR Bank
84.	10 Oct. 1977	PR	UK	Bombing of Pan Am Building
85.	11 Oct. 1977	NY	UK	Attempted bombing of Bank of Iran
86.	11 Oct. 1977	PR	CRP	Bombings of: Esso Caribbean Offices
87.	11 Oct. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb Gimbels
88.	11 Oct. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb Macy's
89.	11 Oct. 1977	PR	CRP	Mobil Oil Offices
90.	11 Nov. 1977	PR	UK	Electrical substation
91.	11 Nov. 1977	PR	UK	Bank
92.	15 Nov. 1977	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of Iran Air Office
93.	23 Dec. 1977	PR	UK	Destroy Electrical Transmis- sion Tower
94.	11 Jan. 1978	NY	UK	Bombing near a Chase Manhattan Bank
95.	14 Jan. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb Electrical Transmis- sion Tower

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
				Bombings of:
96.	19 Jan. 1978	PR	UK	AFF Tower
97.	19 Jan. 1978	PR	UK	AFF Power Lines
98.	20 Jan. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb AFF Tower
99.	31 Jan. 1978	NY	FALN	Bomb Con Edison Building
100.	8 Feb. 1978	PR	CRP	Bomb bank
101.	8 Feb. 1978	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of power transmitter
102.	16 Feb. 1978	NY	FALN	Attempted bombing of Manufacturer's Bank
				Bombings of:
103.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	Department Store
104.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	Woolworth's
105.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	National City Bank
106.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	Chase Manhattan Bank
107.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	Chase Manhattan Bank
108.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	Law Offices
109.	16 Feb. 1978	PR	UK	AFF Tower
110.	14 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Attempted bombing of First Federal Savings and Loan
111.	5 May 1978	PR	COPAAN	Bomb Democratic Party Headquarters
112.	24 Jun. 1978	Schaumburg Illinois	FALN	Bomb J. C. Penney
113.	24 Jun. 1978	Schaumburg Illinois	FALN	Bomb Marshall Fields
114.	24 Jun. 1978	Schaumburg Illinois	FALN	Bomb Sears
115.	7 Jul. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb Central Federal Savings Bank
116.	12 Jul. 1978	NYC	FALN	Bomb Macy's
117.	12 Jul. 1978	NYC	FALN	Bomb Korvettes
118.	25 Jul. 1978	PR	MIRA	Bomb Communications Tower
119.	29 Aug. 1978	NY	FALN	Bomb Macy's
120.	13 Oct. 1978	PR	MIRA	Bomb First Federal Savings Bank
				Bombings of:
121.	17 Oct. 1978	CHI	FALN, FRAP, OVRP, EPB	Republican Headquarters
122.	17 Oct. 1978	NY	FALN, FRAP, OVRP, EPB	Republican Headquarters
123.	17 Oct. 1978	NY	FALN, FRAP, OVRP, EPB	Democratic Headquarters
124.	17 Oct. 1978	PR	FALN, FRAP, OVRP, EPB	RCA's Isabella Tower
125.	14 Mar. 1980	CHI	FALN	Vandalizing of political headquarters of various candidates

Appendix B

INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PROPERTY
BY PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
1.	5 Mar. 1970	PR	MIRA	Assassination of 2 U.S. Sailors
2.	17 Mar. 1970	NY	CAL	Attack on Armed Forces Recruiting Center
3.	17 May 1970	NY	MIRA (?)	Attempted Bombing of a Recruiting Station
4.	18 Mar. 1971	PR	Individual	Assassination of a Riot Unit Policeman
5.	14 Mar. 1973	PR	Unknown	Bomb offices of University of Puerto Rico
6.	31 Aug. 1974	NY	FALN	Bomb Damrosch Park
7.	28 Sep. 1974	Newark	Unknown group claimed credit	Newark City Hall Police Bldg. bombed; 2 wounded
8.	26 Oct. 1974	NY	FALN	Bomb Federal Reserve Bank?
9.	1 Dec. 1974	PR	Unknown	Destroy U.S. Army Reserve vehicles, Gov't owned Water connected
10.	11 Dec. 1974	NY	FALN	Policeman injured by bomb
11.	31 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Government Electrical Agency's Transformer destroyed-- current is cut
12.	15 Jun. 1975	CHI	FALN	Federal Building bombed (Did Not Detonate)
13.	17 Jun. 1975	PR	Unknown	Puerto Rican Co. bombed-- may be strike connected
14.	27 Oct. 1975	NY	FALN	U.S. Mission to UN bombed
15.	27 Oct. 1975	WASH	FALN	State Department bombed
16.	27 Oct. 1975	WASH	FALN	Bureau of Indian Affairs bombed
17.	6 Jun. 1976	CHI	FALN	Bomb Police building
18.	25 Jun. 1976	NY	FALN	Bomb Police building
19.	10 Sep. 1976	CHI	UK	Bomb PR Dept. of Labor
20.	21 Sep. 1976	NY	FALN	Hilton Hotel bombed-- protesting presence of Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon
21.	1 Dec. 1976	NY	Indep. Armed Rev. Command	Letter bombs in U.S. mail-- 14 mailed; 1 postman injured

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
22.	3 Jan. 1977	PR	CLPR	Bomb ROTC Bldgs. at U. of Puerto Rico
23.	14 Jan. 1977	NY	Young Lords Party	Bomb Algerian Mission to UN
24.	21 Jan. 1977	UK	UK	Mailbombs addressed to various public officials including the President & Government agencies
25.	12 Mar. 1977	NY	Indep. Armed Rev. Command	Mailbombs in Post Office
26.	21 Mar. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb FBI Office
27.	4 Jun. 1977	CHI	FALN	Bomb county building
28.	3 Aug. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb Dept. of Defense Bldg.
29.	3 Aug. 1977	NYC	FALN	Bomb Dept. of Defense Office
30.	10 Oct. 1977	PR	UK	Bomb Reserve Officers Beach Club
31.	11 Oct. 1977	CHI	FALN	Bomb in Post Office
32.	12 Oct. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb outside of NY Public Library
33.	12 Oct. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb under police car
34.	15 Oct. 1977	NY	FALN	Bomb in National Guard Armory
35.	7 Oct. 1977	PR	UK	Bomb at statue commemorating U.S. landing in Puerto Rico
36.	25 Jan. 1978	PR	CRP	Bomb at Banco Gubernamental de Fomento
37.	31 Jan. 1978	NY	FALN	Explosion near police car
38.	8 Feb. 1978	PR	People's Rev. Armed Commando	Bomb FBI building in San Juan
39.	7 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Attack on Chilean Consulate in San Juan
40.	11 Apr. 1978	PR	CRP	U.S. Coast Guard Club
41.	14 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Attempted bombing U.S. Army Recruiting Agency
42.	14 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Attempted bombing Coast Guard Housing Project
43.	14 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	U.S. Corps of Engineers bombed
44.	19 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb U.S. Post Office
45.	20 Apr. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb U.S. Post Office
46.	9 May 1978	PR	UK	Bomb U.S. Post Office
47.	9 May 1978	PR	UK	Bomb U.S. Post Office
48.	9 May 1978	PR	UK	Bomb U.S. Post Office
49.	10 May 1978	PR	CRP	Bomb U.S. Army-Navy Recruiting Station
50.	10 May 1978	PR	CRP	Bomb a military vehicle
51.	18 May 1978	PR	UK	Bomb government owned vehicle
52.	22 May 1978	NY	FALN	Bombs explode in Kennedy Airport
53.	22 May 1978	Newark	FALN	Bombs explode in Newark Airport

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
54.	22 May 1978	WASH	FALN	Bombs explode outside Justice Department
55.	6 Jun. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb Post Office
56.	6 Jun. 1978	PR	UK	Bomb government vehicle
57.	19 Jul. 1978	PR	UK	Attempted bombing of Post
58.	31 Jul. 1978	PR	CRP	Bombing of U.S. Dept. of Agriculture vehicles
59.	24 Aug. 1978	PR	Macheteros	Kill policeman in theft
60.	24 Oct. 1978	PR	Macheteros	Bomb Federal Office Bldg.
60.	4 Oct. 1978	PR	MAR	Bomb Federal Office Bldg.
61.	18 Sep. 1979	PR	UK	Bomb attack on National Guard
61.	18 Sep. 1979	PR	UK	Armory
62.	17 Oct. 1979	CHI	FALN, Mach-	Bombing of Great Lakes
63.	17 Oct. 1979	CHI	eteros, FRAP,	Naval Station, various
64.	17 Oct. 1979	PR	Org. of Volun-	Federal as well as local
65.	17 Oct. 1979		teers for PR	offices and the political
66.	17 Oct. 1979		Rev., MAR	headquarters of both Rep.
67.	17 Oct. 1979		Rev., MAR	and Kennedy Hq.; gov't
67.	17 Oct. 1979			owned statue--6 attacks
68.	27 Oct. 1979	Conn.	FALN	Threat to Bomb Amtrack Train
69.	23 Nov. 1979	CHI	FALN	Bomb Recruiting office
70.	24 Nov. 1979	CHI	FALN	Bomb naval militia building
71.	24 Nov. 1979	CHI	FALN	Bomb recruiting office
72.	23 Dec. 1979	PR	Macheteros	Murder of 2 members of Navy
72.	3 Dec. 1979	PR	Macheteros	to retaliate for death of Angel Rodriguez Cristobal who, it is claimed, was murdered in his jail cell. Gov't claimed suicide. He had been jailed for trespassing on U.S. Naval property
73.	12 Mar. 1980	PR	Macheteros	Attempted assassination of
73.	12 Mar. 1980	PR	Macheteros	three members of ROTC facility at U. of Puerto Rico
74.	14 Jul. 1980	PR	UK	Destruction of four
74.	14 Jul. 1980	PR	UK	navigation beams used by FAA and Coast Guard to guide international air traffic
75.	21 Jul. 1980	PR	Rev. Commando	Bomb post offices
75.	19 Aug. 1980	PR	UK	Attempted bombing of post
76.	19 Aug. 1980	PR	UK	office
77.	8 Jan. 1981	PR	Rev. Commando	Bomb three post offices
77.	8 Jan. 1981	PR	del Pueblo	Bomb three post offices
78.	12 Jan. 1981	PR	Macheteros	Destruction of numerous
78.	12 Jan. 1981	PR	Macheteros	airplanes of PR Air National Guard

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
18.	12 Mar. 1980	PR	Macheteros	Attempted murder of 3 members of ROTC staff at Univ. of Puerto Rico
19.	15 Mar. 1980	NY CHI	FALN	Seizure and holding of people in political hqs. of George Bush and Carter-Mondale
20.	21 Dec. 1980	NY	Resistencia Armada Puerto-Riguena	Bombing of Pennsylvania Railroad Station

Appendix D

INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST ENERGY TARGETS BY PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Site</u>	<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>Incident</u>
1.	2 Dec. 1974	PR	Unk.	Cut water supply to Union Carbide's Caribe Oil Refining & Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.
2.	13 Dec. 1974	PR	FALN	Power Transformer
3.	11 Nov. 1977	PR	UK	Electrical substation
4.	23 Dec. 1977	PR	UK	Destroy Electrical Transmission Tower
5.	14 Jan. 1977	PR	UK	Bomb Electrical Transmission Tower
6.	19 Jan. 1977	PR	UK	Bombing of APF Tower
7.	19 Jan. 1977	PR	UK	Bombing of APF Power Lines
8.	20 Jan. 1977	PR	UK	Bomb APF Tower
9.	8 Feb. 1977	NY	FALN (?)	Attempted bombings of power transmitter
10.	16 Feb. 1977	PR	UK	Bomb APF Tower

STATEMENT OF OFFICER IN CHARGE. FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES UNIT LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM, CONCERNING DOMESTIC SECURITY GUIDELINES

I am detective Arleigh E. McCree, the officer in charge of the Los Angeles Police Department's Bomb Squad. During the past three years, the Los Angeles bomb squad has responded to 1875 suspected bombs and on 416 separate incidents have picked up explosive items. In this same period, we have experienced 95 bombings.

A significant number of the bombings have been carried out by terrorists organizations with four (4) terrorist groups being active in the greater Los Angeles area.

On four occasions, members of the bomb squad have narrowly escaped death or serious injury by disarming the terrorist bombs, moments before they were due to explode. This causes me grave personal concerns as I can't help but feel luck has played as much a part in this good fortune as their skill has.

My concern is amplified by the recent arrest of terrorists at Los Angeles International Airport,

when a bomb was placed at the Air Canada Freight office.

This group, ASALA, has threatened to carry out additional acts of terrorism unless their comrades are released. They have given those jurisdictions holding ASALA members until August 14 to free those detained.

Armenian terrorist groups have carried out 11 bombings and one assassination in Los Angeles.

It is unfortunate that our large law abiding Armenian and Croatian community is being tainted by this group of hoodlums. I have observed a gradual decaying process in our ability to separate the hoodlums and terrorists from the law abiding community. This has been brought about by the dismantling of the intelligence community, both on a national and local level.

I am fearful that this well intended, but absurd attitude on the part of federal and local policy makers will ultimately take a terrible toll in lives.

I have documented a series of the more serious instances of how these laws and policies affect our lives.

Unfortunately, it is even more pervasive than I have indicated, and many other useful instances are necessarily omitted.

A CASE FOR SELF-DEFENSE

A society that wishes to survive must have a self defense instinct. The reality of the physical world is that nations are engaged in a continuous struggle for territory and power. The need for a country to protect itself is constant.

The post-Watergate hysteria that exists in America today has rendered us a nation of defenseless victims. Well intended, but hastily enacted federal and local legislation has created a shield that insulates terrorists and criminals from legitimate investigations. In our attempt to guarantee our right to privacy, we have lost our ability to protect ourselves from the criminal and politically insane. Terrorists from the Puerto Rican FALN; the Symbionese Liberation Army; The Weather Underground; the Crusade for Justice; and the National Lawyers Guild have used their involvement in "political organizations" to insulate themselves from legitimate investigation while committing acts of terrorism.

In each of the documented instances, the terrorists were heavily involved in what they and the prevailing law would characterize as a legal political group, exercising its first amendment rights.

Like all law enforcement agencies, we in Los Angeles are being hamstrung by local right to privacy type rules; in fact, the Levi guidelines were used as a model to adopt our intelligence gathering rules.

The FBI, secret service, ATF, and other federal law enforcement agencies have been so hampered by the right to privacy law Title 5 U.S.C., Section 552A, that they are emasculated. The Privacy Act prevents the FBI from investigating any group that only advocates violence.

For example, the San Francisco based group, The Urban Guerrilla (TUG). The TUG No. 4 pamphlet published pictures, home addresses of PG & E executives, and instructions on bomb and explosives manufacturing. The articles exhort the formation of new NWLF cells and the bombing of the named PG&E executives. Is it any wonder that public officials are assassinated, shot and assaulted? For it's not a crime to merely advocate such acts, in fact, it could be against the law to warn the executive of the plot. Prevention against inside disruption is impossible when the inmates run the asylum. California Penal Code Sections 12300, 13302, and 11142 have been interpreted in such a bizarre way.

Most major police departments are politically intimidated to discourage investigation, surveillance and infiltration of left wing and environmen-

al groups; ironically, such sanctions rarely exist for right wing organizations. Extensive justification, to the point of absurdity, is often the order of the day if any surveillance has been conducted.

California Penal Code Section 13300, an extension of the Privacy and Security Act, prohibits the release of personal criminal history. This restriction could allow terrorists who have been released from prison to obtain employment with the very corporation for whose bombing they were imprisoned. The company would not be able to ascertain this information, consequently subjecting themselves to possible additional attacks.

A recent LAPD case involved a certified security guard who was arrested for a series of arsons and bomb threats to premises he was charged to protect. He was fired by the security firm but gained employment with a different security firm while awaiting trial. The guard subsequently built a hoax bomb and planted it in a public supermarket, causing evacuation and bomb squad response. His current security company was sued by the market for negligence in hiring this dangerous and licensed firearm toting security guard. In all fairness to the current security firm, Section 432.7 of the California Labor Code prohibits prospective employers from gaining access to arrest records. It is entirely possible the guard could apply for a job with another security firm, gain employment, and endanger countless lives again. It appears that between 13300 P.C. and 432.7 of the Labor Code, the public has no right to protection.

It is my opinion that the nine people involved with the organizations I will discuss now represent a prima facie justification for police infiltration and investigation.

Shortly after the SLA shootout, Kathleen Ann Soliah helped to organize the Bay Area Research Collective, a political organization that published a pamphlet called, "The Dragon." A series of ten publications were produced. Included in the articles were discussion of political issues, bomb making instructions and anti-police dialogue. Ultimately, Kathleen Soliah and several other members of BARC transcended advocacy and placed a series of bombs on police cars and corporation targets. Kathleen Soliah is still a fugitive and could well be using a similar "political group" to harbor her from arrest. Other members of BARC have been named in the same indictment as unindicted co-conspirators. Their whereabouts are also unknown.

In the mid-seventies, the Episcopal Church established the Commission on Hispanic Affairs. This group was heavily represented by the Puerto Rican community. Two significant people sat on this commission, Carlos Alberto Torres and William Morales. Most of their political rhetoric focused on independence for Puerto Rican and anti-police activity. Less than a year later, Carlos Torres, his wife

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Haydee, and Oscar Lopez Rivera were being sought for involvement in the FALN bombings. Carlos Torres and Oscar Rivera are wanted for investigation of the bombings, but Haydee was being sought for murder in connection with a death in the 1977 Mobile oil bombing in New York. William Morales' bombing activities came to light in 1978 when he blew his hands off building a parcel bomb. The device was consistent with bombs mailed to public figures, FBI and the CIA by the Armed Commandos for Puerto Rican Independence, a FALN splinter group. He escaped while awaiting trial and is a much sought fugitive. The point is again they used the Right to Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts to insulate them.

Explosives seized by authorities suggest that the FALN was at least receiving some of its explosives at one time from the Colorado based "Crusade for Justice." Interesting enough, the impact of the Right to Privacy Act prevented law enforcement from using telephone tools to prove a connection with long distance call records. They were similarly prohibited from investigating those groups that only advocate violence, which, as we shall see, curiously included the terrorist.

In the case of Crusade for Justice, a curious alliance appears. John Hara, a deputy director of Crusade for Justice, and Antonio Quintana were arrested for plotting to blow up police vehicles and facilities in protest of the upcoming IACP convention to be held in Denver. In February, 1976, Hara was sentenced to six years in prison. Interestingly enough, he was also the past president of MECHA at California Polytechnic College.

Another noteworthy player is Ricardo Romero a Crusade for Justice member who also sat on the Episcopal Commission on Hispanic Affairs. He was jailed in November, 1977, in Chicago for refusing to answer grand jury questions about FALN explosives and bomb factory and their connection to stolen explosives in Denver. He is reportedly the son-in-law of Corky Gonzales, the director of Crusade for Justice. When the FALN bomb factory was discovered, a .30 caliber carbine with filed off serial numbers was also recovered. When the serial number was restored, ownership was traced to the one and same Ricardo Romero.

Another terrorist we will look at is one Carlos Zapata who was killed in Denver by a bomb he was planting at a VFW Hall on March 22, 1978. He was also at one time a Brown Beret, Crusade for Justice member and involved in the National Lawyers Guild sponsored "Police Crimes Task Force." He was also reportedly involved in the Coors Strike Support Committee. It seems where there is smoke there is fire.

On the subject of the National Lawyers Guild, it appears that at times, they also transcend being advocates and indulged in terrorism. In several cases, the subjects not only were legal advisors,

but were advocates to terrorism as well. Many people insist that this is the prevailing philosophy in the Guild.

Bernadine Dohrn, the much sought Weather Underground fugitive, was named as the student Director for the National Lawyers Guild in 1967. At the National Convention for the Students for a Democratic Society in 1968, Bernadine Dohrn was selected as the Interorganizational Secretary of SDS, a national office. Asked if she were a socialist, Miss Dohrn answered, "I consider myself a Revolutionary Communist."

NLG member, Stephen Mitchell Bingham, is being sought by the State of California and the FBI for smuggling a .380 automatic pistol to George Jackson in prison, inside a tape recorder. Being a lawyer gave him the privilege of being able to bring a tape recorder into prison. The lawyer-client relationship can and will likely continue to be used by radical attorneys to shield them from security procedures, investigation, and prosecution. They also use the power of subpoena to get terrorist leaders together for strategy sessions.

Another interesting Guild member is Frank (Kiko) Eugenio Martinez. He was a Loyola law student that was active in NLG projects at the college and on the streets. Suspiciously, Frank's fingerprints ended up on several of the eight letter bombs mailed to Denver police officers in 1973. He was recently arrested at an Arizona Border Entry Station. His younger brother Reyes Martinez, also an attorney, was killed in a car when a bomb they were transporting exploded. Violent action seems to run in the profession and the family. The car belonged to Freda Bugarlin, Director of the Platte Valley Action Center, funded with over 1 million in federal, state and local funds. Zapata had also been active with the Platte Valley Action Center.

A final case brings the NLG very clearly into focus. In 1979, a federal Judge ordered Chicago police to turn over their intelligence files to NLG attorney, Jonathan Moore. He specifically ordered they be read, not copied, and returned. Copies were subsequently found in a Milwaukee FALN safe-house.

The NLG continues to act as a clearing house and as an apologist and defender for terrorists and terrorism. They have been at the forefront in drafting much of the national and local legislation, both proposed or enacted, that restricts, hampers, and emasculates police investigation. Mr. Levi, the former attorney general, was at one time a member of the NLG. His Levi guidelines are still the order of the day for federal officers. Is this just the tip of the iceberg?

The Weather Underground and its spinoff organizations have in many respects achieved more than most of the other groups mentioned. Several

of their former members have held congressional jobs, White House appointments, and jobs with the National Security Council. It looks like the old saying, "The foxes are in the hen house." is apropos.

A person worth looking at closely in connection with the Weather Underground is Clayton Van Lydegraf who co-chaired the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee with Jeniffer Dohrn, Bernadine's sister. He helped publish the original Prairie Fire pamphlet and Osowatamie. Both documents advocate revolution. He traveled extensively around the United States meeting other revolutionaries. Naturally, he was insulated from a complete intelligence investigation by the FBI as he was only "political," and following him or maintaining a dossier would be an invasion of his privacy. The truth of the matter is that Clayton couldn't or never intended to wait for the Revolution. He linked up with four Weather Underground Fugitives, planned and executed several bombings. This organization bombed the HEW office in San Francisco, the Selective Service Building, the State Department Building in Washington, D.C. and the cloakroom in the Capitol Building.

Members of the group were arrested in Los Angeles and Houston, Texas. They were planning the murder of a judge and were arrested during the construction of a device intended to blow up a Senator's election headquarters. This is a case of putting terrorism into politics. When taken into custody, they had two bombs, 181 pounds of explosives, 6 weapons, and monitoring equipment for police radio frequencies. PFOC still maintains it is a political organization thereby seeing that it is insulated from legitimate investigation under present Guidelines.

The recent brutal murders of the New York Police Officials and the Brinks Guard last October only serve to clarify this point of view.

Eve Rosahn, Judy Clark and other members of the anti-apartheid movement have been indicted for involvement in this bloody crime. When not "legitimately" protesting the appearance of the South African Spring Boks, she and perhaps unknown others were bombing, robbing, and murdering. How can we in law enforcement develop investigative leads, such as motive, means or opportunity unless we can investigate organizations which appear to manifest reasons for acts of terrorism? We must be allowed to investigate the membership, motives and actions of such groups.

A chilling example is the January assassination of the Turkish Consul General, Kemal Arikan, in Los Angeles, and it amplifies my point. Only the brave actions of a witness provided a clue to the identity of his murderers.

A follow-up investigation resulted in a search of the Sassounian residence in Pasadena. Only

then did we learn from his own photographs that Harry Sassounian was active in the Armenian Youth Federation and a participant in anti-Turkish demonstrations in Los Angeles. A good proactive investigation into this activity may well have saved Mr. Arikan's life. It is a sad commentary that we have been unable to prove or disprove his membership in the Justice Commandos of Armenian Genocide.

Might we not ask where is Marilyn Jean Buck, Joanne Chesimard, Candice Yockey, Ronald Stanley Bridgeforth, and Silas Bissel? Are they and countless others hiding in the midst of us? It is unfortunate that I cannot answer the questions. Will it take another Nyack, Lod Airport or Ankara, Turkey, to provide the answer?

Mr. Ronald Olin, in his article on "Evaluation of the United States Counter-Terrorism Response Capability" in the June, 1979, *Police Chief* magazine noted that "The terrorist threat is unconsciously aided by Department of Justice Guidelines on Domestic security investigations. Counter-terrorist operations must rely on timely, pertinent intelligence information, but an examination of the guidelines covering domestic intelligence shows that many of the activities necessary to collect the information are legally curtailed. This lack of basic intelligence limits activity to response after the fact. A comparison of the numbers of investigations which were conducted before and after recent Congressional hearings on this topic reveals the change of emphasis in this area." Other cases such as the Coors Strike Committee and the anti-nuclear protest groups provide different but compelling examples of a frustrated bombing investigation.

Mr. Olin's article quotes another writer in saying, "That for the past five years the United States has been stripping away its organizational, legal and ideological defenses against terrorism. Without exception, every person who has any acquaintance with terrorism understands that such forms of underground cell-structured, non-nationalist, absolutely disciplined organizations can be successfully combatted only with the help of counteractions that intersect the terrorist universe: secret surveillance, wire taps, mail checks, computerized files of millions of persons throughout the world, secret communications with counter-terrorist agencies in other nations, informers and infiltration."

These techniques are currently unacceptable in the existing political climate. In some cases, these techniques may be necessary for handling of critical situations.

FBI director Webster is quoted as describing the current state of terrorism in the United States as "embryonic." He also has stated that the police response to the SDS or Weather Underground and Black and white radical groups may have prevented

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the development of terrorism beyond its initial stages. It is possible that the very steps now condemned for use in the police community were responsible for preventing the further development of terrorism organizations in the United States.

In closing, I would like to be very clear that I believe the United States is, and should remain, the world's example of a country dedicated to in-

dividual freedom. We must all be vigilant in recognizing the potential for stifling legitimate dissent and its ultimate disastrous results. I also believe that the continued freedom of this country is dependent upon its ability to cope with the efforts of the enemy within who are committed to its destruction. We must rebuild our intelligence capability in self defense.

THE TARGETTING OF AMERICA: a special report on terrorism

LAURENCE GONZALEZ

If terrorists had been watching when Lebanese president Amin Gemayel arrived at the Madison Hotel in Washington last October, the sight would have warmed their hearts. The front of the building was swarming with police. Up and down 15th and across M Street, Secret Service agents stood guard, nervously watching the tops of surrounding buildings. Each man wore a single earphone with a wire that disappeared into his clothing. Inside the hotel, Lebanese secret police stood watch in the corridors while Secret Service agents searched floor to floor. Simultaneously, a private security firm staked out the building and coordinated communications. The hotel was strung with wires and antennas. The lobby was jammed with security personnel waiting, listening, anticipating. In short, Gemayel's mere presence caused an almost palpable level of anxiety not only within the hotel but throughout the neighborhood just north of the White House.

More precisely, it was not Gemeyel but an unseen presence that caused the anxiety.

What electrified the place was the uncertainty.

Would it be the man entering the elevator carrying flowers? Would it be the unoccupied taxicab parked by the side of the building? It might be a gun, a rocket, a poisoned apple or the Armenian double-bomb trick, in which the first bomb goes off, a crowd gathers to see what has happened, and then the second bomb goes off. Terrorism: Guess. Guess again.

Just one month earlier, Gemayel's brother, Bashir—himself the newly elected president of Lebanon—had been killed when a 400-pound bomb destroyed the Christian Phalangist headquarters in east Beirut. When Amin Gemayel left the Madison Hotel after a two-day visit, one could see the relief in the faces of the doormen; the concierge and the assistant managers: The place had not been blown up. No one had even phoned in a bomb threat. Gemayel was now someone else's problem.

We hear about terrorism almost daily, yet few of us have a precise notion of what it is. Fewer yet could say what sort of people we would find behind the ski masks. The experts aren't really sure of what most terrorists want. They haven't even been able to agree on a definition of terrorism. But however we choose to define it, terrorism has become a fact of life. Between 1970 and 1980, according to a 1981 conference at Los Alamos National Laboratories, nearly three terrorist operations per day were reported world-wide. The total number of people killed by terrorism in that ten-year period has been estimated at around 10,000. The cost in property destroyed was about \$200,000 per day. At least \$150,000,000 in reported kidnapping ransom was collected by terror-

ists between January 1, 1971, and late 1982. The security necessitated by terrorism costs billions. But terrorism is not only a major economic influence in the world today, it's a psychological and a political one as well.

It has permanently altered Western Europe, Japan, South America, Central America, the Middle East, Africa—most of the world, in other words. And now, some experts say, the U.S. may be the next big target.

There are people paid to worry about just that possibility, and in the International Club of Washington, where some of them gather to eat lunch, the tension is sometimes as thick as the cigarette smoke. Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (C.S.I.S.) is located in the same building. C.S.I.S. is a private think tank, and a lot of the thinking that goes on there these days concerns terrorism.

I sat in the club one day last summer listening to two of the world's top experts on terrorism, Yacov Heichal, former head of planning for the Israeli military, and Robert Kupperman, executive director of science and technology for C.S.I.S. They were making the small talk of their profession—discussing the prospect of being on various hit lists and the security precautions each takes.

"We're not on them so far as we know," says Kupperman, "but it's always a concern. It's something you watch for."

"They don't like me to walk around in Old Jerusalem," Heichal says of the Israeli security guards. "But I do anyway. I keep my eyes open. You have to keep your eyes

open. I like Old Jerusalem. It's my home."
How do you know when you're on a hit list?

"People tell us," Heichal says.

And then what happens?

He shrugs. "Maybe it goes away. Or maybe you're still on it. Maybe they get interested in someone else."

It was August 1982 and Israel had virtually leveled Beirut in an attempt to drive out the P.L.O. In the process, it had destroyed or captured nearly all the conventional military equipment the P.L.O. had acquired during the previous decade. While the P.L.O. had been founded as a terrorist group and achieved its status largely through terrorist actions, it had begun to show signs of becoming a more conventional nation, lacking only a place to call home. According to Heichal and others, Israel's actions have forced the P.L.O. into a corner where terrorism is now its only option. The question was when it would begin. Kupperman estimated that it would take another few months for the P.L.O. to get organized again. But the day after terrorists machine-gunned a Jewish restaurant in Paris, killing two Americans, Heichal was pacing back and forth in Kupperman's office, chain-smoking cigarettes and saying, "It's begun. It's begun." He turned to Kupperman. "Do you think it's begun?" It was a time of high anxiety. But in the business of counterterrorism, most times are.

"A two-star general in the field with 16,000 soldiers at his disposal," Kupperman says, "would laugh at the mere suggestion that a dozen well-prepared men could render him utterly powerless. Jimmy Carter might also have laughed once at the suggestion that a small group of ill-prepared Iranian students could render the entire U.S. powerless. But it did."

Across the street, I visited with Yonah Alexander, director of the State University of New York's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism. He is editor of the scholarly journal *Terrorism* (yes, terrorism even has its own magazine now). He shares the concern about the P.L.O. "It has to show it is alive and kicking," he says. "And the P.L.O. is very much alive. As a military force, it is no longer viable. It has lost the military option. But as a terrorist force, it certainly is viable. It has an eight-country network. I predict that it will intensify its activities. And Americans today are target number one throughout the world."

Why the United States? And why now?

In the view of academic spooks, as high-level intelligence types are often called, terrorist warfare—like warfare in general—is in a period of evolution. For a long time, terrorists were content to toss bombs, to stage some derring-do with airplanes now and then, to kidnap a few key political figures. But they are becoming more sophisticated, according to intelligence sources, not only in their methods but in their choice of targets. And they are

beginning to understand that the U.S. is a perfect terrorist target. It is the largest free nation in the world—a target of tremendous symbolic value. Since terrorism is largely a symbolic act, that is decisive. Second, the U.S. is a democracy. Most experts agree that a key element in the success of terrorism is good press coverage. It balloons the event and gives it a dimension it otherwise might not have. The U.S. is ideal because it has an uncontrolled and voracious press—essential for democracy, good for terrorism. And, finally, it's a highly mechanized society, dependent on fragile technologies that are subject to attack.

It may come from the P.L.O. It may come from the F.A.L.N., the Puerto Rican national-liberation movement, one of the most active on U.S. soil. Or it may come, as the kidnaping of General James Dozier did, as the Iranian hostage crisis did, well away from the U.S. mainland itself. Terrorists can attack the U.S. from anywhere in the world. The sun never sets on their targets of opportunity, except, perhaps, during the winter months in Alaska.

But some experts feel that the P.L.O. is the most immediate threat. Backed into a corner, it could turn to the U.S. as the last remaining pressure point, a last push for continued national existence. Among major concerns are that it could use blackmail (nuclear blackmail, biological-warfare blackmail) to shift U.S. foreign policy toward its own ends. Some say that the U.S. is the Hiroshima of terrorism, pristine if not untouched, being saved for something ultimate.

As usual, however, there is disagreement among the experts. Former director of the CIA William Colby says, "The P.L.O. does have a political option. Because of the way Israel handled itself with respect to the mass killings in Lebanon, the P.L.O. has a new recognition. It is being dealt with. It has Arab political support. The mass murders in Lebanon are the Israelis' downfall as far as the P.L.O. goes. The P.L.O. will continue to fight and will undoubtedly go over the edge, and to the extent that it goes over the edge, it will lose rather than gain. Your real problem is that you have an intractable difference between peoples, and they're going to fight each other. You've got to get a negotiated solution." He believes that the prospect of terrorism's sweeping the United States is overblown.

"The reason the U.S. has never had a major terrorist problem," says Colby, "is that you can't rally public support of terrorism, because the channels are open to legitimate protest. It's surprising that the blacks didn't resort to terrorism, but they didn't—probably because of the fine leadership they had from religious leaders, Martin Luther King, Jr., and others."

Even if we were able to rule out home-grown terrorism (and many people do not rule it out), that doesn't preclude the imported variety. In a world that hardly blinks anymore when someone snatches a

jet in Poland or Spain or Africa, there are a lot of groups out there for whom the United States is a target with an extremely high payoff potential. The Tupamaros, the F.A.L.N., the P.L.O., the Japanese Red Army, S.W.A.P.O., the I.R.A., the P.F.L.P., the Baader-Meinhof Gang, Black June, the Basque Separatists, the Christian Phalangists—there are more than 140 terrorist organizations currently in operation. Some, such as the P.L.O., have fairly clear motivations (a homeland—and erasing Israel from the map). Others, such as the Japanese Red Army, appear to be purely nihilistic—they seem to be saying that society, civilization, life itself are all worthless and should be destroyed. It may be difficult for us to grasp such a motivation, but it's just as real when the bombs go off.

Whether or not one chooses to believe that a terrorist-precipitated Armageddon is about to take place here, the notion has gained some currency in the Reagan Administration. The problem is that the Administration has responded to the terrorist threat as a convenient public-relations tool instead of a problem in need of solutions.

Kupperman gives the background: "In part, it was terrorism that cost Carter the Presidency. When the Iranians took over the U.S. Embassy, he failed to act. After one week, it was already too late. Then it went on for a year. The final ignominy took place in the desert where a rescue attempt failed before it even got under way. All that was left then was the rug bazaar: negotiating the price for the release of the hostages. For the terrorists, it was complete victory."

In the wake of that political debacle, the Reagan Administration needed a new public-relations tool—a banner, as it were. Human rights wouldn't do, primarily because it was old and was associated with the Carter Administration. And anything associated with the Carter Administration seemed to carry with it the lingering smell of political death. Reagan came to power proclaiming that terrorism was America's number-one foreign-policy problem. Alexander Haig (himself once a target of a terrorist bomb) held a press conference to announce that the Soviets were "training, funding and equipping" terrorists around the world.

Coincident with the installation of the new Administration, two books were published that would strongly influence thinking about terrorism. One was the scholarly work Kupperman co-authored, *Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response*, now considered a classic within academic circles. *Terrorism* magazine summed up the book's content: "There is a very real danger in the years ahead that terrorist groups will seek to further their causes by resorting to high-technology terrorism."

The other influential book was by journalist Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network*, published by and excerpted in *Reader's*

Digest. It was not considered a scholarly work and was, in fact, savaged by the press. Sterling was accused of timing the book to promote the Reagan Administration's point of view, an accusation she flatly denied. Her book described in elaborate detail a massive Soviet conspiracy to use terrorism world-wide to destabilize democratic societies.

Almost immediately, the battle lines were drawn on either side of the Soviet question. Senator Jeremiah Denton opened the hearings of his Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on April 24, 1981, surprised that the room wasn't jammed with Senators eager to nail down the Soviet menace. Undaunted, Denton launched into a tirade against Soviet expansionism and support of world-wide terrorism. Often waxing incomprehensible in his windy statements between questions, he was given to what can only be called raving. "The Soviets were not particularly terroristically inclined in the sense of the fragmented terrorism that was going on around the world," he said. And: "Americans, in general, are not fractionally appreciative of this relativity of badness and goodness." Although I am quoting him out of context, he spoke largely out of it as well. One of his key witnesses was Sterling, to whom he said, "I must say that, although I have great respect for the CIA and our other institutions, I believe that they have such a multitude of matters with which to concern themselves, necessarily, that you, in the field of terrorism, in my opinion are the most valuable source I know of from which to extract that which is significant and news."

But while Sterling and Denton were spinning out their theories of the Soviet connection, the State Department and the CIA, under orders from the White House, were trying to dig out some hard evidence of it. The Administration, as Kupperman put it, "got burned painfully trying to prove that the Soviet Union was behind it all." Soon, it was being reported "in the press that a draft of the national-intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA had been rejected by Haig because it didn't prove the Soviet connection. It had been sent back for redrafting to make it square with the Administration's line. Unfortunately, it never did. The evidence just wasn't there, at least not in the eyes of the CIA.

Colby was called to testify for Denton and did so. And while he admitted some Soviet involvement and responsibility, he had a more moderate version of the story. "With reference to directing the [terrorist] 'orchestra,'" he said, "no, the Soviets are not directly directing the orchestra today. But, yes, they did provide the instruments in the training and some of the equipment that these people had originally and [the Soviets] bear a responsibility for their use. . . . I think there is a feeling that there is some central war room with flashing lights and red arrows on the wall, and so

forth; that it is all being run from some big center. That is not the way terrorism works, and I do not think there is such a central war room for the whole movement."

As most bright intelligence workers knew then and know now, terrorism is a messy, complicated business, not easily packaged as a public-relations tool. Even Kupperman, who is associated with the "Georgetown crowd," typically identified with the right-wing position on terrorist matters, said, "Although Russia certainly provides funding for some terrorist operations, if it withdrew that patronage, little would change. Terrorists know how to raise money. Furthermore, there is really no need for a master conspiracy to keep terrorism going. But," he added by way of warning, "the very diversity and uncontrollability of terrorists make them that much more dangerous to the United States. Terrorists are not constrained by diplomatic considerations. Moreover, it is a mistake to assume that terrorists are necessarily rational people. In many cases, they most definitely are not."

Once again, the proponents of the Soviet connection are undoubtedly sincere, whether they are right or wrong. But the Soviet connection is also a powerful public-relations tool and is almost certain

years in the Army, 13 of them as director of national-security studies at West Point. He is now director of political-military studies at C.S.I.S. He is part of the nation's brain trust on terrorism. Lean and fit-looking, he has neatly cropped, straight black hair and clear eyes. On the left side of his upper lip, at the corner of his mouth, is a scar shaped like a bent staple. It makes it seem as if he's smiling even when he's not.

"The military does not cope well with uncertainty," he says. "And that's what terrorism is. In Vietnam, the war was lost to the Cong—terrorists. When the Cong massed as conventional units, we ate their ass alive. And they learned not to mass. In Four Corps, we had an east-west road between two towns. We *owned* it during the day. But going out on it at night was a suicide mission."

The lesson of Vietnam, he says, is that you can't fight terrorists with a conventional army. And the U.S. hasn't learned the lesson.

Both Kupperman and Taylor have pointed out that the future of warfare promises to be far different from its past. In their view, land wars are outmoded and nuclear war is still unthinkable, contrary to what *Time* and *Newsweek* would have us believe. The warfare of the future is low-intensity conflict—in other words, terror-

"The entire crisis treatment of terrorism has been one of denial," Kupperman says."

to be misused, even if there is some truth in it. And in the meantime, it stands in the way of actually confronting the problem.

Kupperman, Alexander and others are concerned that if the terrorist threat becomes reality in the U.S., it will be too late for us to react properly. "The entire crisis treatment of terrorism has been one of denial," Kupperman says. "One of believing in a self-fulfilling prophecy: If you breathe a word about it, if you even think about it, it's going to happen. Well, it has happened, and we weren't ready for it."

He points out that in the two most important terrorist incidents in the U.S.—the Iranian hostage crisis and the seizure of Washington embassy buildings by Hanafi Moslems—we botched the handling of the situations. But the terrorists don't need to operate within the borders of the United States to have the desired effect, as demonstrated in Iran. "Qaddafi threatened to attack nuclear facilities in Western Europe. Right now, NATO is hanging by a thread. It would fold if those facilities were attacked. Every European nation would demand that we remove the nuclear weapons, and NATO has little else."

But what of the U.S. military? Isn't it prepared to deal with terrorists if the need arises? A man well versed in the problems that terrorism presents for the military is Colonel William J. Taylor, who spent 27

ism. It's cheap, it requires little training or equipment and few men, and there is no trench or fallout shelter into which one can climb to escape it.

"We would find a strategic nuclear exchange to be an extraordinarily unlikely event," Taylor says, adding that the Soviets aren't going to start a nuclear war, because it would be too costly. "They're not going to start a land war in Europe, either, because that would lead inexorably to nuclear war. Anyway, they're probably going to get what they want in central Europe. But now they're going to low-cost, low-risk operations. There are going to be more Cubas, more Ethiopias—the operations for which we're least prepared. We train for the big war. But not for this other stuff. We're training for the least likely forms of conflict and not training for the conflict we're in. We need better intelligence to cope with terrorism, and we're not getting it. For the most part, the American officers stationed in Europe don't speak German. So how can they know what's going on if they can't listen to what people are saying? The secret of counter-terrorism is intelligence—nonmilitary, nonstandard intelligence. The military is a target, so the military has to respond. The Army doesn't coordinate well with others. It needs to—with the FBI, the CIA and other services. It may have to resort to other forms of intelligence—payoffs to in-

formants, dirty tricks, maybe the use of extortive measures.

"So far, the terrorism has amounted to kidnaping Dozier and bombing an officers' club—that sort of thing. Future terrorists may take whole compounds. They may also take a nuke. Nobody in the military has trained to handle this. What's being taught at West Point? One lesson on terrorism in the entire four years."

He says that when he berated a student at the war college for not paying attention to the material, the student, a colonel, said, "Sir, with all due respect, you're mistaking me for somebody who gives a shit."

Taylor leans forward on his desk and his eyes go to points. The scar makes it appear as if he were smiling, but he is not. "We are at war," he says.

At war, perhaps, but with whom? If we are to believe the proponents of the Russian connection, we are at war with the Soviet Union. But academic spooks and other experts in a position to know say that it is not that simple. The Russian connection is just a convenient way to package the problem not only for public consumption but also for the Administration. The Administration doesn't want to deal with anything more complicated than the Russian connection. Because if you take away the Russians—or even say they are only partly responsible—you are left with a Hydra-headed monster that replicates itself infinitely as you attempt to destroy it.

Moreover, if we are at war with such elusive enemies, we still don't even know who they are, what they want and how to tell the terrorist from the other people in conflict. Colby says that when he was parachuting behind enemy lines in Germany during World War Two, he was considered a terrorist and hastens to point out that he was not, for he was fighting a declared war and was not attacking innocent civilians. "Terrorism is, of course, a tactic," he says. "It particularly applies to endangering innocent people in order to demonstrate a terrorist's power or to influence others. Thus, the deliberate tactic of the F.L.N. in Algeria was to demonstrate French inability to maintain order by randomly machine-gunning passengers waiting at bus stops."

Harry Rositzke, a former CIA expert on the Soviet Union, wrote, "Confusing simple terrorism with serious revolutionary 'wars' will create problems for United States policy makers." And so we find ourselves at yet another disadvantage. We are big and simple and visible. The terrorist is small and numerous and unfathomable. Who will win?

W. Clifford of the Australian Institute of Criminology is the man responsible for having terrorism put on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations. "Where modern terrorism strikes a liberal state," he said, "the appearance, at first, is that of a malevolent David ranged against

a benevolent Goliath. And in constraining the monstrous upstart . . . Goliath has to be careful that his methods do not ultimately deprive him of his benevolent image and reveal him as an infuriated bully hitting out at everyone. It is precisely this transformation of labels that the terrorist seeks to achieve by his atrocities."

The classic contemporary example of how terrorism works is Uruguay. It was one of the few true democracies in South America. There were free elections, free trade unions, a healthy population and a functioning Social-Democratic government. In the mid-Sixties, a far-left Marxist group, the Tupamaros, was trained in Cuba for urban guerrilla warfare. It was trained according to the theories of a Brazilian terrorist, Carlos Marighella (not to be confused with Carlos the Jackal), whose classic work, *Mini Manual for Urban Guerrilla Warfare*, explained terrorism this way:

First, the urban guerrilla must use . . . violence . . . to win a popular base. Then the government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police roundups, house searches, arrests of innocent people make life in the city unbearable. The general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems and resorts, purely and simply, to the physical liquidation of its opponents. . . . [Then] the urban guerrilla must become more aggressive and violent, resorting without letup to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations, assaults, kidnapings and executions, heightening the disastrous situation in which the government must act.

In the Sixties, the Tupamaros began bombing, assassinating and kidnaping at random. Feeling frightened and helpless, the Uruguayan people demanded that the government do something—anything—to stop the violence. Thousands demonstrated in the streets. By 1972, the government was forced to act. It brought in the army to attempt to restore order. But a terrorist doesn't stick out from the crowd. He looks like everyone else. So how do you crush him? The army did the only thing it knew how to do: It controlled not just the terrorists but the entire population. The result has been that Uruguay is now a police state run by the military. The Tupamaros have provided a model for many terrorist groups since then.

While the people who protect Government officials in the U.S. are extremely sensitive to that very problem, it is difficult to avoid the appearance of a police state when the police are forced to act as if a terrorist bombing or an assassination were about to occur. And this is the central paradox of terrorism: There is no real defense against it, because the defense itself is an admission of defeat and plays into the hands of the terrorists. Throwing

up the extravagant security curtain around the Madison Hotel to protect President Gemayal was like putting up a great neon sign advertising the power of the terrorists.

Terrorism is so effective, in fact, that merely *suggesting* it works as well as committing a terrorist act. When Secret Service agents heard rumors that a Libyan hit team was coming down from Canada to assassinate President Reagan, they were so afraid that it *might* be true that they wouldn't let him go out to light the White House Christmas tree. An unimportant failure, it would seem, but one with tremendous symbolic value for the Libyans. The White House Christmas tree, the symbol of peace on earth and good will toward men, had been transformed into a reminder of the American giant afraid of its own shadow.

Although the U.S. has by no means become a police state, we have by otherwise insignificant increments made dramatic changes in our attitudes toward authority during the past dozen years. The House and the Senate galleries of the U.S. Capitol building are guarded by ranks of Sentries metal-detection gates. We say, "So what?" Better that than have some nut toss a bomb down there. No one would think to object to a luggage search at an airport. Clifford, on the other hand, asked "how far a democracy can afford to become undemocratic in dealing with those who seek to destroy its very existence. . . . Should there be restraints on a person's freedom to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theater. . . ?" Perhaps. It is, after all, illegal to joke about bomb threats at an airport gate. You can go to jail for it.

There has been a general blurring of where individual rights end and the right of society to protect itself against an individual begins. Take the Tylenol case, for example.

During the fall of 1982, after several people had been killed by Tylenol that had been laced with cyanide, no one seemed even mildly alarmed when video tapes were produced showing one of the victims purchasing the Tylenol that killed her. It just seemed natural. Indeed, it seemed a good thing that those cameras had been there, for they also photographed a man thought to be a suspect in the murders. He turned out to be a look-alike. In fact, during that period of time, precisely what Marighella described took place: "The police roundups . . . of innocent people." A number of people with beards were falsely accused because the suspect had a beard. But people put up with it in good spirits. After all, there was a greater danger afoot, a special situation.

No one, of course, has suggested that the Tylenol killings were terrorist acts. But they give an idea of how terrorism can work even in the largest democratic nation. Within a few weeks of the Tylenol incident, police agencies were deluged with reports from people who either

thought they had seen the bearded suspect or thought their drugs had been tampered with. Mass hysteria ensued at a high school football game when a rumor swept through the crowd that the Coca-Cola sold there had been poisoned. More than 100 students were taken to the hospital with symptoms of food poisoning, which turned out to be anxiety attacks. Overnight, the entire country was clamoring for stricter legislation, tighter controls, more security.

But suppose that this wasn't the act of a lone madman. Suppose that the P.L.O. had poisoned the Tylenol. And suppose that the problem, rather than disappearing, began to get bigger. Say people began dropping dead from eating oranges. One year, P.L.O. terrorists injected a few Israeli oranges with mercury and the entire crop had to be destroyed because no one would eat them. (Ironically, metallic mercury isn't even particularly poisonous when ingested.) The result in such cases is that people demand that the government do something: Without considering the long-range consequences, we give up little by little our rights and our freedom for the appearance of protection.

This may seem insignificant, but in France, the *Renseignements Generaux* (comparable to our FBI), in an effort to combat terrorism, has assembled a file of 22,000,000 names, nearly half the population. Scotland Yard has 1,300,000 names in a similar file, and West Germany's BKA secret police has 3,000,000.

We haven't experienced even a taste of what day-to-day terrorism is like in some countries, where the university presidents, the news commentators, the liberal lawyers, the local politicians are slaughtered systematically, one by one. Yet we have already allowed intrusions that would have been unthinkable 15 years ago. So imagine what we might put up with if a trained, well-equipped terrorist group selected the United States as a prime target.

Besides being considered one of the world's foremost authorities on terrorism, Robert Kupperman is a pure scientist of considerable accomplishments. He has a Ph.D. in applied mathematics and a grounding in a number of other sciences. He is a consultant to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and to the Rand Corporation, Sandia Laboratories and a number of foreign governments. He was chief scientist for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and organized the NATO International Conference on Earthquakes. One of his current activities is attempting to get the Government to face up to the possibility of a problem here in the U.S.

One way he does that is by designing terrorist war games. In effect, he plays the role of terrorist and thinks up something diabolical to do. Then he stages the game

with members of the Government representing those who would actually have to react to such a crisis.

For example, suppose terrorists broke into a nuclear-weapons-storage site somewhere in Europe and held some officers (or some nuclear weapons) hostage. It would hardly matter whether the terrorists ultimately succeeded or failed; any protracted hostage/barricade situation at a nuclear-storage facility could easily cause the European governments to insist that the U.S. get all its nuclear weapons out of Western Europe. That, of course, would effectively be the end of NATO. That is the sort of problem Kupperman throws at the Government. And there are no ready answers. If you were President, what would you do?

Kupperman's answer: "You have to end it quickly, and you have to face the possibility that some people might get killed in the process. You simply evacuate the area and end it as neatly as possible. Then you hope like hell that confidence is maintained."

This is a matter of national sovereignty of the utmost importance, he says, a case in which the use of force is justified. In contrasting the Iranian hostage situation with the siege by Hanafi Moslems in Washington, experts point out that in the first case, we should have stormed the embassy to end the deadlock, even at the risk of lives, because national sovereignty was at issue. In the second case, it was not, and there was no need to use force. The trick is knowing how to react in each case and to react immediately and never to make a mistake.

"That's the point," says Taylor. "It can shred your profession, it can shred your country. It can create great uncertainty: that for which the military officers are least prepared. Military officers are taught to fight set-piece battles toe to toe with the enemy."

And while such lessons as Kupperman teaches in his elite classrooms may prove valuable, most experts—including Kupperman himself—agree that it would be much easier for terrorists to choose chemical- and biological-warfare (C.B.W.) methods than to steal a nuclear weapon.

Alexander says, "What's really worrisome is escalation from conventional to nonconventional force—that is, from the bomb to the chemical and biological or the nuclear. The P.L.O. and Fatah a few years ago made the decision to go nuclear to balance power with Israel. Whether or not they have, I don't know. I would not be at all surprised if they had. And if you escalate to chemical- and biological-warfare methods, it is a threat to civilization itself. They've thought of it. There have already been incidents of terrorists using C.B.W., and they have been intercepted."

Where? I asked.

"All over."

In the U.S.?

He nodded.

It's not surprising that such incidents do not become public. Most Government officials don't even want to *think* about the possibility of C.B.W.'s being used. But as early as 1975, Viennese authorities arrested a group of Germans who were attempting to sell Tabun to terrorists. Tabun is nerve gas. That same year, terrorists contaminated a Viennese train with iodine-131, a radioactive isotope that causes cancer. And although no one will talk much about it, intelligence services now have evidence that terrorists are creating biological-warfare weapons. What, exactly, is biological warfare?

"Two sailors," one source said, "on a nuclear aircraft carrier, contaminated with a lethal virus. I don't want to name it. It's the only disease I know of that the doctors and nurses treating it invariably contract. It also has a ten-day incubation period and a mortality rate of more than 90 percent. So you'd have this nuclear ghost ship drifting nine days out. The Navy doesn't like to talk about it. It has already had cases in which a single infected sailor contaminated 20 percent of a ship's population—not intentionally, just by accident. But you see the point."

"In despair," Alexander says, "if all were lost, terrorists might decide to commit suicide." In a paper delivered before a conference on the future of warfare, he wrote, "It is possible that certain conditions could provide terrorists with an incentive to escalate their attacks dramatically. Relevant examples include . . . perceptions that the 'cause' is lost and, hence, recourse to the 'ultimate weapon' is justified." He calls such suicide the Samson Solution: Bring the whole house down, taking the Philistines with you.

A few years ago, when a Princeton student designed an atom bomb, a great deal was made of the ease with which a terrorist group could "hold the world hostage." Although it is highly likely that a "gray market" in plutonium will arise over the course of this decade, according to intelligence sources, the atom bomb isn't the likely weapon of choice. It is difficult and dangerous to make a nuclear weapon. There are easier ways. And those in the counterterrorism business are worried that if they have thought of such methods, so have the terrorists.

If Kupperman is America's top expert on terrorist games, Heichal may be the world's foremost designer of those exercises in the unthinkable. For each game, a handbook is written and kept under lock and key. "They're very dangerous," Heichal says. "We always think of what would happen if someone got hold of them. Then there are scenarios we think up that we are afraid even to write down. They are too simple, too horrible. I wake up at night sometimes thinking about them."

Taylor believes that the risk of playing terrorist war games is worth taking. He says it's necessary to "make people con-

front the incidents and think them through before they happen." What, exactly, is it that the experts are worried might happen? There are two sides to the problem. One is that terrorists might attack our high technology. The other is that they might use high technology to attack us.

In the first instance, a few people with rocket-propelled grenades (easily available on the black market) could knock out the electrical power for a large part of the New York City area. The grenade launchers would be in the back of their jeep, covered by a tarpaulin. They would stop by the side of the road, fire, cover the weapon and be gone before anyone knew what had happened. The targets: extremely high-voltage transformers (E.H.V.s). They're custom-made in Europe, one-of-a-kind items, and there are no replacements waiting if one is destroyed. It could take up to six months to replace a single E.H.V. The ones that control all the power for New York City are within firing range of a large highway. When New York was blacked out for only one day, in 1977, there was uncontrolled looting, arson and general chaos. No one wants to think what a two-week blackout might do, yet the E.H.V.s remain largely unprotected today.

A group of fewer than a dozen terrorists could cut off 75 percent of the natural-gas supply to the Eastern Seaboard in a few hours without ever leaving the state of Louisiana. The pumping stations and the places where exposed pipes cross rivers are unguarded. In the middle of winter, such an attack could cripple the nation. The cost of the operation would be a few thousand dollars.

Nearly every convenience of a technological society represents a possible point of vulnerability. Several times, Palestinian terrorists have been caught with surface-to-air missiles and rocket-propelled grenades—twice while attempting to shoot down airliners. These small, light weapons can be dismantled and carried in a suitcase. It would require no great skill to hit one of the enormous natural-gas storage tanks near Kennedy Airport with such a weapon. Many people on the East Coast saw what the explosion of one gasoline storage tank was like when it burned in New Jersey for a full week last January. The explosion of a natural-gas storage tank would make that seem trivial by comparison.

More subtle attacks on high-technology targets would require few men and only a little knowledge, most of it readily available. The air-traffic-control system is a prime target. Minor interruptions in service due to malfunction have frequently resulted in near disaster. A concerted effort to disable the system could be devastating.

Another point of vulnerability is the computer. In a society in which the most valuable information is stored as tiny electrical charges on bits of magnetic material, a small (if sophisticated) effort would be required to bring about complete disruption of business. The erasure of records at

a major bank or investment firm (or, say, the IRS) would be sufficient to jeopardize public confidence in all computer information. It could be done without breaking into the building, by using equipment that would fit into a truck parked outside. To describe the construction of that equipment would be irresponsible, for while it is true that some computers are now shielded against such dangers, the vast majority are not.

In the view of counterterrorists, then, the United States is like an exquisitely constructed glass house. A stone thrown by a child could put a noticeable hole in it. A few stones thrown by clever enemies could bring it crashing to the ground. And neither the atom bomb nor the largest standing army in the West would be of any use in preventing the destruction.

But that's just half the worry. What about terrorists using high technology *against* the U.S.? For example, cobalt 60 is a commonly available radioactive isotope used in cancer therapy. It is, in Kupperman's words, "a nasty gamma emitter." What if someone sprinkled it throughout an abandoned building in lower Manhattan and then alerted the authorities? The area would be sealed off. A massive cleanup effort, worth far more than the building itself, might help. Most likely, the area would be uninhabitable for years.

"But what," Kupperman asks, "would the authorities do when a message arrived threatening to do the same thing to a large high-rise office building? It would be impossible to search everyone entering every building in Manhattan. It would be equally impossible to install Geiger counters at every entrance to every building. The fact is, no one wants to think about it, because no one knows what to do."

The question of biological warfare in the hands of terrorists is a delicate one. One senior fellow at C.S.I.S. warned us not even to mention it. It is too hot, too risky. But Kupperman and others feel that if we "keep our heads in the sand" for too long, we are just asking for trouble. Given the evidence that intelligence services have already compiled to show that terrorists have attempted biological warfare, the matter is more or less academic now. Biological warfare is a possibility.

"Suppose," Kupperman says, "that one day, the FBI gets a call that there is a package they should pick up at an address in Harlem. Suppose they pick up this package and inside is a sealed glass container, and inside it are two dead rats infested with fleas. Suppose, further, that these are taken to a lab and are found to be infected with bubonic plague. What do you do?" In the 14th Century, plague killed three fourths of the population of Europe and Asia.

"Or let's make it simpler," Kupperman says. "Suppose the FBI receives a tiny phial with anthrax spores in it and a note demanding that the United States begin

immediately to use all its powers to create a Palestinian homeland."

Along with that is a plan to run a small boat up the Mississippi from Memphis to Cairo, Illinois, with a high-powered air compressor pumping anthrax spores into the atmosphere during the entire 200-mile trip. Pulmonary anthrax runs its course in a day or two. The onset is like that of a common cold. During the crucial early hours when treatment might help, no one would even report such symptoms. After that, the mortality rate nears 100 percent. Depending on which way the wind is blowing at the time the boat passes, the death toll could reach into the hundreds of thousands.

There is an island off the coast of Scotland called Gruinard, where the British conducted anthrax experiments during World War Two. It is now uninhabited. Scientists went there in 1966 to measure concentrations of anthrax spores. When they returned, they reported that the island would remain uninhabitable for at least another century.

"Now imagine that you are President of the United States," Kupperman says. "What would you do?"

I asked whether such things could take place without the public's finding out—whether, say, President Reagan could already have been blackmailed by the P.L.O. in some way. The only thing the public would see would be subtle shifts in foreign policy, such as a shift from favoring Israel to favoring the creation of a Palestinian homeland.

"I don't think it's happened, no," says Kupperman. "But primarily, that's because I think it would leak. If it happened, word would get out. I also don't think the terrorists are politically that sophisticated yet. But it could be done, yes."

As one colleague says of him, "If Kupperman were a terrorist, he'd bring Western civilization to its knees within a week." And there are thousands of qualified scientists out there who could conceivably do the same.

In light of the fact that even a single person bent on wreaking havoc could do so, the question of what we are prepared to do—or are even capable of doing—about it remains. Such questions as whether or not the Soviet Union is directing worldwide terrorism fall away when the practical considerations are brought forth. What, indeed, would the President do?

The war games have been an attempt to answer those questions. But is anyone listening to the answers?

In July 1979, there was an international conference on terrorism in Israel. At the end of the conference, a war game was played. Each government had its own team. The line-up was formidable. Israeli experts played a group of Palestinian terrorists who hijacked a jetliner to Iran. Once the airliner arrived, the Ayatollah

Khomeini held the American passengers hostage. He wouldn't give an inch. Neither would the terrorists. Former Israeli intelligence chief Aharon Yariv wouldn't budge, either. U.S. Ambassador Anthony Quainton, former head of the State Department's Office for Combating Terrorism, wanted to continue negotiating, while American military experts wanted to attempt an Entebbe-style rescue operation. The game ended with American hostages still held in Iran, and everyone returned to real life. Less than three months later, the U.S. embassy in Iran was actually taken over. The Ayatollah refused to free the hostages.

What happened? Why didn't the rehearsal pay off? The answer lies, in part, in the history of U.S. attempts to cope with terrorism. In response to the Palestinian-terrorist attack that left 11 Israeli athletes dead at the 1972 Olympic Games, Henry Kissinger formed the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (C.C.C.T.). Composed of about a dozen people at the Cabinet level, it was supposed to formulate United States policy and design a strategy for coping with future incidents. The C.C.C.T.'s history is a simple one: It held one meeting.

At that meeting, it was decided to delegate the problem. A working group was formed. The C.C.C.T. Working Group (C.C.C.T.W.G.) met perhaps 100 times. It is axiomatic in government that a committee's importance diminishes with the passage of time, no matter what its business. At first, assistant secretaries and undersecretaries attended the meetings. After a while, however, no one above the rank of colonel was showing up. Moreover, some two dozen departments and agencies were represented within the C.C.C.T.W.G. The meetings were usually 75 or 100 people strong. Not only were there too many people in one room to get anything done but the various representatives wouldn't talk with one another. The issues were too sensitive. A lot of information was classified, and no one was sure who could (or should) know what. The FBI, for example, steadfastly insisted that it had the terrorist problem solved.

By 1974, it had become obvious that the C.C.C.T.W.G. wouldn't work. The Executive Group was formed. This was a pared-down version of the working group that wouldn't work, with representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury; the Joint Chiefs; the FAA; the CIA; the Department of Energy; and the National Security Council. While the Executive Group did involve itself in planning for terrorist threats, it limited that planning to those situations it was sure could be handled. The members didn't want to think about more difficult problems that might arise. As Kupperman puts it, "They can solve all the problems that will go away on their own. The trickier ones, such as an attack on the electri-

cal power grid or the use of germ warfare, they wouldn't touch."

Virtually the same group, consisting of the same key people (mostly at the three-star-general level), exists today.

In spite of all the bureaucratic confusion, however, the United States does have a plan of sorts for coping with terrorism. It involves what is called the lead-agency concept. If the incident occurs on U.S. soil, the Justice Department (FBI) will take the lead. If the incident takes place abroad, the State Department will take charge. When Carter came to power, he issued Presidential Review Memo (PRM)-30, which stated four things: (1) The U.S. would never give in to a terrorist demand. (2) The lead-agency concept was to be followed. (3) The National Security Council would coordinate Justice and State during a terrorist incident. (4) The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Centers for Disease Control would have responsibility for "cleaning up" after any terrorist incident that took on the proportions of a national emergency (e.g., the blackout of New York or the contamination of the San Francisco subway system with anthrax). Since Carter issued PRM-30, it is difficult to say that its major directions have been followed; no matter how good a document is, it is going to be violated in time of crisis. And there is serious question as to whether or not FEMA can handle any emergency of this magnitude.

FEMA is a composite agency, drawing from the Office of Preparedness, the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, Civil Defense and half a dozen other offices. It is the same agency that is now well known for thinking up the scheme to provide everyone with change-of-address forms after a nuclear war. The strategy of this and all other agencies involved in contemplating terrorism is one of hiding behind a screen of secrecy and then hoping that whatever happens is either small enough to handle or so enormous that no one can be blamed for failing to cope with it.

Perhaps the most important thing to know about this complex mechanism for responding to terrorism is that it was in place when the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was captured. Although it was supposedly ready to swing into action the moment the incident occurred, the entire U.S. apparatus to cope with terrorism was ignored during the Iranian crisis. *Ad hoc* committees were hastily thrown together to come up with solutions to the problem, with widely publicized and tragic results. That, in short, is precisely what would happen today if another major terrorist incident occurred. It may be worse now than under the Carter Administration, because Reagan's failure to prove the Soviet connection has forced him into the position of quietly dropping the ball in favor of some other more manageable public-relations

tool. Terrorism, it seems, is just too hot to handle.

For the counterterrorists, however, the problem is too hot not to handle. And whether or not you take the point of view that terrorism in the U.S. is imminent, the most difficult part of dealing with it or preparing to deal with it is going to be avoiding the appearance of a police state. Because terrorism is such a complex and subtle weapon, our reaction to it must be carefully thought out. Overnight solutions make nice politics but little else.

As Clifford has written: "Thus did Pisistratus appear in the market place with wounds that he claimed had been inflicted in a murder attack by rival factions; he asked for and received, thereby, a vote of confidence giving him a bodyguard of citizens. Since a bodyguard has no predetermined size and there were no other forces to control its growth, Pisistratus was able to expand the force into a personal army to repress the citizens of Athens. And his method was copied not only by Dionysius of Syracuse but also by a number of modern dictators from Hitler to Idi Amin and from Lenin to the late 'Papa Doc' Duvalier."

In December 1982, a 66-year-old Miami man drove his van up to the Washington Monument and got out wearing a snowmobile suit and a helmet. He refused to speak with police but did tell a reporter that the truck was loaded with high explosives and that he would blow up the monument if something weren't done about nuclear-arms control. Meanwhile, nine people were inside the monument, afraid to come out. The situation dragged on through the afternoon and into the night. The "hostages" walked away without interference from the "terrorist." At some point, the man decided to move his truck, and the police opened fire, killing him.

Reflecting on the situation, a well-known expert on hostage negotiations says that there was no communication between the man and a police negotiator—none of the human transference of feelings that usually takes place. "For that reason, and the basic belief that they had to make an object lesson out of the situation, there was a lot of *macho*, a lot of hysteria involved. Most of us suspected that he had no explosives anyway. And even if he had them, there was no risk to anyone. The police could have surrounded the van with buses, for example. Even if he had set off explosives, that would have contained the blast. If he didn't set them off, they could have shot out his tires and waited him out. And, of course, he had no explosives. But the park police couldn't stand the embarrassment, so they killed this 66-year-old man."

If terrorists were watching and were pleased when President Gemayel stayed at the Madison Hotel in Washington, they would have been delighted to see U.S. authorities, just blocks from the White House, slaughtering an old man in a snow-

mobile suit while the President moved his dinner guests to the other side of the mansion so as not to be disturbed by the gunfire.

The point is, there are times when we can afford to be humane. There are times, in fact, when to avoid the appearance of a

police state we are *obligated* to act humanely. Here there was no question of national sovereignty involved. Nothing was at stake. To take a life was to play the very role real terrorists would prefer the U.S. to play: the imperialist ogre lashing out.

And that, finally, may be the most difficult challenge a democratic nation faces from the terrorist threat: to be alert enough to see terrorism where it exists—but wise enough to resist seeing it where it does not.

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